Judging by the attention given to the 60th anniversary of D-Day, we can expect even more prominent celebrations next year of the 60th anniversary of Victory in Europe (May 8th). Especially in Europe where the day after will be Europe Day (May 9th). My question is: how will Ukrainians (and Ukraine) fit into these commemorations? The Ukrainian Diaspora has less than a year to prepare itself for these events.
From what I know, Ukraine is preparing to have grand celebrations of the 60th anniversary of Victory Day (May 9th). A couple of years ago Ukraine announced that it would take the initiative to organize joint celebrations of all the CIS countries of this anniversary. Thus, while the rest of Europe (except Russia & Belarus) celebrate the end of the Nazi scourge and the birth of a new united Europe, Ukraine will turn its back on Europe and plunge into the "liberal empire" of the "single economic space".
Ukraine will be pushed more and more into Eurasia and further and further away from Europe. (Just imagine for a moment that Ukraine is admitted to EU tomorrow; next year all of Europe celebrates V-Day on May 8th and Europe Day on May 9th while Ukraine only watches Europe on May 8th, celebrates V-Day on May 9th and Europe Day in a staggered rhythm weeks later.) This is the way things will happen, unless Ukrainians do something to change them.
Ukrainians in the Diaspora and in Ukraine should use the year that is left to steer Ukraine into Europe and away from Putin's Eurasian empire.
1. Ukrainians in the Diaspora should develop a program of how things Ukrainian should and could be included in the 2005 commemorations. We should prepare materials on Ukrainians in WWII: in the armed forces of Western nations, in the Red Army.
Special attention should be paid to the UPA and the Ukrainian Division Halychyna. This work should be undertaken on various level, from the Ukrainian World Congress to the local communities in various cities. We should have both written material (memoirs, etc.) to people (veterans, survivors, academics, civic leaders) willing and able to appear on radio & T.V. Programs before and during these events. Work should start now, and not wait until the last moment.
2. Ukrainians in Ukraine should work for a reorientation of Ukraine's involvement, from Eurasia to Europe. On the academic and political level this means, among other things a rejection of the old Soviet and by definition anti-Ukrainian myth of the Great Fatherland War (GFW) (Velyka vitchyzniana vijna) and the reorientation of Victory Day to Remembrance Day.
3. The myth of the GFW was developed by the Soviet regime as a glue to keep together the multinational Soviet empire, and unite it around the Russian core. Today it's strongest defenders in Ukraine are the Communist party, the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian chauvinist organizations. The Ukrainian political elites find it convenient to adhere to it.
The myth consists of three main notions:
A) The Ukrainian people, part of the Soviet people, rose in defense of its Soviet socialist fatherland against the German invader and all those who did not, or who fought Stalin's Red Army were traitors;
B) Ukraine was liberated by the Red Army;
C) The Ukrainian people were victors over the Nazi Germany.
These are ideological and erroneous interpretations of what actually happened:
A) In the beginning of the war most Ukrainians were either hostile, or at least lukewarm to the Soviet regime and actively or passively welcomed the coming of what many thought would be German liberators. It was only Nazi atrocities that turned them against the Germans.
B) Ukraine was not liberated, but only reconquered; it exchanged one anti-Ukrainian totalitarian regime (Hitler's) for another (Stalin's).
C) If Ukrainians had been victors then they would have been masters of their fate, and what most Ukrainian farmers wanted was to get their land back, which they did not get. Stalin called all the subjects of the Soviet empire simple cogs in a large state machine. Cogs are not victors, they can only be used for someone else's victory.
The myth of the GFW is preventing reconciliation between Ukrainians who fought in the three different military formations (even though there were transfers between them): the Red Army, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Division Halychyna (and those in other German formations). It is a disgrace to Ukraine and especially a shame on the Ukrainian political elites that 60 years after the war Ukrainians are still divided on this issue and a shame to the President, the Government and the Parliament of Ukraine, that the only armed force that was formed for the independence of Ukraine is not recognized by this independent state today.
I am raising these issues in the hope that we can start a fruitful discussion and not only discuss but make sure that the important upcoming commemorations do not catch us unprepared.
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Roman Serbyn is Professor Emeritus of History, University of Montreal