HOME DISINFORMATION PEOPLE RAMBAM KLAUSNER DUNN KUHL DUKES L.A. JUSTICE   FEDEX: KURTZ LASC APPEAL SUPREME


This Internet version of the Appellant's Opening Brief filed 11-Aug-2003 differs from the original primarily by its providing links instead of pagination, and navigation bars, and by having corrected a number of small errors and inadequacies.  The 272-page Appellant Appendix with its 49 exhibits which was separately bound and which accompanied this Appellant's Opening Brief is, of course, not available online, though its table of contents is shown at the bottom of the present page; links to those Appendix exhibits which have already been posted on UKAR will be inserted throughout this Brief a few at a time as resources permit.

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In propria persona
Lubomyr PRYTULAK
[Address]
[Telephone]

COURT OF APPEAL — STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND DISTRICT






LUBOMYR PRYTULAK
      Petitioner

      — v —

THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY
      Respondent

STEVEN RAMBAM
(aka STEVEN ROMBOM),
      Real Party in Interest





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APPELLANT
OPENING
BRIEF


Court of Appeal Case No. B166388

Los Angeles Superior Court
Rambam v Prytulak
Case No. BC271433
Hon. James R. Dunn

Petition for Writ of Mandate to compel the Respondent Los Angeles Superior Court to quash service of process on the ground of lack of in personam jurisdiction

[CCP §§ 1085(a), 1087]

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

  1. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES   @
  2. CHRONOLOGY   @
  3. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS   @
    1. Record on Appeal   @
    2. Notation   @
  4. THE GIST   @
  5. BACKGROUND   @
    1. Chilling a Valid Exercise   @
    2. The Rambam Prosecution Was Frivolous   @
    3. The First Rambam Law Suit was Disorderly and was Abandoned   @
    4. Prytulak Submits His Timely Motion-to-Quash-A   @
    5. The Impermissibility of Overlapping Cases   @
    6. Prytulak's Timely Motion-to-Quash-A Should Have Been Saved   @
    7. The Nightmare of Rambam v Prytulak BC271433   @
  6. THE ISSUES   @
    1. Five Answers to the Objection of Untimeliness   @
      1. Motion-to-Quash-A was timely and should have been saved   @
      2. Motion-to-Quash-B should not have been spoliated because untimely: Untimely pleading is not a nulling and precludes default unless stricken   @
      3. Motions-to-Quash B, C, and D should not have been spoliated for their untimeliness: Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time   @
      4. Motions-to-Quash C and D should not have been spoliated for their untimeliness — they should have had their time to plead extended   @
      5. Neither untimeliness nor default entry waives personal jurisdiction   @
    2. Four Answers to the Objection of Informality   @
      1. Prytulak Motions-to-Quash should not have been spoliated because of their informality — They should have been regarded as Amicus Curiae suggestions   @
      2. Clerks lack authority to determine the sufficiency of a submission   @
      3. Informality should have elicited clerical feedback   @
      4. Informality should not detract from the force of a submission unless prejudicial   @
    3. The Interval Between Default Entry And Default Judgment Is Not Inviolate to Jurisdictional Challenge   @
      1. Is the defaulting defendant "out of court" or not?   @
      2. Legislative and judicial intent   @
      3. The CCP offers the Inviolate-Interval Theory no support   @
      4. Vacating default for want of jurisdiction becomes forever impossible   @
      5. Efficiency   @
      6. Devlin v Kearny Mesa does not support the Inviolate-Interval Theory   @
    4. Rambam-LASC Were Wrong to Demand that Prytulak Rely on CCP §473(b)   @
    5. The Los Angeles Superior Court Demonstrates a Flawed Understanding of Jurisdiction   @
      1. The error of thinking that a court is allowed to evaluate its own jurisdiction only in response to a formal motion   @
      2. The error of thinking that a court is able to proceed through a trial all the way to judgment without ever deciding the question of its own jurisdiction   @
      3. The error of thinking that the trial court is under no obligation to preempt the anticipated decision of a reviewing or an enforcing court   @
  7. PREJUDICE OF THE LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT   @
    1. The LASC Spoliated Submissions That Supported Prytulak   @
    2. The LASC Spoliated Two Prytulak Money Orders   @
    3. The LASC Denied Prytulak Customary and Obligatory Clerical Feedback   @
    4. The LASC Blocked Prytulak Access to Documents   @
      1. One-page Order to Show Cause in 02E00326   @
      2. Three-page Minute Order of 25-Nov-2002   @
      3. LASC acknowledges request for Reporter's Transcript   @
      4. One-page Default Judgment   @
      5. Rambam Book of Exhibits of 03-Oct-2002   @
  8. VERIFICATION   @
  9. PRAYER   @

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I.  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
State Cases

Statutes

CCP §403.010-403.090 and especially 403.020 and 403.070   @
CCP §418.10(a)(1)   @ @ @ @ @
CCP §418.10(d)   @
CCP §422.10   @
CCP §425.16(a)   @
CCP §430.10(c)   @
CCP §435(a)(2)   @
CCP §473(b)   @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @
CCP §473(d)   @
CCP §475   @
CCP §585(b)   @
CCP §1085(a) and 1087   @
CRC §7.3(f)   @
CRC §201   @ @

Encyclopedias

20 Am Jur 2d § 60 (1995)   @
21 CJS Courts § 88 (1990)   @ @ @ @

Maxims of Jurisprudence
No. 3539   @

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II.  CHRONOLOGY
Date Case 02E00326 is on GRAY, and Case BC271433 is on WHITE AA
09-Jan-2002 Complaint filed 02
09-Mar-2002 Rambam summons served on Prytulak  
04-Apr-2002 Complaint filed 04
08-Apr-2002 Motion-to-Quash-A delivered to LASC (03/08-Apr-2002) 03
15-Apr-2002 Rambam Summons served on Prytulak  
15-May-2002 Prytulak Answer required  
21-May-2002 Defective Rambam Request for Default Entry (delivered to Prytulak 27-May-2002) 05
24-May-2002 Erroneous date to which 15-Aug-2002 Minute Order moves the Default Entry of 24-Jun-2002  
29-May-2002 Prytulak Motion-to-Quash-B (27/29-May-2002) 06
07-Jun-2002 Order to Show Cause (delivered to Prytulak 15-Oct-2002) 07
17-Jun-2002 Prytulak-Query-A (12/17-Jun-2002, cc to Rambam) 08
17-Jun-2002 Prytulak-Query-B delivered to LASC by FedEx (14/17-Jun-2002, cc to Rambam) 09
24-Jun-2002 Dismissed without prejudice  
24-Jun-2002 Default Entry  
14-Aug-2002 Prytulak mails first request for copy of Order to Show Cause 11
19-Aug-2002 Minute Order justifying spoliation of Motion-to-Quash-B served on Prytulak 12
30-Aug-2002 Motion-to-Quash-C delivered to LASC with filing fee and proof of service (29/30-Aug-2002) 14
09-Sep-2002 Rambam-Objection-C (03/09-Sep-2002, discussing Motion-to-Quash-C) 15
09-Sep-2002 Prytulak to Clarke: What happened to my Motion-to-Quash-C? 16
20-Sep-2002 Prytulak to Clarke: Court door slammed in my face 18
25-Sep-2002 Katina tells Prytulak he must remove jurisdictional challenge to get his motion filed  
26-Sep-2002 Motion-to-Quash-D delivered to LASC with filing fee and proof of service (25/26-Sep-2002) 19
03-Oct-2002 Rambam files copy of Book of Exhibits  
04-Oct-2002 Prytulak to Winston: The saga of the 57-cent photocopy (30-Sep/01-Oct-2002) 20
15-Oct-2002 Copy of 07-Jun-2002 Order to Show Cause delivered to Prytulak  
07-Nov-2002 Prytulak-Reply-D3 (05/07-Nov-2002) 23
22-Nov-2002 Prytulak-Reply-D7 (21/22-Nov-2002) 26
20-Mar-2003 Default Judgment 40
01-Apr-2003 Prytulak Notice of Appeal (01/02-Apr-2003) 42
08-Apr-2003 LASC files Register of Actions (delivered to Prytulak 14-Apr-2003) 43
10-Apr-2003 Prytulak mails LASC first request for 03-Oct-2002 Book of Exhibits  
16-Apr-2003 Prytulak Notice of Appeal lodged with Court of Appeal  
28-Apr-2003 First Court of Appeal deadline to submit copy of Default Judgment  
13-May-2003 Prytulak agent gets copy of Default Judgment from LASC  
14-May-2003 Prytulak receives copy of Default Judgment from his agent in time for next-day filing  
15-May-2003 Prytulak files Civil Case Information Statement with copy of Default Judgment  
16-May-2003 Second Court of Appeal deadline to submit copy of Default Judgment  
20-May-2003 Default Judgment delivered to Prytulak with 25-Mar-2003 Minute Order
announcing 8/10 key suppressed documents are intact
 
09-Jul-2003 Kurtz delivers copy of 03-Oct-2002 Book of Exhibits to Prytulak  
Legend: AA=Appellant's Appendix;  dates left of slash are on face of document, right of slash are dates of service or delivery.

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III.  PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
A.  Record on Appeal
Petitioner Lubomyr Prytulak elected to proceed by appendix because as far as his best efforts had been able to discover, all but one of his submissions and letters to the Los Angeles Superior Court ("LASC") had been spoliated — which is to say, suppressed or destroyed — as is recounted below under the heading The LASC Spoliated Submissions That Supported Prytulak.  As at the outset of litigation Prytulak had not anticipated having to proceed by appendix, he often kept only computer-file copies of his submissions, not recognizing that these were inferior for legal purposes because upon any subsequent printing of a document, font or margin sizes might be reset within printing instructions, yielding somewhat different pagination, and because signatures were lost.

B.  Notation
In the instant Brief, a document being assigned the date 07/12-Mar-2002 means that the date on the face of the document is 07 March 2002, and its delivery to, or service on, recipient is 12 March 2002.  Also, [AA04 142] means Appellant Appendix at tab 04, page 142, and where [AA04 142:06-08] particularly directs attention to lines 6 through 8.

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IV.  THE GIST
Petitioner Lubomyr Prytulak, citizen and resident of Canada, whose jurisdictional ties to California are non-existent, asks the Court of Appeal (the "Court") to issue a Writ of Mandate
(CCP §1085(a)), either peremptory or alternative (CCP §1087) as the Court deems just, to compel the Los Angeles Superior Court ("LASC") to quash service of process in Rambam v Prytulak, Case No. BC271433, on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction under the precedent of Jewish Defense Organization v Superior Court ("JDO v Superior Court" or "JDO," 72 CalApp4th 1045 (California 1999)).

Petitioner Prytulak assertions of his lack of jurisdictional ties to California have been presented to the LASC in Motion-to-Quash-A (03/08-Apr-2002 [AA03
010-011]), Motion-to-Quash-B (27/29-May-2002, [AA06 023]), Motion-to-Quash-C (29/30-Aug-2002, [AA14 046 and 049-053 and with declaration at 059-060]), and Motion-to-Quash-D (25/26-Sep-2002, [AA19 085-089 and with declaration at 095-097]).  Furthermore, Prytulak describes Rambam lack of jurisdictional ties to California within the same four Motions-to-Quash as above (respectively at [AA03 011], [AA06 023-024], [AA14 045-046], and [AA19 081]), and also in particular detail under the heading Steven Rambam Lacks Substantial, Continuous, and Systematic Ties to California in Prytulak-Reply-D7 (21/22-Nov-2002) [AA26 178-180].

At no time during LASC proceedings were Prytulak facts denying both Prytulak and Rambam ties to California disputed.  At no time were contrary facts proven or declared or alleged.  At no time did Prytulak either explicitly submit to jurisdiction or make a general appearance, and at no time did the LASC perceive Prytulak as having explicitly submitted to jurisdiction or as having made a general appearance.  Rather, the LASC abused its discretion by perceiving itself as never having evaluated its personal jurisdiction over Prytulak because never having been obligated to, as documented below under the heading The Los Angeles Superior Court Demonstrates a Flawed Understanding of Jurisdiction, the LASC arriving at this view unmindful of the clashing view that "The court necessarily decides that it has jurisdiction by proceeding in the cause" (21 CJS Courts § 88, 1990) and that "A court by moving in a cause assumes authority, but the assumption does not confer it" (Abelleira v District Court of Appeal 17 Cal2d 280 at 304 (California 1941)).

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V.  BACKGROUND
A.  Chilling a Valid Exercise
The two Rambam v Prytulak law suits 02E00326 and BC271433 fall squarely into a category of which the California Legislature disapproves:

CCP §425.16.  (a) The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.  The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process.

That is, LASC Plaintiff Steven Rambam (who today litigates in New York under the name Steven Rombom) is a public figure who in February 1997 promulgated his views in front of 30 million viewers on 60 Minutes, and a few months later in front of 24 million viewers on the PBS show The Editors, and who has been quoted in scores of newspaper reports of which Prytulak has copies.  Rambam first came to Prytulak attention upon publicizing that he had tape-recorded confessions of Nazi war criminality from some fifty Canadians, which claim Prytulak challenged, and which claim today appears to have been discredited by critics and all but abandoned by its authors, thus justifying Prytulak's original impression that in fact Rambam had tape-recorded zero confessions, and that his project deserved the title of Fifty-Confessions Hoax.  Neither of Rambam's two complaints against Prytulak, however, cited the exceedingly damaging Prytulak accusation that Rambam's Nazi-hunting credentials were based on a hoax, but rather preferred to deflect attention to allegations concerning Rambam's youth that had been in wide circulation, and that Prytulak had quoted by way of demonstrating Rambam's bad reputation, but that were too ancient and too irrelevant to his contemporary job performance to be capable of damaging his career.  Thus, Rambam placed himself in a position resembling one who, accused of being a serial killer and of not paying his parking tickets, sues for defamation on the ground that he does pay his parking tickets; and worse than that, knowing that he can't win even on the parking tickets question, sues in a jurisdiction to which neither he nor his accuser have jurisdictional ties.

Partly as a result of Rambam's Fifty-Confessions Hoax, together with its accompanying propaganda derogating Canada for giving sanctuary to countless Nazi war criminals and thus deserving to be called the "Argentina of the North," the Canadian government came under pressure to prosecute its Nazi war criminals, but being unable to find any, satisfied Rambam-led criticism by prosecuting aging immigrants, disproportionately Ukrainian, who as teenagers more than a half-century ago had been conscripted into German armed forces, typically under extreme duress and sometimes at gunpoint, and against whom no crimes were alleged, but who may be conjectured to have committed the immigration infraction of not disclosing their German military service upon applying for entry into Canada after WW II, though evidence as to whether they had ever been asked this question, or whether they had answered it untruthfully, was shrouded in the mists of time, and was replaced by their denial, and the prosecution's affirmation, that they had.  The predictable effect of Rambam's work, then, has been the besmirching of Canada, the ruining of innocent lives, and the stirring up of inter-ethnic and inter-religious animosity.  This is the accusation brought by Prytulak that is harmful to Rambam's career, and this is the accusation that Rambam wishes to suppress through his California litigation.
B.  The Rambam Prosecution Was Frivolous
Soon after being served with the complaint ("Rambam-Complaint-A") in the limited-jurisdiction Rambam v Prytulak 02E00326 [AA02], Defendant Prytulak located on the Internet a copy of
JDO v Superior Court, and there learned that the same Plaintiff (Steven Rambam) represented by the same lawyer (Gary Kurtz) complaining of the publication of similar allegedly defamatory material (originating with the Jewish Defense Organization) over the same medium (a passive, non-commercial Internet site) had already been told that California declined to exercise jurisdiction over New Yorker Mordechai Levy whose ties to California were stronger and more recent than were Canadian Lubomyr Prytulak's.  The single enormous and glaring difference between Rambam's earlier prosecution of Mordechai Levy and his later prosecution of Lubomyr Prytulak, of course, was that the former suit did not have the looming presence of widely-cited JDO v Superior Court to contraindicate it, whereas the latter did.  Prytulak could not then, and still cannot now, see any justification for Rambam bringing a weaker law suit than one he had just lost, and for that reason alone — though other reasons have emerged since — from the outset viewed the Rambam suit as groundless, meritless, frivolous, vexatious, bad-faith, and sham.
C.  The First Rambam Law Suit Was Slapdash And Was Abandoned
The Rambam v Prytulak 02E00326 Complaint-A [AA02] was delivered to Prytulak with pages 1 and 3 missing if one goes by pagination typed on the upper-right, in the format "PAGE 02" (and with pages 1, 2, and 4 missing if one goes by pagination appearing still higher on the page, possibly printed by a fax machine, in the format "3/18").  When Prytulak objected to the missing pages in his timely Motion-to-Quash-A, stating "Lubomyr Prytulak fears that these pages may have contained essential procedural instructions which are being denied him" [AA03
010], and in his subsequent Prytulak-Query-A, stating "I have not as yet been served with a complete version" [AA08 029], no corrected complaint was ever served, indicating to Prytulak that the Rambam suit had been abandoned, and reinforcing Prytulak's impression that Rambam's motivation was to harass, but with no hope of prevailing on the law spurring him to serious effort.
D.  Prytulak Submits His Timely Motion-to-Quash-A
It is within this context that Prytulak hoped that little more than bringing
JDO to the attention of the LASC would be needed for the LASC to start by questioning its own jurisdiction, and to end by quashing service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction, with which hope Prytulak submitted his timely Motion-to-Quash-A [AA03], bound together with a copy of JDO (as have been all four Prytulak Motions-to-Quash A through D), although in the case of Motion-to-Quash-A unaccompanied by either filing fee or service on Rambam, Prytulak at the time being totally in the dark as to what California requirements were, and learning only gradually that many of these requirements were posted on the Internet.  Prytulak expected for his Motion-to-Quash-A either of two fates: (1) that it would elicit clerical feedback which would permit Prytulak to upgrade it into a proper motion to quash, or (2) that it would be regarded as a suggestion sufficient to prompt the LASC into a sua sponte evaluation of its personal jurisdiction.  That was the initial Prytulak expectation, though at the time it was couched in less formal language, as Prytulak has no training in law and at the time had no exposure to litigation — a qualification that applies equally to other descriptions of Prytulak thinking in the initial stages of litigation; which is to say, Prytulak early thinking is expressed throughout the instant Brief in language acquired later.

As no clerical feedback identifying defects in Motion-to-Quash-A [AA03] was forthcoming, and as the LASC did acknowledge receipt of the motion by means of its online entry CORRESPONDENCE FROM LUBOMYR PRYTULAK FILED [AA01], Prytulak hoped that Motion-to-Quash-A was successfully playing the latter role of a suggestion prompting sua sponte evaluation of jurisdiction, and imagined that the Rambam abandonment of the case had been caused by Prytulak's challenging jurisdiction in that Motion-to-Quash-A, and by his having brought the highly pertinent JDO v Superior Court to LASC attention.
E.  The Impermissibility of Overlapping Cases
Such hopes were dashed, however, upon Prytulak's next receiving a summons for the general-jurisdiction Rambam v Prytulak BC271433, which elicited both astonishment and incredulity.  While the original limited-jurisdiction Rambam v Prytulak 02E00326 was still pending, filing the general-jurisdiction BC271433 seemed impermissible both for its exposing Prytulak to double jeopardy, and for its exposing the LASC to the potential embarrassment of conflicting judgments.  Had Prytulak opted to submit to LASC jurisdiction, which he did not, then one of his options would have been to object to this overlap:

CCP §430.10.  The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer [...] to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:
[...]
       (c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.

In part to prod the LASC to resolve the incongruity of overlapping cases, Prytulak wrote his Prytulak-Query-A [
AA08] regarding 02E00326 and his Prytulak-Query-B [AA09] regarding BC271433 which contained the following respective complaints:

The allegedly defamatory material which is the subject of Case No. 02E00326 is, along with a second instance of such material, the subject of another Steven Rambam law suit against me which is before the California Superior Court, Case No. BC271433, filed 04-Apr-2002. Given this overlap, I wonder if propriety did not require 02E00326 to be withdrawn when BC271433 was initiated.
•  Prytulak-Query-A regarding 02E00326 (12/17-Jun-2002)  [AA08 029]

IS THE COURT GOING TO ALLOW REDUNDANT SUITS?
I am astonished that Steven Rambam is permitted to complain in his Case No. 02E00326 (filed on 09-Jan-2002, and still pending) of alleged defamation contained in a certain public document, and then to complain in his Case No. BC271433 (filed 04-Apr-2002, and still pending) of alleged defamation contained in exactly this same document plus one other.  I look forward next to Steven Rambam initiating a third law suit, before a third judge, which complains of the first two documents plus one other.
•  Prytulak-Query-B regarding BC271433 (14/17-Jun-2002)  [AA09 031]

As Prytulak received no reply to either of the above queries, he reasoned that if there did exist an overlap of cases, the LASC would express concern and take action, so that if the LASC expressed no concern and took no action, then it must mean that the overlap was only imaginary, the seemingly-new case BC271433 being in reality some sort of extension of the old case 02E00326, and which carried the implication that Prytulak's timely Motion-to-Quash-A [AA03] — bound with the potent JDO v Superior Court — had been saved and was doing its work halting the new general-jurisdiction case, just as he thought he had seen it halting the old limited-jurisdiction case.

After it became evident that the LASC had not saved Motion-to-Quash-A from the limited-jurisdiction 02E00326 to the general-jurisdiction BC271433, Prytulak suggested to the LASC in that Rambam had failed in his obligation to reclassify his earlier suit under CCP §403.010-403.090, and more specifically under:

CCP §403.020.  (a) If a plaintiff [...] files an amended complaint or other amended initial pleading that changes the jurisdictional classification from limited to unlimited, the party at the time of filing the pleading shall pay the reclassification fee provided in Section 403.060, and the clerk shall promptly reclassify the case.

If Rambam had proceeded by means of a motion to reclassify as above, then the commencement of the reclassified action would have been the same as that of the original action, and Prytulak's timely Motion-to-Quash-A [
AA03] in the earlier case would have been saved (thus keeping open the possibility of either its defects being corrected, or of its prompting the LASC to evaluate jurisdiction on its own motion):

CCP §403.070.  (a) An action or proceeding that is reclassified shall be deemed to have been commenced at the time the complaint or petition was initially filed, not at the time of reclassification.
     (b) The court shall have and exercise over the reclassified action or proceeding the same authority as if the action or proceeding had been originally commenced as reclassified, all prior proceedings being saved.

Noting also that the two Rambam v Prytulak Cases 02E00326 and BC271433 were "related" according to the definitions in California Rules of Court (CRC) 7.3(f), and not just for one or some of the reasons 7.3(f)(1)(a-d) but for all four reasons, might have invoked Court Rule 7.3(f)(2) requiring Rambam to "file and serve upon all parties of record a Notice of Related Case(s)," which Rambam never did, and certainly not within the 15-day interval which Court Rule 7.3(f)(2)(a) allows, and which had he done might have accomplished the same desirable end of saving Prytulak's timely Motion-to-Quash-A [AA03].
F.  Prytulak's Timely Motion-to-Quash-A Should Have Been Saved
However, Rambam neither reclassified, nor filed a Notice of Related Cases, but instead permitted the two cases to overlap for 81 days from 04-Apr-2002 (BC271433 filed prematurely) to 24-Jun-2002 (02E00326 dismissed belatedly), and as a result of taking neither action Rambam was able to benefit from Prytulak Motion-to-Quash-A being lost.  Any Rambam or LASC assertion that the Prytulak challenge to jurisdiction was not timely, therefore, overlooks the fact that the Prytulak Motion-to-Quash-A was timely, and was improperly lost through Rambam failure to comply with provisions of the CCP and of the CRC.
G.  The nightmare of Rambam v Prytulak BC271433
To sum up in a few lines what is elaborated in detail below, throughout Rambam v Prytulak BC271433, the following transpired.  Prytulak was denied customary and obligatory clerical feedback.  All Prytulak submissions but one were spoliated — which is to say, suppressed or destroyed — with Prytulak being able to elicit no word as to their fate — not from clerical staff, not from Judge James R. Dunn, not from judges holding senior administrative positions, and not from the Commission on Judicial Performance.  The one Prytulak submission that the LASC did permit to be filed was under the LASC condition that Prytulak modify it in such a way as to open Prytulak up to the perception of making a general appearance — which pernicious condition Prytulak declined to meet, though getting his submission filed by making cosmetic changes in the demanded direction.  All Prytulak requests for copies of documents were blocked, even his request for a copy of the judgment in Rambam v Prytulak BC271433 without which Prytulak's appeal could not proceed, and which Prytulak acquired at the last moment by merest chance and against the prohibition of the LASC.  Upon verification, the bulk of legislation and precedent cited by both Rambam and LASC proved to be misinterpreted or misapplied.  Testing the limits of credibility — and of greatest relevance here — was that Prytulak's unremitting campaign to no more than direct LASC attention to the question of personal jurisdiction failed, and a Los Angeles judge awarded the property of a Canadian to a New Yorker while admitting that he, the judge, had not evaluated his own jurisdiction, which is to say while admitting that he had not the foggiest idea of whether his transfer of property had been conducted while he was clothed in, or while he was usurping, judicial authority.

Top Contents Authorities Chronology Preliminary Gist Background Issues Prejudice Verification Prayer Appendix Bottom

VI.  THE ISSUES
Rambam and the LASC had four objections to the four Prytulak Motions-to-Quash: they were untimely, they were informal, the interval between default entry and default judgment (during which the latter two Motions-to-Quash were submitted) is inviolate to jurisdictional challenge, and Prytulak had no choice but to rely on
CCP §473(b) as his first step.  These four Rambam-LASC objections will be treated below under the four headings:
A.  Five Answers to the Objection of Untimeliness
To the objection of untimeliness, five answers can be made:

  1. Motion-to-Quash-A was timely and should have been saved
  2. As has already been explained above, Prytulak's Motion-to-Quash-A [
    AA03] in the earlier limited-jurisdiction Rambam v Prytulak 02E00326 was timely, and would have been saved, and so the question of Prytulak timeliness in challenging jurisdiction would not have arisen, had Rambam properly reclassified the earlier limited-jurisdiction case into the later general-jurisdiction Rambam v Prytulak BC271433, and perhaps also if Rambam had properly filed a Notice of Related Cases.

  3. Motion-to-Quash-B should not have been spoliated because untimely: Untimely pleading is not a nullity, and precludes default unless stricken
  4. The chronology below reveals that Prytulak's Motion-to-Quash-B was required by the LASC 15-May-2002, was delivered to the LASC 29-May-2002, and was followed by default entry 24-Jun-2002, making Motion-to-Quash-B 14 days past time to answer, but nevertheless 26 days before default entry:

    DATE EVENT AA
    15-Apr-2002 Rambam Complaint served on Prytulak 04
    15-May-2002 Prytulak Answer required  
    29-May-2002 Prytulak Motion-to-Quash-B delivered to LASC by FedEx (dated 27-May-2002) 06
    17-Jun-2002 Prytulak-Query-B delivered to LASC by FedEx (dated 14-Jun-2002) 09
    24-Jun-2002 Default Entry  
    19-Aug-2002 Minute Order delivered to Prytulak justifying spoliation (dated 15-Aug-2002) 12

    A motion which arrives after time to answer but before default entry falls under the precedent of
    People v One 1986 Toyota Pickup, wherein is explained that being "out of court" begins not at the expiration of time to answer (which in that case had been some five and one-half months previously), but only upon default entry:

    No default had been entered against claimant prior to the date of the hearing, thus, his ability to file an answer, appear, or make some other motion was not cut off.  The court's failure to allow the claimant to appear and be heard absent an entry of default was an abuse of discretion.
    •  People v One 1986 Toyota Pickup ("Toyota"), 37 CalRptr2d 29 at 33 (California 1995)  Italic emphasis was in the original.

    Further affirming the rule that an untimely motion is not a nullity, and precludes default unless stricken, are the following:

    •  Bowers v Dickerson 18 Cal 420 at 421 (California 1861)
    •  Acock v Halsey 90 Cal 216, 27 P 193 at 194 (California 1891)
    •  Lunnun v Morris 95 P 907 at 909-910 (California 1908)
    •  Buck v Morrossis 114 CalApp2d 461 at 464-465 (California 1952)
    •  A & B Metal Products v MacArthur Properties, Inc 11 CalApp3d 642 at 647 (California 1970)
    •  Goddard v Pollock 37 CalApp3d 137 at 141 (California 1974)

    In view of the above precedents, the LASC was in error to spoliate Prytulak Motion-to-Quash-B on the ground, among others, that at the time of its submission Prytulak was "out of court," because Prytulak would not be "out of court" for 26 more days.

    As the 26 days between, on the one hand the LASC receiving Prytulak's Motion-to-Quash-B (27/29-May-2002, [
    AA06]), and on the other hand default entry (24-Jun-2002), allowed ample time for Prytulak to respond to clerical feedback by removing technical defects, the absence of all clerical feedback followed by Default Entry is error sufficient to justify the setting aside of the Default Entry, should such setting aside be deemed necessary or desirable.  The obligation of the LASC to provide clerical feedback was perhaps strengthened by delivery of Prytulak-Query-B (14/17-Jun-2002) to the LASC 7 days prior to Default Entry, in which Query Prytulak solicited feedback as to how his Motion-to-Quash-B might be made acceptable to the Court, saying among other things, "If my Motion to Quash is defective, I would appreciate being informed so that I can correct it, even as I see the plaintiff being informed when his submissions are defective" [AA09 030].  The account of Prytulak noticing Plaintiff being given clerical feedback can be found in Prytulak-Reply-C (13/16-Sep-2002) under the heading Defendant Prytulak Repeats His Request For Equal Treatment [AA17 069-070]However, the LASC's only explanation for ignoring Prytulak Motion-to-Quash-B, and for entering default, arrived embedded within the 15/19-Aug-2002 Minute Order [AA12], whose relevant paragraph reads as follows:

    The "Motion" was not accompanied by a filing fee [required per Government Code §§26830, 68090.7, 72055 ff.]. The payment of filing fees is both mandatory and jurisdictional. See Hu v. Silgan Containers (1999) 70 CA4th 1261. Thus, the Court was without jurisdiction to consider the motion. Even if the motion had been properly filed, it would have been taken off calendar, as Defendant's default had already been entered by the clerk on 5/24/02.
    •  Honorable James R. Dunn, Minute Order, 15/19-Aug-2002 (that is, dated the 15th and delivered to Prytulak on the 19th), [AA12
    041].  Material in square brackets was in the original.

    However, the LASC's above justification for ignoring Prytulak Motion-to-Quash-B was unsatisfactory for three reasons:
    1. The Minute Order places default entry at 24-May-2002, whereas in fact default entry took place one month later, on 24-Jun-2002 (as can be verified in [AA43 255]).  Thus, the Minute Order is incorrect to state that "Defendant's default had already been entered" at the time that Prytulak's Motion-to-Quash-B was delivered to the LASC.
    2. A reading of the LASC-cited Hu v Silgan Containers revealed that the court clerk had notified Hu by certified mail that her check had bounced, and had given her 20 days to make good her payment (Hu v Silgan Containers 83 Cal Rptr 2d, 333 at 333-334 (California 1999)), whereas Prytulak had not been given 20 days notice, or any notice, by certified mail or otherwise, to pay any fee, for which reason Hu v Silgan Containers fails to apply to the spoliation of Motion-to-Quash-B according to the principle that a case is not authority for issues not raised by its facts or considered: Ziller Electronics Lab GmbH v Los Angeles Superior Court 206 CalApp3d 1222 at 1230 (California 1988).
    3. The interval between the LASC receipt of Prytulak Motion-to-Quash-B (delivered to the LASC 29-May-2002) and Prytulak receipt of the LASC Minute Order (delivered to Prytulak 19-Aug-2002) was 82 days.  As this Minute Order was the first information from the LASC concerning defects in Motion-to-Quash-B, it arrived too late to play the role of feedback which might guide Prytulak to rectify his submission.

  5. Motions-to-Quash B, C, and D should not have been spoliated for their untimeliness: Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time
  6. Broad principles of jurisprudence dictate that a nullity can be vacated at any time, as for example
    California Maxim of Jurisprudence 3539, "Time does not confirm a void act," or the following Corpus Juris Secundum encapsulation in which appearance of the phrase "at any time" is pivotal:

    Every court has judicial power to hear and determine, or inquire into, the question of its own jurisdiction, both as to parties and as to subject matter, and to decide all questions, whether of law or fact, the decision of which is necessary to determine the question of jurisdiction.  The court necessarily decides that it has jurisdiction by proceeding in the cause.

    When at any time or in any manner it is represented to the court that it has not jurisdiction, the court should examine the grounds of its jurisdiction before proceeding further, the question of jurisdiction being always open for determination.
    •  21 CJS Courts § 88 (1990)

    It is perhaps superfluous to point out that "at any time" cannot conceivably mean "at any hour of the day," or "on any day of the week," or "in any month of the year."  "At any time" can have no meaning other than "without constraint by deadlines or time limits."  Any doubt that may remain on this question is banished by the definitive "the question of jurisdiction being always open for determination," where "always" appears to admit of no exceptions.

    Narrowing attention to California precedent discovers the principle that a judgment void on its face can be vacated by the court sua sponte and at any time, whereas a judgment not void on its face can be vacated only within a reasonable time:

    It is well settled that a judgment which is void upon its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment roll to show its invalidity, may be set aside on motion by the court rendering it at any time after its entry; and also that a judgment which is in fact void for want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but where its invalidity does not appear from the judgment roll, may be set aside upon motion within a reasonable time after its entry.
    •  People v Temple 37 P 414 at 415 (California 1894), citations removed.
    Similar statements can be found in:
    •  In re Eikerenkotter 58 P 370 at 370 (California 1899)
    •  Lake v Bonynge 118 P 535 at 537 (California 1911)
    •  Smith v Jones 163 P 890 at 891 (California 1917)
    •  Smith v Bratman 163 P 892 at 893 (California 1917)
    •  Vaughn v Pine Creek Tungsten Co 265 P 491 at 492 (California 1928)
    •  Richert v Benson Lumber Co 139 CalApp 671 at 675, 34 P2d 840 at 842 (California 1934)
    •  Batte v Bandy 165 CalApp2d 527 at 538 (California 1958)

    Furthermore, when facts establishing lack of jurisdiction are unopposed, the situation becomes equivalent to a judgment being void on its face:

    It is well settled in this state that a court has no power to set aside on motion a judgment or order not void on its face unless the motion is made within a reasonable time, and it has been definitely determined that such time will not extend beyond the limited time fixed by section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure as at present in force. However, to the rule just stated there is a well established exception which provides that although the judgment or order is valid on its face, if the party in favor of whom the judgment or order runs admits facts showing its invalidity, or, without objection on his part, evidence is admitted which clearly shows the existence of such facts, then it is the duty of the court to declare the judgment or order void.
    •  Thompson v Cook 20 Cal2d 564 at 569 (California 1942), citations removed.
    The same principle is upheld also in the following cases:
    •  Hill v City Cab & Transfer Co. 21 P 728 at 728 (California 1889)
    •  People v Harrison 40 P 956 at 957 (California 1895)
    •  Smith v Jones 163 P 890 at 891 (California 1917)

    Applying the above principles to Rambam v Prytulak leads to the recognition that lack of jurisdiction was evident on the face of Rambam v Prytulak from at least the following three considerations:
    1. Plaintiff Steven Rambam is a New Yorker and Defendant Lubomyr Prytulak is a Canadian.
    2. Although New Yorker Steven Rambam had been told just three years earlier in Jewish Defense Organization v Superior Court that the California Court of Appeal refused to assert jurisdiction over fellow New Yorker Mordechai Levy, Steven Rambam nevertheless launched a suit against Canadian Lubomyr Prytulak whose ties to California were even weaker than Mordechai Levy's had been.
    3. Prytulak presented facts by way of declaration in the course of Rambam v Prytulak which denied personal jurisdiction, without these facts encountering opposition from Rambam — specifically, facts denying Prytulak contacts with California that would establish either general or specific jurisdiction, and facts denying substantial Steven Rambam links to California, as has been detailed above in the second paragraph under the heading The Gist.
    That facts denying personal jurisdiction went unopposed in Rambam v Prytulak requires a single qualification — they went unopposed by contrary facts, or by allegations of contrary facts, although they did meet opposition upon a single occasion in the form of a sub-threshold grade of evidence — a Rambam allegation of an ability to allege:

    Plaintiff could, if necessary, respond to the jurisdictional arguments.  Plaintiff could, if necessary, outline his substantial ties to California.  Further, plaintiff could present arguments regarding defendant's claimed lack of contacts.  Plaintiff has refrained from those arguments because they are not presently relevant.
    •  Rambam-Objection-D2, 10/17-Oct-2002 [AA22
    110:05-10])

  7. Motions-to-Quash C and D should not have been spoliated for their untimeliness — they should have had their time to plead extended
  8. As argued in Prytulak Motions-to-Quash C and D, the four facts listed below put Prytulak off guard, led him astray, and lulled him into security and inaction sufficient to furnish the "good cause" that was needed to provide "further time" to quash service of summons under
    CCP §418.10(a)(1):

    CCP §418.10.  (a) A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes:
          (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.

    The four facts which furnish "good cause" for extending time, then, are:
    1. Rambam's careless and indifferent prosecution of the earlier Rambam v Prytulak 02E00326, which tested the patience of even the LASC [AA07 028], and its apparent abandonment, and its eventual dismissal, all of which has been recounted above under the heading Background, encouraged Prytulak to view the Rambam law suit as irresolute, and as fleeing any confrontation with JDO v Superior Court.
    2. Rambam's failure to reclassify 02E00326 into BC271433 resulted in the improper loss of Motion-to-Quash-A [AA03], which loss Prytulak did not suspect because he sensed that it would have been improper.
    3. Prytulak Motion-to-Quash-B [AA06] was submitted well before default entry, encouraging Prytulak to believe that it would block default entry, and that it would have ample time to prompt a sua sponte evaluation of jurisdiction.
    4. Failure of the LASC to notify Prytulak of submission defects in either Motion-to-Quash A or B initially encouraged Prytulak to believe not that the LASC was prejudiced against him and had implemented a policy of denying him all clerical feedback, but only that the LASC felt Prytulak's formal participation to be superfluous because it had become persuaded of its authority and its duty to evaluate its jurisdiction ex mero motu.
    In reply to Motion-to-Quash-D [AA19], both Rambam and the LASC ignored the Prytulak recitation of Rambam and LASC errors and defects as providing "good cause" for extending time to quash under CCP §418.10(a)(1), and instead set up a straw man whom they pictured as attempting ineffectually to set aside default based upon Prytulak "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" under CCP §473(b), as is elaborated below in the section titled Rambam-LASC Were Wrong to Demand that Prytulak Rely on CCP §473(b).

  9. Neither untimeliness nor default entry waives personal jurisdiction
  10. Rambam holds that untimeliness of a challenge to personal jurisdiction is a waiver:

    In addition, this Court cannot relieve defendant of his waiver of his jurisdictional challenges.  Personal jurisdiction challenges may be waived.  See Mansour v. Superior Court of Orange County, 38 Cal.App.4th 1750, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 191 (1995); Sanchez v. Superior Court, 203 Cal.App.3d 1391, 1397, 250 Cal.Rptr. 787 (1988); California Overseas Bank v. French American Banking Corp., 154 Cal.App.3d 179, 184, 201 Cal.Rptr. 400 (1984); Creed v. Shultz, 148 Cal.App.3d 733, 740, 196 Cal.Rptr. 252 (1983); Estate of Elftman, 160 Cal.App.2d 10, 12 (1958).  Failure to file a timely objection to personal jurisdiction is a waiver.  Schlyen v. Schlyen, 43 Cal.2d 361 (1954).  "Inherent powers" do not extend to allow a trial court to rewrite the law.
    Plaintiff's Opposition to Order to Show Cause , 07/14-Jan-2003 [AA31 200:28-201:07].  Bold emphasis is in the original.

    Although reading the initial string of five cases cited by Rambam above confirms that challenging in personam jurisdiction can indeed be waived, this does not help Rambam because in every case the waiving results not from untimeliness or from default entry, but from the defendant making a general appearance (which Prytulak never did, and which neither Rambam nor the LASC ever characterized him as having done).

    The sixth case cited by Rambam above, Schlyen v Schlyen, is pivotal because Rambam offers it as precedent for his conclusion (bold emphasis his) that "failure to file a timely objection to personal jurisdiction is a waiver."  Reading Schlyen v Schlyen, however, reveals that it does not deal with personal jurisdiction at all, and thus not with waiving personal jurisdiction, as has been elaborated under the heading Gary Kurtz Misrepresents Schlyen v Schlyen [AA33 220-221] in the 20-Jan-2003 letter to Judge James R. Dunn titled Three Documents Call For A Reply.

    Although none of the six cases cited by Rambam supports his proposition that failure to timely object to personal jurisdiction constitutes a waiver, cases can be found affirming the opposite; that is, according to the logic that default entry ("DEFAULT") is dependably preceded by untimeliness ("UNTIMELINESS"), such that if DEFAULT produces no waiver ("NO WAIVER"), then UNTIMELINESS must have produced NO WAIVER as well.  More succinctly, UNTIMELINESS-DEFAULT being considered as a single event, that event being followed by NO WAIVER implies that UNTIMELINESS or DEFAULT considered individually each produced NO WAIVER.

    [T]he entry of the default was not a step in acquiring jurisdiction, but an act of the court after jurisdiction had been acquired.
    •  Sichler v Look 29 P 220 at 222 (California 1892)

    The entry of the default is not a step in acquiring jurisdiction, but an act done after jurisdiction has been acquired by the court.  Sichler v. Look, 93 Cal. 608, 29 Pac. 220.
    •  Lunnun v Morris 95 P 907 at 909 (California 1908)

    Jo Anne next asserts that James has waived his right to raise the jurisdictional issue by failing timely to object.

    She first relies on Code of Civil Procedure sections 418.10, subdivision (a) and 430.80 which, she says, required James to raise the jurisdictional issue "... on or before the last day of his time to plead ...." (§ 418.10, subd. (a).)

    As we have concluded above, the service of process upon James gave the court no power over his person.  It follows that it could not require him to do any act nor could it deprive him of any weapon to protect his in personam rights.  To rule otherwise would require James to appear in California, something the jurisdictional rules already discussed exist to prevent.
    •  In re Marriage of Merideth 129 CalApp3d 356 at 362-363 (California 1982)

B.  Four Answers to the Objection of Informality
Both Rambam and the LASC have complained that Prytulak submissions were informal to the degree of constituting a sufficient justification for denying Prytulak Motion-to-Quash-D:

The Court notes that the moving party defendant's papers are not in compliance with California law: see, e.g., California Rules of Court (CRC) §§201 [re form of papers presented for filing], 311 [re general format and 313 [re Points & Authorities, contents, case citation, and page limitation].  On this basis, the motion is DENIED.
•  Honorable James R. Dunn, Minute Order, 25-Nov-2002.  Square-bracketed material is in the original.  [AA28
188].

To the objection of informality, four answers present themselves:

  1. Prytulak Motions-to-Quash should not have been spoliated because of their informality — They should have been regarded as Amicus Curiae suggestions
  2. If the LASC is under an obligation to evaluate its jurisdiction sua sponte, then it is not relieved of its obligation by a request for such evaluation appearing informally.  Such a request can be regarded as a suggestion which is unable to release a court from its duty to verify its jurisdiction by its happening to be written single-spaced on non-recycled paper and bound on the left instead of on the top (as is required by
    CRC §201 cited in the 25-Nov-2002 Minute Order just above as one of the bases for denying Motion-to-Quash-D).  In fact, as there appear to be no laws or precedents at all defining what is an acceptable amicus curiae brief, then such a brief can never be rejected on the ground of informality.  Adding italic emphasis to the CJS statement already quoted above reinforces the inability of informality to relieve the LASC of its obligation to evaluate its own jurisdiction: "When at any time or in any manner it is represented to the court that it has not jurisdiction, the court should examine the grounds of its jurisdiction before proceeding further, the question of jurisdiction being always open for determination" 21 CJS Courts § 88, 1990.  An accumulation of other precedents shows widespread agreement:

    If a court finds at any stage of the proceedings, that it is without jurisdiction, it is its duty to take proper notice of the defect, and stay, quash or dismiss the suit.  "This is necessary, to prevent the court from being forced into an act of usurpation, and compelled to give a void judgment.  * * *  So, ex necessitate, the court may, on plea, suggestion, motion, or ex mero motu, where the defect of jurisdiction is apparent, stop the proceeding."  Branch v. Houston, 44 N.C. 85.
    •  In re Davis' Custody 103 SE2d 503 at 506-507 (North Carolina 1958).  Citations omitted.
    The Branch v Houston "ex necessitate" statement above can be found widely quoted within North Carolina, and sometimes beyond:
    •  Henderson County v Smyth 5 SE2d 136 at 138 (North Carolina 1939)
    •  Burgess v Gibbs 137 SE2d 806 at 808 (North Carolina 1964)
    •  Morgan v Hays 426 P2d 647 at 650 (Arizona 1967)

    Lack of jurisdiction, however, may be raised at any time and not necessarily through the formality of a motion to erase, for the question, once raised, must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented.
    •  Carten v Carten 219 A2d 711 at 715 (Connecticut 1966)

  3. Clerks lack authority to determine the sufficiency of a submission
  4. If a submission is labelled "motion to quash," then the clerk is obligated to file it, lacking authority as he does to determine its sufficiency, either as to substance or form.  Also, once filed, such a motion blocks default entry:

    It is settled that the entry of default by the clerk is a ministerial duty and that he has no authority whatever to determine the sufficiency, either as to the substance or form, of a pleading on file. (Rose v. Lelande (1912) 20 Cal.App. 502, 503-504 [129 P. 599]; Bristol Convalescent Hosp. v. Stone (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 848, 862 [66 Cal.Rptr. 404].)  Here, the clerk was in possession of a pleading which, according to its label, was one specifically mentioned in section 585 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  Hence, he had no authority to enter defendants' default and properly refused to do so.

    When on October 6, 1971, defendants' default was entered by the clerk upon the order of the court, defendants' supporting declaration had been on file for several days.  Clearly, the motion to quash was then sufficient, since it reasonably apprised plaintiffs of the substance and basis of the motion. (Tarman v. Sherwin (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 49, 52 [10 Cal.Rptr. 787, 85 A.L.R.2d 989].)  Thus, the court erred in directing the clerk to enter defendants' default on October 6.
    Goddard v Pollock 37 CalApp3d 137 at 143 (California 1974)

    Prytulak's four Motions-to-Quash were all clearly labelled as motions to quash, and for that reason should have been filed, and not only as "correspondence" but as "motions to quash," and the two that preceded default entry (that is, Motions-to-Quash A and B) should have been recognized as blocking default entry as well (in the case of Motion-to-Quash-A, that is, upon its being properly saved from 02E00326 to BC271433).

  5. Informality should have elicited clerical feedback
  6. The LASC refused Prytulak customary and obligatory clerical feedback which could have assisted him in rectifying his submissions, despite Prytulak repeatedly soliciting such feedback, as is detailed in the section below headed The LASC Denied Prytulak Customary and Obligatory Clerical Feedback.

  7. Informality should not detract from the force of a submission unless prejudicial
  8. Denying Motion-to-Quash-D, or any other Prytulak motion, because of its errors or defects appears to be at variance with
    CCP §475 which reads in relevant part as follows:

    CCP §475.  The court must, in every stage of an action, disregard any error [...] or defect, in the pleadings or proceedings which, in the opinion of said court, does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.  No judgment, decision, or decree shall be reversed or affected by reason of any error [...] or defect, unless it shall appear from the record that such error [...] or defect was prejudicial, and also that by reason of such error [...] or defect, the said party complaining or appealing sustained and suffered substantial injury, and that a different result would have been probable if such error [...] or defect had not occurred or existed.  There shall be no presumption that error is prejudicial, or that injury was done if error is shown.

    As informality in Prytulak submissions has never been considered prejudicial, it cannot be a justification for spoliating or ignoring those submissions.

C.  The Interval Between Default Entry And Default Judgment Is Not Inviolate to Jurisdictional Challenge
Relying on Devlin v Kearny Mesa 155 CalApp3d 381 (California 1984), Rambam repeatedly proposes, and with the approval of the LASC, the Inviolate-Interval Theory, by which is meant the theory that during the default-entry to default-judgment interval, jurisdictional challenge is prohibited, and default can be removed only on non-jurisdictional grounds:

The only motion this Court may hear is a motion to set aside the default, not a jurisdictional motion.  By failing to answer the complaint, defendant forfeited his right to bring a motion to quash.  "The entry of a default terminates a defendant’s rights to take any further affirmative steps in the litigation until either the default is set aside or a default judgement is entered."  Devlin v. Kearney Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc., 155 Cal.App.3d 381, 385, 202 Cal.Rptr. 204 (1984).  Defendant has not attempted to set aside the default, which is unlikely based on his letters attesting to knowledge of the proceeding in this Court.  He may not challenge jurisdiction on the present record.  [...]  A motion to quash would not be timely.  [...]  Accordingly, defendant is not at liberty to file a motion to quash.
•  Gary Kurtz, Rambam-Objection-C (03/09-Sep-2002) [AA15
062:1-13 and 063:2-3].  In his statement, Kurtz misspells the correct "Kearny" as "Kearney"; and within the quoted Devlin sentence misspells "judgment" as "judgement," and replaces the correct "its default" with his own "the default."

Plaintiff particularly objects to the constant recitation of jurisdictional arguments.  Defendant has filed a motion to set aside the default based entirely on his jurisdictional arguments.  [...]  Jurisdictional arguments are not appropriately made in letter form.  Moreover, jurisdictional arguments are not ripe while a default is in place.  They may be raised within the time to plead and before the entry of a default, or they may be raised if the default is set aside and if leave is granted.
•  Gary Kurtz, Rambam-Objection-D2, 10/17-Oct-2002 [AA22 110:01-03, 10-14].  Bold emphasis is in the original.

Defendant admits that his position is that the default should be set aside because of his jurisdictional objection.  Of course, it does not work that way.  Evidence to support an objection to personal jurisdiction does not satisfy the requirements of a motion to set aside a default.  The cart cannot come before the horse.
•  Gary Kurtz, Rambam-Opposition, 12/18-Nov-2002, pp. 10-11.  [AA24 158:25-159:02]  Bold emphasis is in the original.

Echoing the same Inviolate-Interval Theory, the LASC spoliated Prytulak Motion-to-Quash-B while proposing that Prytulak's proper course was to no more than set aside default:

Unless the default is set aside after a duly noticed motion which complies with all legal requirements, this case will proceed to the trial setting hearing and default prove-up hearing as described above.
•  Honorable James R. Dunn, Minute Order, 15-Aug-2002 [AA12 042].

In the LASC's reaction to Prytulak Motion-to-Quash-D can be found an eventual acknowledgement of Prytulak disavowal of CCP §473(b), for which the LASC's "473" must be understood to stand, and — more relevant here — can also be found the LASC very explicit embrace of the Inviolate-Interval Theory:

Rather than rely on the grounds stated in CCP §473, Defendant relies on his unsupported argument that the default should be set aside because any default judgment would be void for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Regardless of the merit of that argument [and the Court is stating no opinion on that subject], the issue is irrelevant here as a ground for vacating a default under CCP 473.  It is also improper to combine a motion to quash service of a summons and complaint with a motion to set aside a default, and the former cannot be considered unless and until the moving party is successful in having the default set aside.
•  Honorable James R. Dunn, Minute Order, 25-Nov-2002/14-Jan-2003 [AA28
190].  Square-bracketed material is in the original.

It would appear that the above Rambam-LASC misconception arose out of a cursory reading of statements such as the Devlin statement below, whose first sentence has already been quoted by Rambam above, and whose strong wording appears to admit of no qualification:

The entry of a default terminates a defendant's rights to take any further affirmative steps in the litigation until either its default is set aside or a default judgment is entered.  [...]  "A defendant against whom a default has been entered is out of court and is not entitled to take any further steps in the cause affecting plaintiff's right of action [...]."
Devlin v Kearny Mesa 155 CalApp3d 381 at 385-386 (California 1984).  Citations omitted.

However, as elaborated in the sixth point below, reading Devlin beyond the two sentences quoted above reveals that it does not at all support the Inviolate-Interval Theory, the first five points below demonstrating by way of introduction that the disconfirmation of the Inviolate-Interval Theory that comes from reading the whole of Devlin could have been anticipated even without reading more of Devlin.

  1. Is the defaulting defendant "out of court" or not?
  2. If Devlin does justify locking the defaulting defendant "out of court," then why is he permitted into court to set aside default on non-jurisdictional grounds?  Or if an exception can be made to admit the defaulting defendant into court to set aside default on non-jurisdictional grounds, then why not a parallel exception to admit him into court to vacate default on jurisdictional grounds?  Rambam-LASC take Devlin's two-sentence assertion which appears to dictate locking the defaulting defendant "out of court," and gratuitously offer it in justification of their slamming the court door in the face of some defendants but not others.

  3. Legislative and judicial intent
  4. It does not seem plausible that either the legislature or the judiciary could have intended that a defect as fundamental as absence of jurisdiction, and as often cited in precedent and jurisprudence as essential to detect in limine, should be shielded from detection during proceedings which are as little deserving of exceptional protection as ex parte calculations of damages, and which can drag on for months or years.

  5. The CCP offers the Inviolate-Interval Theory no support
  6. Neither Rambam nor the LASC cite the CCP in support of their Inviolate-Interval Theory.  Devlin does cite
    CCP §585(b):

    Here, we are guided by the California Legislature which has manifested its intent generally to exclude defaulted defendants from judgment hearings.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 585, subd. (b).)
    Devlin v Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc., 155 CalApp3d 381 at 388, footnote 2 (California 1984)

    However, a reading of today's CCP §585(b) fails to reveal any excluding of defaulted defendants from judgment hearings.  Perhaps Devlin cited the CCP erroneously, or perhaps the 1984 CCP that Devlin relied upon has been revised.  In any case, the Devlin statement quoted immediately above represents the CCP as excluding defaulted defendants only "from judgment hearings" and not from petitioning the court for all conceivable purposes.

  7. Vacating default for want of jurisdiction becomes forever impossible
  8. If, during an Inviolate Interval, jurisdictional challenge can only follow setting aside default on non-jurisdictional grounds, and if, as will be argued at length below under the heading Rambam-LASC Were Wrong to Demand that Prytulak Rely on
    CCP §473(b), setting aside default on non-jurisdictional grounds constitutes a general appearance, then default entry precludes jurisdictional challenge for the remainder of the trial.

  9. Efficiency
  10. Maximally efficient is to evaluate jurisdiction in limine.  Maximally inefficient is for the trial court to feel itself under no obligation to evaluate its jurisdiction unless formally motioned to do so, is to posit an interval of indefinite duration during which jurisdiction failure is protected from detection, and is to expect an appellate court to answer a question for the first time that the trial court was competent to answer, but avoided.

  11. Devlin v Kearny Mesa does not support the Inviolate-Interval Theory
  12. Even restricting attention to the strong two-sentence Devlin statement quoted above reveals it to be limited by qualifications whose import is unclear.  Thus, the difference between being forbidden "to take any further steps in the litigation" and Devlin's being forbidden "to take any further affirmative steps in the litigation" is ambiguous — perhaps a motion to quash is not an affirmative step, and so is not forbidden.  Or, the difference between "not entitled to take any further steps in the action" and Devlin's "not entitled to take any further steps in the cause affecting plaintiff's right of action" is also unclear — perhaps a motion to quash is not in the cause affecting plaintiff's right of action, and so is not forbidden.

    More unambiguously undermining of the Inviolate-Interval Theory is that Devlin does specify that defendant is excluded not from petitioning the LASC for every conceivable relief, but only from participating in judgment hearings whose purpose happens to be the calculation of damages: "Our first decision rightly assumed Kearny Mesa, having defaulted, knew it could not participate in a judgment hearing on punitive damages" (p. 206), and which damage-assessment hearings defendant is prohibited from invading to "file pleadings or move for a new trial or demand notice of subsequent proceedings" (p. 207), within which list challenging jurisdiction, or motioning to quash, do not appear.  To consider in turn each of the three actions which Devlin explicitly forbids the defaulting defendant — first, a motion to quash is not a "pleading" (but rather is more in the nature of a refusal to plead):

    CCP §422.10  The pleadings allowed in civil actions are complaints, demurrers, answers, and cross-complaints.

    CCP §435(a)(2)  The term "pleading" means a demurrer, answer, complaint, or cross-complaint.

    Second, a motion to quash is not a "motion for a new trial"; and third, it is not a demand for "notice of subsequent proceedings."

    At bottom, Devlin did not have before it an out-of-state defendant challenging jurisdiction, and did not contemplate such a defendant, and so cannot be construed as intending to shut such a defendant "out of court."  Rambam's use of Devlin consists of citing a passage out of context, and of ignoring the fact situation which occasioned the Fourth District Court of Appeal to write that sentence, and consists of attributing to that sentence an application which that court never intended.

    Furthermore, Devlin's strong and colorful "out of court" statement above can be seen to be an echo of earlier California decisions, and in turn to be echoed by later decisions:

    •  Title Insurance & Trust Co v King Land & Improvement Co 162 Cal 44 at 46, 120 P 1066 at 1067 (California 1912)
    •  Christerson v French 182 P 27 at 28 (California 1919)
    •  Brooks v Nelson 272 P 610 at 611 (California 1928)
    •  Taintor v Superior Court 213 P2d 42 at 44-45 (California 1949)
    •  Heathman v Vant 172 CalApp2d 639 at 67, 342 P2d 104 at 109 (California 1959)
    •  Mackie v Mackie 186 CalApp2d 825 at 833 (California 1960)
    •  Devlin v Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc., 155 CalApp3d 381 at 385-386 (California 1984)
    •  People v One 1986 Toyota Pickup 37 CalRptr2d 29 at 32 (California 1995)
    •  In re Marriage of Askmo 102 CalRptr2d 662 at 665 (California 2000)

    However, it is either a remarkable coincidence, or else a pattern establishing a rule, that not one of the cases cited above proposes that a defendant come to challenge jurisdiction is one who should be kept "out of court."

    On top of all that, post-Devlin cases diverge from Devlin's "out of court" pronouncement:

    Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 381, 385-386 [202 Cal.Rptr. 204], with dictum to the contrary, "is unsupported by any recent authority, and is believed to be incorrect." (Weil & Brown, supra, at Ά 5:479, pp. 5-100 to 5-101, rev. # 1, 1995.)
    Misic v Segars, 37 CalApp4th 1149 at 1154, 44 CalRptr2d 100 (California 1995)

D.  Rambam-LASC Were Wrong to Demand that Prytulak Rely on CCP §473(b)
Already documented in the section immediately above titled The Interval Between Default Entry And Default Judgment Is Not Inviolate to Jurisdictional Challenge was the Rambam-LASC insistence that Prytulak's first step had to be to attempt to set aside default on non-jurisdictional grounds.  Rambam and LASC did elaborate, especially in response to Motion-to-Quash-D, that they thought these non-jurisdictional grounds should be found within
CCP §473(b):

CCP §473 (b) The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.

That is, both Rambam and LASC ignored the Prytulak recitation of Rambam and LASC errors as providing "good cause" for extending time to quash under
CCP §418.10(a)(1), and instead set up a straw man whom they pictured as attempting ineffectually to set aside default based upon a confession of Prytulak errors under CCP §473(b).  Despite Prytulak insistence that he did not adduce his own errors in an effort to set aside default under CCP §473(b), but rather that he did adduce Rambam and LASC errors to extend time to quash service under CCP §418.10(a)(1), Rambam and the LASC ignored Prytulak's 418.10(a)(1) argument and confined themselves to faulting their straw man for failing to meet the criteria of CCP §473(b):

In this case, defendant has presented numerous arguments which may be recharacterized as ineffective Code of Civil Procedure § 473 arguments.
•  Rambam-Objection-D1, dated 30-Sep-2002, filed 01-Oct-2002 [AA21
107:1-3].  In his preceding paragraph, Kurtz had explained that by CCP 473, he meant CCP 473(b).

Assuming Moving party's intent was to seek relief per CCP §473, he fails to show good cause for the relief requested.  There is no adequate showing of inadvertence, mistake, surprise or excusable neglect necessary to support an order setting aside the default.
•  Honorable James R. Dunn, Minute Order, 25-Nov-2002, starting top of page at [AA28 189].  Square-bracketed material is in the original.

It is symptomatic of Rambam and the LASC having set up a straw man that neither of them claims above that Prytulak argued CCP §473(b), but rather Kurtz admits that he only "recharacterizes" Prytulak as doing so, and the LASC admits that it only "assumes" that Prytulak did so, and it is of course even more unambiguously symptomatic of their straw man that they altogether ignore Prytulak's arguing CCP §418.10(a)(1), which could not have been easy for them to do as 418.10 is the sole CCP section cited on Motion-to-Quash-D's title page [AA19 078-079] and is also the sole CCP section cited in the first paragraph of Motion-to-Quash-D's introduction [AA19 081], and CCP §418.10(a)(1) is quoted in full in both Motion-to-Quash-C [AA14 046] and Motion-to-Quash-D [AA19 083] as the legislative ground of the motion:

CCP §418.10.  (a) A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes:
      (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.

Both of the above Rambam and LASC statements citing merely "473" where "473(b)" is presumably intended constitutes an unfortunate encroachment of imprecision, as CCP §473 comes in subsections, and some of these permit relief by different routes, as for example CCP §473(d) offers a radically different route from the Rambam-LASC-recommended CCP §473(b), and in fact a route which provides relief equivalent to that provided by CCP §418.10(a)(1), as the LASC was apprised at the bottom of the section headed Summary of Argument in both Motion-to-Quash-C [AA14 046] and Motion-to-Quash-D [AA19 082]:

CCP §473 (d) The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.

However, Prytulak refused to bend to Rambam and LASC insistence that he trust to CCP §473(b) because Prytulak was mindful of the rule that to avoid appearing generally and thereby attorning to jurisdiction, a defendant must bring before the LASC no question but personal jurisdiction, and must ask no relief but quashing service:

The rule in this regard may be epitomized by saying that if a defendant by his appearance insists only upon the objection that he is not in court for want of jurisdiction over his person and confines his appearance for that purpose only, then he has made a special appearance, but if he raises any other question, or asks any relief which can only be granted upon the hypothesis that the court has jurisdiction of his person, then he had made a general appearance. (Olcese v. Justice's Court, 156 Cal. 82 [103 P. 317]; Zobel v. Zobel, 151 Cal. 98 [90 P. 191].)
•  Judson v Superior Court 21 Cal2d 11 at 13 (California 1942)
Similar sentiments are expressed in
•  Bank of America v Carr 138 CalApp2d 727 at 735-736 (California 1956)

It is also well settled that inclusion of any ground inconsistent with the sole claim that the judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction is sufficient to convert a special appearance into a general appearance.
•  Carpenter v Mohammed 227 CalApp2d 584 at 585 (California 1964)

If one were to take Carpenter v Mohammed literally, Prytulak's petitioning to quash service for lack of jurisdiction would convert into a general appearance if it so much as included the prayer, however secondary and peripheral, to set aside default under the same CCP §473(b) that Rambam-LASC were demanding as Prytulak's obligatory and exclusive first step, because questions of "inadvertence, mistake, surprise or excusable neglect" were clearly questions other than jurisdiction, and because the relief of setting aside default was unmistakably a relief other than quashing service.

Also supportive of the conclusion that following the Rambam-LASC advice (that Prytulak rely on 473(b) by itself to set aside default) would have constituted a general appearance is
CCP 418.10(d) which reads in relevant part as follows:

CCP §418.10(d)  [...]  [N]o motion under [...] Section 473 [...] when joined with a motion under this section [...] shall be deemed a general appearance by the defendant.

In other words, if 473 joined with 418.10 shall not be deemed a general appearance, then it appears to follow that 473 alone shall be deemed a general appearance.

In addition to shunning the Rambam-LASC-recommended 473(b) so as to avoid making a general appearance, strong California precedent expresses the inappropriateness of doing other than nullifying (at any time and if necessary on the court's own motion) proceedings like Rambam v Prytulak which are void on their face:

The motions herein were, however, made primarily on the ground that the service, the default and the default judgment were void on their face.  In such case, it is established that the motions are not within the purview of sections 473 or 473a; that the time limitations of said sections do not apply; that motion on the ground that the entry of default and the default judgment were void can be made at any time; and that the court has the right and power at any time to vacate and set aside a void entry of default and a void default judgment.  (Morgan v. Clapp, 207 Cal. 221, 224 [277 P. 490]; Miller v. Cortese, 110 Cal.App.2d 101 , 103-105 [242 P.2d 84]; People v. One 1941 Chrysler Sedan, 81 Cal.App.2d 18 , 31 [183 P.2d 368]; and collaterally, Pennell v. Superior Court, 87 Cal.App. 375, 378 [262 P. 48].)  Accordingly, cases holding that a trial court has discretionary power under sections 473 and 473a to grant or refuse application for relief from a default or default judgment are not in point where application for relief is sought on the ground that the default and the default judgment are void on their face.
•  Batte v Bandy 165 CalApp2d 527 at 537-538 (California 1958)
The same principle is articulated in
•  Montgomery v Norman, 120 CalApp2d 855 at 858 (California 1953)

The events leading up to the LASC filing Prytulak Motion-to-Quash-D [AA19], the only Prytulak submission which the LASC ever filed, are indicative of the pressure placed on Prytulak by the LASC to follow the 473(b) route and thus to take action which could be interpreted as making a general appearance.  That is, in two telephone conversations on the morning of 25-Sep-2002 with LASC representative Katina (at 213-974-5173), the first having been initiated by Katina and the second arranged as a continuation of the first, Katina gave Prytulak to understand that the only motion that the LASC would permit him to file was a motion to "set aside" default on non-jurisdictional grounds.

Prytulak's response to the Katina-transmitted LASC offer was to comply with the LASC demand to the limited extent of re-writing his earlier and spoliated Motion-to-Quash-C [
AA14] into Motion-to-Quash-D [AA19] by making such superficial changes as inserting "vacate default" into the title, and even giving "vacate default" first place in the title, as shown below, with the upper title being that of spoliated Motion-to-Quash-C, and the lower title being that of filed Motion-to-Quash-D:


Prytulak Notice of Motion to Quash Service of Summons for Lack of Jurisdiction
Prytulak Notice of Motion to Vacate Default or Default Judgment joined with Notice of Motion to Quash Service of Summons for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
•  Respective titles for Prytulak Motion-to-Quash-C [AA14 044] and Motion-to-Quash-D [AA19 078].

However, having accommodated to LASC demands to the slight degree that seemed prudent, Prytulak refused to abandon his challenge to jurisdiction in the body of Motion-to-Quash-D, and indeed continued to feature jurisdiction failure as the justification for vacating default, and placed no reliance whatever on CCP §473(b).  Prytulak felt that if the LASC viewed his motion as unpersuasive, the LASC's proper course would be to file the motion and then deny it rather than to block Prytulak from filing it while pressing him to file an alternative motion that was contrary to his interests.  Although the Prytulak superficial compliance with Katina demands succeeded in getting his Motion-to-Quash-D stamped and acknowledged, the LASC never considered the Prytulak CCP §418.10(a)(1) argument for quashing service on the ground of jurisdiction failure, but rather took the opportunity of the Motion-to-Quash-D hearing of 25-Nov-2002 to deny its own straw-man motion to set aside default based on CCP §473(b).

E.  The Los Angeles Superior Court Demonstrates a Flawed Understanding of Jurisdiction
The excerpt from the Reporter's Transcript of 10-Feb-2003 that is reproduced below that is the focus of this section reveals the following three defects in the LASC understanding of jurisdiction:

  1. The error of thinking that a court is allowed to evaluate its own jurisdiction only in response to a formal motion
  2. Whereas one of the most fundamental principles of jurisprudence dictates that every court must evaluate its own jurisdiction before proceeding, the LASC holds that it need do so only if formally motioned, and holds that if the defendant, both before and after default entry, bombards the LASC with informal suggestions that the LASC evaluate its own jurisdiction, the LASC must not construe these as amicus curiae submissions that have the capacity to prompt a sua sponte evaluation of jurisdiction, but rather must disregard them and suppress any impulse to evaluate its jurisdiction sua sponte.  Rambam, in turn, has argued [AA31 199:08-21] that a court's inherent power to examine jurisdiction does not apply (Rambam stresses these three words with bold font) to personal jurisdiction, and cites as his authority
    Abelleira v District Court of Appeal 17 Cal2d 280 (California 1941).  However, a reading of Abelleira reveals nothing of the kind, as has been elaborated in the Prytulak letter to Judge James R. Dunn of 20-Jan-2003 titled Three Documents Call for a Reply under the heading Gary Kurtz Misrepresents Abelleira v District Court of Appeal [AA33 221-222].

    In contrast to Rambam and LASC is the opposite view whose wide acceptance Prytulak has documented in his Prytulak-Reply-D3 under the heading The court has the power and duty to evaluate jurisdiction on its own motion, through inherent power, ex officio, sua sponte, ex mero motu [AA23 116-121], which can be summarized here as follows:

    A court has the power and duty to examine and determine whether it has jurisdiction of a matter presented to it, its determination being subject, of course, to appellate review.  This question should be considered by the court before it looks at other matters involved in the case, such as whether the parties are entitled to a jury trial.  It may, and must, do this on its own motion, without waiting for the question of its jurisdiction to be raised by any of the parties involved in the proceeding.
    •  20 Am Jur 2d § 60 (1995)

  3. The error of thinking that a court is able to proceed through a trial all the way to judgment without ever deciding the question of its own jurisdiction
  4. Whereas common sense dictates, and jurisprudence declares, that "The court necessarily decides that it has jurisdiction by proceeding in the cause"
    (21 CJS Courts § 88, 1990) and that "A court by moving in a cause assumes authority, but the assumption does not confer it" (Abelleira v District Court of Appeal 17 Cal2d 280 at 304 (California 1941)), the LASC, in startling contrast, believes that it has proceeded through ten months — at the time of the 10-Feb-2003 proceeding quoted from below — of the cause without having decided the question of jurisdiction.  A more correct view, however, might be that by proceeding in the cause, the LASC had asserted jurisdiction, but had done so through a back door — without openly acknowledging that it had done so, without weighing the submitted evidence and arguments concerning jurisdiction, and without justifying its decision by citing legislation or precedent.

  5. The error of thinking that the trial court is under no obligation to preempt the anticipated decision of a reviewing or an enforcing court
  6. The LASC expresses awareness that the issue of jurisdiction will be decided explicitly by some later court — whether the Court of Appeal in California or a Canadian court in the event of an attempt to execute judgment — and recognizes that jurisdiction might then be denied, and therefore, by implication, recognizes that all its own work may at that future time be declared a nullity — and yet feels powerless to answer that same question of jurisdiction itself, at the trial level.  However, efficiency might demand that no question within the competence of the trial court be deferred for first consideration by a reviewing or an enforcing court, and most certainly not the paramount question that every court is obligated to answer before all others — the question of its own jurisdiction.  Though contemplating a different fact situation,
    Don v Cruz echoes this same sentiment:

    As our Supreme Court has stated: "When defendants first challenge the damage award on appeal, without a motion for a new trial, they unnecessarily burden the appellate courts with issues which can and should be resolved at the trial level." (Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 908, 919, fn. omitted [114 Cal.Rptr. 622, 523 P.2d 662].)
    •  Don v Cruz 131 CalApp3d 695 at 708 (California 1982)

Here, then, is that excerpt from the trial transcript in which the three above errors in LASC understanding of jurisdiction are manifested:

THE COURT:  YOU ARE AWARE, MR. KURTZ, IF THE COURT DOES ENTER A JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE, WHEN YOU GO TO -- ENFORCE IT AND WHEREVER YOU HAVE TO ENFORCE IT, THAT IT MAY WELL -- THAT THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION MAY WELL BE RAISED AT -- AT THAT POINT, IN THAT COURT.
           UM-M-M -- (INTERRUPTED)
MR. KURTZ:  YOUR HONOR, I WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DO THAT (GIGGLE).
THE COURT:  WELL I -- I -- I UNDERSTAND.
           UH -- AND -- UH -- I THINK THE COURT'S PRIMARY INTEREST, WHEN IT LOOKED AT THE PAVLOVICH CASE, WAS THE -- UH -- THE ISSUES THAT WERE RAISED IN THAT CASE WHICH EMPHASIZED THE KIND OF ISSUES WHICH WERE RAISED IN THE JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE CASE, WHICH MR. PRYTULAK BELIEVES IS APPROPRIATE AND APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.  THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE COURT IN ITS RULING HAD DETERMINED THAT HE NEVER RAISED THOSE ISSUES PROPERLY IN THIS COURT.  AND THE COURT'S MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT IT HAS NEVER EXPRESSED A VIEW AS TO WHETHER THERE WOULD OR WOULD NOT BE JURISDICTION HAD THIS CASE BEEN PROPERLY BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT.  OF COURSE, THE COURT HAS NEVER HAD IT BEFORE THE COURT PROPERLY.  AND THE COURT HAS NEVER HAD DECLARATIONS AND EVIDENCE BEFORE IT, WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED IN THAT KIND OF A MOTION IN ANY EVENT.
           AND WHETHER OR NOT THAT EVIDENCE WOULD BE, UH -- SIMILAR TO EVIDENCE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONAL CASES IN THIS -- IN THIS -- UH -- DIVISION, THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE NOT -- IS SOMETHING THAT THIS COURT CANNOT KNOW UNLESS AND UNTIL ITS BEFORE THE COURT.  I'M GONNA TAKE -- UH -- ANOTHER -- I'M GONNA TAKE A LOOK AT THAT -- A -- UH -- LIMITED JURISDICTION CASE, WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE THE INFLUENCE ON THE COURT IN THIS REGARD.  UH -- UNDOUBTEDLY, THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE WILL BE RAISED AT SOME POINT, WHETHER -- WHETHER IT'S BY THIS COURT, UH -- UH -- BY THE COURT -- UH -- VACATING THIS -- THE DEFAULT OR WHETHER IT'S IN ANOTHER COURT OR WHETHER IF THE COURT ENTERS JUDGMENT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS SENDS IT BACK HERE.  I MEAN, THOSE ARE THE NUMBER OF POSSIBILITIES IN WHICH THAT ISSUE WILL BE ADDRESSED.  BUT -- UH -- AS OF NOVEMBER 25TH, THIS COURT WAS OF THE VIEW THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN PROPERLY BROUGHT BACK TO THE COURT.
•  Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Rambam v Prytulak BC271433, Monday, February 10, 2003 [AA34 230:21-232:07].  Bold added.

The LASC statement above must be corrected when it says that "THE COURT HAS NEVER HAD DECLARATIONS AND EVIDENCE BEFORE IT" pertaining to the question of jurisdiction, as such declarations and evidence have in fact been presented in all four Prytulak motions to quash, and as well in Prytulak-Reply-D7, as has been elaborated above in the second paragraph under the heading IV. THE GIST.

Top Contents Authorities Chronology Preliminary Gist Background Issues Prejudice Verification Prayer Appendix Bottom
VII.  PREJUDICE OF THE LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT
The description of the prejudice of the LASC against Lubomyr Prytulak is placed toward the end of the instant Appellant Opening Brief because it does not bear on the sole relief sought by Prytulak of quashing service, but only demonstrates the obstacles that Prytulak encountered in seeking that sole relief.  Nevertheless, without an appreciation of LASC prejudice, much that transpired during Rambam v Prytulak BC271433 proceedings, both in court and out, will either seem inexplicable, or will invite misinterpretation.  One relevant benefit of appreciating LASC prejudice is that it explains and justifies Prytulak's having elected to proceed by appendix, as recounted immediately below.
A.  The LASC Spoliated Submissions That Supported Prytulak
Prytulak elected to proceed by appendix in the instant appeal because throughout Rambam v Prytulak proceedings, the LASC spoliated — that is suppressed or destroyed — all but one Prytulak submission, with not a word in answer to queries as to their fate.

It was only well after the LASC final judgment (two months after, to be exact), and too late to undo Prytulak's election to proceed by appendix, that the LASC disclosed for the first time that some spoliated Prytulak documents were intact — eight were intact of the chief ten that Prytulak persisted in enquiring about — and that the LASC was ready to send these to a reviewing court (see the LASC Minute Order of 25-Mar/20-May-2003 at [AA41
246]).

As the LASC 08-Apr-2003 Register of Actions [AA43 254-255] lists no Prytulak document other than Prytulak Motion-to-Quash-D, Prytulak asks leave to augment the record with all Prytulak documents other than Motion-to-Quash-D that have been included in the Appellant's Appendix.

Where Prytulak suffered all but one of his submissions being spoliated, Rambam suffered only one out of all his submissions being spoliated, namely his 03/09-Sep-2002 Rambam-Objection-C [AA15].  Although the degree of spoliation differed radically for the respective parties, the reason for the spoliation was identical — it was to weaken Prytulak's position and strengthen Rambam's.  That is, this sole Rambam submission that the LASC spoliated focussed on, and thus authenticated the existence of, Prytulak Motion-to-Quash-C which the LASC had recently spoliated and thus wished to suppress all reference to, Motion-to-Quash-C particularly attracting LASC spoliation because it was the first Prytulak submission to be delivered to the LASC with both filing fee and proof of service, and thus was harder for the LASC to disregard out of hand.

Prytulak queries as to the fate of spoliated submissions are too numerous to count, among them being the 14-Mar-2003 Prytulak letter to Carolyn B. Kuhl, Supervising Judge Civil Departments, titled But what about those missing documents? [AA38].
B.  The LASC Spoliated Two Prytulak Money Orders
Even when the LASC finally decided to acknowledge that it had not destroyed Prytulak submissions, and by so doing had implicitly acknowledged having only temporarily suppressed them, (in the LASC Minute Order dated 25-Mar-2003 and first served on Prytulak 20-May-2003, [AA41
246]), it still never acknowledged receiving, and never returned or offered to return, two Prytulak money orders:
  1. American Express Worldwide Money Order for US$193, No. 107746731, dated 29-Aug-2002
  2. Toronto-Dominion Bank money order for US$23, No. 1763790, dated 11-Sep-2002
The briefest of 26 Prytulak queries concerning the money orders is the 05-Jun-2003 Prytulak letter to Judge James R. Dunn titled Please return two missing money orders [AA46].  Reference to the two vanished money orders can be found within materials already included in the Appendix for other reasons — specifically the possibility that the money orders seem about to be lost is broached at [AA17 067-068], and later their ancient loss is mourned in the second-last paragraph at [AA32 208].
C.  The LASC Denied Prytulak Customary and Obligatory Clerical Feedback
In connection with none of the spoliated Prytulak submissions and money orders did Prytulak receive clerical feedback.  His submissions and money orders were never returned, in cases where Prytulak failed to include a money order with a submission he was never asked to pay a filing fee, he was never sent a clerical feedback form, he was never given any indication as to what he must do to get the LASC to file a given submission, his queries concerning the fate of his submissions and money orders always went answered.  The first LASC justification for its not filing a Prytulak submission arrived, with regard to Motion-to-Quash-B of 27/29-May-2002 [
AA06], in the Minute Order of 15/19-Aug-2002 [AA12 041], but as the interval between 29-May-2002 and 19-Aug-2002 is 82 days, arrived too late to serve as feedback that Prytulak could have acted upon to rectify his submission, and in any case depended on one wrong date and on one misconstrued authority, as has already been described above.
D.  The LASC Blocked Prytulak Access to Documents
The table below summarizes that upon the five occasions that Prytulak requested documents from the LASC, he had to put his request between 4 and 8 times, and he had to wait from 39 to 90 days, before obtaining the sought-for material.

Document Requests Days
One-page Order to Show Cause in 02E00326 5 62
Three-page Minute Order of 25-Nov-2002 7 51
LASC acknowledges request for Reporter's Transcript 4 39
One-page Default Judgment of 20-Mar-2003 6 61
Rambam Book of Exhibits of 03-Oct-2002 8 90
  1. One-page Order to Show Cause in 02E00326

    For Prytulak to negotiate acquisition of a one-page photocopy of an Order to Show Cause [
    AA07] in the earlier limited-jurisdiction Rambam v Prytulak 02E00326 required the exchange of ten letters, five from Prytulak and five from the LASC, the negotiations centering on Prytulak payment of the 57-cent photocopying charge, and on Prytulak supplying the U.S. postage needed to transport that single page from California to Canada, as detailed in the 30-Sep-2002 letter to LASC Deputy Clerk Steven Winston titled "The saga of the 57-cent photocopy" [AA20].

  2. Three-page Minute Order of 25-Nov-2002

    The Minute Order of 25-Nov-2002 [
    AA28] was of especial interest to Prytulak because it explained the LASC denial of Prytulak Motion-to-Quash-D [AA19] — the sole Prytulak submission that the LASC filed.  The LASC never did serve Prytulak with the sought-for Minute Order, and Prytulak discovered it as an exhibit in the Rambam document of 07/14-Jan-2003 [AA31].  The first of the seven Prytulak requests for this Minute Order can be found in the 02/03-Dec-2002 Prytulak Request-for-Minute-Order [AA29].

  3. LASC acknowledges request for Reporter's Transcript

    The interval between Prytulak sending the first of his four requests to Executive Officer/Clerk, John A. Clarke, for transcripts on 10-Jan-2003, to receiving his first reply from the LASC (from Court Manager, Court Reporter Services, Terry Weiss, letter of 11/21-Feb-2003) was 39 days.  Transcript preparation further delayed delivery of transcripts until 27-Mar-2003, 76 days after first request.  Indicative of the nature of Prytulak's requests is the fourth of the four, the 18-Feb-2003 letter to Clarke titled Fourth Request for Transcripts [
    AA36].

  4. One-page Default Judgment of 20-Mar-2003

    How the LASC almost succeeded in engineering the dismissal of the Prytulak appeal by denying him a copy of its 20-Mar-2003 judgment [
    AA40] in Rambam v Prytulak BC271433 is outlined in the 07-Jun-2003 Prytulak letter to the LASC titled Unlawful Interference With The Reviewing Court, particularly in the section titled The Rambam v Prytulak Judgment of 20-Mar-2003 [AA47 261-262].  The LASC did eventually serve Prytulak with a copy of the judgment on 20-May-2003, but only 61 days after the judgment was issued, and only after Prytulak had requested it in six letters, and only after the second deadline for Prytulak submission of a copy of that judgment to the Court of Appeal had expired, and only after it became known that Prytulak had already acquired a copy of the judgment against the prohibition of the LASC.  Reference to the LASC "prohibiting" Prytulak acquisition of a copy of the judgment is justified not only by the LASC ignoring Prytulak's six written requests until after Prytulak had already acquired a copy of the judgment, but also by Prytulak agent applying in person at the LASC clerical counter having been refused a copy and upon returning to the counter to get the number and name of the clerk responsible for the refusal, there discovered Plaintiff's counsel being furnished a copy of that very same judgment, in which situation the clerk found it impossible to refuse Prytulak agent [AA45].

  5. Rambam Book of Exhibits of 03-Oct-2002

    Prytulak efforts to acquire a copy of the Rambam Book of Exhibits of 03-Oct-2002 culminated with the LASC confessing in its Minute Order of 12/20-May-2003 [AA44
    257] that it had given Rambam lawyer Gary Kurtz a monopoly on all extant copies by relinquishing the LASC's own copy to Kurtz, to whom the LASC directed Prytulak to take his application.  Prytulak did eventually succeed in receiving a copy from Kurtz on 09-Jul-2003, 90 days after Prytulak mailed his first request for it to the LASC on 10-Apr-2003, and 29 days after Prytulak FedExed his request for it to Gary Kurtz on 10-Jun-2003.  The sixth Prytulak request for a copy of the Book of Exhibits was Prytulak letter to Judge Dunn of 07-Jun-2003 titled Unlawful interference with the reviewing court [AA47 262-264], and the eighth request was Prytulak letter to Judge Dunn of 27-Jun-2003 titled Kurtz controls all extant copies [AA48 266-267].

Top Contents Authorities Chronology Preliminary Gist Background Issues Prejudice Verification Prayer Appendix Bottom
VIII.  VERIFICATION
I, Lubomyr Prytulak, am the Petitioner for Writ of Mandate in the instant proceeding, and the author of the instant Appellant Opening Brief, and know the contents thereof, and declare on penalty of perjury under the laws of California that all facts alleged are true and correct.

09-Aug-2003


__________________________________
Lubomyr Prytulak

Top Contents Authorities Chronology Preliminary Gist Background Issues Prejudice Verification Prayer Appendix Bottom
IX.  PRAYER
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays:
     1.  That the Court of Appeal affirm the lack of jurisdiction of the Los Angeles Superior Court over the person of Lubomyr Prytulak, in Rambam v Prytulak Case No. BC271433;
     2.  For such other relief as may justly be awarded to a Petitioner making only a special appearance.


09-Aug-2003


__________________________________  (in propria persona)
Lubomyr Prytulak



Top Contents Authorities Chronology Preliminary Gist Background Issues Prejudice Verification Prayer Appendix Bottom


APPELLANT APPENDIX CONTENTS


All exhibits relate to general jurisdiction Rambam v Prytulak BC271433, except those marked 02E00326 on GRAY which relate to the earlier, limited-jurisdiction Rambam v Prytulak 02E00326.  Exhibit source: RED=Los Angeles Superior Court (LASC), BLUE=Plaintiff Steven Rambam, YELLOW=Defendant Lubomyr Prytulak.  Date left of slash is date on document, right of slash is date of service or delivery, where known.

Chronological
AA
pages
Date Description
01
001-002
  02E00326  LASC Case Summary for 02E00326 (downloaded 31-Jul-2002)
02
003-008
04-Jan-2002 02E00326  Rambam to LASC: COMPLAINT ("Rambam-Complaint-A") filed 09-Jan-2002, served on Prytulak 09-Mar-2002
03
009-013
03/08-Apr-2002 02E00326  Prytulak to LASC: "Motion-to-Quash-A" (mailed to LASC, no service on Rambam, no filing fee.  Minus exhibit.)
04
014-018
03/15-Apr-2002 Rambam to LASC: COMPLAINT ("Rambam-Complaint-B") filed 04-Apr-2002
05
019-021
21/27-May-2002 Rambam to LASC: REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT (first and defective request)
06
022-027
27/29-May-2002 Prytulak to LASC: "Motion-to-Quash-B" (FedExed to LASC, no service on Rambam, no filing fee.  Minus exhibit.)
07
028
07-Jun/15-Oct-2002 02E00326  LASC to Rambam: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ("failure to file proof of service")
08
029
12/17-Jun-2002 02E00326  Prytulak to LASC: "Prytulak-Query-A," mailed to LASC re Motion-to-Quash-A (cc to Rambam)
09
030-032
14/17-Jun-2002 Prytulak to LASC: "Prytulak-Query-B" FedExed to LASC, re Motion-to-Quash-B (cc to Rambam)
10
033-038
18/25-Jul-2002 Rambam to LASC: SUMMARY OF CASE FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT BY COURT UPON DECLARATIONS (minus exhibits)
11
039-039
14-Aug-2002 02E00326  Prytulak to Taylor: Request for copy of OSC dated and mailed
12
040-042
15/19-Aug-2002 LASC Minute Order: EARLY MEDIATION STATUS CONFERENCE ("The payment of filing fees is both mandatory and jurisdictional")
13
043
28-Aug-2002 02E00326  LASC (Winston) to Prytulak, with Prytulak reply hand-printed on the bottom and mailed back in early September
14
044-060
29/30-Aug-2002 Prytulak to LASC: "Motion-to-Quash-C" (FedExed to LASC with Proof of Service to Rambam and with filing fee.  Minus exhibits.)
15
061-063
03/09-Sep-2002 Rambam to LASC: OBJECTION TO DOCUMENT SERVED BY DEFENDANT PRYTULAK ("Rambam-Objection-C")
16
064
09-Sep-2002 Prytulak to Clarke: "What happened to my Motion-to-Quash-C?"
17
065-075
13/16-Sep-2002 Prytulak to LASC: "Prytulak-Reply-C" (FedExed to both LASC and Rambam
18
076-077
20-Sep-2002 Prytulak to Clarke: "Court door slammed in my face"
19
078-097
25/26-Sep-2002 Prytulak to LASC: "Motion-to-Quash-D" (FedExed to LASC with Proof of Service to Rambam and with filing fee.  Minus exhibits.)
20
098-104
30-Sep/01-Oct-2002 02E00326  Prytulak to Winston: "The saga of the 57-cent photocopy"
21
105-108
30-Sep/04-Oct-2002 Rambam to LASC: OBJECTION TO DOCUMENT SERVED BY DEFENDANT PRYTULAK ("Rambam-Objection-D1")
22
109-110
10/17-Oct-2002 Rambam to LASC: OBJECTION TO IMPROPER EX-PARTE CONTACT ("Rambam-Objection-D2")
23
111-145
05/07-Nov-2002 Prytulak to LASC: DEFENDANT PRYTULAK ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF RAMBAM OBJECTIONS "Prytulak-Reply-D3" (minus exhibits)
24
146-165
12/18-Nov-2002 Rambam to LASC: PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT (minus 39-page exhibit promoting VNN Hoax)
25
166-168
15/19-Nov-2002 Rambam to LASC: PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT
26
169-185
21/22-Nov-2002 Prytulak to LASC: ANSWER TO "PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT," "Prytulak-Reply-D7" (minus exhibits)
27
186-187
25/29-Nov-2002 Rambam to LASC: NOTICE OF RULING RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND TO QUASH SERVICE
28
188-190
25-Nov-2002
/14-Jan-2003
LASC Minute Order: MOTION OF DEFENDANT TO VACATE DEFAULT OR DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS DENIED ("relief per CCP §473")
29
191-192
02/03-Dec-2002 Prytulak to LASC: DEFENDANT PRYTULAK REQUESTS A MINUTE ORDER "Prytulak-Request-for-Minute-Order"
30
193-194
20/30-Dec-2002 LASC Minute Order: CASE REVIEW ("Order To Show Cause Why The Default In The Case Should Not Be Set Aside")
31
195-207
07/14-Jan-2003 Rambam to LASC: PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE RECONSIDERATION OF ISSUES REGARDING PERSONAL JURISDICTION (minus exhibit)
32
208-209
10-Jan-2003 Prytulak to Clarke: "Transcript Order"
33
210-227
20-Jan-2003 Prytulak to Dunn: "Three documents call for a reply"
34
228-232
10-Feb/27-Mar-2003 LASC: Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Rambam v Prytulak BC271433, Monday, February 10, 2003, pp. 6-8.
35
233
10-Feb/06-Mar-2003 LASC Minute Order: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE WHY THE DEFAULT SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE ("argued and submitted")
36
234-235
18-Feb-2003 Prytulak to Clarke: "Fourth request for transcripts"
37
236-237
21-Feb/03-Mar-2003 LASC Minute Order: OSC RE RECONSIDERATION OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT ("court declines to reconsider")
38
238-241
14-Mar-2003 Prytulak to Kuhl: "But what about those missing documents?"
39
242-244
19-Mar/20-May-2003 LASC Minute Order: RULING ON DEFAULT PROVE-UP HEARING ("court finds in favor of plaintiff")
40
245
20-Mar/20-May-2003 LASC JUDGMENT ("Judgment is entered for plaintiff")
41
246-247
25-Mar/20-May-2003 LASC Minute Order: COURT ORDER ("No documents have been destroyed")
42
248-251
01/02-Apr-2003 Prytulak to LASC: NOTICE OF APPEAL OF JUDGMENT
43
252-256
08/14-Apr-2003 LASC: Register of Actions
44
257-258
12/20-May-2003 LASC Minute Order: CASE REVIEW ("The Court is unable to forward the book of exhibits")
45
259-259
14/14-May-2003 Prytulak: Dye & Durham Fax documenting Prytulak acquisition of 20-Mar-2002 Judgment
46
260
05-Jun-2003 Prytulak to Dunn: "Please return two missing money orders"
47
261-265
07-Jun-2003 Prytulak to Dunn: "Unlawful interference with the reviewing court"
48
266-268
27-Jun-2003 Prytulak to Dunn: "Kurtz controls all extant copies"
49
269-272
  LASC Case Summary for BC271433 (downloaded 11-Aug-2003)


Alphabetical
AA
pages
Date Description
01

001-002
  02E00326  LASC Case Summary for 02E00326 (downloaded 31-Jul-2002)
07
028
07-Jun/15-Oct-2002 02E00326  LASC to Rambam: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ("failure to file proof of service")
13
043
28-Aug-2002 02E00326  LASC (Winston) to Prytulak, with Prytulak reply hand-printed on the bottom and mailed back in early September
03
009-013
03/08-Apr-2002 02E00326  Prytulak to LASC: "Motion-to-Quash-A" (mailed to LASC, no service on Rambam, no filing fee.  Minus exhibit.)
08
029
12/17-Jun-2002 02E00326  Prytulak to LASC: "Prytulak-Query-A," mailed to LASC re Motion-to-Quash-A (cc to Rambam)
11
039-039
14-Aug-2002 02E00326  Prytulak to Taylor: Request for copy of OSC dated and mailed
20
098-104
30-Sep/01-Oct-2002 02E00326  Prytulak to Winston: "The saga of the 57-cent photocopy"
02
003-008
04-Jan-2002 02E00326  Rambam to LASC: COMPLAINT ("Rambam-Complaint-A") filed 09-Jan-2002, served on Prytulak 09-Mar-2002
49
269-272
  LASC Case Summary for BC271433 (downloaded 11-Aug-2003)
40
245
20-Mar/20-May-2003 LASC JUDGMENT ("Judgment is entered for plaintiff")
30
193-194
20/30-Dec-2002 LASC Minute Order: CASE REVIEW ("Order To Show Cause Why The Default In The Case Should Not Be Set Aside")
44
257-258
12/20-May-2003 LASC Minute Order: CASE REVIEW ("The Court is unable to forward the book of exhibits")
41
246-247
25-Mar/20-May-2003 LASC Minute Order: COURT ORDER ("No documents have been destroyed")
12
040-042
15/19-Aug-2002 LASC Minute Order: EARLY MEDIATION STATUS CONFERENCE ("The payment of filing fees is both mandatory and jurisdictional")
28
188-190
25-Nov-2002
/14-Jan-2003
LASC Minute Order: MOTION OF DEFENDANT TO VACATE DEFAULT OR DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS DENIED ("relief per CCP §473")
35
233
10-Feb/06-Mar-2003 LASC Minute Order: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE WHY THE DEFAULT SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE ("argued and submitted")
37
236-237
21-Feb/03-Mar-2003 LASC Minute Order: OSC RE RECONSIDERATION OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT ("court declines to reconsider")
39
242-244
19-Mar/20-May-2003 LASC Minute Order: RULING ON DEFAULT PROVE-UP HEARING ("court finds in favor of plaintiff")
43
252-256
08/14-Apr-2003 LASC: Register of Actions
34
228-232
10-Feb/27-Mar-2003 LASC: Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Rambam v Prytulak BC271433, Monday, February 10, 2003, pp. 6-8.
45
259-259
14/14-May-2003 Prytulak: Dye & Durham Fax documenting Prytulak acquisition of 20-Mar-2002 Judgment
18
076-077
20-Sep-2002 Prytulak to Clarke: "Court door slammed in my face"
36
234-235
18-Feb-2003 Prytulak to Clarke: "Fourth request for transcripts"
32
208-209
10-Jan-2003 Prytulak to Clarke: "Transcript Order"
16
064
09-Sep-2002 Prytulak to Clarke: "What happened to my Motion-to-Quash-C?"
48
266-268
27-Jun-2003 Prytulak to Dunn: "Kurtz controls all extant copies"
46
260
05-Jun-2003 Prytulak to Dunn: "Please return two missing money orders"
33
210-227
20-Jan-2003 Prytulak to Dunn: "Three documents call for a reply"
47
261-265
07-Jun-2003 Prytulak to Dunn: "Unlawful interference with the reviewing court"
38
238-241
14-Mar-2003 Prytulak to Kuhl: "But what about those missing documents?"
26
169-185
21/22-Nov-2002 Prytulak to LASC: ANSWER TO "PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT," "Prytulak-Reply-D7" (minus exhibits)
23
111-145
05/07-Nov-2002 Prytulak to LASC: DEFENDANT PRYTULAK ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF RAMBAM OBJECTIONS "Prytulak-Reply-D3" (minus exhibits)
29
191-192
02/03-Dec-2002 Prytulak to LASC: DEFENDANT PRYTULAK REQUESTS A MINUTE ORDER "Prytulak-Request-for-Minute-Order"
06
022-027
27/29-May-2002 Prytulak to LASC: "Motion-to-Quash-B" (FedExed to LASC, no service on Rambam, no filing fee.  Minus exhibit.)
14
044-060
29/30-Aug-2002 Prytulak to LASC: "Motion-to-Quash-C" (FedExed to LASC with Proof of Service to Rambam and with filing fee.  Minus exhibits.)
19
078-097
25/26-Sep-2002 Prytulak to LASC: "Motion-to-Quash-D" (FedExed to LASC with Proof of Service to Rambam and with filing fee.  Minus exhibits.)
42
248-251
01/02-Apr-2003 Prytulak to LASC: NOTICE OF APPEAL OF JUDGMENT
09
030-032
14/17-Jun-2002 Prytulak to LASC: "Prytulak-Query-B" FedExed to LASC, re Motion-to-Quash-B (cc to Rambam)
17
065-075
13/16-Sep-2002 Prytulak to LASC: "Prytulak-Reply-C" (FedExed to both LASC and Rambam
04
014-018
03/15-Apr-2002 Rambam to LASC: COMPLAINT ("Rambam-Complaint-B") filed 04-Apr-2002
27
186-187
25/29-Nov-2002 Rambam to LASC: NOTICE OF RULING RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND TO QUASH SERVICE
15
061-063
03/09-Sep-2002 Rambam to LASC: OBJECTION TO DOCUMENT SERVED BY DEFENDANT PRYTULAK ("Rambam-Objection-C")
21
105-108
30-Sep/04-Oct-2002 Rambam to LASC: OBJECTION TO DOCUMENT SERVED BY DEFENDANT PRYTULAK ("Rambam-Objection-D1")
22
109-110
10/17-Oct-2002 Rambam to LASC: OBJECTION TO IMPROPER EX-PARTE CONTACT ("Rambam-Objection-D2")
24
146-165
12/18-Nov-2002 Rambam to LASC: PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT (minus 39-page exhibit promoting VNN Hoax)
31
195-207
07/14-Jan-2003 Rambam to LASC: PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE RECONSIDERATION OF ISSUES REGARDING PERSONAL JURISDICTION (minus exhibit)
25
166-168
15/19-Nov-2002 Rambam to LASC: PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT
05
019-021
21/27-May-2002 Rambam to LASC: REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT (first and defective request)
10
033-038
18/25-Jul-2002 Rambam to LASC: SUMMARY OF CASE FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT BY COURT UPON DECLARATIONS (minus exhibits)

Top Contents Authorities Chronology Preliminary Gist Background Issues Prejudice Verification Prayer Appendix Bottom


HOME DISINFORMATION PEOPLE RAMBAM KLAUSNER DUNN KUHL DUKES L.A. JUSTICE   FEDEX: KURTZ LASC APPEAL SUPREME