NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. For years after Ukraine gained independence, it made
the news chiefly with respect to its nuclear weapons. The West, and in
particular the United States, employed a campaign of badgering, bullying,
disparagement and humiliation � combined with a few weak and vague
promises � in its effort, ultimately successful, to make Ukraine give up its
nuclear weapons. The United States made it appear that it was simply
following the principle that a nation must de-nuclearize before becoming
eligible for U.S. aid, but omitted to explain why it was that Israel, the
single largest recipient of U.S. aid, was allowed to possess nuclear weapons. And CUI BONO Ukraine's unilateral disarmament? Ukraine was not belligerent, not saber-rattling. Ukraine either did, or certainly would have, removed American targeting for its long-range missiles, and in any case acted with great friendliness toward the United States. That Ukraine might use its nuclear weapons against Russia, or even threaten Russia, is also inconceivable. One reason is that Russia had even more nuclear weapons than Ukraine, was better able to deliver them, was marked by irrationality and instability, and was particularly contemptuous and arrogant toward Ukraine � not the sort of neighbor Ukraine would want to play nuclear confrontation with, or to lob nuclear missiles at. Another reason is that in view of the large Russian population within Ukraine, Russia could not contemplate using nuclear weapons against Ukraine, and so could not saber-rattle its nuclear sabers against Ukraine � and so Ukraine would not be predisposed to rattle its nuclear sabers back. Also, non-nuclear military aggression on the part of Russia against Ukraine was not and is not plausible � because of Ukraine's size, a military invasion would be frightfully expensive, and because of the tenacity of some Ukrainian nationalists, the venture would be bloody. Also, Russia quickly realized that the dollar was mightier than the sword, and that there was no point winning with blood that which could simply be bought � and with Russia's larger size and superior economic performance, it will simply buy up whatever it wants � starting with Crimea. Thus, Ukraine was threatening nobody with its nuclear weapons, and the possibility that Ukraine would use, or threaten to use, its nuclear weapons against anybody was utterly remote. So, why all the fuss? In my view, there were two beneficiaries to Ukraine's nuclear disarmament � Russia and Israel. Russia gained not because it became able to wage nuclear war against a defenseless Ukraine, but because a nation possessing a vast nuclear arsenal must be treated by the West with respect and deference, and the West must make serious and substantial efforts to stabilize and modernize such a country. That, I believe, is the chief reason why Russia today is thrown the lion's share of international aid, and Ukraine is thrown the scraps � it is because Russia's nuclear weapons make Russia's backwardness directly and immediately threatening to the U.S. in a way which Ukraine's backwardness does not. The reason Russia wanted Ukraine de-nuclearized, then, is because it did not want such a large competitor for Western respect and Western aid. And how did Israel gain from Ukraine's nuclear disarmament? Israel's survival depends ultimately on its possessing nuclear weapons while the Muslim world does not. The image of Ukraine possessing thousands of nuclear weapons, imperfectly monitored and accounted for, in combination with extreme poverty, made the image of an illicit sale of one or a few nuclear weapons to a Muslim country plausible. Israel preferred these weapons in Russian hands firstly because having all the weapons within one political entity made them easier to keep track of than having them spread over two political entities, and in any case, Russia was the political entity that had controlled the nuclear weapons over many decades without losing any to the Muslim world, whereas the Ukrainian political entity was new on the scene, and did not have the same track record. Also, as Russia seemed slated for serious modernization and Ukraine was not, this again made Russia the preferred location of the nuclear weapons. But to return to the question of aid to Ukraine � nuclear disarmament is a case in which the chief beneficiaries are Russia and Israel, and the United States only indirectly in that it has an interest in the well-being of Russia and Israel. Ukraine benefits slightly in that the cost of monitoring and maintaining and servicing these weapons and their delivery vehicles is removed. However, Ukraine is primarily the big loser in the transaction because it is now accorded reduced respect and allocated reduced aid into the indefinite future. And even though Ukraine is the big loser, the cost of placing itself into the position of being the big loser is counted as aid to Ukraine. Thus, President Bill Clinton said in a joint press conference with President Leonid Kuchma on November 22, 1994, "I told President Kuchma that the United States will continue to work with Ukraine to dismantle completely its nuclear arsenal. Three hundred and fifty million dollars of our total $900 million two-year aid package is targeted toward that goal, and there could be no better use of the funds" (The Ukrainian Weekly, December 4, 1994, p. 9). And so my conclusion is that some foreign aid funds � in the figures cited above, a substantial proportion of them � not only fail to help Ukraine, but actually hurt Ukraine. The principle suggested by list subscribers with respect to Cuba � that when nations give away large amounts of money, it can usually be discovered that they do so to help themselves rather than to help the recipient � should be applied to the United States itself. The United States, in some cases at least, spends money to help itself even when the spending of that money hurts the recipient. |
Lubomyr Prytulak