karber20150310CSIS.html

Russia's Hybrid War Campaign

Published on 10 Mar 2015

The CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program is pleased to invite you to a discussion with Dr. Phillip Karber, President of the Potomac Foundation, a defense and foreign policy think-tank. Dr. Karber, who is also a former DOD official and veteran defense analyst, will discuss Russia's "hybrid warfare" campaign in eastern Ukraine. Dr. Karber has traveled repeatedly to eastern Ukraine during the present conflict, and has spoken first-hand with a number of the participants. Dr. Karber will draw on these discussions to elaborate on the techniques of Russian hybrid warfare, evaluate their effectiveness, and explore their implications for both Ukraine and the West.

Moderated by:
Paul Schwartz
CSIS Senior Associate, Russia & Eurasia Program

Remarks by:
Dr. Phillip Karber
President of the Potomac Foundation

https://csis.org/event/russias-hybrid-war-campaign-implications-ukraine-and-beyond

[00:00 -- 05:20] -- Paul Schwartz: Introduction to "Russian Forum"; to Russia's Hybrid War in Crimea and Donbas; to Dr. Phillip Karber, President of the Potomac Foundation -- 12 separate fact-finding missions to Ukraine.

[05:21 -- 11:40] -- Phillip Karber: "Ukraine Request for Potomac Assessment" by Andriy Volodymyrovych Parubiy; flew to Kyiv with General Wesley Clark within 72 hours; General Valery Gerasimov's "Russian view of Hybrid War";

[11:41 -- 14:18] -- 4 elements of hybrid warfare: Political Subversion; Proxy Sanctum, Intervention, Coercive Deterrence.

[14:19 -- 17:52] -- Phase 1: March Protests & Russian "Agiprop" Campaign; Separatists & Russian Volunteer Terrorism -- Stalinist repression is settling in.

[17:53 -- 21:39] -- Phase 2: April Seizure Campaign with Russian "Spetsnaz"; mobilized Russian army at eastern border, but because Ukraine surprisingly managed to transfer 11 brigades into eastern Ukraine, Russian generals advised Putin not to start full-scale invasion. Putin decided on Plan B, that is, the hybrid campaign. Karber was in Slovyansk when Russians occupied government building and the Ukrainian were discussing about taking it back. Orders came from Kyiv (who had talked to Washington and Western Europe) not to do anything provocative. Thus, one seizure became more and more.

[21:40 -- 29:18] -- Phase 3: May Insurgency Campaign with Russian "Volunteers"; every town center was now contolled by separatists. Local policemen were assassinated or intimidated. (Probably, one-third of police were pro-separatist.) Girkin & Pushilin. Macho nationalists on both sides. Novorossiya as a Stategic Objective.

[29:17 -- 32:36] -- Strategy of State Sponsored Terrorism; March emphasis on protest; April seizure of government buildings -- terror, murder; May infrastructure damage, Russian equipment; June Russian tanks crossing border, "Russian Mobilization Order" on 27Jun2014

[32:37 -- 36:56] -- Prelude to a Ceasefire (24 May to 5 Sep. 2014); Poroshenko tried to launch a ceasefire, sent in 4 brigades to try to establish control of border (450 km drive by Zombrowsky of 95 Brigade). Mid July 2014 Russians started cross-border fire of artillery. Western leaders told Ukrainians not to fire back. On 24Aug2014 (Kyiv parade on Independence Day) Russians initiated the Ilovaisk cauldron. Resulted in Minsk-1 ceasefire of 05Sep2014.

[36:57 -- 46:40] -- Russian Security Problematique; have 4 military districts Eastern, Centreal, Western, Southern. Wanted all volunteer (contract) army, but didn't get enough volunteers. Created battalion technical groups. Lessons of Asymmetric War in Chechnya & Georgia. -- mixture of conscripts, mercenaries and Russian volunteers. Take one battalion from brigade and send it to front -- rather hodge-podge. Russian Humanitarian Convoys replenish armaments. Debaltseve was a major rail and highway hub. From 30Oct2014 to 09Dec2015, Russian Heavy Weapons to Donbas Proxies = 890; US/NATO Heavy Weapons to Ukraine = 0.

[46:41 -- 57:50] -- Value of UAV Drones in Monitoring Ceasefire; Russian military installations are always sequestered amongst civilian buildings. Russians have six winter objectives and have already secured the Donetsk Airport and Debaltseve. Potential for major Russian incursion come spring.

[57:51 -- 01:05:14] -- "Why do Ukrainians keep getting into the situation -- they put up a really good defence, then get into a pocket, and then get destroyed?" Explanation: Ukraine doesn't have anti-tank guided missiles, the tanks outflank the Ukrainian strong points and close the pocket. (The Ukrainians can't stop the tanks.) Americans simply refuse to give (or sell) Ukraine anti-tank missiles. (Javelin)

[01:03:27 -- 01:05:14] -- Slide: "Ukraine's Failed Ceasefire, 2,801 Attacks on Ukrainian Forces, (5 Sep. 2014 thru 8 Feb. 2015) -- chart of daily attacks.
Minsk-2 will Fail unless ENFORCEMENT added
Ukraine is the only country that can ENFORCE Ceasefire
- UAV, ATGM, Counter-Btry Radar, Covering Force, & Secure C3
- IF West wants successful Ceasefire must supply those ASSETS

350 OSCE personnel is absolutely useless -- you couldn't monitor the area with 3,500 people.

[01:05:15 -- 01:06:38] -- Slide: Problems of Monitoring a Ceasefire
Pulling back heavy artillery 50 to 70 km is stupid, because if Russia attacks then there is only infantry to oppose them in that zone. (They will be overrun within 4 hours.)
"You could not design a disaster better than the Merkel-Hollande" Minsk-2 agreement.

[01:06:39 -- 01:09:27] -- Nuclear Lessons; Hybrid Lesson from Ukraine -- 20 point summary, the last one of which reads as follows:
20. The victim of Hybrid Aggression is also victimized by Western caution and prevarication. While Russia has introduced thousands of weapons into the conflict, European and American political hesitation in helping Ukraine acquire replacements for its losses (and the political message it sends to others who would like to help) serves as a virtual military embargo on Ukraine. Ironically, the most successful Western sanction has been in preventing a frriendly country from defending itself.

[01:09:28 -- 01:09:28] -- Questions.
Q1: (???) -- They don't want to bring conscripts into Ukraine; prefer "contract" soldiers. If Ukrainians had anti-tank weapons, they could probably hold out against 80 Russian battalions. "If we had sent 100 Javelin-2s, I don't think we would have had the Winter Offensive." "We have a couple of thousand Bradleys sitting out -- with nobody to man them. I would start sending Bradleys over. ... The longer this goes on, the tougher it is going to be to help them." The escalation threat is just an obscene argument -- Russian send in tanks, but giving Ukrainians anti-tank weapons is escalation; they bring in a thousand tubes of artillery, but it is escalation if we give Ukrainians long range counter-battery radar; they have drones flying over like Kennedy airport, but we can't give Ukraine drones.

[01:17:30] Q2: The nuclear dimension.
Russian Theory ofr Nuclear De-escalation
Stage 1 - Demonstration (unpopulated targets)
Stage 2 - Intimidation-Demonstration (single strikes)
Stage 3 - Intimidation (group strikes to change balance on operational direction)
Stage 4 - Intimidation-Retaliation (strikes across the theater to "eliminate the threat of defeat")
Stage 5 - Retaliation-Intimidation (massive strikes to annihilate the enemy in the theater)
Stage 6 - Retaliation (massive theater & strategic strikes)

Karber was told that Putin phoned Poroshenko with a direct nuclear threat. Russians are developing (and deploying?) tactical nuclear weapons.

[01:24:44] -- END