Prytulak to Bascue:  Chaos or Over-Billing in Los Angeles Superior Court Fees?
"One can only imagine the vast burden that this unauthorized billing may have been placing on the backs of defendants in LASC civil actions over the years.  One might expect that investigators into misconduct will be sensitive to the possibility that funds acquired without authority are particularly vulnerable to non-entry in accounting ledgers." — Lubomyr Prytulak

Lubomyr Prytulak
Ukrainian Archive, www.ukar.org

07 October 2002

James A. Bascue
Presiding Judge
Los Angeles Superior Court
111 North Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA
USA     90012

Re: Rambam vs Prytulak   BC271433   before Judge James R. Dunn

James A. Bascue:

Upon receiving 26-Sep-2002 a faxed statement of the filing of Defendant Prytulak Motion-to-Quash-D (so named here to distinguish it from three earlier motions to quash) in Case BC271433, the magnitude of the fee charged exceeded Defendant expectations and occasioned the following analysis.

The Rubber-Stamp Court Statement Verges on Illegibility

The Court statement of fees and charges arising from Defendant Prytulak Motion-to-Quash-D consists of a small rubber-stamped area measuring 8.6 x 3.2 cm (3.4 x 1.3 inches) on the front page of a fax transmission from the Court whose purpose is to confirm filing.  Even when this rubber-stamp area is enlarged as below, in some spots it borders on illegibility, and in a few spots actually becomes illegible, which both discourages and thwarts verification of the Court fee.

The Rubber-Stamp Court Statement is Cryptic

Where Defendant was expecting a filing fee of $193, it was not immediately evident where the above "FILING FEE" of $239 came from, and even less evident where the total charge of $285.37 came from.  The illegibility combined with the opacity left the Court rubber-stamp account far short of a standard of service that is the norm in the business world, and almost made Defendant wonder whether the Court had anything to hide.  Further delving into the rubber-stamp statement of account revealed that maybe the Court did have something to hide.

Faxing fees

First, let us deal with faxing costs that can be seen in the rubber stamp above, which at the receiving end in the United States are in US dollars:

The Court's "processing fee" for receiving any fax: 3.00
One dollar per fax page received times 40 pages: 40.00
"Confirmation fee" is the Court's cost of faxing me 5 pages which confirm filing: 3.37
TOTAL:   46.37

Not much to complain of here, as the above faxing fees seem to conform to the LASC Fee Schedule:

10. Facsimile filing, per document in addition to any other fee imposed by law ...  CRC 2006(g)  ...  $3.00
Plus fee per page of document filed by facsimile  ...  CRC 2006(g)  ...  $1.00
Los Angeles Superior Court Fee Schedule, Effective 01-Jul-2002, Civil Filing Fees www.lasuperiorcourt.org/fees/pdf/fee-schedule.pdf.  All Los Angeles Superior Court (LASC) fees cited in the instant letters are ones that were in effect on the day that Motion-to-Quash-D was filed on 26-Sep-2002.

And even at this early point we are able to lunge ahead and reach the grand total.  First, subtracting the faxing fee of $46.37 from the total fee of $285.37 leaves $239, which in turn breaks down into the expected filing fee of $193, plus $46.  The mysterious $46 is of the utmost importance, and will be dealt with further below.

What About That Filing Fee of $193?

The LASC web site Fee Schedule lists the "first paper" fee as $193:

7a   First paper on behalf of each defendant, intervenor, respondent, or adverse party, whether appearing separately or jointly, per appearing party  ...  GC 26826  ...  $193.00
Los Angeles Superior Court Fee Schedule, Effective 01-Jul-2002, Civil Filing Fees

Consulting the sole authority cited above — the Government Code (GC) 26826 (which can be seen to be quoted in full below) — demonstrates:

  1. The Government Code first-paper fee is $182.  The LASC fee schedule above cites GC 26826 as its sole authority for charging $193 for a first paper, whereas GC 26826 below in fact stipulates $182.  If authority has been granted for applying a surcharge, that authority should be cited; if no authority can be cited, Lubomyr Prytulak requests a refund of $11.  As it seems plausible that the Court does have authority for its surcharge, but that this authority is at present concealed from accessible verification, concealed as perhaps by Government Code fee increases being slow to be updated on the Government of California web site, the matter of the $11 discrepancy will not be pursued further in the instant letter.

  2. The second word in the Government Code is "total."  The Government Code below stipulates that the first-paper filing fee is to be the "total" fee, which might be understood as at minimum forbidding any supplemental fee, a prohibition which the LASC Fee Schedule above chose not to echo, and a prohibition which we will shortly discover the Court violating.

  3. "First paper" means "first document."  Although it is section (a) below that is most relevant, section (b) is included because it provides instances indicating that a "paper" is what it sounds like — a material object, variously described as a document, a report, a filed declaration, a signed settlement, or a stipulation which in one instance is referred to as being signed.  There is not the slightest hint that the "first paper" for which a filing fee is charged can be other than a document submitted to the court.

GC 26826.   (a) The total fee for filing the first paper in the action described in Section 26820.4 on behalf of any defendant, intervenor, respondent, or adverse party, whether separately or jointly, except for the purpose of making disclaimer shall be one hundred eighty-two dollars ($182).
      (b) As used in this section, the term "paper" does not include any of the following:
      (1) A stipulation for the appointment of a temporary judge or of a court investigator, or the report made by the court investigator.
      (2) The declaration of a spouse filed in an order to show cause proceeding.
      (3) A marital settlement agreement which is signed by a defaulted respondent and intended for incorporation in a proposed decree of dissolution of marriage.
      (4) A stipulation regarding the date of termination of the marital status when the court has retained jurisdiction over that date.
      (5) A document relating to a stipulated postjudgment modification of child support.
      (6) A stipulation to modify a marital settlement agreement which was signed by a defaulted respondent and incorporated in a decree of dissolution if the stipulation is presented by the petitioner.

What About That Mysterious $46?

The $23 subsequent-paper filing fee

All that remains unaccounted for is that mysterious $46 computed above.  Defendant's guess (and it reflects poorly on LASC accounting that Defendant is not told but has to guess) is that $46 is twice the $23 filing fee for a paper subsequent to the first.  Why this fee might be levied at all, let alone why it might be doubled, will be examined further below, but first a look at what the LASC Fee Schedule has to say about the filing of a paper subsequent to the first paper:

13.   Notice of motion, any other paper requiring a hearing subsequent to the first paper (with specified exceptions) or application for renewal of judgment  ...  GC 26830  ...  $23.00
Los Angeles Superior Court Fee Schedule, Effective 01-Jul-2002, Civil Filing Fees

Searching for confirmation within the authority cited above of Government Code 26830, of which only the first portion is relevant and reproduced below, we note the repetition of the pivotal phrase "subsequent to the first paper" which underlines that this section applies to all papers that follow the first paper, and that thus are distinct from the first paper:

GC 26830.   (a) Except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c), the fee for filing any notice of motion, or any other paper requiring a hearing subsequent to the first paper, or any notice of intention to move for a new trial of any civil action or special proceeding, or an application for renewal of a judgment, is twenty-three dollars ($23).
California Government Code, County Clerk Fees, 26820-26863, www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=gov&group=26001-27000&file=26820-26863

The "appearance fee" is mythical

What emerges from our examination of the filing fees for first and subsequent papers is the conclusion that Defendant Motion-to-Quash-D cannot be considered to be both a first paper and a subsequent paper, and thus cannot command both the $193 fee and the $23 fee.

And yet that is what Court representative Katina (at 213-974-5173) told Defendant in the course of two telephone conversations on the morning of 25-Sep-2002 in advance of his submitting his Motion-to-Quash-D — that Defendant was going to be charged both an "appearance fee" and a filing fee.  Defendant first got wind of the notion of an "appearance fee" in Rambam attorney Gary Kurtz's objection of 03-Sep-2002, p. 3, when Kurtz stated that "Defendant [Prytulak] still has not paid an appearance fee or obtained a fee waiver."

"Appearance fee" — what's that?  The Government Code makes no mention of an "appearance fee."  In the 6192 words contained in GC 26820-26863 which deals with fees chargeable by the County Clerk, the expression "appearance fee" is never seen, and the word "appearance" can be found exactly once, and is synonymous with "first filing," and in any case addresses a situation in which no fee is charged:

GC 26857.5.   Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no fee shall be charged to file a respondent's or defendant's appearance, stipulation if any, and waiver of rights in the action under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 [...].
California Government Code, County Clerk Fees, 26820-26863, www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=gov&group=26001-27000&file=26820-26863, blue emphasis added.

Turning from the Government Code to the LASC web site Fee Schedule, we again discover that no "appearance fee" finds its place in the fee list, and thus no authority is cited for such a fee, and no fee amount is specified.  There is a single mention of an "appearance fee," but this occurs in passing during discussion of the unrelated topic of change of venue, rather than being an exposition of such a fee, and it may be construed as being a colloquial reference to the inflated fee charged for filing a first paper:

1.  Transfer to another county (change of venue) — transmittal fee (in addtion to motion fee, filing fees payable to receiving court, and this court’s appearance fee if not previously paid by paying party) Plaintiff pays if transfer is ordered due to filing in wrong court, otherwise moving party pays at time of filing motion  ...  GC 26823 & GC 72054  ...  $23.00
Los Angeles Superior Court Fee Schedule, Effective 01-Jul-2002, Civil Filing Fees
www.lasuperiorcourt.org/fees/pdf/fee-schedule.pdf, blue emphasis added, "addtion" in the original.

California law, therefore, cannot readily be found to harbor any such entity as an "appearance fee," though in casual or colloquial speech, the inflated fee for a first paper may be spoken of as an "appearance fee," and colloquial speech is what "appearance fee" popping up exactly once in the LASC Fee Schedule above seems to amount to.  "Appearance fee," then, is not a legal entity, but only lawyers' slang, and it is the genius of the Court to turn lawyers' slang into profit according to the following verbal legerdemain — tell litigants filing nothing more than a single first paper that two fees are required of them, an "appearance fee" of $193, and a "filing fee" of $23.  The success of the legerdemain relies on litigants failing to understand that the Government Code neither makes provision for any "appearance fee," nor levies the $23 fee for anything but a subsequent filing.

Defendant Prytulak needs one hearing, and not two or three hearings

In Defendant's particular case, the $23 subsequent-paper fee appears to have been applied twice to justify a charge of $46.  This was probably occasioned by Defendant's first paper giving the impression of containing two separate motions, which impression receives some support from that paper's title, "Prytulak Notice of Motion to Vacate Default or Default Judgment joined with Notice of Motion to Quash Service of Summons for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction," which does indeed sound like two separate motions bundled into one document.  However, according to the LASC Fee Schedule Civil Filing Fee 13 that has already been quoted above, it is not every subsequent motion that can be charged the $23 filing fee, but rather it is every subsequent motion or paper that requires its own separate hearing: "Notice of motion, any other paper requiring a hearing subsequent to the first paper."

It is clear that the Fee Schedule envisions one motion per paper.  In bundling two motions within one paper, Defendant Prytulak follows a convention dictated by default being necessarily and automatically voided by quashing, such that it is unnecessary, and indeed would be wasteful, to consider the voiding of default separately from quashing of service.  Defendant Prytulak's Motion-to-Quash-D dedicates the bulk of its space to quashing service, and only secondarily touches on voiding default.  Quashing service and voiding default in the instant case constitute a tautology, and the Court is not empowered to charge $23 twice, once for each iteration of the tautology.  The Court would be empowered to charge $23 twice only for two separate subsequent-paper motions requiring two separate hearings.  At best, the Court is authorized to bill Defendant $193 for filing a first paper because that first paper requires only a single hearing.

A single hearing is the norm

Dealing with both motions in a single hearing is a commonplace which in every court but Judge James R. Dunn's passes without raising Court eyebrows, as for example:

On February 26, 1997, Floveyor specially appeared and filed a motion to set aside the default judgment and a motion to quash Shick's service of summons and the cross-complaint.
Floveyor Int. Ltd v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 789, 792.

In featuring the primacy of quashing service in his earlier Motion-to-Quash-C (which, along with accompanying money order for US$193, the Court acknowledges losing), Defendant Prytulak was no more than following respectable precedents that he saw in every direction, most notably that of the Matthew Pavlovich case (DVD Copy Control Association, Inc vs Andrew McLaughlin, et al) before the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Santa Clara, Case No. CV 786804, argued by Allonn E. Levy (Bar No. 187251) of Huber Samuelson APC.  The face page of the motion presents as the title MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION — a title that pays no lip service to vacating default.  Within the body of the motion, however, vacating default is frequently requested, though never by means of separate arguments, but merely as a logical consequence of quashing service:

Accordingly, this Court must quash service of process and set aside any existing default or default judgment as void (C.C.P. §473(d); C.C.P. §418.10(d)).
Additionally, any default or default judgment entered without jurisdiction over the defendant is necessarily void.
Thus, this Court should follow the Appellate Court’s holding in Jewish Defense Organization, set aside any default, and quash service of process based on a lack of purposeful availment.
For all of the above reasons, California does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendant Pavlovich; therefore, Defendant’s motion to vacate default and/or default judgment and quash service should be granted.
Electronic Frontier Foundation online at www.eff.org/IP/Video/DVDCCA_case/20000802_pavlovich_quash_motion.html

If attorney Allonn E. Levy is able to get his above motion — which bundles vacating default with quashing service — filed in Santa Clara, Defendant Prytulak has difficulty comprehending why he has faced, and continues to face, such fierce resistance to getting his very similar motion filed in Los Angeles.

Among the materials found in Electronic Frontier Foundation coverage of Pavlovich proceedings that have gone to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, is the following affirmation of the propriety of challenging jurisdiction while simultaneously requesting the vacating of default:

Where a defendant attacks jurisdiction post default, the proper mechanism is to file a motion to concurrently vacate default or default judgment and quashing service of process (Floveyor Int. Ltd v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 789, 792).  It is then the plaintiff's burden both to prove proper service of process and to prove the existence of personal jurisdiction over the defendant (Id at 792-793).
Electronic Frontier Foundation online www.eff.org/IP/Video/DVDCCA_case/20000911_pavlovich_app_petition.pdf

Indeed, asking that default be vacated while simultaneously challenging jurisdiction is not only permissible, and not only proper, and not only efficient, but as well affords protection against the perception that a motion to vacate default by itself attorns to jurisdiction:

Florida courts have repeatedly held that filing a motion to vacate a default does not waive jurisdictional defenses where such defenses are raised simultaneously with the motion.
National Safety Associates, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Company (2001), In the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, Case No. 2D01-374 at www.2dca.org/opinion/October%2005,%202001/2d01-374.pdf
In Montero v. Duval Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 581 So.2d 938, 939 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), we held that a defendant did not submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court where he had filed a motion to quash service of process along with a motion to set aside a default.
Ginsberg v. Lamour, 711 So.2d 182, 183 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
The District Court of Appeal, Dell, J., held that defendant did not waive her right to contest service of process by joining her motion to quash service of process with motion to vacate default judgment.
Montero v. Duval Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 581 So.2d 938, 938 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).

LASC clerical staff twist Defendant's arm to attorn

Let it be clear that the only reason Defendant Prytulak gave "vacating default" top billing in the title of his Motion-to-Quash-D is that in two 25-Sep-2002 telephone conversations with Court Representative Katina (at 213-974-5173), Prytulak was given to understand that the only motion that the Court would permit Prytulak to file was a motion to "set aside" default.  Prytulak viewed this as the Court's offer to file a Prytulak submission that was conditional upon his taking his challenge to jurisdiction off the table, which he was unprepared to do.

Defendant Prytulak's response was to comply with the Court demand to the limited extent of introducing "vacating default" into his motion's title, and even going so far as to yield it first place in that title as well, and of introducing minor reorganization within the body of the motion — but while nevertheless refusing to abandon his challenge to jurisdiction, and indeed continuing to feature it as the cornerstone of his paper.  Defendant Prytulak's justification for complying with Court directions only to the extent of making cosmetic revisions to his motion is that the Court's recommendation that he request nothing more than to "set aside" default was encouraging him to take an action that could later be interpreted as his attorning to Court jurisdiction.  Prytulak asking that an already null or void default be vacated would not be attorning, but what else would Prytulak asking that default be set aside be doing other than recognizing the legitimacy of the instant default, which legitimacy that default could possess only if it had been entered by a Court having jurisdiction?  Whether the Court sets this trap for Defendant Prytulak calculatedly or inadvertently, it does set the trap, and which trap Prytulak declines to jeopardize his position by walking into.

Defendant Prytulak recommends that if the Court views any Prytulak motion as fallacious or unpersuasive, the Court's proper response is to file the motion and then deny it rather than to do the sorts of things that it has been doing, namely

Even the wording of the LASC Case Summary statement above is symptomatic of the Court's refusal to look into the face of its own lack of jurisdiction — the wording refers to the Prytulak motion as one to "set aside" default.  However, those were not the words that Prytulak chose.  Rather, the Prytulak motion title requests that default be not "set aside" but "vacated."  What Prytulak intended to convey by avoiding the use of "set aside" was that Judge James R. Dunn's default entry was from inception a nullity.  It was created in a proceeding coram non judice, which is to say before a person not a judge, and which is the correct description for a proceeding before a person who in another context may be a judge, but who in the current proceeding exceeds his jurisdiction:

The proposition that the judgment of a court lacking jurisdiction is void traces back to the English Year Books [citations], and was made settled law by Lord Coke in Case of the Marshalsea [citations].  Traditionally that proposition was embodied in the phrase coram non judice, "before a person not a judge" — meaning, in effect, that the proceeding in question was not a judicial proceeding because lawful judicial authority was not present, and could therefore not yield a judgment.  American courts invalidated, or denied recognition to, judgments that violated this common-law principle long before the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.  [citations]  In Pennoyer v Neff [citation], we announced that the judgment of a court lacking personal jurisdiction violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well.
Scalia, J., in Burnham v. Superior Court of California (1990) 495 US 604, 109 L Ed 2d 631 at 638, 110 S Ct 2105.

In Prytulak's view, then, his default entry cannot be "set aside," as it never existed.  Such a default can only be "vacated," by which Prytulak means not that its status can be changed, but rather that its pre-existing lack of status can be acknowledged.  (Defendant Prytulak explains in his instant discussion what he himself means when he uses the expressions "set aside" and "vacate," while at the same time recognizing that such is not common usage and that others may mean something different when they use the expressions.)

To wrap up without mincing words, Defendant Prytulak is left with the impression that the Court is intent on finding against him but shirks from taking responsibility for the patently-wrong decision of asserting jurisdiction, and so instead works toward Prytulak's demise by interfering with the filing process and by deep-sixing submissions.  The result of the Court's blocking some Prytulak papers and losing others is not only to undermine Prytulak's position in the instant proceedings, but — more importantly — is also to leave him with an LASC-bowdlerized trial record to present upon appeal.  On top of that, it is to bring the Los Angeles Superior Court into disrepute.

The $46 fee is gratuitous

To return, finally, to the question of filing fees — as Motion-to-Quash-D presents an argument for quashing service, and which argument if successful will automatically vacate default, and as any argument that addresses itself solely to vacating default is as brief as it is superfluous, it is preposterous to anticipate that the labor of Motion-to-Quash-D must be spread over two separate hearings, and it is therefore as indefensible to charge $23 twice as it would be to charge $23 once.  Accordingly, Defendant Prytulak regrets ever having provided the Court with his VISA number which enabled the Court to help itself to Prytulak funds without needing first to justify what it was doing, and Defendant Prytulak asks the Court to refund $46.  Defendant Prytulak has never before asked VISA to change his VISA number merely out of the anxiety of having released the number to an untrustworthy vendor for the purpose of making payment, but has done so in consequence of the revelations emerging from the instant analysis of the Los Angeles Superior Court rubber-stamp statement, not to mention the Court loss of a minimum of one, and possibly as many as three, Prytulak money orders.

Chaos or Over-Billing?

The LASC Court rubber-stamp statement justifying Court billing may at the very least be considered the product of chaos — the inadequacies and insufficiencies and discrepancies and anomalies and incongruities documented above being several:

  1. The rubber-stamp statement supplied by the Court hovers on either side of the border of legibility.

  2. The rubber-stamp statement supplied by the Court is cryptic.

  3. The Court's first-paper filing fee of $193 is listed in GC 26826 as being $182.

  4. The Court's adding a $23 surcharge for filing a first paper is prohibited by GC 26826 in its specification that $182 shall constitute the total fee for a first paper.

  5. GC 26830 specifies that the $23 fee shall be applied to a paper subsequent to the first paper.

  6. The expression "appearance fee" is a colloquialism making reference to the inflated fee for filing a first paper.  California law does not recognize or levy any fee called an "appearance fee" which is other than the fee for filing a first paper.

  7. The $23 filing fee for a subsequent paper can only be charged when a separate hearing is required, and yet the LASC charged Defendant Prytulak $23 twice for a matter that must naturally be settled in a single hearing.  To be more accurate, the LASC charged Defendant thrice for what should be a single hearing to consider Motion-to-Quash-D — the Court's filing fee of $239 breaking down into the three fees $193 + $23 + $23.

If "chaos" were an apt description of Court billing, then one would expect randomness to produce some errors in the Court's favor, and other errors in the Defendant's favor.  In fact, however, all errors are observed to be in the Court's favor, which is to say, all errors move money out of the pocket of the Defendant and into the pocket of the Court, and never in the opposite direction, which is why some less indulgent term than "chaos," like "over-billing," is called to mind.

Particularly egregious and indefensible is the practice of adding a $23 surcharge to the fee for filing a first paper by means of the subterfuge of relabelling the $193 "first-filing fee" as an "appearance fee" and relabelling the inapplicable $23 "subsequent-filing fee" as merely a "filing fee" and applying it anyway.  One can only imagine the vast burden that this unauthorized billing may have been placing on the backs of defendants in LASC civil actions over the years.  One might expect that investigators into misconduct will be sensitive to the possibility that funds acquired without authority are particularly vulnerable to non-entry in accounting ledgers.

How Much Must Defendant Bleed Before Judge James R. Dunn is Persuaded to Contemplate the Possibility that His Court Lacks Jurisdiction?

Given that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant Prytulak, that any money at all should be moving from Defendant Prytulak's pocket into the Court's pocket is unjust.  Los Angeles Superior Court reality, therefore, appears to incorporate a substantial measure of injustice because Defendant Prytulak so far has purchased a money order for US$193 to file his first-paper Motion-to-Quash-C, with no better result than to have the Court lose both the motion and the money order.  Subsequent to that, Defendant submitted a second paper accompanied by a subsequent-paper money order for $23, which the Court may also have lost — although the Court has not acknowledged losing this paper-with-money-order, neither has the Court acknowledged receiving them, as for example in its online Case Summary, and it has been 20 days since they were delivered to the Court.  With respect to the filed Motion-to-Quash-D, the Court has charged the Defendant a filing fee of $239.  The amount spent in filing fees alone, then, sums to US$455, which works out to CAN$723.54.  On top of that, the amount spent on postage and on Faxing and on FedExing is in the hundreds of dollars.  And what has this — what to Defendant is a vast outlay — accomplished?  Nothing, really.  What it tried to accomplish is no more than to get the Court to consider the question of jurisdiction.  That was the only goal.  That goal has still not been achieved.  Judge James R. Dunn still shows not the least inclination to consider Defendant argument that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction.

Anybody Else Being Over-Billed?

One may be excused for wondering what a comparison of the over-billing of Lubomyr Prytulak with the billing of other litigants would reveal.

If over-billing of Defendant Prytulak is representative of billing generally, then the conclusion would have to be that a substantial chunk of Court billing is unauthorized.  More specifically, if the instant Court filing fee of $239 should correctly be $193, this constitutes 24% over-billing; and if it should correctly be $182, this constitutes 31% over-billing.  (Such understatements are made possible only by overlooking for the moment the two money orders lost by the Court, and overlooking as well the fact that the Court's lack of jurisdiction justifies none of the fees levied against Defendant Prytulak.)

If over-billing of Defendant Prytulak is unrepresentative of billing generally, then the conclusion would have to be that Prytulak is being accorded special treatment.

The truth is probably that it is not exclusively one or the other, but both.  That Lubomyr Prytulak is being accorded discriminatory treatment has been repeatedly documented in Prytulak submissions, and is not susceptible to doubt, as a reading of those submissions will confirm.

Lubomyr Prytulak


G Beavers, Deputy Clerk • LASC • PO Box 151, Main Post Office • Los Angeles, CA • USA 90053
John A Clarke, Executive Officer/Clerk • LASC • PO Box 151, Main Post Office • Los Angeles, CA • USA 90053
Robert A Dukes, Assistant Presiding Judge • LASC • 111 North Hill Street • Los Angeles, CA • USA 90012
James R Dunn, Judge • LASC • 111 North Hill Street • Los Angeles, CA • USA 90012
Richard Fruin, Judge • LASC • 111 North Hill Street • Los Angeles, CA • USA 90012
Gary Klausner, Supervising Judge, Civil Division • LASC • 111 North Hill Street • Los Angeles, CA • USA 90012
Carolyn Kuhl, Assistant Supervising Judge, Civil Division • LASC • 111 North Hill Street • Los Angeles, CA • USA 90012
Gary Kurtz, Esq • 20335 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 200 • Woodland Hills, CA • USA 91364
Charles W McCoy, Judge • LASC • 111 North Hill Street • Los Angeles, CA • USA 90012
S James Otero, Assistant Supervising Judge • LASC • 111 North Hill Street • Los Angeles, CA • USA 90012
V Ponce, Assistant Clerk • LASC • PO Box 151, Main Post Office • Los Angeles, CA • USA 90053
Barry A Taylor, Judge • LASC • 6230 Sylmar Avenue • Van Nuys, CA • USA 91401

Mike Wallace • 60 Minutes, CBS Television • 524 West 57th Street • New York, NY • USA 10019
Don Hewitt, Executive Producer • 60 Minutes, CBS Television • 524 West 57th Street • New York, NY • USA 10019
Irving Abella • Department of History • York University • 4700 Keele Street • Toronto, ON • Canada M3J 1P3
F David Radler COO • Hollinger International • 712 Fifth Avenue • New York, NY • USA 10019
Steven Rambam • Pallorium, Inc • PO Box 155 — Midwood Station • Brooklyn, New York • USA 11230
Moshe Ronen • Chair Board of Governors • CJC • 100 Sparks Street, Suite 650 • Ottawa, ON • Canada K1P 5B7
Bernie Farber • Executive Director, Ontario Branch • CJC • 4600 Bathurst Street • Toronto, ON • Canada M2R 3V2

Gray Davis, Governor • State Capitol Building • Sacramento, CA • USA 95814
Martha Escutia, Senator • 12440 E. Imperial Highway, Suite 125 • Norwalk, CA • USA 90650
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General • California DOJ • PO Box 944255 • Sacramento, CA • USA 94244-2550
Bernadette Torivio, Executive Secretary • CJP • 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 14400 • San Francisco, CA • USA 94102-3660