

**Ukrainian Genocide  
1932—1933  
How millions of  
deaths were not in-  
cluded in the statistics**

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This scientific research is based on previously unknown archival documents. The documents are the main basis used in our attempt to establish the true number of victims of the Genocide-Holodomor 1932—1933. The information contained in this presentation is intended for the use of researchers and those who are interested in the history of this Ukrainian catastrophe. Every victim counts and deserves to be counted.

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For decades, our Diaspora was convinced that, because of Holodomor-Genocide of 1933—1933, Ukraine had lost from 7 to 10 million human lives. In many cases, this belief was predicated upon the records of German diplomats assigned to the USSR; in particular, the Consulate General of Germany in Kharkiv. For example, on 11 December 1933, they reported:

From reliable sources it is known that according to the official estimates, seven million victims did not constitute a great loss, but that means that a quarter of peasantry was annihilated, which even comparatively to the victims of the World War is a terrible number.<sup>1</sup>

An employee of the German Embassy in USSR, Schiller, added, "As for me, the announced figure of 10 million of victims of hunger is not an exaggeration".<sup>2</sup>

The relevant conclusions were made also by researchers of Ukrainian emigration. For example, S. Sosnovyi, a former employee of Ukrainian SSR State Planning Committee, an entity well aware of the distortions imposed upon the statistics of population movement in Ukrainian SSR in early 1930s, wrote:

Thus, the conclusion to which we come by analyzing official materials are: the total number of hunger due to lack of population in 7.5 million, 4.8 million people died of starvation (1.5 million in 1932, and 3.3 million in 1933) and 2.7 million — a reduction of population growth after the famine.<sup>3</sup>

In this manner, dating from the first mass recognition of the tragedy in 1953, the Ukrainian Diaspora used these figures. On 2 August 1953, in Manchester, UK, a demonstration was held, marching under the slogan, "Blaming Moscow for Death of Seven Million Ukrainians Annihilated by Hunger in 1933."<sup>4</sup> With the declaration of Ukrainian independence, this statement passed to Ukraine. For almost a quarter of century, this expression of losses remained in the minds of the people.

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<sup>1</sup>Holodomor in Ukraine 1932—1933. According to documents of the political archives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany. — p. 161.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 130.

<sup>3</sup>*Ukrainian News* (New Ulm, Bavaria, Germany), 1950, Part 11.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 22 October 1953.

Significantly, a few weeks before the unveiling of the United States' Memorial to the Victims of the Holodomor, on 7 November 2015, in Washington, DC, five leaders of Ukrainian research institutions in North America: the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, the Shevchenko Scientific Society of America, Inc., the Ukrainian Free Academy of Science, and the American Association for Ukrainian Studies appealed to the Chairman of the Organizing Committee, Michael Sawkiw Jr.,<sup>5</sup> **with a request not to use the conventional figures of losses ranging from 7 to 10 million, and to limit information to the conclusions of Professors Andre Graziosi, Timothy Snyder, and Stanislaw Kulchyzkiy, who claim that this tragedy took the lives of less than half of our peasantry. Otherwise, they warned, it will cause protests in certain anti-Ukrainian circles, and will be used immediately by Kremlin propagandists to blame Ukrainian science for incompetence, etc.** In light of these concerns, the Organizing Committee decided to abide by this request. Thus, at the unveiling ceremony, the topic of the number of victims was addressed only in terms of millions of victims, without specifying of any numbers.<sup>6</sup>

Concurrent with the already mentioned letter, there appeared in Kyiv an article written by N. Levchuk, T. Boriak, A. Wolowyna, O. Rudnytskiy and A. Kovbasiuk (demographers and historians) published in *Ukrainian Historical Journal*, entitled, "Losses of Urban and Rural Population Due to Holodomor in Ukraine 1932—1934."<sup>7</sup> This article states:

During 1932—1933, about 8.7 million deaths in the Soviet Union was caused by hunger. Almost 98% of these losses come to three Soviet republics: Ukraine (3.9 million), Russia (3.3 million) and Kazakhstan (1.3 million). If you calculate the relative loss, in

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<sup>5</sup>Serhii Plokhii, "Holodomor Memorial" to Michael Sawkiw, Jr., Chairman U.S. Holodomor Commission: George Grabowicz, [Albert Kipa] "Kipa" [sic], Tuesday 1 September 2015, 9:44:53 A.M. e-mail (12 September 2017).

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>N. Levchuk, T. Boriak, O. Wolowyna, O. Rudnytskiy, A. Kovbasiuk, "Losses of Urban and Rural Population Due to Famine in Ukraine, 1932—1934," *Ukrainian Historical Journal* No. 2:4 (Kyiv, 2015): 87.

other words per 1000 of population, the rank of Ukraine is second after Kazakhstan. Losses from hunger are 22% of the total population of Kazakhstan; 17% — in Ukraine; 3% in Russia; and less than 2% in other former Soviet republics.<sup>8</sup>

These authors substantiate their calculations of losses from famine in USSR, with such factors as those related to internal migration (in other words by mechanical outflow of population from villages to cities in quantities 3,388 thousand people for 1927—1938), and external migration, which assess the losses in terms of nine streams:

- 1) Transporting of prisoners outside of the Republic, 1928—1938
- 2) Transporting of "kulaks" outside of the USSR, 1930—1933
- 3) Forced migration outside of the Republic, 1929—1933
- 4) Organized agricultural resettlements to other republics, 1927—1929
- 5) Deportation of Poles and Germans to Kazakhstan, 1936
- 6) Emigration of Jews out of the Republic, 1928—1938
- 7) Organized labor recruitment from rural areas for construction of new projects outside of Ukraine, 1935—1938
- 8) Resettlement of peasants to Ukraine from Belarus and Russia, 1933—1934
- 9) Eviction of "kulaks" from Central Asia to Ukrainian SSR, 1931

This would be an acceptable approach for our demographers and their colleague from the USA, Dr. Oleg Wolowyna, if these innovations used in the creating of a counting methodic of Holodomor victims, were based upon a perfection of the statistics to which they refer. However, we believe that what factors make it impossible to assess the losses of rural population of Ukrainian SSR, are the facts that the authors evaluated a great period of time, during which all the events directly affecting the total calculations, and the full scope of the documentation regarding these events, have not been made available to allow a complete analysis.

Indeed, even if Holodomor killed not any accepted number of millions of Ukrainians, but many less, that would not lessen or change the genocidal nature of the crime. It is our duty to remem-

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

ber all the innocent victims. Therefore, we should continue to methodically seek a comprehensive answer, and critically treating any position established in academic circles about a designated number of losses.

The first mistake made by these demographers, in counting the losses of Ukrainian peasantry in 1932—1933, was their basic references to and reliance upon data issued from the Moscow All-Union Censuses of 1937 and 1939, especially in regards to the Ukrainian SSR. These not only make it impossible to determine the various migration flows of population due to lack of relevant questions, as was the case in the two earlier Censuses (1897, and 1926); but, these Censuses also have significant inaccuracies made in calculations.

The last point is especially important. Let us say, according to official documents of Bolshevik government, it is known that, at the beginning of 1939, in Ukraine, there were 11,195,620 urban residents, and 19,755,848 rural, and, in total: 30,946,218 people.<sup>9</sup>

Quite a different picture is given by the Director of the National Economic Accounting of the Ukrainian SSR Ryabychko, in his secret report to the Director of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukrainian SSR Korotchenko, on 2 February 1939, "In total, according to [the] census [of] 1939, we have 29.4 million people,"<sup>10</sup> and an additional control document issued three weeks later found that there were, within the entire republic, only an additional 17,553 previously unregistered citizens.<sup>11</sup>

Apparently, in 1939, more than half a million people of Ukrainian SSR were left unattributed. Such divergence in numbers denies the demographers the ability to derive irrefutable conclusions from the data.

Regarding data issued in the Moscow Census of 1937, so disturbing in that its statistical content shows the great population losses of the Holodomor, was classified by the Soviet government. It must be noted that, in comparison with the primary source documents archived in

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<sup>9</sup>Pravda (2 June 1939).

<sup>10</sup>CzDAVOVU: F.2. — Op. 12. — Spr. 70. — Ark. 5, 7.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

Kyiv,<sup>12</sup> the figure increases by 532,000 people to 28,387,609.<sup>13</sup>

In addition to warning about the risk of errors inherent in taking as the basic premise the conclusions drawn from the falsified Soviet censuses, especially the Census of 1939, we consider invalid the inclusion of the period of 1937—1938. The next All-Union Census was held in early 1937, and the data from that period was included in the next census conducted in 1939. Other events, not directly related to the Holodomor that substantially increase the numbers of those deported, already were taking place. The transporting of prisoners to areas outside of the Ukrainian SSR, and the inclusion of the 1938 data, includes a span of time when those who were sent away were those also charged as "enemies of the people," but not for the same reason(s) as those of the Holodomor years (e.g., in the years of the Great Purges, quite often, people were arrested just to fulfill a government-imposed quota of arrests<sup>14</sup>), and their numbers were not comprised solely those deported for the "crime"

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<sup>12</sup>CzDAGOU; F. 1. — Op. 20. — Spr. 7163. — Ark. 24—46.

<sup>13</sup>*All-Union Population Census 1937. Brief Outcome.* Moscow: Institute of History of the USSR, 1991. 58.

See also: Federal'naia arkhivnaia sluzba Rossii: Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki, *The All-Union Population Census, 1939: Vsesoluzmaia perepis' naseleniia 1939 goda*; *The All-Union Population Census, 1937: Vsesoluznaia perepis' naseleniia 1937 goda*. Woodbridge, CT: Research Publications, an imprint of Primary Source Media; Moscow: Federal Archival Service of Russia, 2000. OCLC: 82365639. "Guide to the microfilm collection." From the holdings of the Russian State Economic Archive, Moscow, Russia. 36 + various unnumbered pages.

<sup>14</sup>He talked about the reasons so many of the best intellectuals left the Soviet Union in the 1920s: 'Why? Because any reasonable person, reading Article-58 [of the criminal code, which had a vague and sweeping prohibition against "counter-revolutionary" activity] would understand everything. A person could be arrested for *anything*.' ....It was not a good time to be arrested. That very day, a new chief, Leonid Zakovsky, took over the Moscow branch of the NKVD. ...Zakovsky immediately called a meeting of the city's top Chekisti, railed at them furiously for being too slow in rounding up 'enemies of the people,' and ordered a daily quota of two hundred arrests. This pace surpassed even Torquemada, who during the Inquisition managed a mere thirty-five prosecutions of Spanish heretics per day. Adam Hochschild, *The Unquiet Ghost: Russians Remember Stalin*. New York: Viking, 1994): 162.

charged under the "Law of 5 Ears" (promulgated 7 August 1932).<sup>15</sup> This law, "Decree of the Central Government of the USSR: 'On the Protection of the Property of State Enterprises, Collective Farms, and Cooperatives, and on the Consolidation of Public (Socialist) Property'" defines the word "draconian." It prohibited even gleaning so much as five spikelets of grain from the already-harvested field to feed oneself or one's family, even to prevent starving to death. Promulgated on 7 August 1932, its text reads in part:

The Central Executive Committee and the Soviet of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR believe that public property (belonging to the state, collective farms, and co-operative societies) is the foundation of the Soviet State system, that it is sacred and inviolable, and that people attempting to obtain public property into their private possession should be considered enemies of the people. In view of this, and unrelenting struggle against the use of public property is the foremost duty of the Soviet government bodies.

On the basis of these considerations, and in order to grant the request of workers and collective farmers, the Central Executive Committee and the Soviet of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR have resolved: ...

Part II: 1.) Consider of the importance of property belonging to collective farms and corporative societies (harvest in the fields, public reserves, cattle, cooperative warehouses and stores, etc..) equal to that of state property and reinforce theft protection of this property in every way.

2.) As a measure of judicial repression for this after property belonging to collective farms and co-operative societies, apply the highest measure of social protection—shooting and the confiscation of the entire property. Under mitigating circumstances, replace this measure with the least 10-year imprisonment with the confiscation of property.

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<sup>15</sup>Decree of the Central Government of the USSR: "On the Protection of the Property of State Enterprises, Collective Farms, and Cooperatives, and on the Consolidation of Public (Socialist) Property" (7 August 1932) at: [http://www.famigenocide.com/kuryliw/corn\\_law.htm](http://www.famigenocide.com/kuryliw/corn_law.htm) (accessed 25 April 2017). From *Sobranie zakonov* (Collection of Laws) 1932, No. 62, in *Tragediia sovetskoi derevni*, Vol. 3 (Moscow, 2001): 453, 454.



3.) No amnesty is to be applied to criminals guilty of stealing property belonging to collective farms and cooperative societies.<sup>16</sup>

The same can be said about including the numbers of Jews migrating out of the Republic in 1928-1938, in amount of 57,000 people; and organized labor recruitment from rural areas, conscripted for construction of new buildings outside of Ukraine in 1935—1938. Additionally, the number of workers thus deported during the Holodomor years from each collective farm and village for work in the timber industry, male or female, responsibilities to family notwithstanding, initially were erroneously reported in the speech by Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, to the VI All-Union Soviet Congress (March 1931), in Moscow, *The Success of the Five-Year Plan*.<sup>17</sup> In the forward matter of this booklet, the Errata Page notes a substantial correction to other publications of the same speech. "The statement that 1,314 workers are engaged in logging work should read 1,314,000."<sup>18</sup>

All the Ukrainian farmers could not simply move into cities, as we are wanted to be convinced by Russian researchers O. Shubin and V. Zhyromska. According to the statement of V. Zhyromska, "Peasants, who ran from Ukrainian villages, were required by Ukrainian industry. That is why local authorities posted their detachments with orders — not to let them out, and the Russian side had the same orders for their detachments — not to let them in."<sup>19</sup>

These words of V. Zhyromska as we can see from the official documents are in complete contradiction to the decision of the CC UCP (b) and the People's Commissars of the USSR, from 22 January 1933, about the ban hungry Ukrainian peasants fleeing to Russia and Belarus for bread; in other words, for quite different motives. Moreover, Ukrainian industry could not absorb all hungry peasants of Ukraine—but only a small part, the number of citizens in Ukrainian SSR, from 1926 to 1937, increased just 4 million.

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Vyacheslav M. Molotov, "The Success of the Five-Year Plan," Speech given to the All-Union Soviet Congress (Moscow, March 1931) in booklet by the same title. New York: Worker's Library Publishers, 1931: Errata.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., page 23, line 3.

<sup>19</sup>*Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (6 December 2006).

A surplus of rural population over those years grew generally by 9.457.316 people. Deputy of Commissar of Agriculture of Ukrainian SSR Lutsenko believed that this extra population could be used to the benefit of the Soviet State, through:

- a.) Intensification of agriculture,
- b.) Development of industry,
- c.) Development of export
- d.) Crafts
- e.) Land reclamation
- f.) Relocations to the south of Ukraine

g.) Lastly, **the surplus of rural population, which would not be absorbed in these sectors of economy, would belong to future contingent of immigrants from Ukraine.**<sup>20</sup>

Consequently, for the lack of land resources, 5,215,071 people could be deported.<sup>21</sup>

However, the planned relocation did not happen, because Ukrainian peasants did not want any promised lands far from their native land. Thus, by the five-year plan for the relocation from Ukrainian SSR collective farms were expected to send away for resettlement from the Ukrainian SSR 182,000 families, or 910,000 people. In fact, for 1927/28, and 1928/29, there were relocated 9,244, and 13,419 families, respectively. In 1929, from the Ukrainian SSR were moved to Siberia 486 Ukrainians; in 1930, 862.<sup>22</sup>

Some Russian researchers also wrote about this. In particular, some Ukrainians who settled in the grain-growing districts of Yenisei province, after the Census of 1926, already could have returned home.<sup>23</sup>

The causes of rotary migration movements and insufficient settlement on Union farms were: poor preparation for inhabitation of the lands designated, fragmentation of those farms, bad arrangements for the practical, social, cultural, and healthcare needs of these migrants; the insufficiently small amount of funds given for reset-

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<sup>20</sup>CDAVOVU: F. 413. — Op. 1. — Spr. 199. — Ark. 7.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid. — Arch. 24.

<sup>22</sup>CDAVOVU: F. 27. — Op. 11. — Spr. 715. — Ark. 7.

<sup>23</sup>A. Shnaider, Population Prynysyetskoho edge (Krasnoyarsk, 1928): 7.

tlement, etc. For example, a group of settlers from Yemchyha, Myronivskiy district, Kyiv province, did not find any lands for collective farming in Siberia, but only after their return to the Ukrainian SSR, was there found a suitable area in northern Kazakhstan.<sup>24</sup>

Given the real weakness of the resettlement processes in place for those venturing outside of the Ukrainian SSR, there is no reason to consider those persons as those who had a significant impact on the reducing of the rural population in Ukraine in late 1920s-early 1930's. Obviously, during that period, the Ukrainian village also provided the industrial centers with a workforce, especially those in the Donbass. In particular, on 17 April 1932, the presidium of Lysychanskiy Regional Executive Committee stated: "The quota for the transfer of the workforce to industry is considered unrealistic, due to the significant movement of rural population of the area, and the complete exhaustion of available free workforce resources on the collective farms."<sup>25</sup>

However, that does not mean that the entire increase of urban population over the mentioned period, in amount of 4,300,000, people occurred only due to the outflow from the Ukrainian village. Therefore, we quite agree with V. Tsaplin, that even those data cannot be considered as final, because:

The topic "requires a deep analysis of all materials about population migration which survived till nowadays, restoration of census indexes for 1937, their comparative analysis with the censuses of 1926 and 1939 ... As for me, certainly, [wrote V. Tsaplin] the most important thing in my effort to distort the results of natural movement of population and census 1939 was the de sire to hide the amount of mass population annihilation in 30s. Millions of dead people disappear from statistics. They simply did not exist".<sup>26</sup>

Ukrainian city grew in that period primarily due to natural growth and mechanical inflow of labor force, including from Russia, starting with the building of Dniproges in 1927. Just after new working factories became active in Ukrainian SSR, they were supposed to ensure their needs with skilled workforce right from Russia.

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<sup>24</sup>CDAVOVU: F. 27. — Op. 15. — Spr. 504. — Ark. 54.

<sup>25</sup>CDAVOVU: F. 1. — Op. 8. — Spr. 323. — Ark. 219 zv.

<sup>26</sup>V. Tsaplin Statistics victims of Stalinism. — P. 181).

Thus, people were brought from Russia and Belarus, and local hungry peasants who wanted to get a job on plants and factories to receive food rations were refused. For example, on October 26, 1932 Politburo CC CP(b) decided that from 48.961 workers needed for Donbass coal mines for the fourth quarter of 1932, 20,000 should cover Ukraine and 28.961 — BSRR and RSFSR. In particular, BSRR had to send 8,200 people, Tatarstan - 9.000 and Central Black Earth region — 11.760 ...

According to the plan of providing of skilled labor force in amount of 922 people for launching of Lugansk locomotive factory was supposed to prepare on Kryukovsky plant 20 people, on Factory named after Uritskiy — 13, in Tver — 48, on Moscow Brake — 29, Lenin-grad factory named after Egorov — 59, on Bryansk Engineering — 242, in Kolomna — 176, on factory named after October revolution — 335.<sup>27</sup>

Soon, in August 1932, it became clear that the strict limitation of supply from the state will not allow to get the required number of workers among local peasants; so executives of chemical Factory X2 59, which was during construction in Donbass, requested CC CP (B) U to raise the question for CC UCP(b) and People's Commissar of labor of USSR about selection of districts in RSFSR and Byelorussian SSR for organized recruitment of labor force<sup>28</sup>

Outstanding Ukrainian scientist, one of the founders of national demographics, Professor Arsen Khomenko, in the end of 1932 published an article "Population of USSR in prospective calculation", in which on the base of his own analysis of population movement since 1927 was made a calculation of republic residents number for next five years. Based on the basic number of population on January 1, 1932 — 32.241 thousand people (apparently without prison population, because government figure on that date was somewhat higher — 32.600 thousand people) and by applying the appropriate rate of growth, the researcher predicted that on January 1, 1937 in Ukrainian SSR should have been present 35,617 thousand people.

It is clear that such an experienced professional as A. Khomenko

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<sup>27</sup>CzDAGOU: F. 1. — Op. 20. — Spr. 5379. — Ark.4).

<sup>28</sup>TSDAHOU: F. 1. — Op. 20. — Conjugation — 5326. — Ark. 8).

took into his account the trend of migration flows over the previous years, changes in birth rate and mortality rate, which occurred with increasing of urbanization processes, ending of dekulakization policy, etc. But on January 9, 1937 the All-Union census happened, and recorded that in Ukrainian SSR according to official figures were only 28.2 million people (excluding prison population, which were established in 1937 in the amount of 165 thousand people). That means that in Ukrainian SSR population was even less than it was in 1926. As if no one was born at all, but only died or moved out of the Republic almost 7.5 million people.

About these calculations of A. Khomenko our modern demographers do not mention, for some reason, while representing their own analysis of Holodomor 1932—1933, claiming a number of direct losses of Ukrainian SSR in 1932—1933 in amount of 3.9 million people, as evidenced by publication of Alexander Gladun and Omelian Rudnytskiy.<sup>29</sup>

Could such a famous scientist as A. Khomenko be mistaken in his calculations, or his current colleagues simply overlooked the method of calculation, which he proposed?

But even without answers on these questions we have reason to believe that calculations of A. Khomenko about population growth in Ukrainian SSR allows us to get a very close figure to the actual Holodomor losses. For example, if we know the official figures of population in Ukrainian SSR in amount of 32.600,7 thousand people on January 1, 1932, add at least 921.2 thousand people of potential growth for those two years (take as a minimum 460.6 thousand people in 1931, when there wasn't mass starvation) and we would have 33.521,9 thousand people, and according to calculations of A. Khomenko on January 1, 1934 — there must be 33.464 thousand people.

To determine population losses of Ukrainian SSR within two years of famine, from official figures of the All-Union census 1937 in amount of **2,82,000 people let's minus natural population growth for 1934 in amount of 882,000 people, in 1935 — 417,200 people,**

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<sup>29</sup> "Voice of Ukraine" from November 26, 2016).

**in 1936 — 533,700 people — in total 1,391,000 people and also derived on areabased results difference of previously mentioned census, which for 5,320,000 lower than was presented in Moscow. Thus, state on January 1, 1934 we have only 26,628,100 thousand people, which ultimately indicate a decrease of population in Ukrainian SSR for 6.993,8 thousand people.**

Why do we insist today on a casualty figures iii least 7 million people? That is because all the directions are not investigated yet, which makes it impossible to get the real results of scientific re-searches.

**First**, somehow was not analyzed a specific migration flow in 1932 - 1933's, when thousands of starving Ukrainian peasants tried to reach Poland and Romania through Polissya swamps, Zbruch and Dniester, but were shot by Soviet border guards or did not reach the rescue opposite bank, where hoped to get such a desired bread.

For example, Osip Ilkiv from Vitkivtsi village, Kamenetz-Podolsk district of nowadays Khmelnytsky region "taking all his family, two children, a wife and her mother, under the cover of night frosts and snowstorms head on West. Apparently in the daytime they had to sit somewhere in coppice covered with snow, away from the eyes of NKVD, boarder guard and their dogs. And so, in one of those dark winter and blizzard night, when even the boarders' " guardians" of "the red paradise" and their dogs had no courage to cross their warm doorsteps, Osip Ilkiv and his frozen, wearied by hunger and disadvantages of previous days family, with their last forces got to Zbruch, crossed Soviet-Polish border and reached village Mozolivka, Pidhayechyna on Galtske Podillya ... As a result of cold, exhaustion, physical and mental shock the wife of Osip Ilkov died... ".

Wasn't that Holodomor that caused this loss for our nation? Wasn't that its fault that on June 24, 1933:

An elderly man wanted to go from village Bronytsia to Romania. He was seen by the Soviet's boarder guard who began to shoot. But the fugitive was far from boarder guard and he could not hit him. Meanwhile, the fugitive went into the water till his groin. It looked like he couldn't swimmy because the water started to spin him around. Then he began waving his arms, asking the

rescue from Romanian bank... Considering that, one among Bolshevik guards ran almost to the shore and from a distance of 100—150 steps from his knee shut right into the fugitive's head. Only a cap floated on the water, and the man himself went to the bottom".<sup>30</sup>

Romanian newspapers increasingly inform about atrocity of Communists near Dniester. Bolshevik's boarder guard shoot the people who run away to the other side of Dniester, as hares. Such scenes happen not just once a white day and Romanian population can witness atrocities of Bolsheviks. Such situation recently was on the opposite of Vasiltsi: a group of three fugitives attempted to cross to Romanian side. The Bolsheviks opened fire from machine guns. One wounded fugitive drowned, another was returned by Bolsheviks to the shore, where he was finished off immediately, and the third reached another shore, but was so wounded that it was impossible to talk to him. All this was happening in front of people's eyes at four o'clock in the afternoon.

Similar situations also occurred on Polissya. In Taras Bulba-Borovets memoirs "Army without a state" there is a testimony: "There is a real war between fugitives and border guard GPU. All nights long machine guns are firing and rockets and searchlights are shining like at the front. A spectacle like this was never seen by this border.

Polish border are clouded with people. Who is that? These are already not bourgeois, not fists, not engineers, not cooperatives, not professors, not agronomists, and not officials. These are simple workers and peasants who are saving their lives. They are escaping under a hail of machine-gun bullets, like on the front line. They are running blindly through the impenetrable mud and forests, just to get somewhere outside the Ukrainian SSR. They are carrying out on their shoulders wounded and beaten children, dragging maimed and stripped to the nakedness women. They create on the borders an indescribable horror.

... They told to those who were interested that in Ukrainian SSR

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<sup>30</sup> Those days about shooting of hungry fugitives from Ukrainian SSR was written in Lviv's newspaper "Svoboda" under the headline "Dniester is red from blood".

was carried out violent collectivization, that from people were taken away their cattle, implements, lands — all that they had from revolution, that millions of people were starving and ding like flies throughout Ukraine, that poor victims had no one to bury them, that people ate leaves, grass, cats and dogs, and even other humans".

Holodomor Researcher Ivan Chyhyryn gives data which confirms that for 1932 boarder's guards GPU shot 5.450 people. How many fugitives exhausted from malnutrition were absorbed by waves of Dniester or Zbruch remains unknown. As well as we don't know about all those who died from catarrhal diseases after crossing border in icy water. As for the losses of 1933 on the western border — we still don't have any generalizations. Those who were lucky to cross the West boarders would not come back until January 1937, in order to be included to **Census. That means that they did not become citizens and did not go to Russia, to survive there — they were lost to Ukrainian SSR because of Holodomor.**

**Second**, no one counted those Ukrainian peasants who died from starvation in Russia or Belarus, where they came before the resolution of CC UCP (b) and the People's Commissars of USSR from January 22, 1933, which forbade them to travel to these regions for food. For example, the letter from Secretary of Kantemyrivka District Committee of UCP (b) Zhurylova to Secretary of Regional Committee of Central Black Earth region Vareykis from April 1, 1932 shows that in Kantemyrivka "only for last few days were buried 12 people who came for bread from Ukrainian neighboring areas".

We know only that GPO authorities had the task to arrest those "Ukrainian and North Caucasus peasantries, who made their way on North", and after among them would be sorted "counterrevolutionary elements, to rotate those who left to their places of residence". On February 14, 1933 were detained 31.783 people, among which 28.351 were returned to their places of residence and 3.434 people were prosecuted, 579 were selected for sending to Kazakh ASRR.

**Third**, for a quarter of century, in fact, was not investigated any mass grave of those people who left for bread, corpses of which were thrown into common pits without proper registration near railway



stations. That way in village around, let's say, Mirgorod relatives of missing people thought that they were lost somewhere in search of food, but in fact they were lying close to their family houses in damp ground because the authorities would not let them for bread to Russia or Belarus.

For example, on May 16, 1932, more than 8 months before signing of previously mentioned ban of Kremlin from January 22, 1933, a group of people in search for bread from Globinsk, Semenovsk, Pototsk-Kremenchug, Alexandria districts:

In search for bread, on behalf of five thousand others—not livestock, but people still half-alive, tearing themselves out of strong claws of artificial hunger," [addressed a letter to Stalin and the CC CP (B)]:

... we are lying half-starved on stations, like a useless trash; while boarding railway carriages, we got our noses broken by hands of unpunished conductors, and our fingers crossed with doors of carriages on distance between Ronny and Bakhmach.

Tattered from malnutrition, dried and blackened by winds and sunshine people with sacks are coming to wagons, show tickets, and a young conductor — a girl with a CIY badge — screams: "Where are you going, go further." They go to the back wagons, and there is a feldsvyaz MPD representative in a hurry to get on, as if **in agreement, repeats the phrase of the conductor, but only changing the tone: "where are you going, you will go on collective one"**.

In cases like this, people tried to run behind the train, jumped on footboard of wagons in movement, but they were roughly pushed down, they fell and did not get up again, stayed lying along railway embankments. Near station Bulatselivka, for example, from December 1932 to May 1933 were ten thousands of those.

And what about a giant mass grave, which wasn't dug out, near Dnieproges in Zaporozie, where all hungry people were coming from neighborhood, with a hope for ration of builder, but they, completely exhausted, weren't hired, so they died nameless ...

**Fourth**, the question about kulaks returning to Ukraine in 1932—1936 wasn't investigated. Many of kulaks' wives and their children managed to come back through divorce with the head of

the family. On this matter remained corresponding resolutions of presidiums of local Executive Committees, but they were not analyzed by anyone.

**Fifth**, all members of kulaks' families were withdraw from the Red Army as unreliable social element. Thus, on January 27, 1932 presidium of Popasnajanskiy local Executive Committee decided to return from Soviet army Ivan and Sergey Lebed from Skolevatska village council, Daniel Belka — from Berestovsk, Vasil Orlenko — from Vasilevsk as the sons of kulaks.

Decrees like these on January 28, 1932 were approved by presidium of Ulyanovsk local Executive Committee about native dweller of Hryntseve village Gritsenko Petro Pavlovych, on February 5, 1932 by Reshetylivsk — "extraneous elements Nazarenko Andrei Petrovich and Lutyi Luka Antonovich," December 2, 1932 by Koropsk — Prikhodko A. A.. If they were lucky to move to Ukrainian cities, they could save themselves by joining the ranks of workers — in their native villages they were waited only by usual fate of countrymen during Holodomor.

**Sixth**, stayed uncounted the return of those peasantries, which Moscow agreed to release under the memorandum of chairman deputy of Radnarkom USSR V. Chubar from September 20, 1936, to Politburo CC UCP (b) "About the order of dismissal of people from working villages previously convicted for various crimes from 3 to 5 years after serving their punishment". That meant those who were convicted under "the law of 5 ears". On March 31, 1933 People's Commissar of Justice and Prosecutor General of Ukrainian SSR V. Polyakov reported to General Secretary of CC CP (B) U S. Kosior that during period from November 27, 1932 to the North were transported 86.884 offenders among peasants, who were accused **for the crimes of "attacks on socialist property "or malicious failure of grain procurement. How many of them returned till January 1937 to Ukrainian SSR, and how many of them died from starvation, disease and overwork? It is known that in 1932 the number of deaths among "kulaks' exile" was 87.7 thousand people, and in 1933 - 151.6 thousand people. How many of them were Ukrainians - no one counted yet.**

**Seventh**, it is obvious that to Holodomor losses should be also included those who were sentenced to death under the law from August 7, 1932. During the second half of August shooting was applied to 27 prisoners, in September - to 193, in October — to 121, in November — to 159 people. But for the time from November 26 to December 7, 1932 were sentenced to death 137 people.

This pattern continued in 1933. During January 1933, in Kharkiv region, were sentenced to death 117 people. For the first five days of February, in Dnipropetrovsk region, were sentenced to death 44 people ...

**Eighth**. Has it ever been taken into account deaths from starvation in pre-trial prison chambers, or were these deaths considered natural? Yes, in Zinov'yevsk in Common place of detention in December 1932 there were 20 people like that, in January 1933—117, in February — 163, for 13 days of March —105 people died. Were those losses counted in all prisons, in which were punished our peasants who were already removed from the register by their place of residence.

**Ninth**, the separate statistics should be applied for counting of those deaths which were caused by Bolshevik firmness in carrying out the repressions for failure on grain procurements. Specifically, the wife of member of council farm "Voskhod" of Volnovsk district, Donetsk region, who was brought to responsibility for so-called collective waste of bread; the woman hacked to death her two children and tried to hang herself...

On Chernihivshyna a middle peasants Bolohovets, who had already fulfilled his task till December 16, 1932, and from which was demanded to continue bread procurement, and from whom were removed all available food supplies for family that were planned until the next harvest (corn — 116 kilograms, potatoes — 19, grain — 4, millet —11, beans — 3, sunflower seeds — 10, and 10 poppy heads), hanged himself.

A peasant Kolomiets from Novovolodymyrivka Alexandrivskiy district, Dnipropetrovsk region, from whom on January 10, 1933 was made an attempt to **take away food, shot with gun a female activist and the head of commission; than he took his wife, their food and disappeared from the village.**

The Head of village council from Sorochinske village, Bobrynets district Shevchenko and a secretary of local party center Skaliy, got suspicious of stealing about collective farmer Nehrash, and killed him on the way to police office. Collective farmer Demian Klochko farmers, who dug potatoes in the garden, was killed on the spot. A few days later died beaten by them pauper Dubovka; as well as beaten by senior stableman from farm named after Stalin a boy Androsov and a girl Berezhyska ...

Collective farmers Verbitskiy from Novoaleksandrovka was beaten to half death and buried; he got out of the pit, crawled to his house and died. His fellow villager Yosyp Tsapenko, was tied by the neck to the tail of the horse and drove until poor man fell down and died by village council member Ponomarenko.

In Dolyna village a secretary of local party center Ivanchenko and attached to threshing Adamenko were abusing Komsomolets Labenko so harshly, that in the end he broke down and hanged himself.

Where can you find the statistics of such cases? Wasn't it caused by organized Holodomor?

**Tenth.** We must not forget that there were people who returned from cities to villages. For example, 150,000 people did not receive passports in Kharkov, Kiev, Odessa, Stalin, Dnipropetrovsk and Vinnytsya, so they had to leave city. According to official numbers among deported people over 30,000 were former wealthy farmers, 40 thousand were so-called parasitic elements, and 15 thousand - were workers who did not have permanent employment.

There was another wave of those who came back: in July 1934 large Kharkiv plants fired 8,230 people, tractor factory — 3,227, among which 936 were wealthy farmers. They returned to villages, and filled places of those who were annihilated by hunger.

**Eleventh;** an unexplored problem remains cannibalism. In Ukrainian village it did not have those classic features that belong to peculiar culture elements, for example, of some African tribes. Ukrainian cannibalism 1932—1933 — usually was a despair of people insane from hunger, who were still alive due to determined victims. That was a kind of cannibalism in the name of life. How many

victims it took away — it is still a mystery. As like as stretched by wild dogs unidentified corpses on the roads.

Still weren't investigated nor by historians, nor by demographers many other problems that were fixed in memories of Holodomor witnesses. For example, why in some regions was forbidden to record to civil status of deceased children under 1 year old? And why after March 1933 there ceased to constitute any acts of mortality? Who calculated all those deaths of children, who were left on the doorsteps of orphanages, but they did not get help because no one opened the door for the crying baby.

**Twelfth.** Who counted the number of people who were brought to Ukrainian cities as work from Russia and other Soviet republics. Indeed, in census 1937, which showed that population of Ukrainian SSR declined compared to 1926, those people actually took places of those who were lost for Ukraine during that period. For example, official data for 1934, 1935 and first three quarters of 1936 show that this flow was 1.435,969 people?<sup>31</sup>

How many people were brought in as workers to Ukraine during 1932—1933? The coal mines of the "Kadiyivvuhillya" Trust in the Donbass, in October 1932, most hungry Ukrainian farmers were not employed: Only 118 people from Ukraine were hired, compared to 403 from Tatarstan, 125 from Byelorussia, 194 from the Central Chernozem Region (Russia), and 14 from the West Oblast.<sup>32</sup>

On 26 October 1932, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPU (b) U resolved that of 48,961 necessary workers for the coal mines of Donbass in the fourth quarter of 1932, 20,000 should be given from Ukraine, and 28,961 from the BSSR and RSFSR. In particular, 8,200 people were to be sent from the BSSR; from Tatarstan — 9000; and from Central Chernozem Region — 11760.<sup>33</sup> As a result, in September 1932, to the "Donbasantracite" were sent: from Central Chernozem Region — 2.450; from Tatar SSR — 2.400; from BSSR — 0; USSR — 3.150.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>31</sup>Implementation of Economic Plan of Ukrainian SSR for 1936. — K.: *The economy and accounting*, 1937. — P. 500).

<sup>32</sup>TsDAGOU: F.1. — Op.20. — Spr. 5315. — Ark. 42, 43.

<sup>33</sup>TsDAVOVU: F. 2623. — Op 1. — Spr. 6807. — Ark. 45.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid. — Ark 25.

In October 1932, to the "Donbasantracite" workers arrived: from Central Chernozem Region — 407; from Tatar SSRR — 132; Kom-somol members from Odessa — 242; and 159 were mobilized inside the district.<sup>35</sup> In the fourth quarter of 1932, for the coal mines of Donbas, were recruited: 12.810 from the USSR; 5.917 from Central Chernozem Region; 2.012 from BSSR; 1.792 from Tatarstan; and 53 from West Region.<sup>36</sup>

The same happened in the Dnieper region. For example, the leadership of the Dniprobud, asking about the provision of labor for the construction of the Dnieper Aluminum Plant by qualified labor in the 3rd quarter of 1932, required a permit for the recruitment of 242 diggers; 164 maslings; 1052 carpenters; 146 armored personnel carriers; 410 concrete workers; 194 plasterers; 1174 unskilled workers, and 207 others from the Central Chernozem Region, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kostroma, Smolensk regions, Tatar and Mordovia ASSR, also in Belarus.<sup>37</sup>

**Thirteenth, and perhaps the most important,** all researchers are unanimous about the fact that official registration of deaths in Ukrainian village covered far not all deceased, because often there wasn't anyone to fix them. In Pischansky village council, Dnipro-petrovsk region, for example, was discovered underestimation of dead, about 300 people, on the territory of Vilniansk village council, Kyiv region were not registrated 50 unidentified dead bodies, in Kiev — 5,481 "in accordance with legislative guidelines of public prosecutor's office (oral and written)" (*Kulchytsky S. Holodomor 1932—1933 as genocide: difficulties of realization.* — K.: Nash chas, 2008. — C. 48).

In memorandum of People's Commissar Deputy of Health of Ukrainian SSR Harmandaryana to Kosior from June 6, 1933, specified: "To consider as doubtless significantly minimized numbers of deaths, as inspections on spots and thorough investigation of local materials testifies about much higher figures: so in Skvirsky district from 1.01 to 1.03 according to reports died 802 people, while the inspection defined on 15.01 1.773 deaths, in Volodarsky district on

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid. — Ark. 18.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid. — Spr. 6807. — Ark. 9.

<sup>37</sup>DAZO: F. P-995. — Op. 16. — Spr. 25. — Ark. 128.

1.03 refers about 742 death, whereas, in reality, so far, died more than 3,000 people "(ibid. — P. 78).

As for Volodarsky district, Kyiv region, about which by the way, remained some other data that were contained in a special certificate addressed to Secretary General of CC CP (B) U Kosior, from 21 April 1933: during 1931, there died 690 people; in January 1933, 540—550 people; in February, 710—720; in March, 1450—1500; for 15 days of April, 350—370.<sup>38</sup>

According to this document:

Accounting of mortality is not organized up to this day. In all villages council records are not kept in books of civil register. District leadership did not deal with matters of mortality accounting and only 23 II on base of village councils' surveys were made rough accounting. The same accounting was made 20 / III and finally 15 / IV. According to these data from January 1st to April 15th, 3.427 people died. The total number of deaths in the area makes almost minus 10 percent.<sup>39</sup>

Only during mentioned period in Mihajlovka, Volodarka, Luhyny, Petrashivtsi, Chypyzhentsyah died from 15 to 20 percent of population, ad in Ozhohivtsi — 30,7. In other towns it varies between given extreme figures of percentage (ibid. — Ark. 194).

What are the specific mortality data in Skvyrschyna, for period from January 15 to March 1? The previously mentioned document, unfortunately, does not provide us with specific numbers...

Did someone make a similar mortality accounting, checking figures for each settlement in Ukrainian SSR in January-March 1933? No, although such a situation was everywhere the same. For example, in Hutor Selysche, Kyshenivskiy district, that time Kharkiv region, in the cellar were piled together 17 corpses, that had been collected over a long period of time by the inhabitant, Serdyuk.<sup>40</sup>

There were doubts about veracity of population accounting and statistics of Ukrainian SSR. Thus, reporting on April 22, 1935 to Secretaries of CC CP (B) U Kosior and Postyshev classified "top secret"

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<sup>38</sup> CDAGOU: F. 1. — Op. 20. — Spr. 6275. — Ark. 193.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid. — Ark. 194.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid. — Ark. 129.

about the population presence in Ukrainian SSR on 1 January 1933, in the amount allegedly 31,901,400 people; and on 1 January 1934, 30,665,300; as for 1 January 1935, 30,743,500. The Head of the National Economic Accounting State Planning of Ukrainian SSR Asatkin, in particular, said:

The correctness of these numbers is under a big doubt due to the poor state of existing statistical data about movement of people: current registration of acts of civil status and accounting of population movement. The case of civil registration began to worsen in 1929 — since elimination of Registry Office, which was a part of NKVD: there was no normal supply of village councils with acts books, the registration was often carried out on pieces of paper, numbers were confused, the records were not processed officially **(by the head and secretary of village councils), were not always supported by statutory witnesses and documents.**

The list of people who kept civil registration, as it turned out during a special inspection of Statistical Commission USSR was full of class-hostile elements - kulaks, former priests, embezzlers, etc.

Such situation could not only lead to such errors, but sometimes to direct and deliberate distortion of reality; for applying of disadvantages in case of population accounting with purpose of direct sabotage.<sup>41</sup>

The Head of the National Economic Accounting State Planning of Ukrainian SSR Asatkin specifically stops on statistics of 1932-1933. Recognizing the catastrophic lack of population growth in 1933 (deficit according to official documents was then 1,379,571 people; he questions the figure that only can be explained the sharp decrease in population of Ukraine by intense migration in 1932-1933, or by an increase of mortality—as it were not only errors, but erroneous current accounting of population.<sup>42</sup>

**That is why we would be able to talk finally about amount of Ukrainian losses from the Genocide-Holodomor, only after investigation of all 13 previously mentioned directions of scientific research.** However, even before establishing of specific figure by a

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<sup>41</sup> CDAGOU: F. 1. — Op. 20. — Spr. 6762. — Ark. 1).

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. — Ark. 2.



thorough check of all the circumstances of this tragedy, it is our opinion that, **for today, it is justified to talk about minimum number of losses in amount of 7 million victims** and continue the hard work to identify, especially in Ukrainian archives, primary materials, which would help to set the number closest to real total. It is not just a matter of those who died from starvation on Ukrainian black earth, but also about those victims, whose deaths were caused by the Holodomor that languish uncounted by our demographers.

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**Ukrainian Genocide  
1932—1933  
How millions of  
deaths were not in-  
cluded in the statistics**



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