Other comments on Ukrainian nuclear disarmament can be found in the Lubomyr Prytulak InfoUkes postings of 12Oct97, 14Oct97, and 15Oct97, and as well in the Amitav Ghosh selections of 26Oct98.
Date: Thu, 02 Oct 1997 10:19:50 -0700
To: [email protected]
From: Lubomyr Prytulak
Subject: Plundering of Ukraine (reply to Victor Chudowsky)
Victor Chudowsky's research in "Re: Ukraine's hidden friend" of Sep 30/97
has made a significant contribution with respect to our understanding of
Cuban aid to Chornobyl children � particularly on the question of whether it
is likely that Cuban aid to Ukraine was reciprocated by Ukrainian aid to
Cuba, such that the event constitutes a swap rather than uni-directional aid.
However, I continue to be cynical toward Western, and particularly
American, aid to Ukraine. Here are a few of my points:
(1) NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. For years after Ukraine gained independence, it made the news chiefly with respect to its nuclear weapons. The West, and
in particular the United States, employed a campaign of badgering,
bullying, disparagement and humiliation � combined with a few weak and vague
promises � in its effort, ultimately successful, to make Ukraine give up its
nuclear weapons. The United States made it appear that it was simply
following the principle that a nation must de-nuclearize before becoming
eligible for U.S. aid, but omitted to explain why it was that Israel, the
single largest recipient of U.S. aid, was allowed to possess nuclear weapons.
And CUI BONO Ukraine's unilateral disarmament? Ukraine was not
belligerent, not saber-rattling. Ukraine either did, or certainly would
have, removed American targeting for its long-range missiles, and in any
case acted with great friendliness toward the United States. That Ukraine
might use its nuclear weapons against Russia, or even threaten Russia, is
also inconceivable. One reason is that Russia had even more nuclear
weapons than Ukraine, was better able to deliver them, was marked by
irrationality and instability, and was particularly contemptuous and
arrogant toward Ukraine � not the sort of neighbor Ukraine would want to
play nuclear confrontation with, or to lob nuclear missiles at. Another
reason is that in view of the large Russian population within Ukraine,
Russia could not contemplate using nuclear weapons against Ukraine, and so
could not saber-rattle its nuclear sabers against Ukraine � and so Ukraine
would not be predisposed to rattle its nuclear sabers back. Also,
non-nuclear military aggression on the part of Russia against Ukraine was
not and is not plausible � because of Ukraine's size, a military invasion
would be frightfully expensive, and because of the tenacity of some
Ukrainian nationalists, the venture would be bloody. Also, Russia quickly
realized that the dollar was mightier than the sword, and that there was no
point winning with blood that which could simply be bought � and with
Russia's larger size and superior economic performance, it will simply buy
up whatever it wants � starting with Crimea. Thus, Ukraine was threatening
nobody with its nuclear weapons, and the possibility that Ukraine would
use, or threaten to use, its nuclear weapons against anybody was utterly
remote. So, why all the fuss?
In my view, there were two beneficiaries to Ukraine's nuclear
disarmament � Russia and Israel. Russia gained not because it became able
to wage nuclear war against a defenseless Ukraine, but because a nation
possessing a vast nuclear arsenal must be treated by the West with respect
and deference, and the West must make serious and substantial efforts to
stabilize and modernize such a country. That, I believe, is the chief
reason why Russia today is thrown the lion's share of international aid,
and Ukraine is thrown the scraps � it is because Russia's nuclear weapons
make Russia's backwardness directly and immediately threatening to the U.S.
in a way which Ukraine's backwardness does not. The reason Russia wanted
Ukraine de-nuclearized, then, is because it did not want such a large
competitor for Western respect and Western aid.
And how did Israel gain from Ukraine's nuclear disarmament? Israel's
survival depends ultimately on its possessing nuclear weapons while the
Muslim world does not. The image of Ukraine possessing thousands of
nuclear weapons, imperfectly monitored and accounted for, in combination
with extreme poverty, made the image of an illicit sale of one or a few
nuclear weapons to a Muslim country plausible. Israel preferred these
weapons in Russian hands firstly because having all the weapons within one
political entity made them easier to keep track of than having them spread
over two political entities, and in any case, Russia was the political
entity that had controlled the nuclear weapons over many decades without
losing any to the Muslim world, whereas the Ukrainian political entity was
new on the scene, and did not have the same track record. Also, as Russia
seemed slated for serious modernization and Ukraine was not, this again
made Russia the preferred location of the nuclear weapons.
But to return to the question of aid to Ukraine � nuclear disarmament is a
case in which the chief beneficiaries are Russia and Israel, and the United
States only indirectly in that it has an interest in the well-being of
Russia and Israel. Ukraine benefits slightly in that the cost of
monitoring and maintaining and servicing these weapons and their delivery
vehicles is removed. However, Ukraine is primarily the big loser in the
transaction because it is now accorded reduced respect and allocated
reduced aid into the indefinite future.
And even though Ukraine is the big loser, the cost of placing itself into
the position of being the big loser is counted as aid to Ukraine. Thus,
President Bill Clinton said in a joint press conference with President
Leonid Kuchma on November 22, 1994, "I told President Kuchma that the
United States will continue to work with Ukraine to dismantle completely
its nuclear arsenal. Three hundred and fifty million dollars of our total
$900 million two-year aid package is targeted toward that goal, and there
could be no better use of the funds" (The Ukrainian Weekly, December 4,
1994, p. 9).
And so my conclusion is that some foreign aid funds � in the figures cited
above, a substantial proportion of them � not only fail to help Ukraine, but
actually hurt Ukraine. The principle suggested by list subscribers with
respect to Cuba � that when nations give away large amounts of money, it can
usually be discovered that they do so to help themselves rather than to
help the recipient � should be applied to the United States itself. The
United States, in some cases at least, spends money to help itself even
when the spending of that money hurts the recipient.
(2) AMERICAN INTENTIONS. When we look at Germany or Japan, we are invited
to arrive at the conclusion that U.S. intervention and assistance following
the war succeeded in establishing democracy and instituting structures that
led to economic success. But Germany and Japan are large and powerful
countries � what is America's success rate with smaller, weaker countries?
It is unimpressive. Let's look at the case of Zaire.
(3) AMERICAN INTENTIONS � THE ZAIRE MODEL. When Ukrainians think of the
effects of American aid, they think of Germany and Japan. But perhaps
Ukraine is categorized by America not as a Germany or as a Japan, but as a
Zaire. I will quote several passages from an article by Adam Hochschild,
It Takes a Villa, published in The New Yorker earlier this year prior to
the death of Zairian dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. I see that when I ripped
out the two sheets on which the article is contained from the magazine, I
assumed that the date of the article would appear somewhere on the four
pages � but unfortunately it does not.
The upshot of Hochschild's article is that Mobutu was a "kleptocrat
extraordinaire, the epitome of the African 'big man,' who rules by theft
and fear" (p. 6). Comparing Mobutu to the previous ruler of the same
territory � Leopold II of Belgium � Hochschild writes:
|
As rulers of a vast African land ... both men were ruthless and cruel in
their disregard of human rights. ... Both drained huge private fortunes
from the territory: Mobutu's is estimated at between four and five billion
dollars.... (p. 8) |
|
Europe's legacy to Africa was not the example of democracy.... It was the
example of plunder. And nowhere was the plunder as vast or as brazen as in
the territory that is now Zaire. In running his country as a moneymaking
machine for himself and his entourage, Mobutu has merely been following the
pattern set by his Riviera neighbor [Leopold II] of a century ago. (p. 8) |
Mobutu's legacy to Zaire is described as follows (and as you read, ask
yourself whether you can be certain that this is not the pattern that
Ukraine has already begun to follow):
|
Today, Zair's riches have been siphoned off to the Villa del Mare and
Mobutu's other luxury homes in Paris, Spain, Belgium, Portugal,
Switzerland, and elsewhere, and into the pockets of his foreign business
partners. Zaire's schools, universities, and hospitals are bankrupt.
Among the police and in the civil service, bribery is not just routine: it
is often the only source of income. There has not been anything remotely
resembling a democratic national election for more than thirty years. As a
stricken and fragmented Zaire now implodes, no one knows what new and more
terrible varieties of famine, mass flight, and civil war may lie ahead; we
are perhaps seeing only a beginning. And all this is happening,
tragically, in a country whose size and potential wealth could make it a
powerful positive influence in its region.... (p. 8) |
Now here is the important part � it is the role that the United States has
played in bringing Zaire to its present state:
|
The United States has been the major backer of Mobutu for more than thirty
years, to the tune of well over a billion dollars in aid. President
Kennedy welcomed him to the White House, in 1963, and gave him a United
States Air Force plane for his personal use and a crew to fly it for him.
President Reagan received him several times and praised him as "a voice of
good sense and good will." President Bush greeted him on an official visit
to this country as "one of our most valued friends" (p. 8). |
And it is not just the case of Zaire alone that invites us to be
suspicious of the US Trojan Horse. Look at all of Latin America � long
within the American sphere of influence, long the recipient of American
guidance and aid. What we see here is an unrelieved pattern of the support
of ruthless dictatorships which under CIA direction were responsible for
the torture and execution of hundreds of thousands of people primarily for
the crime of opposing dictatorship, torture, and execution, and which
ruthless dictatorships at the same time delivered poverty rather than
economic well-being.
Or, look at the very largest recipient of American aid � Israel. Israel is
a racist Apartheid state which treats its oppressed minorities worse than
Apartheid South Africa treated its blacks. With the full backing of the
United States, there has been created in the Middle East a country
execrated by the entire Muslim world. Is Israel an example of the success
story that the United States is able to produce when it gives a country its
fullest support?
Or, look at the second-largest recipient of American aid � Egypt. Egypt is
at present governed by a ruthless military dictatorship kept in place by
the United States. So long as this dictatorship remains in power, Egypt
has no chance of evolving into a free and open society, and thus has little
chance of substantial economic development, simply because massive amounts
of American money keep in power a nomenklatura which does not allow native
Egyptian intelligence and talent and creativity to rise to the top and
begin steering the country in productive directions.
One could go on � but perhaps it is not necessary to in order to present my
conclusion. My conclusion is that when a nation succeeds in winning
American guidance and aid, then this should not by itself become the
occasion of rejoicing nor should it elicit feelings of optimism � not until
it is definitively established whether America's intentions are to produce
another German or Japan or another Egypt or Zaire. As America most
typically follows the Zairian model which leads toward degradation and
enslavement, the mere fact alone of American intervention should lead more
to suspicion than to trust. More specifically, the United States should in
the absence of evidence to the contrary be expected to act in its own
interests, not in Ukraine's, and it may be more in America's interests to
have a Ukraine that is backward and weak � but subservient and
predictable � than a Ukraine that is advanced and strong � but independent
and thus not wholly predictable. So far, after more than six years of
independence and of guidance from the United States and of aid from the
United States, all we have seen is a slide into dependence, degradation,
and poverty. To assume that this slide is a temporary aberration in the
implementation of the Japanese model is a triumph of hope over the lessons
of historical precedent.
If the United States were indeed a friend of Ukraine, and if it were
indeed a friend of justice, then instead of offering Ukraine, say, a $25
million loan, it might rather ask Israel to extradite former Ukrainian
deputy Yukhym
hilsky back to Ukraine where investigators could ask him
about the $25 million that he is said to have stolen from the Ukrainian
government. If the United States were a friend of Ukraine, it would ask
Switzerland to stop accepting deposits of money from Ukrainian members of
parliament. Instead, the United States stands by while Ukraine is
plundered, and then offers Ukraine loans which do not begin to make up the
losses of the plundering.
(4) THE CASE HISTORY OF UKRAINE'S COATS. Ukrainian factories that formerly
made coats for the Red Army converted to making civilian coats which were
exported to, among other places, the United States:
|
Ukrainian coats are proving a blessing for moderate-income Americans.
Prior to the arrival of the imports, good wool coats routinely cost more
than $200. Now, wool coats are available for under $100. Matthew Burns,
chief executive of the Eastland Woolen Mills of Corinna, Maine, observed
that Ukrainian coats are "an excellent garment. It's well-tailored. It's
well-manufactured. It's stylish." (p. 9) |
Well, here, it would seem is a success story which simply needs to be
duplicated in one area after another for Ukraine to succeed economically.
If the United States were interested in helping Ukraine in this one
venture, then no intervention is called for � just standing by and watching
it happen is enough.
But life is not so simple. In fact, Ukraine makes just about nothing that
is not already being made in the United States. Thus, if Ukraine is able
to make a better product cheaper, then the comparable American manufacturer
must expect to lose sales. What did the American administration do
in the case of the Ukrainian coats? U.S. federal officials began
pressuring Ukraine to restrict the number of coats it exported to the U.S.
and threatened to impose restrictive quotas. American officials are
described, perhaps sardonically, as "horrified at the appearance of foreign
bargains in American department stores."
There are, however, a large number of reasons why the U.S. should allow
unrestricted importation of Ukrainian coats. The U.S. textile industry is
one of the country's most protected. Textile tariffs and import quotas
cost American consumers some $40 billion per year. Half the cost of
American textiles is attributed to tariffs and quota restrictions. The
American government already rakes in a 21.5% tariff on each Ukrainian coat, thereby
adding to US revenues and also giving the U.S. industry a huge competitive
advantage over foreign competition. In the first six months of 1994,
Ukraine exported $1.8 million worth of clothing to the United States, which
constituted barely one-tenth of 1 percent of the value of all clothing
imported into the U.S. The United States advocates free-market economies
and purports to be a friend of Ukraine. Bill Clinton, speaking generally
and not about Ukrainian coats, has said
|
For four and a half decades, we challenged these nations to cast away the
shackles of communism. Now that they have done so, surely we have an
obligation to work with them.... (The Ukrainian Weekly, March 26, 1995, p. 6) |
Even as imports of coats into the U.S. have gone up, so has domestic U.S.
production, so that there is no evidence that the domestic coat industry is
being harmed by the imports, although obviously it can be argued that in
the absence of Ukrainian imports, the US industry would have grown even
more than it did. Donald Levy of the New York firm of Lou Levy & Sons
speaking against import quotas said
|
This to me is the exact opposite of what the U.S. government says it is
trying to achieve in pledging hundreds of millions of dollars to Ukraine in
foreign aid. I believe that the quota not only directly negates the
benefits of an aid package..., but also sends a highly unfavorable message
to other U.S. industries interested in Ukrainian investment. (The
Ukrainian Weekly, May 7, 1995, p. 6) |
And to summarize:
|
Many experts fear that the economic chaos in Ukraine could result in a
nuclear civil war. Clothing is one of the few exports in which Ukraine is
competitive in world markets. Yet, officials in the U.S. Commerce
Department seem obsessed with finding a way to throttle the Ukrainians.
(James Bovard, The Ukrainian Weekly, February 5, 1995, p. 9) |
And so more specifically, the US response was that President Bill Clinton
together with Senator George Mitchell of Maine joined together to demand a
limitation of imports of Ukrainian coats and threatened to impose an import
quota.
So what is going on here? Why with the many excellent reasons for
encouraging Ukraine to develop its textile industry, was the United States
trying to stunt its growth? Why would the United States prefer to give
Ukraine money, or to lend it money, rather than allowing Ukraine to earn
money in trade?
I think the answer is very simple, and I challenge anybody to come up with
a better explanation. If Ukraine earns money in trade, then it become
stronger and more independent. It owes the United States nothing. No
Ukrainian has been bought. The people who make money from the
trade � either in the United States or in Ukraine � are free to think as they
like, to vote as they like, to acquire wealth and power which they may
ultimately place at the disposal of interests which run contrary to
American interests.
In contrast, when the U.S. makes a grant or a loan, the situation is
entirely different � someone is indebted, someone is being bought, someone
loses a measure of independence. When the U.S. gives grants or makes
loans, it can control who the money is directed to, and it can exercise
control over that person's later actions. This is true whether the money
is used wisely for the good of Ukraine, or is stolen and ends up in a Swiss
bank � the donor gains control in either case, perhaps even more control if
the money is stolen.
I think, then, that it is because the U.S. wants primarily not to put
Ukraine on its feet, but rather to control Ukraine that it prefers to give
out loans and donations rather than to allow Ukraine to develop
economically. And the situation � obviously � is not restricted to Ukrainian
coats, but is a universal one applying to every exportable commodity � that
is, I would venture to guess that there is not a single thing that Ukraine
is able to sell internationally that is not already being sold also by the
United States (or some Western country). Why are coats any different from
any other commodity? � Every item sold by Ukraine threatens to be one less
item sold by the U.S.
For example, the situation is similar with respect to Ukrainian sugar.
Thus, ANNOUNCE list member "Anubis" reports on Oct 1/97 under the subject
"Yatsenko" that "Taras" summarized a speech by Ukrainian official Vladimir
Yatsenko, in which summary was included the following statement again
implicating the US in the boycott of a Ukrainian product:
|
The problem of surplus sugar ... is severe
due to trade barriers set up by the EU and
USA which do not allow Ukie sugar into
these markets, yet their sugar occupies
some 15% of the Ukie market. Russia
boycotted the Ukie sugar for several years
and the signing of the Russian-Ukrainian
Treaty this past July opened up this market.... |
And so again, if the US is genuinely interested in helping Ukraine, should
we not be hearing that the US is removing its own trade barriers against
Ukrainian sugar, and asking others to remove theirs? But no, building up
the Ukrainian sugar industry threatens loss of sales by US and other
Western sugar producers, and threatens a loss of control over an
increasingly strong and independent Ukraine, whereas giving Ukraine (many?)
loans and (a few?) donations tends to produce a weaker, more subservient
and controllable Ukraine. Similar arguments can be made with respect to
the sale of nuclear technology and weaponry � that the American attitude is
to kill Ukrainian sales and in compensation place Ukraine on US welfare.
And so the one statement made by Victor Chudowsky that I most disagree
with is that
|
Loans are the best type of aid,
because they force the borrower
to make the wisest use of resources.
This plan is slowly working, as Ukraine
has received over US$2.7 billion for a
variety of projects. Hopefully
one day they will pay the money back.... |
I prefer to think that the removal of trade barriers is the best type of
aid. I think that loans do not force the borrower to make the wisest use
of his resources, but rather that loans can be stolen by government
officials who know that the repayments will fall not on their own backs but
on the backs of the Ukrainian people generally. The loans can also be
allocated for foolish or mismanaged projects. The world contains numerous
countries that have taken out loans in the distant past, and can today
point to no lasting benefit that was achieved as a result of those loans,
but whose people continue to make crushing payments, and cannot within
their lifetimes look forward to the day when their debt will be repaid. So
I ask, how are the Ukrainian people better off for the $2.7 billion
(mentioned by Victor above) that they received? And if there is no answer
to that question, perhaps there is an answer to the question of how they
are worse off � the repayments of principal and interest have probably
already begun, and can be calculated on a per capita basis. Could Ukraine
have earned $2.7 billion over the same interval had its products not been
denied access to world markets by trade barriers? How many more infusions
of $2.7 billion will Ukraine be invited to swallow? How many lifetimes
will it take to pay all this money back?
Lubomyr Prytulak