An International Newsletter, The Latest, Up-To-Date
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis and Commentary

Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion, Economics,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World       
Induced Famine, Death for Millions, Genocide. 1932-1933
Ukraine Remembers - The World Acknowledges! Nov 2009
Coined the term ‘genocide,’ "Father of the Genocide Convention"
Called the Holodomor a classic case of Soviet genocide
Also articles by Gareth Jones, Walter Duranty, James Mace, Roman
Serbyn, Lubomyr Luciuk, Stanislav Kulchytsky, Yuriy Shapoval
Mr. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor, SigmaBleyzer Emerging
Markets Private Equity Investment Group,
Clicking on the title of any article takes you directly to the article.               
Return to Index by clicking on Return to Index at the end of each article

By Professor Roman Serbyn, Université du Québec à Montréal
Montréal Québec, Canada
"Holodomor Studies" Journal, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Winter-Spring 2009, Pg. 1-2
Charles Schlacks, Publisher, Idyllwild, CA 
FAMOUS ESSAY by Rafael Lemkin, New York, NY, 1953 
"Holodomor Studies" Journal, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Winter-Spring 2009, Pgs 3-8
Charles Schlacks, Publisher, Idyllwild, CA 

Coined the term ‘genocide,’ "Father of the Genocide Convention"
Called the Holodomor a classic case of Soviet genocide
Commentary: By Lubomyr Luciuk, Professor
Political Geography, Royal Military College of Canada
Kyiv, Post, Kyiv, Ukraine, Friday, November 20, 2009

Article by James E. Mace, Professor of Political Science
Kyiv-Mohyla Academy National University, Kyiv, Ukraine
Published in: "Holodomor: The Ukrainian Genocide, 1932-1933"
Holodomor 70th Anniversary Commemorative Edition
Canadian American Slavic Studies Journal, Vol 37, No. 3, Fall 2003
Charles Schlacks, Jr, Publisher, Idyllwild, CA, Pages 45-52
Did Stalin’s communist regime commit genocide against the Ukrainian people?
By Professor Roman Serbyn, Université du Québec à Montréal
Montréal, Québec, Canada
"Holodomor Studies" Journal, Vol. 1, Issue 2, Winter 2009
Charles Schlacks, Publisher, Idyllwild, CA 

Gareth Jones, Lloyd George Aid, Reports Devastation
Evening Post Foreign Service, New York, New York, March 29, 1933
Deaths From Diseases Due to Malnutrition High, Yet the Soviet is Entrenched
Ukraine, North Caucasus and Lower Volga Regions Suffer From Shortages
Russian and Foreign Observers In Country See No Ground for Predications of Disaster
The New York Times, New York, March 31, 2009, Page 13   

["I stand by my statement that Soviet Russia is suffering from a severe famine."]
Letter Published in: The New York Times, New York, NY, May 13, 1933

By Stanislav Kulchytsky, Institute of History
National Academy of Sciences (Ukraine)
"Holodomor Studies" Journal, Vol. 1, Issue 2, Winter 2009
Charles Schlacks, Publisher, Idyllwild, CA 

Yuriy Shapoval, National Academy of Sciences Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine
Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta D. Olynyk
"Holodomor Studies" Journal, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Winter-Spring 2009, Pages 41-54
Charles Schlacks, Publisher, Idyllwild, CA 

Action Ukraine History Report (AUHR), Washington, D.C., Tue, Nov 17, 2009
By Professor Roman Serbyn, Université du Québec à Montréal
Montréal Québec, Canada
"Holodomor Studies" Journal, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Winter-Spring 2009,
Pages vii-viii, 1-2, In Memoriam: Raphael Lemkin [1900-1959]
Charles Schlacks, Publisher, Idyllwild, CA 
EDITOR'S FORWARD [Roman Serbyn]:  .......The first issue of "Holodomor Studies" is dedicated to the memory of Raphael Lemkin (1900-1959), to honor the first Western scholar to approach the analysis of the Ukrainian genocide with the same conceptual framework as this journal.  A Polish Jew, who studied law in the Jan Casimir University of Lviv, Lemkin became a recognized expert in international criminal law, with particular interest in the prevention of mass exterminations.
In 1943 he coined the term "genocide" and then popularized it with his book "Axis Rule in Occupied Europe" published the following year.  [Raphael Lemkin, "Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress, Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944].  It was mainly due to Lemkin's perseverance in lobbying the delegates to the United Nations, that the General Assembly passed the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, on December 9, 1948 (
While in the United States Lemkin maintained friendly relations with members of the Ukrainian community, and in 1953 was invited to speak at the commemoration of the Great Ukrainian Famine, held at New York's Manhattan Center.  Lemkin's address remains to this day on of the most perceptive of the Ukrainian genocide. [Raphael Lemkin, "Soviet Genocide in the Ukraine," Raphael Lemkin Papers, N.Y. P.L., Manuscripts & Archives Division, Aster, Lenox and Tilden Foundation, 2. File 16.]
Lemkin's notion of genocide was much broader than the definition of that crime retained by the UN Convention.  In particular, Lemkin's victims of genocide included groups targeted because of their social and/or political identities.  However, the Genocide Convention recognized only four groups of victims:
national, ethnic, religious and racial. 
Aware of this limitation of the UN document, Lemkin examined the destruction of the Ukrainian population as a national/ethnic group.  It is very clear from his arguments, that Lemkin saw the partial annihilation of the Ukrainian people, both by starvation and by othe means, as intended to destroy the Ukrainian national group, as such. 
To honor Lemkin's memory and recognize his invaluable contribution to the understanding of genocide in general, and of the Ukrainian genocide in particular, we take great pride and pleasure in featuring his insightful paper "Soviet Genocide in the Ukraine." [See article two below, AUR Editor]
Raphael Lemkin’s essay, “Soviet Genocide in Ukraine,” is one of the earliest writings on the subject by a non-Ukrainian scholar. A note “Begin here,” scribbled in before the second paragraph, which begins with the words “What I want to speak about,” suggests that the text was originally composed for Lemkin’s address at the 1953 Ukrainian Famine commemoration in New York. Later Lemkin added it to the material he was gathering for his elaborate History of Genocide which was never published. [1]
Lemkin’s views on the Ukrainian tragedy are virtually unknown and hardly ever figure in scholarly exchanges on the Ukrainian famine of 1932-1933, or on genocides in general. [2] Yet his holistic approach to the Soviet regime’s gradual destruction of the Ukrainian nation is enlightening and makes a valuable, if belated, addition to scholarly literature on the subject.

Rafael was born in 1900 to a Jewish farming family in the village of Bezwodne, near the Old Rus’ town of Volkovysk, now part of the Grodno region of Belarus. Before World War I the territory belonged to Russia, but after the break-up of the Tsarist Empire it was incorporated into Poland.[3] Lemkin studied philology and law at the University of Lviv, where he became interested in the Turkish massacres of the Armenians, during World War I. After studying on a scholarship in Germany, France and Italy he returned to Poland and pursued a career in the Polish courts of law, mainly in Warsaw.
He continued his preoccupation with the problem of legal sanctions against perpetrators of mass exterminations and developed his ideas, which he later presented at various international conferences. Lemkin was appointed assistant prosecutor, first at the District Court of Berezhany, Ternopil Province of Eastern Galicia (Western Ukraine), and then he obtained a similar position in Warsaw, where he also practiced law and continued his writings on international law. He must have been quite aware of the collectivization, dekulakization and the eventual Great Famine devastating Soviet Ukraine.

After the invasion of Poland by German and Soviet troops in 1939, Lemkin fled to Vilnius and then to Sweden where he lectured at the University of Stockholm. In early 1941 he managed to obtain a visa to the USSR, and then via Japan and Canada came to the United States. In April 1941 he was appointed “special lecturer” at the Duke University Law School in Durham, North Carolina. In 1944 he published Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, which he had started writing in Sweden.[4]
The study is a thoroughly documented exposé on German crimes in Europe. The book contains the first mention of the term “genocide,” which has become a generic name not only for the Nazi atrocities but of all mass destructions. The author’s relentless lobbying, backed by the prestige of his book, finally succeeded in swaying the United Nations Organization to adopt the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.”

After the war, Lemkin devoted his life to the further development of legal concepts and norms for containing mass destructions and punishing their perpetrators. After the fall of Nazism, Lemkin saw the main threat in Communism, which had overrun his native Poland. Towards the end of his life he had close relations with the Ukrainian and Baltic communities in the United States. In 1953 he took part in the commemoration of the Great Famine by the New York Ukrainian community.
His essay on the Ukrainian genocide shows his empathy for the plight of Ukrainian victims of Communism and Russian imperialism, not only of the Great Famine of the early thirties but of the periods that preceded and followed the tragic event. Lemkin’s essay, based on personal observations and supplemented with emotionally charged testimony provided by the Ukrainian community may appear sketchy and naïve today.
Yet his comments offer an insight that is often lacking in present-day literature, whose authors have access to documentation, unavailable to Lemkin. Lemkin rightly extends the discussion of Ukrainian genocide beyond the starving peasants of 1932-1933 and speaks about the destruction of the intelligentsia and the Church, the “brain” and the “soul” of the nation. He put the emphasis on culture, beliefs and common ideas, all of which made Ukraine “a nation rather than a mass of people.”

Lemkin’s essay is reproduced here [article two below, AUR Editor] with the correction of obvious typographical errors, minor updating of terminology (Ukraine instead of “the Ukraine,” Romanian instead of “Rumanian,” Tsarist instead of “Czarist”) and the transliteration of Ukrainian names from Ukrainian.
[1]. Raphael Lemkin Papers. The New York Public Library. Manuscripts & Archives Division. Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundation. Raphael Lemkin ZL-273. Reel 3. For Lamkin’s biography, see: Pané, note 2.
[2]. A notable exception is Jean-Louis Panné, “Rafaël Lemkin ou le pouvoir d’un sans-pouvoir,” in Rafaël Lemkin, Qu’est-ce qu’un genocide? Presentation par Jean-Louis Panné (Monaco: Édition du Rocher, 2008), pp. 7-66.
[3]. Bibliographical data gathered from Ryszard Szawlowski, “Raphael Lemkin (1900-1959) The Polish Lawyer Who Created the Concept of ‘Genocide’,” Polish International Affairs, no. 2 (2005), pp. 98-133; Panné, “Rafaël Lemkin ou le pouvoir d’un sans-pouvoir,” pp. 7-66.
[4]. Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), pp. xii-xiii.
AUR FOOTNOTE:  Roman Serbyn is a well-known historian and scholar. He is professor emeritus of Russian and East European history at the University of Quebec at Montreal, and an expert on Ukraine. Publications: Roman Serbyn and Bohdan Krawchenko, "Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933," 1986, ISBN 0920862438 and Roman Serbyn, "Holod 1921-1923 I Ukrainska Presa V Kanadi" (translation: The Famine of 1921-1923 and the Ukrainian Press in Canada), 1992, ISBN 0969630107, [email protected].
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FAMOUS ESSAY by Rafael Lemkin, New York, NY, 1953 
[Text was probably originally composed for Lemkin’s address at the 1953 Ukrainian
Famine commemoration in New York. Later Lemkin added it to the material he was
gathering for his elaborate History of Genocide which was never published. Ed, Roman Serbyn.]
"Holodomor Studies" Journal, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Winter-Spring 2009, Pages 3-8
Charles Schlacks, Publisher, Idyllwild, CA 

Sosyura. “Love Ukraine”
You cannot love other peoples
Unless you love Ukraine.[1]
The mass murder of peoples and of nations that has characterized the advance of the Soviet Union into Europe is not a new feature of their policy of expansionism, it is not an innovation devised simply to bring uniformity out of the diversity of Poles, Hungarians, Balts, Romanians – presently disappearing into the fringes of their empire. Instead, it has been a long-term characteristic even of the internal policy of the Kremlin – one which the present masters had ample precedent for in the operations of Tsarist Russia. It is indeed an indispensable step in the process of “union” that the Soviet leaders fondly hope will produce the “Soviet Man,” the “Soviet Nation,” and to achieve that goal, that unified nation, the leaders of the Kremlin will gladly destroy the nations and the cultures that have long inhabited Eastern Europe.

What I want to speak about is perhaps the classic example of Soviet genocide, its longest and broadest experiment in Russification – the destruction of the Ukrainian nation. This is, as I have said, only the logical successor of such Tsarist crimes as the drowning of 10,000 Crimean Tatars by order of Catherine the Great, the mass murders of Ivan the Terrible’s “SS troops” – the Oprichnina; the extermination of National Polish leaders and Ukrainian Catholics by Nicholas I; and the series of Jewish pogroms that have stained Russian history periodically. And it has had its matches within the Soviet Union in the annihilation of the Ingerian nation, the Don and Kuban Cossacks, the Crimean Tatar Republics, the Baltic Nations of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. Each is a case in the long-term policy of liquidation of non-Russian peoples by the removal of select parts.

Ukraine constitutes a slice of Southeastern USSR equal in area to France and Italy, and inhabited by some 30 million people.[2] Itself the Russian bread basket, geography has made it a strategic key to the oil of the Caucasus and Iran, and to the entire Arab world. In the north, it borders Russia proper. As long as Ukraine retains its national unity, as long as its people continue to think of themselves as Ukrainians and to seek independence, so long Ukraine poses a serious threat to the very heart of Sovietism. 
It is no wonder that the Communist leaders have attached the greatest importance to the Russification of this independent [minded – R.S.] member of their “Union of Republics,” have determined to remake it to fit their pattern of one Russian nation. For the Ukrainian is not and has never been, a Russian. His culture, his temperament, his language, his religion – all are different. At the side door to Moscow, he has refused to be collectivized, accepting deportation, even death. And so it is peculiarly important that the Ukrainian be fitted into the procrustean pattern of the ideal Soviet man.

Ukraine is highly susceptible to racial murder by select parts and so the Communist tactics there have not followed the pattern taken by the German attacks against the Jews. The nation is too populous to be exterminated completely with any efficiency. However, its leadership, religious, intellectual, political, its select and determining parts, are quite small and therefore easily eliminated, and so it is upon these groups particularly that the full force of the Soviet axe has fallen, with its familiar tools of mass murder, deportation and forced labor, exile and starvation.

The attack has manifested a systematic pattern, with the whole process repeated again and again to meet fresh outburst of national spirit. The first blow is aimed at the intelligentsia, the national brain, so as to paralyze the rest of the body. In 1920, 1926 and again in 1930-33, teachers, writers, artists, thinkers, political leaders, were liquidated, imprisoned or deported. According to the Ukrainian Quarterly of Autumn 1948, 51,713 intellectuals were sent to Siberia in 1931 alone. At least 114 major poets, writers and artists, the most prominent cultural leaders of the nation, have met the same fate. It is conservatively estimated that at least 75 percent of the Ukrainian intellectuals and professional men in Western Ukraine, Carpatho-Ukraine and Bukovina have been brutally exterminated by the Russians. (Ibid., Summer 1949).

Going along with this attack on the intelligentsia was an offensive against the churches, priests and hierarchy, the “soul” of Ukraine. Between 1926 and 1932, the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church, its Metropolitan (Lypkivsky) and 10,000 clergy were liquidated. In 1945, when the Soviets established themselves in Western Ukraine, a similar fate was meted out to the Ukrainian Catholic Church. That Russification was the only issue involved is clearly demonstrated by the fact that before its liquidation, the Church was offered the opportunity to join the Russian Patriarch[ate] at Moscow, the Kremlin’s political tool.

Only two weeks before the San Francisco conference, on April 11, 1945, a detachment of NKVD troops surrounded the St. George Cathedral in Lviv and arrested Metropolitan Slipyj, two bishops, two prelates and several priests. [3] All the students in the city’s theological seminary were driven from the school, while their professors were told that the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church had ceased to exist, that its Metropolitan was arrested and his place was to be take by a Soviet-appointed bishop. These acts were repeated all over Western Ukraine and across the Curzon Line in Poland. [4] At least seven bishops were arrested or were never heard from again. There is no Bishop of the Ukrainian Catholic Church still free in the area. Five hundred clergy who met to protest the action of the Soviets, were shot or arrested.
Throughout the entire region, clergy and laity were killed by hundreds, while the number sent to forced labor camps ran into the thousands. Whole villages were depopulated. In the deportation, families were deliberately separated, fathers to Siberia, mothers to the brickworks of Turkestan, and the children to Communist homes to be “educated”. For the crime of being Ukrainian, the Church itself was declared a society detrimental to the welfare of the Soviet state, its members were marked down in the Soviet police files as potential “enemies of the people.” As a matter of fact, with the exception of 150,000 members in Slovakia, the Ukrainian Catholic Church has been officially liquidated, its hierarchy imprisoned, its clergy dispersed and deported.

These attacks on the Soul have also had and will continue to have a serious effect on the Brain of Ukraine, for it is the families of the clergy that have traditionally supplied a large part of the intellectuals, while the priests themselves have been the leaders of the villages, their wives the heads of the charitable organizations. The religious orders ran schools, took care of much of the organized charities.

The third prong of the Soviet plan was aimed at the farmers, the large mass of independent peasants who are the repository of the tradition, folk lore and music, the national language and literature, the national spirit, of Ukraine. The weapon used against this body is perhaps the most terrible of all – starvation. Between 1932 and 1933, 5,000,000 Ukrainians starved to death, an inhumanity which the 73rd Congress decried on May 28, 1934.[5] There has been an attempt to dismiss this highpoint of Soviet cruelty as an economic policy connected with the collectivization of the wheat lands, and the elimination of the kulaks, the independent farmers was therefore necessary. The fact is, however, that large-scale farmers in Ukraine were few and far-between. As a Soviet writer Kosior [6] declared in Izvestiia on December 2, 1933, “Ukrainian nationalism is our chief danger,” and it was to eliminate that nationalism, to establish the horrifying uniformity of the Soviet state that the Ukrainian peasantry was sacrificed. The method used in this part of the plan was not at all restricted to any particular group. All suffered – men, women, children.
The crop that year was ample to feed the people and livestock of Ukraine, though it had fallen off somewhat from the previous year, a decrease probably due in large measure to the struggle over collectivization. But a famine was necessary for the Soviet and so they got one to order, by plan, through an unusually high grain allotment to the state as taxes. To add to this, thousands of acres of wheat were never harvested, were left to rot in the fields. The rest was sent to government granaries to be stored there until the authorities had decided how to allocate it. Much of this crop, so vital to the lives of the Ukrainian people, ended up as exports for the creation of credits abroad.

In the face of famine on the farms, thousands abandoned the rural areas and moved into the towns to beg food. Caught there and sent back to the country, they abandoned their children in the hope that they at least might survive. In this way, 18,000 children were abandoned in Kharkiv alone. Villages of a thousand had a surviving population of a hundred; in others, half the populace was gone, and deaths in these towns ranged from 20 to 30 per day. Cannibalism became commonplace.

As C. Henry Chamberlin, [7] the Moscow correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, wrote in 1933:

         The Communists saw in this apathy and discouragement, sabotage and counter-revolution, and, with the ruthlessness peculiar to self-righteous
         idealists, they decided to let the famine run its course with the idea that it would teach the peasants a lesson.

         Relief was doled out to the collective farms, but on an inadequate scale and so late that many lives had already been lost. The individual peasants
         were left to shift for themselves; and much higher mortality rate among the individual peasants proved a most potent argument in favor of joining
         collective farms.
The fourth step in the process consisted in the fragmentation of the Ukrainian people at once by the addition to Ukraine of foreign peoples and by the dispersion of the Ukrainians throughout Eastern Europe. In this way, ethnic unity would be destroyed and nationalities mixed. Between 1920 and 1939, the population of Ukraine changed from 80 percent Ukrainian to only 63 percent.[8] In the face of famine and deportation, the Ukrainian population had declined absolutely from 23.2 million to 19.6 million, while the non-Ukrainian population had increased by 5.6 million. When we consider that Ukraine once had the highest rate of population increase in Europe, around 800,000 per year, it is easy to see that the Russian policy has been accomplished.

These have been the chief steps in the systematic destruction of the Ukrainian nation, in its progressive absorption within the new Soviet nation. Notably, there have been no attempts at complete annihilation, such as was the method of the German attack on the Jews. And yet, if the Soviet program succeeds completely, if the intelligentsia, the priests and the peasants can be eliminated, Ukraine will be as dead as if every Ukrainian were killed, for it will have lost that part of it which has kept and developed its culture, its beliefs, its common ideas, which have guided it and given it a soul, which, in short, made it a nation rather than a mass of people.

The mass, indiscriminate murders have not, however, been lacking – they have simply not been integral parts of the plan, but only chance variations. Thousands have been executed, untold thousands have disappeared into the certain death of Siberian labor camps.
The city of Vinnitsa might well be called the Ukrainian Dachau. In 91 graves there lie the bodies of 9,432 victims of Soviet tyranny, shot by the NKVD in about 1937 or 1938. Among the gravestones of real cemeteries, in woods, with awful irony, under a dance floor, the bodies lay from 1937 until their discovery by the Germans in 1943. Many of the victims had been reported by the Soviets as exiled to Siberia.
Ukraine has its Lidice too, in the town of Zavadka, destroyed by the Polish satellites of the Kremlin in 1946.[9] Three times, troops of the Polish Second Division attacked the town, killing men, women and children, burning houses and stealing farm animals. During the second raid, the Red commander told what was left of the town’s populace: “The same fate will be met by everyone who refuses to go to Ukraine. I therefore order that within three days the village be vacated; otherwise, I shall execute every one of you.”
         CURZON LINE by Walter Dushnyck

When the town was finally evacuated by force, there remained only 4 men among the 78 survivors. During March of the same year, 2 other Ukrainian towns were attacked by the same Red unit and received more or less similar treatment.
What we have seen here is not confined to Ukraine. The plan that the Soviets used there has been and is being repeated. It is an essential part of the Soviet program for expansion, for it offers the quick way of bringing unity out of the diversity of cultures and nations that constitute the Soviet Empire. That this method brings with it indescribable suffering for millions of people has not turned them from their path. If for no other reason than this human suffering, we would have to condemn this road to unity as criminal. But there is more to it than that. This is not simply a case of mass murder. It is a case of genocide, of destruction, not of individuals only, but of a culture and a nation.
Were it possible to do this even without suffering we would still be driven to condemn it, for the family of minds, the unity of ideas, of language and customs that forms what we call a nation constitutes one of the most important of all our means of civilization and progress. It is true that nations blend together and form new nations – we have an example of this process in our own country, – but this blending consists in the pooling of benefits of superiorities that each culture possesses.[10] And it is in this way that the world advances. What then, apart from the very important question of human suffering and human rights that we find wrong with Soviet plans is the criminal waste of civilization and of culture. For the Soviet national unity is being created, not by any union of ideas and of cultures, but by the complete destruction of all cultures and of all ideas save one – the Soviet.
[1]. Verse by Volodymyr Sosiura added in pencil. Sosiura wrote the patriotic poem in 1944, during the German-Soviet war. At first it was praised by the authorities, but in 1948 it was condemned for Ukrainian nationalism. The two verses in the Ukrainian original:
       не можна любити народів других
       коли ти не любиш Україну! . .
[2]. According to the 1959 census there are a little over 40 million people.
[3]. The Charter creating the United Nations was signed by the delegates of 50 countries, including the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, at the Conference held on April 25-26, 1945.
[4]. The Curzon Line proposed by the British as a border between Poland and the Soviet state after the First World War eventually served as the basis for the post-World War II border between Poland and the USSR. The border left a large Ukrainian minority in the Polish state.
[5]. On May 28, 1934 Congressman Hamilton Fish of New York introduced a resolution (H. Res. 309) in the House of Representatives in Washington. The document stipulated that “several millions of the population of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic” died of starvation during 1932 and 1933.” The Resolution further proposed:
“that the House of Representatives express its sympathy for all those who suffered from the great famine in Ukraine which has brought misery, affliction, and death to millions of peaceful and law-abiding Ukrainians”;
“that . . . the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics . . . take active steps to alleviate the terrible consequences arising from this famine”;
“that . . . the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Government will place no obstacles in the way of American citizens seeking to send aid in form of money, foodstuffs, and necessities to the famine-stricken region of Ukraine.”
The Resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. (From the Ukrainian Quarterly, no. 4 [1978], pp. 416-17.)
[6]. In fact, Stanislav Kosior was the First Secretary of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine. In a speech delivered at the joint session of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, on November 27, 1933, he stated that “at the present moment, local Ukrainian nationalism poses the main danger.”
[7]. The correct name is W[illiam] Henry Chamberlain. Prolific writer on Soviet affairs, he later wrote a history of the Russian Revolution.
[8]. There was no census in 1920. The official figures from the 1926 and 1939 census are somewhat different from Lemkin’s. In 1926 there were 22.9 million ethnic Ukrainians in Ukrainian SSR and the falsified 1939 figure showed 23.3 million, or an increase of 435,000 ethnic Ukrainians. However, the rise in over-all population of Ukrainian SSR by 3.3 milllion reduced the ethnically Ukrainian portion from 80 percent to 73 percent.
[9]. On June 10, 1942, 173 males over the age of 14 were shot, the women and children deported and the village of Lidice razed to the ground in reprisal for the assassination of the Nazi dictator of Moravia, Reinhard Heydrich. Zavadka Morokhivs’ka, Sianik povit, Lemkivshchyna, now Zawadka-Morochowska, Powiat Sanok, Poland.
[10]. Lemkin has in mind the United States.
FOOTNOTE: Lemkin’s essay is reproduced here with the correction of obvious typographical errors, minor updating of terminology (Ukraine instead of “the Ukraine,” Romanian instead of “Rumanian,” Tsarist instead of “Czarist”) and the transliteration of Ukrainian names from Ukrainian.  Roman Serbyn, Editor.
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Coined the term ‘genocide,’ "Father of the Genocide Convention"
Called the Holodomor a classic case of Soviet genocide
Commentary: By Lubomyr Luciuk, Professor
Political Geography, Royal Military College of Canada
Kyiv, Post, Kyiv, Ukraine, Friday, November 20, 2009
Rafael Lemkin who coined the term ‘genocide,’ called the Holodomor a classic case of Soviet genocide.

Only seven people came to bury him. He rests beneath a simple stone in New York’s Mount Hebron cemetery, the sole clue to his historical importance an inscription incised below his name - “Father Of The Genocide Convention.”

As a graduate student I was obliged to read his book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress, frankly more door-stopper than page-turner. Nowadays, with advocates for “humanitarian intervention” shilling the notion of a “duty to intervene” whenever and wherever necessary to “stop genocide,” Dr. Raphael Lemkin’s name and words are better known. After all he fathered the term “genocide” by combining the root words –geno (Greek for family or race) and –cidium (Latin for killing) then doggedly lobbied United Nation member states until they adopted a Convention on Genocide, on Dec. 9, 1948, his crowning achievement.

Because of the horrors committed by Nazi Germany in World War II what is often forgotten, however, is that Lemkin’s thinking about an international law to punish perpetrators of what he originally labeled the “Crime of Barbarity” came not in response to the Holocaust but rather following the 1915 massacres of Armenians, Greeks and Assyrians within the Ottoman Turkish empire.

Likewise overlooked were Lemkin’s views on Communist crimes against humanity. In a 1953 lecture in New York City, for example, he described the “destruction of the Ukrainian nation” as the “classic example of Soviet genocide,” adding insightfully: “the Ukrainian is not and never has been a Russian.
His culture, his temperament, his language, his religion, are all eliminate (Ukrainian) nationalism...the Ukrainian peasantry was sacrificed...a famine was necessary for the Soviet and so they got one to order...if the Soviet program succeeds completely, if the intelligentsia, the priest, and the peasant can be eliminated [then] Ukraine will be as dead as if every Ukrainian were killed, for it will have lost that part of it which has kept and developed its culture, its beliefs, its common ideas, which have guided it and given it a soul, which, in short, made it a nation...This is not simply a case of mass murder. It is a case of genocide, of the destruction, not of individuals only, but of a culture and a nation.”

Yet Ukraine’s declaration that the Great Famine of 1932-1933 (known as the Holodomor) was genocide has secured very little official recognition from other nations. Canada is among those few. Most have succumbed to an ongoing Holodomor-denial campaign orchestrated by the Russian Federation’s barkers, who insist famine occurred throughout the USSR in the 1930’s, did not target Ukrainians and so can’t be called genocide.
They ignore key evidence – the fact that all foodstuffs were confiscated from Soviet Ukraine even as its borders were blockaded, preventing relief supplies from getting in, or anyone from getting out. And how the Kremlin’s men denied the existence of catastrophic famine conditions as Ukrainian grain was exported to the West. Millions could have been saved but were instead allowed to starve. Most victims were Ukrainians who perished on Ukrainian lands. There’s no denying that.

A thirst for Siberian oil and gas explains why Germany, France and Italy have become Moscow’s handmaidens, refusing to acknowledge the Holodomor and blocking Ukraine’s membership in the European Union, kowtowing to Russia’s geopolitical claim of having some “right” to interfere in the affairs of countries in its so-called “near abroad.” More puzzling was a 28 January 2009 pronouncement by Pinhas Avivi, deputy director-general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry: “We regard the Holodomor as a tragedy but in no case do we call it genocide…the Holocaust is the only genocide to us.” Yet if only the Shoahis genocide what happened to the Armenians, or to the Rwandans, not to mention to those many millions of Ukrainians?

This year, Nov. 28 (fourth Saturday of November) is the date on which the Holodomor’svictims will be hallowed. Thousands of postcards bearing Lemkin’s image and citing his words have been mailed to ambassadors worldwide with governments from Belgium to Botswana, from Brazil to Bhutan, being asked to acknowledge what was arguably the greatest crime against humanity to befoul 20th century European history.
There is no doubt that Lemkin knew the famine in Soviet Ukraine was genocidal. If the world chooses to ignore what he said than what this good man fathered – the word “genocide” – will lose all meaning, forever more.

NOTE: Professor Lubomyr Luciuk teaches political geography at the Royal Military College of Canada and edited "Holodomor: Reflections on the Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine (Kashtan Press, 2008)."
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Article by James E. Mace, Professor of Political Science
Kyiv-Mohyla Academy National University, Kyiv, Ukraine
Published in: "Holodomor: The Ukrainian Genocide, 1932-1933"
Holodomor 70th Anniversary Commemorative Edition
Canadian American Slavic Studies Journal, Vol 37, No. 3, Fall 2003
Mr. Charles Schlacks, Jr, Publisher, Idyllwild, CA, Pages 45-52
In 1988 the US Commission on the Ukraine Famine arrived at nineteen findings, among them (No. 16) that what happened to the Ukrainians in 1932-1933 constituted genocide. [1] This was, fact the most important of the commission's conclusions, and as the person who drafted those conclusions for the commission's approval, I feel a certain responsibility to defend it in this journal in the light of new evidence that has been made available after the collapse of the Soviet Union and published by scholars in Ukraine.

There have been two major United Nation documents on genocide, the Ruhashyankiko report of 1978 and the Whittaker report of 1985.[2] Both are major studies of genocide from the standpoint of the commission, with the second intended as a corrective to the former. The Ruhashyankiko report had been forced to delete any mention of the Armenian genocide committed by the Ottoman Empire because of extensive pressure by the government of Turkey.
The Whittaker report was intended as a corrective and did hold that the Armenian massacres had constituted genocide. These reports, however, were merely adopted by a UN subcommittee and did not necessarily reflect the views of higher UN bodies, let alone of the UN as a whole.

The same is true of the US Commission on the Ukraine famine, which was adopted by and thus reflected the opinion of a temporary joint (hybrid) commission of the Congress, representatives of the president of the United States, and public members appointed by the members from Congress but was in no way binding on either Congress or the president, since it required approval from neither.

Neither of the UN reports mentioned Ukraine. If Turkey had been able to block findings not to its liking, imagine what the Soviet Union could have done. Moreover, while the Whittaker report was being prepared, I corresponded with the author, who said that since the issue was one of only three million or so Ukrainians, about 10% of the total Ukrainian SSR population at the time, it really did not merit consideration as genocide. As a person having no standing with the body in question, there was little I could do to pursue the matter further.
However, it should be kept in mind that when Ukrainians raise the issue of the international recognition of the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33 as genocide, about all that is feasible is something on the order of the UN reports, and any attempt to get an amendment to or revised and updated report would likely face the same obstacles placed by the Russian government as those placed by that of Turkey to any recognition of the Armenian genocide in past years.
In addition, it must be kept in mind that Russia, unlike Turkey, is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and thus carries far more weight in all UN organizations. Still, what is not feasible today might well become so in the future.


Unlike the US Commission on the Ukraine Famine, in 1990 the International Commission of Inquiry Into the 1932-33 Famine in Ukraine, a moot court sponsored by the then World Congress of Free Ukrainians, stopped short of such a conclusion, stating:

       If the intent to eliminate seems to have been present, was it nevertheless bent upon eliminating "a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, "as

       There is no doubt that the famine and the policies from which it arose were not confined to Ukraine, even if the territories with a Ukrainian majority
       appear to have been tragically privileged. Moreover, history has since largely confirmed that Stalin's hatred extended beyond the Ukrainians. One the
       possibility of a series of genocides, however frightful that might be, but this does not in itself rule hypothesis of a genocide during the 1932-33 famine.

       To this extent, and with due regard for the substantiating data supplied it, the Commission deems it plausible that the constituent elements of genocide
       were present at the time.[3]

This is a little like the Scottish verdict of "not proven," that is, the charge is one explanation that does not necessarily exclude others but not enough for a conviction. It was adopted because the chairman of the commission, Prof. Jacob Sundberg, argued,
       ........such prosecution would have to take the general defences into account, the most important of which perhaps would be that invoking the
       Genocide Convention would mean its retroactive application to a moment in Europe's history when no European or American power was willing to
       intervene in favour of the victims of the famine, not even by relief on purely humanitarian grounds, much less by a forcible humanitarian intervention of
       the type that used to hit the Ottoman Empire.[4]

While this was presented as a dissenting opinion of the chairman, it was certainly taken into account by his colleagues in drawing up the majority opinion. In fact, with the exception of this point Prof. Sundberg's dissent was perhaps stronger than that of the majority of his colleagues  in its condemnation of the Soviet policies that brought about the famine.
While Prof. Sundberg found that among the multiple goals Stalin's regime pursued in creating the famine was "destroying the Ukrainian nation," [5] it was precisely on this point that the majority, which found that the Genocide Convention applied to acts committed before its legal adoption, [6] found its reason for dancing around the issue of whether this element needed to demonstrate genocide had been legally proven or merely proven to be one of several "plausible" explanations.
With all due respect to the distinguished legal scholars on the tribunal, the only real reason for not finding that a crime of genocide had been perpetrated was that those most obviously culpable were almost all dead by the time the given commission announced its findings, and finding something to charge with a crime now, thirteen years later, would be well nigh impossible.
However, Professor Sundberg, not the majority, was quite correct in finding on the basis of the limited evidence we had at the time that the intent was there. Consider a private letter of September 11, 1932, from Stalin to Kaganovich, recently published from the personal archives of Lazar Kaganovich: 

       ..........The main thing is now Ukraine. Matters in Ukraine are now extremely bad. Bad from the standpoint of the Party line. They say that there are two
       oblasts of Ukraine (Kyiv and Dnipropetrovs'k, it seems) where almost 50 "raikomy" {district Party committees} have come out against the plan of grain
       procurements, considering them unrealistic. In other "raikomy," they confirm, the matter is no better. What does this look like? This is no party, but a
       parliament, a caricature of a parliament. Instead of directing the districts, Kosior is always waffling between the directives of the CC VKP(b) and the
       demands of the district Party committees and waffled to the end. Lenin was right, when he said that a person who lacks the courage at the necessary
       moment to go against the current cannot be a real Bolshevik leader. Bad from the standpoint of the Soviet {state} line. Chubar is no leader. Bad from
       the standpoint of the GPU. Redens lacks the energy to direct the struggle with the counterrevolution in such a big and unique republic as Ukraine.

       If we do not now correct the situation in Ukraine, we could lose Ukraine.

       Consider that Pilsudski is not daydreaming, and his agents in Ukraine are much stronger than Redens or Kosior imagine. Also consider that within
       the Ukrainian Communist Party (500,000 members, ha, ha) there are not a few (yes, not a few!) rotten elements that are conscious or unconscious  
       Petliura adherents and in the final analysis agents of Pilsudski. If the situation gets any worse, these elements won't hesitate to open a front within (and
       outside) the Party, against the Party. Worst of all, the Ukrainian leadership doesn't see these dangers. Set yourself the task of turning Ukraine in the
       shortest possible time into a fortress of the USSR, into the most inalienable republic. Don't worry about money for this purpose. [7] 

Transforming Ukraine at any cost in the shortest possible time into a fortress of the Soviet Union and the most inalienable republic is a pattern that the late Hryhory Kostiuk as early as 1960 was able to describe on the basis of Soviet official press sources as Hryhory Kostiuk's "Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine: A Study in the Decade of Mass Terror, 1929-1939" (London, 1960). Based on what could be learned from the official Soviet Ukrainian press of the period, Kostiuk called this policy one of turning "the non-Russian republics of the USSR into "de facto" provinces of Russia." [8]

Now, of course, with Ukrainian historians having had over a decade to work in the archives, we know much more about the details. We know about Molotov's and Kaganovich's direct role in Ukraine and the Kuban after being appointed heads of special commissions on October 22, 1933, to oversee the grain procurements in those places and how they were able to send the very top Communists in their own jurisdictions wherever they decided in order to fulfil whatever tasks they assigned. [9]
We now have the terrible decree of November 18, 1932, that Molotov pushed through the Ukrainian Politburo, taking away everything but the seed (that would be taken under a separate decree in late December) if they had not fulfilled their quotas, placing collective farms on blacklists and fining individual peasants in other foodstuffs (in kind) for "maliciously" not having enough bread to seize. [10]

We have the Moscow Politburo decree signed by Stalin and Molotov on December 14, 1932, blamed "shortcomings in grain procurements" in Ukraine and the North Caucasus (read the Kuban) on "kurkul and nationalist wreckers" in order to unleash a reign of terror on Party officials, decree how many years specific officials in several districts should receive from the courts, end Ukrainization in the North Caucasus, condemn its "mechanistic" implementation (thereby "de facto" eliminating it there also), and the following day ending Ukrainization in the rest of the USSR. [11]
We have Kaganovich's diaries recalling how on his first day in the North Caucasus he told the local leadership, "Without doubt among those who have come from Ukraine (i.e., Skrypnyk's Commissariat of Education -J.M.) there were organized groups leading the work (of promoting kulak attitudes -J.M.), especially in the Kuban where there is the Ukrainian language." [12]

We also now have thousands of eyewitness accounts recorded in Ukraine itself, basically identical to what the Commission on the Ukraine Oral History Project began to collect almost 20 years ago from those who had fled to North America.[13] The first outpouring was when Stanislav Kul'chyts'kyi published a list of highly "Party-minded" questions in "Sil's'ki visti" (Village News) for a book of people's memory that the Writers Union had commissioned the late Volodymyr Maniak to compile.
Maniak sorted through 6000 letters sent in response to Kul'chyts'kyi's questions to publish 1000 accounts.[14] Now there are enough individual memoirs and collections of eyewitness accounts to make up the bulk of an impressive biography.[15] These witnesses can no longer be dismissed as fascist collaborators. Many fought in the Red Army during the Second World War and were exemplary Soviet citizens.
In short, under such pressure from the very pinnacle of Soviet power, witnessed to both by the documents of the perpetrators and the memories of those who survived, the question ceases to become, How many millions died? One is forced to ask instead, How could so many still survive when literally everything possible was done to starve them to death? Each account is individual, but taken together their collective accounts of traumatization cannot fail to move even the most "scientific" of historians.

Still, the basic outlines of what happened and why remain basically the same in general outline as what we learned from classical Sovietology working on the basis of the official Soviet press. The only difference is that now we know in much more detail just how invasive Moscow's interventions in Ukraine were.
And what Raphael Lemkin - the Jewish jurist from Poland who coined the term "genocide," [16] wrote the basic documents, and lobbied them through the United Nations - had in mind when he first developed the term is quite clear:

        Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressor group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the  
        oppressor. This imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed to remain, or upon the territory alone, after removal
        of the population and colonization of the area by the oppressor's own nationals. Denationalization was the word used in the past to describe the
        destruction of a national pattern. This author believes, however, that this word is inadequate because: (1) it does not connote the destruction of the
        biological structure; (2) in connoting the destruction of one national pattern, it does not connote the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor;
        and (3) denationalization is used by some authors to mean only deprivation of citizenship. [17]

Some scholars have called for defining genocide in either too narrow or too broad for scholarly purposes. [18] But what the author of the term had in mind and what was actually adopted by the international community were actions "subordinated to the criminal intent to destroy or cripple permanently a human group."[19] Few would doubt that Ukraine was crippled by the Stalinist period and ways that are both painfully obvious and agonizingly difficult to define.
For this reason, in my more recent work I have tried to understand how and why independent Ukraine has thus far been unable to transform itself in the ways we might think appropriate and its people deserve. For this reason I have found it useful to describe contemporary Ukraine as a post-genocidal society.


Ukrainians have sometimes spoken of the "Holodomor" as the Ukrainian Holocaust. With all due respect to those who have chosen to do so, I must point out the pitfalls of such a usage of the term. The word "holocaust" is usually traced to Wycliffe's translation of the Bible as a burnt offering to the Lord, and indeed it is an English word from the ancient Greek words "holos" (whole) and "caustos" (to burn).
In reference to Hitler's destruction of the Jews, it came to be used as a not quite exact translation of the Hebrew word "shoah" (complete and utter destruction), yet eerily evocative of what Hitler tried to do to with a people traditionally considering themselves to be chosen by God, the Jews, to destroy them entirely as a people, including burning them in ovens specially designed for that purpose. It is not a generic term for a certain kind of crime against any given group but a specific word for a specific event and as such has entered many languages.

Almost until the end of the Soviet Union, Ukrainians in the West used such terms as the Great Famine or the Manmade Famine in Ukraine. Only when the veil of silence began to gradually lift at the end of 1987 [20] did it become clear that the word "holodomor" become the label that stuck in people 's memory in the place where it happened. The word itself is interesting, "holod" (hunger or famine) and "mor" (mass death as in a plague, like "chumats'kyi mor," the Black Death).

For this reason, to speak of the Ukrainian Holocaust makes about as much sense as speaking of the Jewish Holodomor. It is a unique term that has arisen from the depths of a victimized nation itself. As the unique tragedy faced by Ukrainians in the USSR becomes more a part of the consciousness of the larger world, the use of the word that Ukrainians in Ukraine have chosen will inevitably enter other languages as well.

As is the case with any culture of which we are not a part, those who are not part of the Ukrainian nation that has lived through the Soviet period, a nation that has been shaped or distorted by precisely that experience, cannot tell them how to understand themselves any more than we can tell them how to overcome all the obstacles that their past has burdened with. Ukrainians in Ukraine with make their own Ukrainian history.

Having lived there for a decade not as an expatriate but as one of them, I might be more aware of this than most. Ukrainian historians today have largely retreated from the Party-mindedness of yesterday into the compilation of facts and documents, leaving them to the historians of tomorrow to figure out what it all means for them. We have written our books and will continue to do so.

They will either embrace or reject what skills we can offer, preserved in the various works we will leave behind. It is, after all, their country, and they will make their own history for the rest of the world and their own posterity to deal with. We can only hope that they will find what we have to offer of some use. 
For the reason, Raphael Lemkin, believed that genocide was a crime against humanity because nothing else can "convey the specific losses to civilization in the form of the cultural contributions which can be made only by groups of people united through national, racial or cultural characteristics."[21] It is up to them to define and recover their own losses in this sphere.

[1] Commission on the Ukraine Famine, "Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933: Report to Congress" (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. vii, xxiii.
[2] Nicodeme Ruhashyankiko, "Report to the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of National Minorities: Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide "(E/CN.4/Sub. 2/416, 4 July 1978), 186 pp.; Ben Whitaker, "Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide" (E/CN.4/Sub. 2/416/1985/6, 2 July 1985), 62 pp.
[3] International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932-33 Famine in Ukraine, "The Final Report: 1990" (Toronto: International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932-1933 Famine in Ukraine, 1990), p. 61.
[4] Ibid., pp. 87-88.
[5] Ibid., p. 74.
[6] Ibid., pp. 64-65.
[7] "Komandyry velykoho holodu: Poyizdky V. Molotova i L. Kahanovycha v Ukrayinu ta na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz, 1932-1933 rr." (Kyiv: Heneza, 2001), Valerii Vasyl'iev, Iurii Shapoval, eds., pp. 174-175; Ukrainian translation, pp. 160-161. Originally published in "Nezavisimaia gazeta," November 30, 2000.
[8] Hryhory Kostiuk's "Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine: A Study in the Decade of Mass Terror, 1929-1939" (London: Atlantic Books, 1960), p. 1 et passim.
[9] "Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukrayini: ochyma istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv" (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo politychnoyi literatury Ukrayiny, 1990), pp. 228, 245, 260-261.
[10] Ibid., pp. 250-260.
[11] Komandyry, pp. 310-312.
[12] Ibid., p. 254.
[13] Commission on the Ukraine Famine, "Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933: Oral History Project of the Commission on the Ukraine Famine," edited for the Commission by James E. Mace and Leonid Heretz (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), 3 vols.
[14] "33-y holod: Narodna kniha - Memorial," Lidiya Kovalenko and Volodymyr Maniak, compilers (Kyiv: Radians'ke pysmennyk, 1991).
[15] "Holodomor v Ukrayini 1932-1933 rr. Bibliohrafichnyj pokazhchyk" (V-vo M.P. Kots': Odesa - L'viv, 2001), 654 pp.
[16] Explaining that he was combining "the ancient Greek word "genos" (race, tribe) and the Latin "cide" (killing)," he added in a footnote, "Another term could be used for the same idea, namely, "ethnocide," consisting of the Greek word 'ethnos'-nation-and the Latin word 'cide.'" Raphael Lemkin, "Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation-Analysis of Government-Proposals for Redress" (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, 1944), p. 79.
[17] Ibid., pp. 79-80.
[18] Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonasson, "The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies" (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 23-27.
[19] Raphael Lemkin, "Genocide as a Crime Under International Law," "The American Journal of International Law," XLI (1947), p. 147.
[20] Volodymyr Shcherbyts'kyi cracked the door open in a long speech on December 25, 1987, stating that in 1932-33 there has been hardships and even famine in some areas.
[21] Lemkin, "Genocide as a Crime Under International Law," p. 147.

ACTION UKRAINE HISTORY REPORT (AUHR) FOOTNOTE: The article above by James E. Mace was edited and posted by the Information Service (ARTUIS), Morgan Williams, Publisher, Washington, D.C., in the fall of 2003 with permission from author James E. Mace and from publisher Charles Schlacks. All the graphics on the website were been added by ARTUIS. The article cannot be used without permission of the publisher.  Additional writings by James Mace and hundreds of other articles about the Holodomor in Ukraine can be found in the "Genocide Gallery" of the ArtUkraine website:
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Did Stalin’s communist regime commit genocide against the Ukrainian people?
By Professor Roman Serbyn, Université du Québec à Montréal
Montréal, Québec, Canada
"Holodomor Studies" Journal, Vol. 1, Issue 2, Winter 2009
Charles Schlacks, Publisher, Idyllwild, CA 

Did Stalin’s communist regime commit genocide against the Ukrainian people? The answer is “yes,” if the UN Convention on Genocide informs our understanding of what constitutes genocide, and if our analysis of the events is based on relevant documents.
The “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide” provides the most authoritative definition of genocide, which has been integrated into national and international laws. The document acknowledges that genocides occurred in all periods of history, and in times of war and peace. Article II defines genocide as “acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, as such.”

The focus is on groups, two types of which are applicable to Ukrainians: “national,” which lays emphasis on civic bonds, and “ethnic,” which stresses cultural ties. The 30 million inhabitants of the Ukrainian SSR (over 80 percent ethnic Ukrainians) constituted a “national group,” and the 8 million ethnic Ukrainians in the RSFSR (mostly in the Kuban and along the Ukrainian border) formed an “ethnic group.” A comprehensive discussion of the Ukrainian genocide must include both groups because together they constituted an identifiable minority on which Stalin’s regime imposed its genocidal policies.

Genocide does not imply total destruction or only physical extermination. Article II lists three lethal actions: killing, causing bodily harm, and imposing conditions of life leading to physical destruction. Two measures are non-fatal: preventing births and transferring children. Ukrainians were victims of all these atrocities, and the deportation of divided Ukrainian families to Russia falls under the last heading. There are no quantitative criteria for genocide, but it is assumed that the victims form a significant part of the target group. The extinction of the Ukrainian population did not suit Stalin: Ukrainians comprised over 20 percent of the Soviet workforce and inhabited a strategic region. A partial extermination would suffice. Since there is consensus that several million Ukrainians perished, quibbling over the number of victims becomes irrelevant and only diverts attention from fundamental issues.

The Convention requires the establishment of the intent of the crime, not the motives behind it. Some scholars see reference to motives in the expression “as such.” This position is held by those who insist that genocide victims are attacked because they are members of a hated group, and that hatred is the driving force behind the attacks. Deniers of the Ukrainian genocide have argued that there was no genocide because there was no hatred against the Ukrainians on the part of Stalin and the Soviet authorities. This interpretation shifts the focus of genocide from the group to its members; it replaces intent with motive as the critical element; and it exaggerates the role of hatred while ignoring other motives. Stalin had more pragmatic reasons than hatred for destroying the Ukrainians as a group.

Genocide is a term that has been applied to various catastrophes, but each case has had to be judged on its own merit, as the classification of one tragedy is not contingent on that of another. The claim that there was no Ukrainian genocide because the famine was the same throughout the Soviet Union is thus untenable, as it is illogical to argue that if the Holodomor was genocide of the Ukrainian peasants, then it was equally genocide of the Russian peasants. The second argument ignores the fact that the majority of famine victims in the RSFSR were not ethnic Russians but Kazakhs, Ukrainians, Germans, and so on. Furthermore, there was no ethnic factor in the starvation of the Russian peasants. Finally, starving the peasants was only one component of the Ukrainian genocide.

The earliest cogent articulation of the Ukrainian genocide belongs to the father of the Genocide Convention himself. In September 1953 Professor Raphael Lemkin read a paper entitled “Soviet Genocide in Ukraine” at a public commemoration in New York. Lemkin expanded his discourse beyond the peasants and the famine and spoke of the genocide as a four-pronged destruction of the Ukrainian nation. The first blow struck the intelligentsia, “the national brain,” so as to paralyze the body. In tandem came the destruction of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the “soul” of Ukraine. The third prong was “aimed at the farmers who are the repository of the tradition, folklore and music, the national language and literature, the national spirit, of Ukraine.” As a result, “5,000,000 Ukrainians starved to death.”
Significantly, Lemkin rejected the interpretation of “this highpoint of Soviet cruelty as an economic policy connected with the collectivization.” The fourth step was the “fragmentation of the Ukrainian people” through forced migration. The Polish-Jewish scholar, who was well versed in the national question, and cognizant of the exigencies of the Convention, insisted on identifying the victim group as “Ukrainians,” and not just “peasants” or “Ukrainian peasants.” Comparing the Jewish and Ukrainian genocides, Lemkin concluded that the latter were too populous, and thus too indispensable to the Soviet economy, to be completely annihilated. The sole oversight in Lemkin’s perceptive analysis was the Ukrainian population of the RSFSR, victim of the same genocide.

Lemkin never published his speech, and the book that he was planning, “The History of Genocide,” which would have contained a section on Ukraine, was never written. Thus, his observations on the Ukrainian genocide remained virtually unknown in academic and political circles. The Ukrainian diaspora concentrated on the “Great Famine,” denounced as propaganda by the Soviets and their supporters. The demise of the Soviet empire brought recognition of the historicity of the famine, and the controversy shifted to questions of demographic losses and territorial boundaries of the catastrophe. Incongruously, the debate continues to focus on the “peasant famine,” even though “genocide” rapidly became the main bone of contention, and that issue cannot be resolved by concentrating only on that one segment of the victim group.

The aim of Stalin’s “revolution from above” was to turn free farmers into state serfs, strengthen party control over them, and place the fruits of their labor at the disposal of the state. Capital from grain exports would help industrialize the empire, arm the cogs of the Soviet war machine, and allow Stalin to spread socialism abroad. Kolkhozes would provide the grain for export. Stalin knew that collectivization would be resisted especially in Ukraine and the Kuban, where grain seizures by Moscow would have national overtones. He understood the danger of alienating the peasantry, the main army of national movements. He knew that in a hostile atmosphere productivity declines while sabotage and wastage grow. With grain supplies falling and state quotas rising, procurement would turn into requisition. The countryside would be rapidly swept clean of foodstuffs, and starvation would set in. That is exactly what happened.

In November 1932 Stalin boasted that the kolkhozes gave twice as much marketable grain as the private sector had done before collectivization. True enough, “marketable” grain did increase (fourfold in Ukraine), but the increase came from the farmer’s table, not his surplus. Yearly grain exports jumped to over 5,000,000 tons in 1930-1931 and 1931-1932, and around 1,500,000 in the next two years. During the peak famine year, 1933, the USSR had 1,500,000 tons of grain in state reserves. A million tons being sufficient to feed five million mouths during a whole year, the Soviet authorities had sufficient means to feed an additional fifteen million mouths, more than enough to prevent starvation during the worst years. Collective farms became the means by which the totalitarian regime gave itself control over food production and distribution, and the weapon of food in its war on the farmers.

The Ukrainian genocide culminated in the famine of 1932-1933, but the process began much earlier. In the winter of 1929-1930 the GPU rounded up hundreds of members of an invented “Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU),” put forty-five of the accused on trial and sentenced most of them to various terms in the Gulag. The SVU was accused of counterrevolutionary activity, of conspiracy to separate Ukraine from the USSR, and of organizing the peasantry for the same purposes. No Russian equivalent to the SVU was ever fabricated by the GPU in the RSFSR. In 1930 the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was liquidated, not because it was a religious institution (the Russian Orthodox Church was never outlawed) but because it was independent of Moscow. The Ukrainian national intelligentsia was put on notice and cowed. Repression then spread to pro-Soviet and communist cadres that were becoming disenchanted with the regime’s ruinous policies in Ukraine. In January 1933 Stalin sent the hardliners Postyshev, Balitsky, and Khataevich to take effective control of the republic, complete the purge, and tighten Moscow’s grip. By the summer of 1933, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians were removed from their posts in the Ukrainian SSR and the Kuban region, and repressed. Leaders like Skrypnyk committed suicide.

The destruction of the rural elites was launched in 1929 in the guise of a socialist revolution aimed at “eliminating the kulak as a class,” and to foster collective ownership of agriculture. Dekulakization was carried out in two waves of expulsions, executions, and deportations, and was accomplished within a year, although the regime continued to wage war against fictitious “kulaks” throughout the famine years. The national dimension of the campaign was prominent. The epithet “kulak-Petliurite,” found in OGPU reports and party statements, reflects a certain reality and points to the regime’s fear of any Ukrainian farmer, rich or poor, who opposed its repressive measures. The apprehension of an alliance between the disaffected middle and lower cadres and the oppressed masses with a “kulak-Petliurite” mentality was one of the main motives for the genocidal starvation imposed by the regime in 1932-1933.
Wholesale collectivization, launched at the end of 1929, provoked fierce resistance, and Ukraine became one of its main centers. Of the 13,756 mass “disturbances” recorded for the USSR in 1930, 4,098 took place in Ukraine, with well over a million participants. Slogans with nationalist messages like “Free Ukraine from Moscow rule” appeared. Often put down with military force, the troubles continued until the fall of 1932. By then collectivization had practically ended and the farmers, weakened by malnutrition, were all but subdued. Their goals were reduced from fighting collectivization to struggling for survival – for food, which had completely disappeared from the Ukrainian countryside. Stalin was well informed about the degenerating situation in Ukraine by the Communist Party, the GPU, and the special emissaries he periodically sent there.

Ukraine first succumbed to the famine during the winter and spring of 1931-32. The Ukrainian party boss Kosior mentioned it in a letter to Stalin in April 1932, but it was Chubar, the head of state, and Petrovsky, the head of government, who on 12 June sent Stalin detailed descriptions of widespread starvation, requesting aid and the lowering of quotas for grain delivery. Petrovsky warned that unless help was given, the starving farmers would cut unripened wheat and jeopardize the harvest. Stalin responded with draconian laws on public property. Promulgated on 7August 1932, the “5 ears of corn law” prescribed the death penalty for pilfering kolkhoz goods. Enforced throughout the famine period, the decree was a glib expression of Stalin’s intent to exterminate the enfeebled farmers and weaken the rest into submission. Limited aid was given to healthier farmers who could still work.

The Stalin-Kaganovich correspondence shows that the draconian laws were triggered by Ukrainian events and were aimed at Ukraine. On 11 August, just four days after the infamous decree, Stalin wrote that the situation in Ukraine was critical and cautioned that unless immediate measures were taken, “we may lose Ukraine.” The Ukrainian Party leadership was weak and ineffective, and the 500,000-strong organization was full of “rotten elements,” “conscious and unconscious” Petliurites. Then Stalin made a startling prediction: “As soon as things get worse, these elements will waste no time opening a front inside (and outside) the party, against the party.”
Commentators have failed to connect this passage with the beginning of the letter, where Stalin affirms that the decree on property is good and will soon have an effect. Stalin knew that the said “effect” would be a dearth of foodstuffs and a famine, and things would definitely “get worse” for the farmers. The danger was that when that happened, the “rotten elements” and “Petliurites” would turn against the party and form an alliance with the farmers. The letter shows that the famine was neither a surprise for Stalin, nor an unwelcome occurrence: he set the policy, which he knew would bring about starvation, and he deliberately intensified repression so as to shape the famine into a powerful weapon.

The worst aspect of the Ukrainian crisis, Stalin claimed, was that the Ukrainian leadership did not see the dangers. Moscow had to take the situation in hand and transform Ukraine into a “real fortress of the USSR.” Stalin set the party and the GPU apparatus in motion to accomplish this task. His two troubleshooters, Molotov and Kaganovich, aptly called “commanders of the Great Famine,” were sent on missions to Ukraine and the North Caucasus, where they supervised purges of party and state cadres, forced local authorities to vote for Moscow’s exorbitant quotas of grain deliveries and then terrorized them into carrying out the plan. Starvation spread across the countryside. There is no need to describe here the well-known horrors that were visited upon the farming population of Ukraine and the North Caucasus during the Great Famine. Suffice it to mention those two repressive measures, aimed specifically at the Ukrainian population, which demonstrate the regime’s intent to destroy the Ukrainian group by means of physical annihilation and cultural transformation.
On 14 December 1932, Stalin and Molotov signed a secret party and state resolution blaming the hitherto government-approved Ukrainization program for the current difficulties in grain deliveries. Bourgeois nationalists and Petliurites had been allowed to join party and state institutions and to set up their organizations. They acquired administrative positions in collective farms and sabotaged sowing and harvesting campaigns. In the North Caucasus “unbridled Ukrainization” was allegedly forcing the Ukrainian language on a population that did not want it. As a remedy, the Ukrainian authorities were ordered to expel Petliurite and other bourgeois-nationalist elements from party and soviet organizations and meticulously select and train new Ukrainian Bolshevik cadres. In the North Caucasus the policy of Ukrainization was completely abolished and replaced with Russification. The Ukrainian language was banned from all administrative, cooperative and school activity. Newspapers and magazines were switched from Ukrainian to Russian. The next day, 15 December, the language provisions were extended to all other previously Ukrainized regions of the RSFSR.

By the end of 1932 Ukraine and the Kuban had become a killing field for the starving collective and independent farmers. To escape the coming doom, many farmers tried to flee to Belarus or the RSFSR, where food was more readily available. Stalin decided to stop this mass flight and on 22 January 1933, he sent around a secret directive forbidding farmers to leave Ukraine and the North Caucasus for other regions of the USSR. Orders were given to the railways and water transportation agencies to stop selling tickets to farmers from these regions, and to the OGPU and local administrations on both sides of the administrative borders to arrest all peasants migrating from these regions and, after punishing the most dangerous, to send the others back to their places of residence. A quarter of a million farmers were thus intercepted. These measures was clearly aimed at the Ukrainian group.

The atrocities committed in the early 1930s by Stalin’s communist regime against the Ukrainian population of Soviet Union fit the UN definition of genocide. Stalin’s intent to destroy the Ukrainian SSR as a national group, in the sense of an ethnically based socio-economic and political entity, is well documented in Stalin’s correspondence and other documents. The criminal acts consisted of the decimation of the urban elites and the deliberate starvation of the peasantry. Executions, deportations and induced famine were also inflicted on the Ukrainian ethnic minority in the Kuban and other regions of the RSFSR. The abolition of Ukrainization and the persistent condemnation of bourgeois-nationalist and Petliurite elements show that the destructive measures were conceived in terms of ethno-national transformations.

Ukrainians refer to their genocide as “the Holodomor,” coined from the words “holod” (hunger, famine) and “moryty” (to waste, destroy or kill). When capitalized, the term acquires the sense of “Ukrainian genocide.” 
AUR FOOTNOTE: Roman Serbyn is a well-known historian and scholar. He is professor emeritus of Russian and East European history at the University of Quebec at Montreal, and an expert on Ukraine. Publications: Roman Serbyn and Bohdan Krawchenko, "Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933," 1986, ISBN 0920862438 and Roman Serbyn, "Holod 1921-1923 I Ukrainska Presa V Kanadi" (translation: The Famine of 1921-1923 and the Ukrainian Press in Canada), 1992, ISBN 0969630107, [email protected].
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
Gareth Jones, Lloyd George Aid, Reports Devastation
Evening Post Foreign Service, New York, New York, March 29, 1933

Famine grips Russia Millions Dying. Idle on Rise, Says Briton
Asserts Reds Arrest British to Check Public Wrath
Peasants "Wait for Death"

BERLIN, March. 29th , - Russia today is in the grip of a famine which is proving as disastrous as the catastrophe of 1921 when millions died, reported Gareth Jones, Foreign Affairs secretary to former Prime Minister David Lloyd George of Great Britain, who arrived in Berlin this morning en route to London after a long walking tour through the Ukraine and other districts in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Jones, who speaks Russian fluently, is the first foreigner to visit the Russian countryside since the Moscow authorities forbade foreign correspondents to leave the city. His report, which he will deliver to the Royal Institute of International Affairs tomorrow, explains the reason for this prohibition. Famine on a colossal scale, impending death of millions From hunger, murderous terror and the beginnings of serious unemployment in a land that had hitherto prided itself on the fact that very man had a job-this is the summary of Mr. Jones's first-hand observations.

He told the EVENING POST: "The arrest of the British engineers in Moscow is a symbol of panic in consequence of conditions worse than in 1921. Millions are dying of hunger. The trial, beginning Saturday, of the British engineers is merely a pendant to the recent shooting of thirty-five prominent workers in agriculture, including the Vice-Commissar of the Ministry of Agriculture, and is an attempt to check the popular wrath at the famine which haunts every district of the Soviet Union.

"Everywhere was the cry, 'There is no bread. We are dying. This cry came from every part of Russia, from the Volga,. Siberia, White Russia, the North Caucasus, Central Asia. I tramped through the black earth region because that was once the richest farm land in Russia and because the correspondents have been forbidden to go there to see for themselves what is happening.

"In the train a Communist denied 'to me that there was a famine. I flung a crust of bread which I had been eating from my own supply into a spittoon. A peasant fellow-passenger fished it out and ravenously ate it. I threw an orange peel into the spittoon and the peasant again grabbed it and devoured it. The Communist subsided. I stayed overnight in a village where there used to be 200 oxen and where there now are six. The peasants were eating the cattle fodder and had only a month's supply left. They told me that many had already died of hunger. Two soldiers came to arrest a thief. They warned me against travel by night as there were too many 'starving' desperate men.

"'We are waiting for death' was my welcome, but See, we still, have our cattle fodder. Go farther south. There they have nothing. Many houses are empty of people already dead,' they cried.

"A foreign expert returning from Kazakhstan told me that 1,000,000 out of 5,000,000 there have died of hunger. I can believe it. After Stalin, the most hated man in Russia is Bernard Shaw among- those who read his glowing descriptions of plentiful food in their starving land. "The future is blacker than the present. There is insufficient seed. Many peasants are too weak physically le to work on the land. The new taxation policy, promising to take only a fixed amount of grain from the peasants, will fail to encourage production because the peasants refuse to trust the Government."

In short, Mr. Jones concluded, the collectivization policy of the Government and the resistance of the peasants to it have brought Russia to the worst catastrophe since the famine of 1921 and have swept away the population of whole districts.

Coupled with this, the prime reason for the breakdown, he added, is the terror, lack of skill and collapse of transport and finance. Unemployment is rapidly increasing, he declared, because of the lack of raw materials. The lack of food and the 'wrecking of the currency and credit system have forced many of the factories to close or to dismiss great numbers of workers.

The Jones report, because of his position, because of his reputation for reliability and impartiality and because he is the only first-hand observer who has visited the Russian countryside since it was officially closed to foreigners, is bound to receive widespread attention in official England as well as among the public of the country.

LINK:; For further material on Gareth Jones please check out the Dr. Margaret Colley and Nigel Linsan Colley website about Gareth Jones:
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
Deaths From Diseases Due to Malnutrition High, Yet the Soviet is Entrenched
Ukraine, North Caucasus and Lower Volga Regions Suffer From Shortages
Russian and Foreign Observers In Country See No Ground for Predications of Disaster

The New York Times, New York, March 31, 2009, Page 13   
MOSCOW, March 30---In the middle of the diplomatic duel between Great Britain and the Soviet Union over the accused British engineers there appears from a British source a big scare story in the American press about famine in the Soviet Union, with "thousands already dead and millions menaced by death and starvation."

Its author is Gareth Jones, who is a former secretary to David Lloyd George and who recently spent three weeks in the Soviet Union and reached the conclusion that the country was "on the verge of a terrific smash," as he told the writer.

Mr. Jones is a man of a keen and active mind, and he has taken the trouble to learn Russian, which he speaks with considerable fluency, but the writer thought Mr. Jones's judgment was somewhat hasty and asked him on what it was based. It appeared that he had made a forty-mile walk through villages in the neighborhood of Kharkov and had found conditions sad.

I suggested that that was a rather inadequate cross-section of a big country but nothing could shake his conviction of impending doom.

Predictions of Doom Frequent
The number of times foreigners, especially Britons, have shaken rueful heads as they composed the Soviet Union's epitaph can scarcely be computed, and in point of fact it has done incalculable harm since the day when William C. Bullitt's able and honest account of the situation was shelved and negatived during the Versailles Peace Conference by reports that Admiral Kolchak, White Russian leader, had taken Kazan---which he never did---and that the Soviet power was "one the verge of an abyss."

Admiral Kolchak faded. Then General Denikin took Orel and the Soviet Government was on the verge of an abyss again, and General Yudenich "took" Petrograd. But where are Generals Denikin and Yudenich now?

A couple of years ago another British "eyewitness" reported a mutiny in the Moscow garrison and "rows of corpses neatly piled in Theatre Square," and only this week a British news agency revealed a revolt of the Soviet Fifty-fifth Regiment at Duria, on the Manchurian border. All bunk, of course.
This is not to mention a more regrettable incident of three years ago when an American correspondent discovered half of Ukraine flaming with rebellion and "proved" it by authentic documents eagerly proffered by Rumanians, which documents on examination appeared to relate to events of eight or ten years earlier.

Saw No One Dying
But to return to Mr. Jones. He told me there was virtually no bread in the villages he had visited and that the adults were haggard, guant and discouraged, but that he had seen no dead or dying animals or human beings.

I believed him because I knew it to be correct not only of some parts of the Ukraine but of sections of the North Caucasus and lower Volga regions and, for that matter, Kazakstan, where the attempt to change the stock-raising nomads of the type and the period of Abraham and Isaac into 1933 collective grain farmers has produced the most deplorable results.

It is all too true that the novelty and mismanagement of collective farming, plus the quite efficient conspiracy of Feodor M. Konar and his associates in agricultural commissariats, have made a mess of Soviet food production. (Konar was executed for sabotage.)

But---to put it brutally---you can't make an omelette without breaking eggs, and the Bolshevist leaders are just as indifferent to the casualties that may be involved in their drive toward socializaton as any General during the World War who ordered a costly attack in order to show his superiors that he and his division possessed the proper soldierly spirit. In fact, the Bolsheviki are more indifferent because they are animated by fanatical conviction.
Since I talked to Mr. Jones I have made exhaustive inquiries about this alleged famine situation. I have inquired in Soviet commissariats and in foreign embassies with their network of consuls, and I have tabulated information from Britons working as specialists and from my personal connections, Russian and foreign.

Disease Mortality Is High
All of this seems to me to be more trustworthy information than I could get by a brief trip through any one area. The Soviet Union is too big to permit a hasty study, and it is the foreign correspondent's job to present a whole picture, not a part of it. And here are the facts:

There is a serious shortage food shortage throughout the country, with occasional cases of well-managed State or collective farms. The big cities and the army are adequately supplied with food. There is no actual starvation or deaths from starvation, but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition.
In short, conditions are definitely bad in certain sections--- the Ukraine, North Caucasus and Lower Volga. The rest of the country is on short rations but nothing worse. These conditions are bad, but there is no famine.
The critical months in this country are February and March, after which a supply of eggs, milk and vegetables comes to supplement the shortage of bread---if, as now, there is a shortage of bread. In every Russian village food conditions will improve henceforth, but that will not answer one really vital question-
What about the coming grain crop?
Upon that depends not the future of the Soviet power, which cannot and will not be smashed, but the future policy of the Kremlin. If through climatic conditions, as in 1921, the crop fails, then, indeed, Russia will be menaced by famine. If not, the present difficulties will be speedily forgotten.

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Send in a letter-to-the-editor today. Let us hear from you.
["I stand by my statement that Soviet Russia is suffering from a severe famine."]
Letter Published in: The New York Times
New York, New York, May 13, 1933

To the Editor of The New York Times:

On my return from Russia at the end of March, I stated in an interview in Berlin that everywhere I went in the Russian villages I heard the cry; "There is no bread, we are dying," and that there was famine in the Soviet Union, menacing the lives of millions of people.

Walter Duranty, whom I must thank for his continued kindness and helpfulness to hundreds of American and British visitors to Moscow, immediately cabled a denial of the famine. He suggested that my judgment was only based on a forty-mile tramp through villages. He stated that he had inquired in Soviet commissariats and in the foreign embassies and had come to the conclusion that there was no famine, but that there was a "serious food shortage throughout the country.....No actual starvation or deaths from starvation, but there Is widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition."
Evidence From Several Sources
While partially agreeing with my Statement, he implied that my report was a "scare story" and compared it with certain fantastic prophecies of Soviet downfall. He also made the strange suggestion that I was forecasting the doom of the Soviet régime, a forecast I have never ventured.
I stand by my statement that Soviet Russia is suffering from a severe famine. It would be foolish to draw this conclusion from my tramp through a small part of vast Russia, although I must remind Mr. Duranty that it was my third visit to Russia, that I devoted four years of university life to the study of the Russian language and history and that on this occasion alone I visited in all twenty villages, not only in the Ukraine, but also in the black earth district, and in the Moscow region, and that I slept in peasants' cottages, and did not immediately leave for the next village.
My first evidence was gathered from foreign observers. Since Mr. Duranty introduces consuls into the discussion, a thing I am loath to do, for they are official representatives of their countries and should not be quoted, may I say that I discussed the Russian situation with between twenty and thirty consuls and diplomatic representatives of various nations and that their evidence supported my point of view. But they are not allowed to express their views in the press, and therefore remain silent.
Journalists Are Handicapped
Journalists, on the other hand, are allowed to write, but the censorship has turned them into masters of euphemism and understatement. Hence they give "famine" the polite name of "food shortage" and "starving to death" is softened down to read as "widespread mortality from diseases ue to malnutrition." Consuls are not so reticent in private conversation.

My second evidence was based on conversations with peasants who had migrated into the towns from various parts of Russia. Peasants from the richest parts of Russia coming into the towns for bread! Their story of the deaths in their villages from starvation and of the death of the greater part of their cattle and horses was tragic, and each conversation corroborated the previous one.

Third, my evidence was based upon letters written by German colonists in Russia, appealing for help to their compatriots in Germany. "My brother's four children have died of hunger." "We have had no bread for six months." "If we do not get help from abroad, there is nothing left but to die of hunger." Those are typical passages from these letters.

Statements by Peasants
Fourth, I gathered evidence from journalists and technical experts who had been in the countryside. In The Manchester Guardian, which has been exceedingly sympathetic toward the Soviet rйgime, there appeared on March 25, 27 and 28 an excellent series of articles on "The Soviet and the Peasantry" (which had not been submitted to the censor). The correspondent, who had visited North Caucasus and the Ukraine, states: "To say that there is famine in some of the' most fertile parts of Russia is to say much less than the truth: there is not only famine, but-in the case of the North Caucasus at least-a state of war, a military occupation." Of the Ukraine, he writes: "The population is starving."

My final evidence is based on my talks with hundreds of peasants. They were not the "kulaks"--those mythical scapegoats for the hunger in Russia-- but ordinary peasants. I talked with them alone in Russian and jotted down their conversations, which are an unanswerable indictment of Soviet agricultural policy. The peasants said emphatically that the famine was worse than in 1921 and that fellow-villagers had died or were dying.

Mr. Duranty says that I saw in the villages no dead human beings nor animals. That is true, but one does not need a particularly nimble brain to grasp that even in the Russian famine districts the dead are buried and that there the dead animals are devoured.

May I in conclusion congratulate the Soviet Foreign Office on its skill in concealing the true situation in the U. S. S. R.? Moscow is not Russia, and the sight of well fed people there tends to hide the real Russia.

London, May 1, 1933   
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
By Stanislav Kulchytsky, Institute of History
National Academy of Sciences (Ukraine)
"Holodomor Studies" Journal, Vol. 1, Issue 2, Winter 2009
Charles Schlacks, Publisher, Idyllwild, CA 

For many years two librarians at the M. Gorky Odesa Research Library, L. Burian and I. Rikun, have recorded the acquisition of new works on the Holodomor, including newspaper articles. Starting in 2001, they published two bibliographic reference books containing a total of 12,309 entries for the period covering 1932-2007.[1] This is an incomplete list because the Holodomor topic is not always reflected in the publication title.

The circumstances connected with the murder of millions of Ukrainians by means of an artificially-engineered famine in 1932-1933 are still being debated. There are terminological disputes among scholars and politicians. Basing themselves on an immense number of available facts, people with diverse political views reached opposite conclusions.
The Holodomor is being actively exploited in the domestic political struggle, whose intensity is extraordinarily high in Ukraine today. This topic is also a stumbling block in Ukrainian-Russian relations. With every passing year the ruling circles of Russia increase the pressure on Ukraine, including with regard the treatment of their shared past.

Nevertheless, Ukrainian scholars have achieved important successes in their study of the Holodomor. On the basis of their work, on November 28, 2006 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the law “On the Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine,” which defines this tragedy of the Ukrainian nation as genocide. The Ukrainian Institute of National Memory is also working assiduously. In 2008 it spearheaded the publication of a National Book of Memory of the Victims of the Holodomor for every oblast that was included within the boundaries of Ukraine at that time. The volume encompassing all of Ukraine is a summary of the work done by scholars, regional historians, and archivists in the past twenty years.
This book contains eyewitness testimonies, documents, and photographic documents, a chronicle of events, a select bibliography, and so on.[2] This tragedy, any mention of which was considered a crime in the Soviet Union until December 1987, is now becoming part of the historical memory of the Ukrainian nation and all of humanity.

In May 2009, on the initiative of President Viktor Yushchenko, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) launched a criminal case in connection with the 1932-1933 genocide in Ukraine. The investigation(s) will help supplement the political assessment contained in the law passed on November 28, 2006 with a legal assessment.

The constraints of this article do not permit me to offer a detailed analysis of my own version of the Holodomor. Therefore, I will cite the fundamental publications in which it is laid out and will limit myself here to describing the general approaches to this topic.[3]

First of all, the unique nature of the Ukrainian Holodomor of 1932-1933 must be emphasized. It is different from the famines of 1921-1923 and 1946-1947, the prime causes of which were droughts on an unprecedented scale. However, the famine of 1921-1923 in Ukraine was exacerbated and prolonged by Kremlin’s actions: international relief organizations were forbidden to operate in Ukraine until January 1922, even though they were allowed to render assistance to the Volga region by August 1921; state grain deliveries were carried out in the starving guberniias with the goal of weakening the peasants’ anti-government action; and the export of grain was renewed.
In similar fashion, the famine of 1946-1947 was exacerbated by the state grain procurement, for export to those European countries where the Kremlin was interested in strengthening its influence. When scholars or politicians talk about three Holodomors, they ignore the essence of that which happened only in 1932-1933 in two Ukrainian-speaking regions of the USSR and which never took place anywhere else. At that time the Kremlin’s ultimate aim in those regions was not the grain deliveries, which caused the deaths by starvation of hundreds of thousands of peasants, but the deliberate creation for the peasants of conditions that were incompatible with life.

Russian politicians and scholars emphasize that the famine was a general tragedy that affected all the peasants and was caused by the Soviet government’s grain deliveries. They do not distinguish the Ukrainian famine from the all-Union one and are indignant when it is called genocide.

To show the difference between the famine and the Holodomor means to expose a thoroughly concealed Stalinist crime that was committed during a severe political crisis. Before establishing the fact of this crime, it is necessary to have a good understanding of the situation, the severest manifestation of which was the all-Union famine. In Ukrainian literature, the famine and the Holodomor are combined into a single whole because the famine preceded the Holodomor, which fused with it. The difference between the two disappeared from the consciousness of those who survived because in both cases people died.

The famine was caused by the efforts of the country’s leaders to fully implement Lenin’s call to build a “commune state” declared in his April Theses of 1917. This utopian task was being implemented by a trial-and-error method in two directions: propaganda of the rousing communist idea of social justice, and mass terror. In continuing the “revolution from above” that had been initiated by Lenin, Stalin sought to put an end to buying and selling and money, and to fuse the urban economy to the rural economy on the principle(s) of the exchange of goods on a barter basis. However, in 1930 he did not succeed in driving the peasants into communes because of their resistance, which was most intense in Ukraine. The Soviet leadership had to acquiesce to the peasants’ insistence on retaining part of their private plots of land.
To Stalin’s way of thinking, the quid pro-quo for this concession was that the collective farmers had to work for the state on collective farms. For three years in a row grain was taken away from them practically without compensation. Left with accumulated workdays only on paper, with every passing year they worked increasingly badly. In 1932 no less than one-half of the harvest in Ukraine was lost because of weed-infested fields and crops left standing for too long during harvesting and transport. A similar picture was observed in other regions of the Soviet Union.

The actions that resulted in the Holodomor consisted of the confiscation – under the guise of state grain deliveries – of all food supplies that the peasants had accumulated up to the new harvest. These were not deliveries of grain, which had been requisitioned earlier. This was a punitive action deliberately aimed at creating conditions that were incompatible with life. There was no other goal.

The confiscation of non-grain foodstuffs transformed the quality of the famine. Whereas earlier only those died who had not sown their plots of land, now death from starvation threatened everyone. Peasants could obtain food only in stores that were part of the Torgsin (Trade with Foreigners) network, which the state had foresightedly extended to the raion level. But the only people who could save themselves from death from starvation were those who had gold items.

Once all foods were confiscated, the peasants ended up completely dependent on the state for food – which was the goal of the Stalinist action: to force everyone to feel this dependence and thus preempt the massive even if disorganized anti-government protests of the starving people, which the Chekists predicted.

I am not saying that Stalin suddenly got the idea to destroy all the Ukrainian peasants by starving them to death. After the confiscation of all foodstuffs the state began to feed the peasants “by hand,” i.e., through the collective and state farms, in preparation for the spring sowing. This food relief was widely publicized in the press and helped conceal the food confiscation action that preceded it.

The masterfully prepared and diligently concealed death of millions of Ukrainian peasants (which was not that complicated a feat in the conditions of the all-Union famine and the ban on disseminating information about it) was essential to ensure that those who survived consented to live and work in the collective farm system.
The goal of the organized mass terror in the cities under the flag of the struggle against Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism was to destroy that segment of the intelligentsia, including Sovietized and partified intellectuals, which treated in all seriousness the propagandistic Soviet slogans and the constitutional guarantees of the consolidation of Ukrainian national statehood.

The actions of Stalin’s team are documented. I shall list five types of proof that form a unit.

1. On November 18, 1932 the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (CC CP(B)U) published a resolution, and two days later, on November 20, the Radnarkom (RNK) of the Ukrainian SSR published an identically-titled resolution, “On Measures to Intensify the State Grain Deliveries.” Drawn up by Molotov and edited by Stalin, these resolutions prescribed fines in kind for debtors – meat and potatoes.[4]

2.On November 27, 1932, at a joint session of the Politburo of the Central Committee and the presidium of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) (TsKK AUCP[B]), Stalin criticized those CC members who had accused him personally of the failure of the state grain deliveries. He pointed to sabotage and wrecking on collective farms as the reasons behind the failure. Sabotage had to be answered with a “destructive blow.” In early December the “destructive blow” was delivered to the inhabitants of hundreds of blacklisted Ukrainian villages. According to eyewitnesses, collective farms and peasant homesteads were subjected to constant searches for concealed grain, accompanied by the levying of fines in kind. This is how the Holodomor began.

3. On December 10 Stalin accused Mykola Skrypnyk of maintaining links with nationalist elements. The Ukrainian leader’s fault was in striving to achieve the reunification of the Kuban district of the RSFSR with the Ukrainian SSR and organized the Ukrainization of nearly half of the raions in the Northern Caucasus. On December 14-15 secret resolutions issued by the CC AUCP(B) declared Ukrainization outside the borders of the Ukrainian SSR “Petliurite” and abolished it. The Kremlin ordered the CC CP(B)U and the RNK of the Ukrainian SSR to ensure the “expulsion of Petliurite and other bourgeois nationalist elements from party and Soviet organizations.”[5] Pavel Postyshev was sent to work in Ukraine as the secretary of the CC CP(B)U. Retaining his post as secretary of the CC AUCP(B), he organized a purge that by 1939 resulted in the expulsion of half the members of the 500,000-strong Communist Party of Ukraine.

4. On January 1, 1933 Stalin addressed a telegram through the CC CP(B)U to the Ukrainian peasantry, consisting of two points. The first point contained the announcement that peasants would not be repressed if they voluntarily surrendered their grain. The second point concerned those who ignored the warning. Such peasants were to be repressed in keeping with the law of August 7, 1932 concerning the property of state enterprises, collective farms, and cooperatives.[6]
From reports submitted by the OGPU (Soviet secret police) Stalin knew that the peasants had no more grain left. Therefore, the goal of the telegram, which was immediately replicated in the form of resolutions issued by the lower structures of the power vertical, was not the state grain deliveries. The two points of this document were united in such a way that an order that could be read between the lines, emerged: Search every peasant farmyard! There was no other method for ferreting out those who “had ignored the warning” expressed in the first point. According to Holodomor survivors, all foodstuffs were confiscated during searches.

This statement is replicated in thousands of published accounts of the 1933 Ukrainian famine. There are still survivors who can give their statements to investigators who have launched a criminal case in connection with the genocide that was committed in Ukraine. These statements must be duly recorded and presented to the court.

The confiscation of grain from its producers can be presented as the state’s need to feed the residents of cities (who, in the crisis conditions, were malnourished and dying from starvation) or its need to sell grain abroad and purchase machines for the Dniprohes or Magnitogorsk with the acquired currency. Such arguments are frequently used to justify the policies of the Soviet government. But the confiscation of all foodstuffs does not leave any loopholes for justifying the government’s actions. Any court of law will draw only one conclusion from this: murder by starvation.

5. On January 22, 1933 Stalin handwrote a letter in the name of the CC AUCP(B) and the RNK of the USSR to local leaders, that contained an order to blockade the Ukrainian SSR and the Kuban district in order to prevent the mass exodus of starving people to other regions.[7]

Even official correspondence marked “Top Secret” was forbidden to use of the word “famine.” This prohibition was part of the mechanism behind the organization of the Holodomor because it paralyzed relief for the starving, not sanctioned by Kremlin. Sanctioned relief was regulated through “special files.” The document establishing the prohibition has not been found or was never created. Nor is there any need for one because everyone knows that for fifty-four years it was forbidden to call the “food difficulties” a famine.

The documented mechanism underpinning the organization of the Holodomor consisted of three elements: the confiscation of food, the ban preventing the starving population from leaving the Ukrainian SSR and the Kuban, and the information blockade. In sum, such actions signified the creation of conditions that were incompatible with life, i.e., genocide. The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide does not require an explanation of the causes of genocide. In our case it must be proven that the Ukrainian peasants were being exterminated not as peasants but as Ukrainians. This is where we run into problems: in which of the two groups listed in the UN Convention should Ukrainians be placed – ethnic or national? The answer is crucially important.

According to the typology of genocide, the interpretation of the Holodomor as ethnic cleansing places it on an equal plane with the Holocaust. Because of this, some people in the diaspora have called the Holodomor the “Ukrainian Holocaust.” The classic work by Vasyl I. Hryshko, Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears, which was first published in New York in 1963, was republished there in 1978 under the title The Ukrainian Holocaust of 1933.

The phrase “Ukrainian Holocaust,” in reference to the Holodomor, is unacceptable. First, there was a Ukrainian Holocaust – the death of 1.5 million Jews at the hands of the Nazis and their allies on the territory of Ukraine. Second, identification with the Holocaust propels the Holodomor into the field of ethnic cleansing, whereas it should be considered a form of terror.

In recent years many documents on the Kremlin’s nationality policy have been published. They leave no room for doubt that Stalin sought to turn the Ukrainian nation, which was dangerous to his personal power, into a politically toothless ethnic group. Once the Holodomor had transformed the Ukrainians into an inert mass of hounded people, he took pains to portray them as a blossoming nation, and in 1934 he transferred Ukraine’s capital to Kyiv, the national center of the Ukrainian people.

[1]. Holodomor v Ukraini 1932-1933 rr.: bibliohrafichnyi pokazhchyk, ed. S. V. Kulchytskyi, O. F. Botushanska, and V. Motyka  (Odesa-Lviv: Vydavnytstvo M. P. Kots, 2001), 656 pp.; Holodomor v Ukraini 1932-1933 rr.: bibliohrafichnyi pokazhchyk, comp. L. M. Burian and I. E. Rikun (Odesa: Vydavnytstvo Studiia “Nehotsiiant,” 2008), 576 pp.
[2]. Natsionalna knyha pamiati zhertv Holodomoru 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraini (Kyiv: Ukrainskyi instytut natsionalnoi pamiati, 2008).
[3]. “Iak tse bulo,” in Natsionalna knyha pamiati zhertv Holodomoru 1932-1933 v Ukraini, pp. 11-44. The next chapters, “Svidchennia ochevydtsiv” (pp. 47-144) and “Dokumenty” (pp. 147-93) are the evidentiary basis for the theses laid out in the introductory chapter. See also “Peredmova,” in Velykyi holod v Ukraini 1932-1933 rokiv: Svidchennia ochevydtsiv dlia komisii Konhresu SShA, executive director of the Commission James Mace, ed. Stanislav Kulchytsky (Kyiv: Vydavnychyi dim “Kyievo-Mohylianska akademiia,” 2008), 1: 10–81.
[4]. Stanislav Kulchytsky, Holodomor 1932-1933 rr. iak henotsyd: trudnoshchi usvidomlennia (Kyiv: Nash chas, 2008), pp. 269-73.
[5]. Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv, ed. F. M. Rudych et al. (Kyiv: Vyd-vo politychnoi lit-ry Ukrainy, 1990), p. 292; Komandyry velykoho holodu: poizdky V. Molotova i L. Kahanovych v Ukrainu ta na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz, 1932-1933 rr., ed. Valerii Vasyliev and Iurii Shapoval (Kyiv: Heneza, 2001), pp. 312-13.
[6]. Holod 1932-1933 rr. na Ukraini, p. 308.
[7]. Tragediia sovetskoi derevni: Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie: Dokumenty i materialy v piati tomakh, 1927-1939 (Moscow: Rossiiskaia polit. entsiklopediia, 2001), 3: 635.
By Stanislav Kulchytsky, Institute of History, National Academy of Sciences (Ukraine) [ [email protected]]
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
Yuriy Shapoval, National Academy of Sciences Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine
Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta D. Olynyk
"Holodomor Studies" Journal, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Winter-Spring 2009, Pages 41-54
Charles Schlacks, Publisher, Idyllwild, CA 
In 1933 Mendel Khataevich, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (CC CP(B)U), told an activist: “A ruthless struggle is going on between the peasantry and our regime. It’s a struggle to the death. This year was a test of our strength and their endurance. It took a famine to show them who is master here. It has cost millions of lives, but the collective farm system is here to saty. We’ve won the war.”[1]

In this war Ukraine suffered the highest number of human losses of all the “Union republics” in the former USSR. Thus, questions emerge as to why this happened precisely that way? Was it accidental? In the quest for answers to these questions, researchers from many countries (and not just researchers) are still engaged in debates, but one thing is certain: it is impossible to ignore or keep silent about the Holodomor in the historical chain of humanitarian catastrophes that afflicted humankind in the twentieth century.

Scholarly research is continuing, knowledge about the Holodomor is expanding, and access is slowly being gained to documents that reflect the activities of the highest Soviet leadership in 1932-1933 and the conduct of regional leaders, particularly the party-state nomenklatura of the Ukrainian SSR. These documents are allowing scholars to gain an understanding of the technology of the crime per se, whose mechanisms helped the Stalinist regime to extract grain, justifying this by the need to modernize. The lives of millions of people were swallowed by this Moloch.
These documents are helpful in attaining a clearer understanding of the doctrinal and situational motives that governed the communist establishment, as well as in recreating the situation in those times at the macro- and micro-levels, which is crucially important in the formulation of general, realistic conclusions and judgments. Among other things, new research is repudiating claims about the absence of specific features of the government’s actions in one region or another in the former USSR in 1932-1933.

In recent years, documents and other materials housed in numerous archives in Ukraine have become accessible. Among them are the Branch State Security Service Archives of Ukraine (HDA SBU). In the summer of 2006 a number of archival sources, access to which was forbidden for a long time, were declassified.
The employees of the Soviet security service unintentionally turned out to be rather good historians, recording in their documents the situation in the countryside, the demands of the government and its own efforts to carry them out, the mood of the population and the repressive measures that were applied to it, and actions to block the leakage of truthful information about the essence and scale of the Holodomor. Some of these documents and materials were included in the scholarly collection of documents entitled The Declassified Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine in GPU-NKVD Documents.[2]

However, the Soviet security service left behind another category of extraordinarily interesting and important documents. These materials not only relate to the situation in the Ukrainian SSR, but also show how events in Ukraine were being recorded by foreign diplomatic bodies, specifically the information and assessments drafted by Polish, German, Italian, Turkish, and Japanese diplomats about the Holodomor.
Through various channels these materials fell into the hands of the Chekists, who were diligently tracking the members of foreign diplomatic missions. These documentary testimonies, together with already published documents written by foreign diplomats about the famine in the early 1930s in the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR,[3] are a unique and important source for further research, which, I am convinced, have never been studied by scholars.
Stalin’s “great breakthrough” (i.e., accelerated industrialization and forcible collectivization) was such a breakneck change of policy that dissatisfaction and resistance among the broadest strata of society was inevitable. This led to the emergence of an opposition within ranks of the Bolshevik party itself, even among its leaders. It is not surprising that the peasants launched the most active resistance to the regime.

The representatives of foreign missions recorded all this. According to the opinion of one Italian diplomat, which he voiced in July 1930, even before 1928 “it was possible to consider that the Government will be able to overcome the crisis, but today, in connection with the latest failed collectivization measures that have sparked powerful resistance on the part of the population, it is evident that the Soviet government will not be able to cope with the tasks that it is facing.”[4]

However, the Stalinist regime viewed terror and the merciless crushing of uprisings as an effective means of subduing the disgruntled population. In a memorandum on the political situation among the peasants of Ukraine, which was written in connection with the “policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class,” during the period from January 20 to February 12, 1930 the head of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, Vsevolod Balytsky, reported that a total of 12,000 people had taken part in 37 mass peasant protests in January; as of February 9, 1930, 11,865 people had been arrested, and peasants had carried out 40 terrorist acts in response to the policy of “dekulakization.”[5] Balytsky was even forced to head an “operational headquarters” for the struggle against peasant protests and was in charge of crushing these protests in various regions of Ukraine.

In order No. 74, issued by the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR on March 31, 1930, Balytsky emphasized that “on March 19, 1930 the organs of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, with the active participation of poor peasants and leading rural activists, completed an operation to expel kulaks from districts of all-out collectivization in Ukraine.
Despite the exceptionally tight deadlines for the preparation of this operation, the lack of experience in conducting this kind of mass work, as well as the significant complexity of the work itself, the entire operation to expel the kulaks in Ukraine was successfully carried out: the work was finished on time, the control figure of expulsions of kulak farmsteads, as outlined in the plan, was exceeded on the whole. . . .”[6] As of June 1, 1930, 90,000 farmsteads were “dekulakized,” the total figure reaching more than 200,000 during the years of collectivization. This is a clear-cut illustration of the war that the Bolshevik government had unleashed against the peasantry.

Tracking these dramatic events, the personnel of various diplomatic missions noted the rise in the agricultural crisis. For example, Japanese consular officials, who traveled to certain regions of the Ukrainian SSR in 1929, mention a “food crisis” and the fact that, despite the Civil War and the devastation that had already been experienced, the “material situation of the majority is not improving but deteriorating.”[7] As early as 1928 officials of the Italian Consulate, who were analyzing the situation of the peasants and the government’s policies toward them, say that famine is to be expected,[8] and that the communists’ own actions “are building up the counter-revolution.”[9]
In 1930 officials of the Turkish Consulate noted that the USSR was exporting food with the goal of obtaining hard currency instead of feeding its own people, and that the government “is forcing its working class and the entire population to starve.”[10] Foreign diplomatic missions were also constantly reporting to their superiors about disturbances caused by food shortages, which were taking place in large Ukrainian cities, including Kyiv.

Specific to Ukraine was the fact that this republic, together with the North Caucasus, supplied more than half the grain produced in the entire USSR. Speaking about Ukraine in 1931, Stalin noted that “a number of grain-producing districts are in a state of devastation and famine.”[11] Nevertheless, the Kremlin leaders assumed that Ukraine had huge supplies of grain that collective farms and independent farmers were supposedly concealing from the state.
For this reason the government resorted to pressure methods in order to complete the state grain deliveries. Already in 1931 the grain delivery plans had to be reduced for a number of oblasts in the Ural and Middle Volga regions, as well as Kazakhstan, yet such reductions were practically not instituted in Ukraine and the North Caucasus.

Compared to the previous year, in 1931 Ukraine supplied less grain, and already that year more than 150,000 people had died in the republic.[12] All the same, on January 3, 1932 a meeting of the Politburo of the CC CP(B)U) discussed Stalin and Molotov’s telegram, which contained an order to unswervingly carry out the state grain delivery plans. Eighty-three top officials then dispersed throughout Ukraine in order to organize the plans’ implementation. A special resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) (CC AUCP(B)) proclaimed February 1932 a militant shock month for the completion of the state grain deliveries.
By March-April 1932 there were large numbers of starving people in Ukrainian villages, while children abandoned by their parents roamed the cities. This was an obvious sign of a calamity, but it in no way stopped the government.       

Foreign diplomats were observing, analyzing, and reflecting all this in their documents. On May 11, 1932 the Polish consul in Kyiv writes:

         I report that every day I received increasingly more news about the famine in Right-Bank Ukraine, which is felt particularly acutely in the province.
         According to the latest reports, almost every day there are cases of people who are collapsing from weakness and exhaustion being collected from the
         streets of such cities as Vinnytsia and Uman. The situation may even be worse in the countryside, where, according to information from a reliable
         source, robberies and murders as a result of starvation are daily occurrences.[13]
Foreign diplomats were quite well informed about the state of affairs, and this level of informedness influenced the quality of their assessments of the agricultural situation both in the USSR as a whole and the Ukrainian SSR in particular. With good reason, therefore, the cover letter from the OGPU of the USSR, accompanying the copy of a report drawn up by the German consul in Odesa about the state grain deliveries, which arrived at the counterintelligence division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR in January 1930, demanded to know the sources of the consulate’s information about Soviet grain exports that were being channeled through the Port of Odessa.[14]

In 1932-1933 the Stalinist leadership de facto clearly designated two main opponents. The first one was the peasants, who were refusing to work on collective farms and die in the name of modernization. In the USSR the peasantry had been turned into an object of constant expropriation, a resource for modernizing transformations. The second opponent was the none-too-reliable party-state leadership of Ukraine, which, to a certain degree, was conducting a “flexible” line in the “tension field” between the Kremlin’s demands and the tragic local realities.

Stalin issued a clear signal in his now widely publicized and fundamentally important letter to Lazar Kaganovich, dated August 11, 1932. In it he questions the loyalty of the entire party organization of the Ukrainian SSR, while simultaneously demanding that allegedly concealed grain be squeezed out of Ukraine regardless of sacrifices (which could be justified by the lofty goals of modernization) and that a repressive “purge” of society be carried out in order to eradicate “Ukrainian nationalists.”[15] Stalin then dispatched his loyal associates to Ukraine, who introduced punitive practices that were diverse in form but universal in their fatal result.

Particularly dangerous to the Stalinist regime was the fact that the peasants were trying to escape from the places where they were starving. In one of his letters to Kaganovich, dated June 1932, Stalin expresses his dissatisfaction with the fact that “several tens of thousands of Ukrainian collective farmers are still traveling all over the European part of the USSR and demoralizing the collective farms for us with their complaints and whining.”[16]

A document prepared by Polish intelligence in September 1932 states: “Nearly all of Ukraine is traveling in search of bread, the trains are packed to the rafters; to get on a train [people] have to stand in lineups for several days.”[17] This situation quickly changed after so-called food blockades of Ukraine’s borders were erected in the fall and winter of 1932-33.
The blockades were manned by interior troops and the militia, who prevented peasants from leaving the country and, hence, spreading information about the famine. Also instituted at this time was a ban on what was known as a food “reverse,” which meant that private individuals were not permitted to bring food into Ukraine from Russia and Belarus without the state’s permission, with the volume of food products entering the republic restricted by a special decision.

On January 22, 1933 Stalin and Molotov circulated a directive to party and state organs, in which they emphasized that the migration processes which had begun as a result of starvation among the peasants had been organized by the “enemies of Soviet power, SRs, and agents of Poland with the goal conducting agitation ‘through the peasants’ in the northern districts of the USSR against the collective farms and generally against the Soviet government.”
In connection with this directive, the government organs and the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR and the North Caucasus were ordered to prevent the mass departure of peasants to other districts. Instructions were issued to the transport divisions of the OGPU of the USSR. The Soviet regime thus transformed Ukraine into a starvation ghetto, which was not done in any other Soviet republic.

“The situation in Ukraine is worsening day by day, starvation is staring people in the face, each time in a more brutish and stronger form…”[18] Polish diplomats write in February 1933. On March 12, 1933 the Kyiv oblast’ division of the GPU informed the head of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR about the critical food situation in Kyiv, noting in particular that 400 corpses had been picked up in the city in January, 518 in February, and 248 over a period of eight days in March.[19] The Chekists added that every day 100 or more children are abandoned in the city.[20]

Another document that was prepared by Polish diplomats in March 1933 reports mass dismissals of office workers and laborers in Kyiv. “Bread ration cards are taken away without exception from all those who have been dismissed. In the future, the loss of employment will result in the necessity to leave the city in connection with the system of passports that is being introduced. The number of thefts and robberies is increasing along with the growing number of unemployed people. In many cases, dismissed laborers and state officials are invited to leave for the countryside.
However, owing to the famine reigning there and the dissatisfaction of the urban population, those who are unemployed try at any cost to remain in the city.”[21] During a private conversation, one of the leaders of Kyiv oblast’ admitted that the supplies of necessary seeds did not even meet 60 percent of the required amount, and “therefore, regardless of the official announcement of the free trade in grain, constant searches and grain requisitions are continuing to take place, and the ban on transporting grain and the complications that make it difficult for peasants to travel are still in force at railway stations.”[22]

A document issued by the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR in February 1933 states that Kyiv oblast’ is the leading Ukrainian region with respect to the number of peasants who have left to escape death by starvation.[23] Were Ukrainian peasants under the illusion that the situation was better in Russia? No, they were not. This is what is recorded in a report by the Polish consul, who took a trip from Kharkiv to Moscow in May 1933.
         During my entire journey I was most struck by the difference in the appearance of the villages and fields of Ukraine in comparison with the   
         neighboring TsChO (Central Chernozem oblast’) and even with the non-grain-producing vicinities of Moscow. Ukrainian villages are in significant
         decline; emptiness, desolation, and destitution waft from them; houses are in a semi-collapsed state, often with [missing] roofs that have been torn off;
         new homesteads are nowhere to be seen; children and elderly people resemble skeletons; there is no sign of livestock. . . . When I later ended up in 
         the TsChO (at first, in the vicinities of Kursk and Orel), I had the impression that I had arrived in Western Europe from the Country of soviets. There
         are significantly more plowed and sown fields, the villages are clean, more decent, the houses are restored, and relatively greater well-being is
         evident among the people; you can see cattle grazing. . . .[24]
In June 1932 the Japanese consul in Odesa undertook a long journey through various regions of the USSR. He reported that “in comparison with the peasants of other republics, Ukrainian peasants make a pitiful impression with their ragged clothing, their emaciated bodies, and their begging: even in large railway stations peasants and their wives and children stretch out their hands for alms and beg for bread. . . .”[25]

It is extremely interesting to note that already in 1933 foreign diplomats were trying to ascertain the technology of the Holodomor. This question is fundamentally important. Certain contemporary Western researchers reproach their Ukrainian colleagues for ignoring the fact that Ukrainians also took part in the grain deliveries. Some even write that the “Soviet leadership partially depended on the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians who occupied state positions on the most varied levels.”[26]

Yes, there were Ukrainians in the governing structures. However, no serious researcher would dare write about “hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians,” who, in the conditions of Stalinist dictatorship, have a say in the government’s decisions. They simply did not exist. In connection with this, we find a more accurate analysis in an announcement issued on November 18, 1933 by the Polish vice-consul in Kyiv, Petr Kurnicki. Convinced that the secret of the Bolsheviks’ successes lies in “the complete disregard of means and victims,” the Polish diplomat states:
         The realization of all this took place through the deployment of huge cadres of newly educated communists who, first and foremost, are not bound by
         anything to the local population or [who have been] imbued with theoretical conclusions to such a degree that they have practically become fanatics,
         who carry out all kinds of orders while turning a blind eye to all consequences that will affect the population.[27]
According to some data, more than 54,000 people starved to death in Kyiv in 1933.[28] That same year the German Consulate in Odesa reported: “The horrors of last spring have passed and for the most part forgotten. The communist rulers are not letting the peasants remember their misfortunes for long, and this is being achieved by the fact that, on the heels of one misfortune they are already preparing others, and willy-nilly the old horrors are being forgotten.”[29]
Reverberations of the Holodomor
The Soviet leadership was engaged in what may be called lies for export. As early as January 14, 1933, when he was replying to numerous queries from abroad, Maxim Litvinov, People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, issued a special declaration in which he claimed that there was no famine in the Soviet Union whatsoever, and that all talk of one was nothing but fabrications. Meanwhile, in the international arena Ukrainians were making efforts to informing the world community about the real situation.

Oleksander Shulhyn, the representative of the government in exile of the Ukrainian National Republic, contacted the Grain Commission that was established by the London Economic Conference of 1933. He writes:
         At the time when the committee of advisers should be establishing the volume of grain that the USSR will export abroad, we are asking you, in the
         name of humaneness, to object to any kind of exports of food products, particularly grain, from the USSR. This grain belongs by rights to those who
         sowed it and who today are starving to death – the peasants of Ukraine and the Kuban. On our part, we strenuously protest against this export, which
         we cannot qualify as anything other than criminal.[30]
It is generally known that after dispatching Pavel Postyshev to Ukraine in late 1932 and officially confirming him in January 1933 as the second secretary of the CC CP(B)U, Stalin ordered him to liquidate what was euphemistically called “economic difficulties” and the “failure in the agriculture” of the Ukrainian SSR. Postyshev, who virtually controlled Ukraine until early 1937 (Stanislav Kosior, the weak leader of the CC CP(B)U notwithstanding), accused the Ukrainians themselves of organizing the famine, that is to say, “Ukrainian nationalists” and “Petliurites.” Postyshev and his “team” (people from his milieu, as well as party workers who had come from Russia to reinforce the cadres) implemented the policy of pumping grain out of Ukraine and simultaneously “purging” the party and all social spheres.[31]

The GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, headed by Balitsky, was enlisted to carry out this work. A “massive operation to inflict an operational blow on the class enemy” began already in the fall of 1932. Its goal was also to uncover “counter-revolutionary centers that are organizing sabotage and the disruption of the state grain deliveries and other economic-political measures.” At this point, the Chekists significantly escalated the scale of their actions.

In Soviet Ukrainian agriculture a “counter-revolutionary organization” was uncovered, in which agrarian specialists were implicated and which was soon “linked” with similar organizations in Moscow, Rostov, and Minsk. In Moscow arrested Ukrainian specialists were also implicated in some kind of all-Union organization whose goal, according to official claims, was “to wreck agriculture and cause a famine in the country.” Arrests throughout the regions had a mass character, and the thirty-five members of that mythical organization headed by the former Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the USSR, a Ukrainian named Fedir Konar, were sentenced to death by the Collegium of the OGPU of the USSR on March 11, 1933.
Between November 1932 and January 1933 alone, the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR liquidated 1,208 “counter-revolutionary” collective farm groups. In 1933, nearly 200,000 people were “purged” at 24,191 collective farms.[32] The inspections affected Soviet state farms, the Zagotzerno (Grain Procurement) system, and the system of food cooperatives. It should be noted that a “purge” of the CP(B)U itself was also proclaimed. A significant contingent of individuals who could be easily blamed for organizing the famine was thereby formed.

While the Soviet government hunted for guilty parties, the consequences of the famine were making themselves felt. They were quite conspicuous not only in rural areas but also in cities. In July 1933 a female Polish consular official based in Kharkiv noted that the epidemic had not abated in the summer but instead had grown, affecting increasingly wider strata of the population.
She writes: “The mortality rate is rising every day. There are very many beggars on the streets; lately, small children have been seen with greater frequency.”[33] In the same month, July 1933, the Italian consul in Kharkiv notes: “Some doctors have confirmed to me that the mortality rate in villages often reaches 80 percent, and it is never lower than 50 percent. Worst affected are Kyiv, Poltava, and Sumy oblasts, where one can already speak of depopulation.”[34]

On November 2, 1933 the German consul in Kyiv records the following:
         In the last few weeks the typhus epidemic has once again grown very significantly in Kyiv. Every day around 11 people are delivered to hospitals
         throughout the city. This number includes only residents of Kyiv. Together with non-locals – people from the countryside – the number of hospitalized
         individuals is significantly higher and reaches nearly 200.[35]
During his speech at the XVII Congress of the AUCP(B) in 1934, Stalin issued a statement about the population increase in the USSR in 1933. After this declaration, all mentions of the famine disappeared – even from secret documents. The government named those who were responsible for the famine, but the famine itself became a taboo subject. In information items prepared on the food situation in the Soviet Union, officials at the German Embassy comment: “The government’s victory has been achieved: the peasant has been brought to his knees.”[36]

But, as newly discovered documents attest, the famine did not disappear. In April 1934, Jan Lagoda, the deputy trade counselor at the Polish Embassy in Moscow, went on a trip around the Ukrainian SSR, visiting Kyiv, Korosten, Zhytomyr, Berdychiv, Koziatyn, and Uman. In his report about his journey he writes:
         I became convinced that in the oblasts which I visited the rural population is starving. There are very many people who are clearly starving, there are
         very many abandoned children at railway stations, who are feeding themselves any which way they can. . . . As a result of my observations, I can say
         that the famine in Right-Bank Ukraine is a very widespread phenomenon. . . . Against this background an epidemic of malignant influenza, like the one
         in the West in 1918, has spread; it is immeasurably dangerous. Very many people are dying of influenza. The phenomena associated with last year’s
         famine have still not faded from people’s memories, on trains they talk exclusively about the famine.[37]
Meanwhile, the Soviet government was doing everything to erase all memories of the tragedy. This was done in various ways, including scare tactics, with the aim of forcing people not to discuss the famine. In October 1933 Kurnicki, the Polish vice-consul, insisted that “the news about the possibility of famine are in no way exaggerated,” noting the “government’s concrete efforts to create and strengthen patriotism and state ambitions.”
According to his observations, “now, when you speak with those doctors, who one year ago had gladly taken advantage of every opportunity to eat breakfast or lunch at the Consulate, readily complaining about all sorts of shortcomings, today you notice a complete change in their attitude: they are trying to bluff, [saying] that everything is wonderful, even better than anywhere else. . . .”[38]

In November 1936 German diplomats compiled information about how Soviet propaganda was counteracting the spread of truth about the tragic events of 1932-1933 and continuously seeking to contradict the very existence of the famine. This was the goal of a Soviet film entitled Harvest. According to information prepared by the German diplomats, this film “is being sent abroad in thousands of copies. It is screened everywhere that the truth about the famine catastrophe of 1932-1933 and subsequent times has become a matter of public knowledge.”[39]
The film shows an area located in the lower Dnipro region where the famine had raged. It was now supposedly a well-to-do collective farm employing happy peasants, who are wonderfully fed. “The propaganda in this film,” the Germans’ information emphasizes, 
         should be contrasted with the fact that individual highlights from the collective farm shown on screen have been craftily cobbled together, that the
         majority of collective farms are far from achieving the profitability of the old, independent farmsteads, that the forcible collectivization which was
         achieved only meant that millions of rural residents were evicted from their buildings and deported to forced labor camps, and – above all – with the
         fact of the famine catastrophe of 1932-1933 and the subsequent period. These catastrophes, which show not only the Soviet government’s inability to
         overcome the problem of supporting its people but also its exceptional diabolic desire to destroy certain strata of the population (“the organized
         famine”), are historical facts, the details of which are explained today by the testimonies of reliable witnesses. . . . In addition, it must be emphasized
         that with the state of Soviet food production as it is, one can reckon on a repeat famine.”[40]
On January 18, 1934 the plenum of the CC CP(B)U confirmed the agenda of the XII Congress of the Ukrainian party. It was decided to submit a proposal for confirmation by the XII Congress of the CP(B)U about transferring the capital of Ukraine to Kyiv.[41] 

Already by January 31, 1934 the Italian consul Sergio Gradenigo drew up a report in which he attributed great significance to this decision. He even concluded that the most fertile areas of Left-Bank Ukraine would be annexed to Russia:
         With the help of the famine, this territory, which has already been depopulated, has been settled by a new population – for the past two months
         Russians  have been brought here by the trainload from Siberia    . . . . The transfer of the capital to the border is obviously entirely aimed at
         concealing the persecutions of the Ukrainian people, which will escalate even more after the capital is returned to its historic place. This return of the
         capital to Kyiv . . . is launching the process of territorial decapitation at the same time as national decapitation is already taking place on a broad
         scale. and will continue further; it will inevitably be accompanied by famine in the nearest future.[42]
In his report of May 3, 1933 Gradenigo revisits the question of the Ukrainian capital’s transfer to Kyiv. He writes that repressions of the Ukrainian intelligentsia are increasing.
         In recent months, the suppression of any kind of Ukrainian nationalist activity is taking place steadily; its episodes are unfolding in Moscow, Kyiv,
         [and] Kharkiv.

         On the other hand, parallel with this action of destroying even the slightest attempt to manifest Ukrainian separatism, the policy of laying emphasis on
         the Ukrainian national character is gaining greater momentum, which I predicted the minute when it was decided to make Kyiv the capital of Ukraine
         again. That is to say, there is an intention to supplant Ukrainian nationalism of a separatist orientation, which looks toward Poland, with centripetal
         nationalism, which would incline the Ukrainians of Poland toward possible or desirable unification with the Ukrainians of the USSR.[43]
After conducting infernal trials by famine and repressions everywhere, the Soviet government once again made Kyiv the capital at the very time when the consequences of these tragic events were still fully felt.

In conclusion, I cannot stress enough the need for further research on the history of the Holodomor and its specific features in one region or another of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, not only in the countryside but cities as well. Such research, based on previously unknown documentary and factual material and on the eradication of obsolete historiographic stereotypes and perceptual pigeonholing, is extremely pressing not just in terms of analyzing the totalitarian past. It is also important for gaining an understanding of the true nature of the Soviet regime, which is, regrettably, still veiled in various kinds of myths and propagandistic stereotypes.
An important role in mapping out the real situation during the Holodomor can and should be played by documents and materials that were created by foreign diplomats who were based in Ukraine in those years. Furthermore, although most of these documents and materials from the 1930s were never made public by the leaders of these foreign countries owing to certain political motives (e.g., Italy was buying fuel from the USSR and did not believe it necessary to “quarrel” with the Kremlin), and despite the fact that some of these sources contain certain inaccuracies, they are nonetheless valuable and important.
[1]. Victor Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom (New York: Scribner, 1946.), p. 130.
[2]. Rozsekrechena pami’iat. Holodomor 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraini v dokumentakh GPU-NKVD (Kyiv: Stylos, 2007).
[3]. See, e.g., Andrea Graziosi, ed., “Lettres de Char’kov’. La famine en Ukraine et dans le Caucase du Nord à travers les rapports des diplomates italiens, 1932-1934,” Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique, 1-2 (1989) ; Andrea Graziosi, ed., Lettere da Kharkov. La carestia in Ucraina e nel Caucaso del Nord nei rapporti dei diplomatici italiani, 1932-1933 (Torino : Einaudi, 1991) ; Lubomyr Luciuk and Bohdan Kordan, eds., The Foreign Office and the Famine : British Documents on Ukraine and the Great Famine of 1932-33 (Kingston, ON: Limestone Press, 1988); Dymitri Zlepko, ed., Der ukrainische Hunger-Holocaust (Sonnenbühl : Verlag Helmut Wild, 1988); “Ukraina. Holod 1932-1933 rokiv : za povidomlenniamy brytanskykh dyplomativ,” Vsesvit 11 (1989) : 153-62 ; Upokorennia holodom. Zbirnyk dokumentiv (Kyiv : Instytut ukrainskoi arkheohrafii, 1993), pp. 47-101 ; Wsevolod Isajiw, Famine-Genocide in Ukraine, 1932-33 : Western Archives, Testimonies and New Research (Toronto : Ukrainian Canadian Research and Documentation Centre, 2003) ; Lysty z Kharkova. Holod v Ukraini ta na Pivnichnomu Kavkazi v povidomlenniakh italiiskykh dyplomativ, 1932-1933 roky (Kharkiv : Folio, 2007) ; Andrii Kudriachenko, “Holodomor v Ukraini 1932-1933 rokiv ta ioho suspilno-politychni naslidky za otsinkamy dokumentiv politychnoho arkhivu MZS Nimechchyny,” in Holodomor v Ukraini : Odeska oblast. 1921-1923, 1932-1933, 1946-1947. Doslidzhennia, spohady, dokumenty (Odesa : Astroprynt, 2007), pp. 20-27 and elsewhere.
[4]. Branch State Security Service Archives of Ukraine (henceforward: HDA SBU), fond 13, file 418, vol. 1, pt. 3, fols. 629-33.
[5]. Cited in Andrea Graziosi, “Collectivisation, révoltes paysannes et politiques gouvernementales à travers les rapports de GPU d’Ukraine de février-mars 1930,” Cahiers du monde russe 3 (1994) : 480-81.
[6]. HDA SBU, Kyiv, file 2174, fol. 31.
[7]. Ibid., fond 13, file 418, vol. 1, pt. 3, fols. 583, 592.
[8]. Ibid., fond 13, file 419, vol. 1, pt. 2, fol. 471.
[9]. Ibid., fond 13, file 419, vol. 1, pt. 2, fol. 459.
[10]. Ibid., fond 13, file 418, vol. 1, pt. 3, fol. 632.
[11]. Cited in Valerii Vasyliev and Yuri Shapoval, eds., Komandyry velykoho holodu. Poizdky V. Molotova i L. Kahanovycha v Ukrainu ta na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz. 1932-1933 rr. (Kyiv: Heneza, 2001), p. 23.
[12]. Stanislav Kulchytsky, “1933 rik: stalinskyi teror holodom,” Uriadovyi kurier, 8 (Nov. 2002).
[13]. Central Military Archive (Tsentralnyi Viiskovyi Arkhiv, henceforward: TsVA), Warsaw, Department II of the Chief Command, file I.303.4.3043, fol. 64.
[14]. HDA SBU, Kyiv, fond 13, file 22, fol. 234.
[15]. See Stalin i Kaganovich. Neizdannaia perepiska. 1931-1936 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001), p. 274.
[16]. Ibid., p. 179.
[17]. TsVA, file I.303.4.5424, p. 28.
[18]. Ibid., file I.303.4.1985 (without pagination).
[19]. See Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv (Kyiv: Politvydav Ukrainy, 1990), p. 437.
[20]. Ibid.
[21]. TsVA, file I.303.4.1867, fol. 130.
[22]. Ibid., fol. 131.
[23]. HDA SBU, Kyiv, fond 68, file 228, fol. 140.
[24]. TsVA, file I.303.4.1867, fols. 32-34.
[25]. HDA SBU, Odesa, file 66, vol. 4, fol. 2241.
[26]. “Mark Tauger o golode, genotside i svobode mysli v Ukraine,” 2000: 1-2 (397), 11-17 January.
[27]. TsVA, file I.303.4.1993 (without pagination).
[28]. See Holod-henotsyd 1933 roku v Ukraini: istoryko-politolohichnyi analiz sotsialno-demohrafichnykh ta moralno-psykholohichnykh naslidkiv (Kyiv-New York: M. P. Kots Publishers, 2000), p. 277; and Serhii Vakulyshyn, Holodova katastrofa v Kyievi (Kyiv: Heoprynt, 2005), p. 72.
[29]. HDA SBU, Kyiv, fond 13, file 161, vol. 1, fol. 42.
[30]. Cited in Taras Hunczak, “Holodomor 32/33 – bil sertsia vsiiei Ukrainy,” Den 132, Aug. 1, 2003.
[31]. For a more detailed discussion, see Yuri Shapoval, Ukraina 20-50-kh rokiv: storinky nenapysanoi istorii (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1993); Robert Kusnierz, Ukraina v latach kolektywizacji i Wielkiego Glodu (1929-1933) (Torun: GRADO, 2005); and Rozsekrechena pamiat.
[32]. Yuri Shapoval and Vadym Zolotariov, Vsevolod Balytsky. Osoba, chas, otochennia (Kyiv: Stylos, 2002), p. 193.
[33]. TsVA, file I.303.4.2094 (without pagination).
[34]. Lysty z Kharkova, p. 183
[35]. Cited in Kudriachenko, “Holodomor v Ukraini,” p. 23.
[36]. HDA SBU, Kyiv, fond 13, file 161, vol. 11, fol. 22.
[37]. Archive of New Acts (henceforward: AAN), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, file 9513, fols. 200, 208-11.
[38]. TsVA, I.303.4.1993, vol. V-47 (without pagination).
[39]. HDA SBU, Kyiv, fond 13, file 161, vol. 14, fol. 42.
[40]. Ibid., fol. 45.
[41]. The official transfer of the higher party and state institutions from Kharkiv to Kyiv took place on June 24, 1934.
[42]. Cited in Upokorennia holodom, p. 96
[43]. Lysty z Kharkova, p. 225.
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WASHINGTON, D.C. - Vol 1, Issue 2 of the new journal "Holodomor Studies," Roman Serbyn, Editor, has been published by Charles Schlacks, Idyllwild, CA.  Issue 1 was published in the winter-spring of 2009.  Copies of both issues of the "Holodomor Studies" journal" are available for purchase.  Information about annual subscriptions and the purchase of individual copies is found below.  Please order your copy today.  More subscriptions are needed to keep the journal in publication.  Please send in your subscription today.
The table of contents for "Holodomor Studies," Vol 1, Issue 2 is shown below:
EDITOR’S FOREWORD:Roman Serbyn                                                          
       Introductory Remarks: Cormac O'Grada                                                                      
       Holodomor – the Ukrainian Genocide: Roman Serbyn                                                    
       Investigating the Holodomor: Stanislav Kulchytsky                                                                          
       Hunger of 1932-1933 – a Tragedy of the Peoples of the USSR:  Viktor Kondrashin                          
       Causation and Responsibility in the Holodomor Tragedy: Stephen Wheatcroft                                    
       The 1932-1933 Holodomor in the Kuban: Evidence of the Ukrainian Genocide: Volodymyr Serhijchuk
       A Selection of Soviet Documents on the Holodomor                                            
              Compiled, edited and introduced by Roman Serbyn
       Public Pressure on the International Committee of the Red-Cross as it Waited for the Soviet Reply on the Ukrainian Famine
              Compiled, edited and introduced by Roman Serbyn
Two Forceful Collections and Documents on the Ukrainian Famine-Genocide of 1932-1933. Yaroslav Bilinski
Affirmation and Denial: Holodomor-Related Resources Recently Acquired by the Library of Congress: Jurij Dobczansky
Papers from Holodomor Conferences at University of Toronto and Harvard: Andrew Sorokowski
Vasyl Barka and his Zhovty kniaz: Bohdanna Monczak
SUBSCRIPTION RATES:  The journal "Holodomor Studies" is published semi-annually.  Annual subscription rates are: institutions - $40.00; individuals - $20.00 - Postage in the USA is $6.00, in Canada it is $12.00; and foreign postage is $20.00.  Sent payment to:  Charles Schlacks, Publisher,
P. O. Box 1256, Idyllwild, CA 92549-1256, contact: [email protected].  Order your copy of the new journal "Holodomor Studies" today! Your support of the "Holodomor Studies" journal is needed and will be much appreciated.
ARTICLES FOR PUBLICATION:  Contributions submitted for possible publication should be sent to the editor, Roman Serbyn, in e-mail format to [email protected].
"HOLODOMOR STUDIES" JOURNAL AND THE WORD "HOLODOMOR":  Note from Editor Roman Serbyn:  At the publishers suggestion we are calling the new journal "Holodomor Studies."  Although the term "Holodomor" is rapidly gaining currency, it may be convenient to briefly explain its origin and state it's usage in this publication. 
The term was coined from two words: the noun "holod," meaning " hunger, famine, starvation," and the transitive verb "moryty," which can be variously translated as "to waste, debilitate, exhaust, kill." 
The expression "moryty holodom" ("to exhaust somebody by food deprivation") is found in the complaints by Ukrainian peasants, recorded in official Soviet documents of the Stalin era. The neologism "holodomor," in the sense of "artificially organized starvation" and imposed specifically on Ukrainian victims, began to be widely used in the 1980s. 

"The Holodomor" (capitalized and preceded by the definite article "the" is now commonly employed as a synonym for "Ukrainian genocide."  For some people the notion of that genocide is limited to the starvation of the peasants, but for a growing number of Ukrainians it now connotes the destruction of the Ukrainian nation, a genocide in accordance with the UN definition. 

It is in the latter sense of the expression that the journal's title "Holodomor Studies" should be understood. 
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