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Houghton Mifflin Harcourt | 2018 | Michael McFaul
From Cold War to Hot Peace
An American Ambassador in Putin's Russia
1. The First Reset
2. Democrats of the World, Unite!
3. Yeltsin’s Partial Revolution
4. Putin’s Thermidor
5. Change We Can Believe In
6. Launching the Reset
7. Universal Values
8. The First (and Last) Moscow Summit
10. Denying Iran the Bomb
11. Hard Accounts: Russia’sNeighborhood and
Missile Defense [pdf-106]
12. Burgers and Spies
13. The Arab Spring, Libya, and the Beginning of
the End of the Reset [pdf-122]
14. Becoming “His Excellency”
15. Putin Needs an Enemy -- America, Obama, and
16. Getting Physical
18. Twitter and the Two-Step
19. It Takes Two to Tango
20. Chasing Russians, Failing Syrians
21. Dueling on Human Rights
22. Going Home
23. Annexation and War in Ukraine
24. The End of Resets (for Now)
Trump and Putin
with HMH [pdf-353]
Review by Will Zuzak:
Michael McFaul presents a very personal, detailed and readable account
of his career as a government employee and, esapecially, his stint as
the American Ambassador in Mocow. For people wishing to understand U.S.
politics during this period this book is must reading.
- Strangely, McFaul claims (pdf-35) that he proposed that Russia become
a member of NATO, but that this was not accepted by the West and by
Russia; whereas I was of the opinion that the West did, indeed, made
overtures to have Russia join NATO.
The Ctrl-F search function for "Ukrain" yields 253 hits -- most of
which are in Ch. 23 Annexation and War in Ukraine
(94), Ch. 24 (28), Ch. 11 (18), Epilogue (18), Ch. 4 (8),
with the rest
scattered amongst the other chapters (23) and in the Notes and Index
pdf-6 -- Two years into his third term as Russian president, in
February 2014, Putin invaded Ukraine,
annexing Crimea and supporting separatist militias in the eastern part
of the country.
pdf-46 -- The following year, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine represented
an even bigger setback for Putin. ... Putin asserted later that Ukraine was "a
made-up country" that should not exist, let alone pose a threat to his
rule by trying to build democracy on Russia’s border.
pdf-107 -- Regarding Ukraine,
there was neither push nor pull for membership. Even under President
Yushchenko, the leader of the Orange Revolution in 2004, a majority of
Ukrainians opposed NATO membership.
pdf-109 -- Soon after Russia’s invasion of Georgia, Putin said publicly
that Russia had no legitimate claims on the peninsula: "The Crimea is
not a disputed territory . . . Russia has long recognized the borders
of today’s Ukraine."
pdf-242 -- Putin first annexed Crimea on March 14, 2014, then doubled
down in support of the separatist movement in eastern Ukraine.
pdf-243 -- We [had] also suggested that Ukraine could become more
prosperous through closer association with EU members (even without EU
membership), which would create more opportunities for Russian
investment and trade with Ukraine.
- But Putin was having none of it. ... The battle for Ukraine was a
zero-sum contest, with winners and losers, and Putin was determined to
pdf-244-245 -- ... on February 21 ... . Specifically, after meeting
overnight with European officials, the president had agreed to an
accord to resolve the political crisis with three opposition leaders:
Vitali Klitschko, Oleh Tyahnybok, and Arseniy Yatsenyuk. These
signatories agreed to “refrain from the use of violence" ...
Three European foreign ministers -- Radek Sikorski from Poland,
Frank-Walter Steinmeier from Germany, and Laurent Fabius from France --
also signed the agreement, in an effort to bolster its legitimacy.
Vladimir Lukin, Putin’s ombudsman for human rights, represented Russia
at the mediation efforts. ... When Lukin didn’t sign the agreement like
the other foreign ministers, however, I became worried. Maybe Putin was
not going to support the accord because he had other plans?
pdf-245 -- On February 23, 2014, National Security Advisor Susan Rice
decided to publicly discourage Russian intervention, warning that “it
would be a grave mistake” for Putin to send soldiers into Ukraine.
pdf-247 -- As Putin stated in 2008, “Crimea is not a disputed territory
. . . Russia has long recognized the borders of modern-day Ukraine.”
- In 1994 the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom had signed
the Budapest Memorandum, which committed signatories to respect
Ukrainian territorial integrity in return for Ukraine’s denuclear
pdf-248 -- Pleased with the results in Crimea, Putin decided to
green-light a complex plan to seize Novorossiya, or New Russia, a vast
region from eastern Ukraine
to Odessa on the Black Sea. ... The Kremlin provided money, weapons,
commanders, and even soldiers to separatist proxies in eastern Ukraine.
pdf-249 -- On July 17, 2014, the conflict internationalized even
further. Russian-supported separatists or Russian soldiers -- the
details remain murky -- shot down Kuala Lumpur-bound Malaysia Airlines
Flight 17 in eastern Ukraine,
killing all 298 people on board.
- The shooting down of MH17 focused greater world attention on the
conflict in eastern Ukraine, prompting the West to react with greater
vigor, including new sanctions.
- If there were a Ten Commandments of international behavior, “Thou
shalt not annex the territory of thy neighbor” would be at the top of
pdf-252 -- Russian military power deployed against Ukraine punctuated the end of Obama’s Reset and the Western
strategy of Russian integration started thirty years ago.
pdf-255-- There was one possible policy not pursued by us
that might have deterred Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: NATO membership
for Ukraine. Had Ukraine
a NATO member in 2014, I doubt that Putin would have tried to annex
Crimea or support separatist movements in eastern Ukraine. This
outcome, however, had no chance of being realized while I was in the
(3) In the Epilogue, McFaul analyzes the situation with Trump regime at the Whitehouse.
pdf-272 -- My own view is that American democratic institutions remain resilient and will survive Trump.
- The hot peace, tragically but perhaps necessarily, seems here to stay.