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Renfrey Clarke
Johnson Russia List
23-Sep-1998
Plucked from the gutter
"Instead, the banks have made high profits out of currency
manipulations and from lending to the government on the short-term debt market. Many, especially among the smaller ones, are reputed to be fronts for mafia money-laundering operations. The
banking industry has also played a big role in expediting illegal
capital flight, estimated at a staggering US$140 billion over the
past seven years.
Such are the institutions that Primakov, at serious peril to
Russia's economy and society, has now plucked from the gutter and
set back on their unsteady feet." � Renfrey Clarke
The Renfrey Clarke article below is being circulated by e-mail. It seems to have originated in the Johnson Russia List (JRL), and been copied from there to the soc.culture.russia newsgroup.
A comment as to why some material concerning Russia, such as the Renfrey Clarke article below, has been added to the Ukrainian Archive recently can be found in the UKAR introduction to a Los Angeles Times article by Richard Paddock.
Another relevant comment that can be found on the Ukrainian Archive is a list of the topics that pertain to the plunder of the Slavic world, but that tend to be avoided. In the Renfrey Clarke article below, a central observation which is avoided is that the saving by Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov of the Russian oligarchs so that they can continue to plunder Russia is the saving by a Jew (Primakov was born Finkelstein) of oligarchs, six out of seven of whom are Jewish. Although this observation is striking, it may be immaterial and irrelevant, as perhaps would be the observation that these same individuals all had brown eyes, or all frequented the same restaurants. If it is the case that the avoided observation is immaterial and irrelevant, then it would seem appropriate that the observation be first acknowledged, and then explicitly allocated its proper devaluation. What does not seem appropriate is to treat the discussion of any striking observation as a taboo. Bowing to taboos is forsaking the path of understanding in favor of the path of political correctness.
As far as I can see, the hypothesis that the Russian Revolution amounted to the Jewish conquest of Russia remains tenable, and the ethnic composition of Russia's oligarchs, as well as the ethnic membership of Russia's prime minister, as well as the indulgent treatment by Russia's prime minister of Russia's oligarchs, suggests further that such a conquest continues to this day. If American Jews exercise a disproportionate influence over American foreign policy, then American backing of Primakov and the oligarchs might be viewed as the backing by American Jews of the plundering of the Slavic world by Slavic Jews. Perhaps this interpretation is false or exaggerated, in which case let it be openly discussed and proven to be false or exaggerated. The interpretation must be openly discussed because there is some chance that it is true, and if it is true, then to suppress its discussion might be dangerous.
RUSSIA: GOVERNMENT BLOWS WAGE ARREARS
TO SAVE OLIGARCHS
By Renfrey Clarke
MOSCOW � After weeks in which it was regarded as a certainty,
there will be no crash of Russia's speculative, mafia-infested
banking system � not yet, anyway. Instead, the crash is likely to
take place in the living standards of anyone in the country whose
income is calculated in rubles rather than dollars, or who is not
well-placed in financial or resource-exporting circles.
This is the upshot of a deliberate choice made sometime in mid-September by the new government of Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov. Appreciating that if it did not capitulate to Russia's
most powerful business magnates � the so-called oligarchs � it would have to mount a serious offensive against them, the government opted for surrender.
On September 18, banks in Moscow, St Petersburg and several
other important regions took part in a state-supervised "debt
swap". This was intended to overcome the paralysis that had
gripped the banking sector since August 17, when the previous
government of Sergey Kiriyenko devalued the ruble and defaulted
on huge sums in short-term bonds. In technical terms, the banks
were permitted on September 18 to settle their debts with the
state, their depositors and one another by borrowing from the
reserve funds they are required to lodge with the Central Bank.
In a later process completed on September 19, the banks were
allowed to "pay back" the new loans using the bonds on which
Kiriyenko's government had earlier refused payment. But this
repayment was fictitious, since the bonds were almost worthless. The Kiriyenko government defaulted on them because it had no way of raising the money to redeem them. Simply issuing unbacked credits � in the term often used by journalists, cranking up the printing presses � was considered at the time to pose an unacceptable risk of sparking uncontrollable inflation.
The new authorities do not share Kiriyenko's scruples. Because
the "debt swap" credits are effectively a gift, the effect of
Primakov's manoeuvre is that billions of new rubles, backed by
nothing more than thin air, have entered the general money
supply. According to the English-language Moscow Times on
September 22, the Central Bank put the additional sum at 4.2
billion rubles, equivalent to about US$250 million.
While this is only about 4 per cent of the total money supply,
analysts fear it will have a catastrophic "trigger" effect on
price rises. At 43 per cent in the first two weeks of September
alone, these are already in the hyperinflation range. Increased
inflation is virtually guaranteed by the use to which many of the
banks are expected to put their newly-restored liquidity � buying
dollars, thus forcing down the ruble rate and raising the cost of
the imports which account for around half the purchases made by
the Russian population.
Was pumping up the banking system with unbacked credits the best
choice available? Central Bank Deputy Chairperson Andrei Kozlov
insisted on September 18 that it was. "The negative consequences
of this action are less than of any other," Reuters quoted him
as saying.
But this is simply not true. The government had a perfectly
workable alternative to emitting money. It could have
nationalised the banks.
With the banks under state management, their debts to depositors
could have been paid out or put on hold in line with the
government's real possibilities. The available funds could have
been directed not toward currency speculation, but toward ends
such as maximising production, employment and the payment of
wages.
All this would have met with furious resistance from the
oligarchs, backed up by Western governments and financial
interests. The Russian banking sector, along with energy and raw
materials exports, represents a vital component in the business
empires of the country's most notorious "crony capitalists".
The resistance of the business moguls could, however, have been
effectively countered through mobilising Russia's workers and
poor � that is, the prime victims of inflation. At a time when
the oligarchs are weaker than at any time since the early 1990s,
mass demonstrations could have forced them to swallow their losses.
But there is no point in looking to Primakov to call such actions. A long-time senior Pravda correspondent and foreign policy adviser, Primakov served the Soviet elite
faithfully for decades, and remains loyal to them now that they have metamorphosed into owners of capital.
With the decision to emit billions of rubles to bail out the
banking sector, many of Primakov's utterances on the economy have
to be regarded as pure demagogy. In an interview published on
September 20 in the German newspaper Bild am Sonntag, the
prime minister stated: "The biggest problem to tackle is that of
[unpaid] salaries and pensions." He also pledged to boost
industrial and agricultural production.
The question of whether unbacked credits could be used to pay
wage arrears without disastrous results has been the topic of
sharp debate in Russia in recent weeks. In an article in
Nezavisimaya Gazeta on September 16 prominent economist
Leonid Abalkin maintained that the Russian economy was heavily
demonetised, and that there was a need for controlled emission to
drive pseudo-money such as bartered goods and promissory notes
out of circulation.
It could be argued that paying wage and pension arrears would
have been an ideal mechanism here, since the rubles would not as
a rule have been used to buy dollars, but to purchase cheap
foodstuffs and other basic consumer goods. The extra money would
thus have translated directly into additional demand for the
products of Russia's heavily depressed consumer manufacturing and
agriculture.
But now that unbacked credits have been poured into saving the
private banking system, and inflationary expectations are at
extreme levels, the possibility of paying off wage and pension
arrears without sending prices into orbit seems effectively nil.
Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin admitted as much on
September 20 when he ruled out emitting more money to meet wage
and pension payments, saying it would depreciate the ruble. "The
best option is to attract external resources to pay our obligations," Shokhin said.
"External resources"? Who is going to lend money to Russia
now? What Shokhin could not bring himself to say is that the
government has no serious plans for meeting the arrears. The sum
that might have been used to begin this process has been given to the oligarchs.
Primakov's weakness for "solutions" that fail to challenge the
rich and do nothing for the ordinary population is showing up in
other areas as well.
To curb the dollarisation of the Russian economy, restrict
capital flight, and build up the Central Bank's hard currency
reserves, the new Prime Minister has promised to tighten controls
on the foreign exchange market. According to the English-language
Moscow Times, the Central Bank on September 18 announced it
had drafted a presidential decree requiring exporters to sell 25
per cent of their foreign currency revenues to the Central Bank,
in addition to the 50 per cent that already has to be sold through the currency exchange.
However, analysts quoted by the paper pointed out that the new
measure would encourage exporters to conceal their earnings, and
implied that they would have little trouble doing just that. The
inflow to the Central Bank's reserves, the sources predicted, would not be great.
The Russian state's reserves of hard currency and gold were
badly depleted during the effort, abandoned on August 17, to
maintain an artificially strong ruble. Replenishing these
reserves is vital if the government is to have even a medium-term
prospect of stabilising its finances.
If exporters � above all in the oil, gas and metals sectors � sabotage this effort, the case for nationalising their firms is strong. But after rescuing the oligarchs' banking interests,
Primakov is hardly likely to strip the business chiefs of their energy and raw materials operations.
Meanwhile, what are Russian banks like, that the prime minister
should be willing to risk sending inflation over the moon to keep
them in business?
In all but a few cases, these institutions bear little
resemblance to banks in the West. The great majority have never
shown any interest in building up a large network of depositors.
Few provide anything remotely like Western-level services to
their clients. Only a handful have a record of lending
substantial sums to producers in the "real economy".
Instead, the banks have made high profits out of currency
manipulations and from lending to the government on the short-term debt market. Many, especially among the smaller ones, are reputed to be fronts for mafia money-laundering operations. The
banking industry has also played a big role in expediting illegal
capital flight, estimated at a staggering US$140 billion over the
past seven years.
Such are the institutions that Primakov, at serious peril to
Russia's economy and society, has now plucked from the gutter and
set back on their unsteady feet.
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