2.
UN AGAIN REFUSES TO INCLUDE UKRAINE FAMINE IN SESSION AGENDA
RIA Novosti, Moscow, Russia, Friday, December 19, 2008
UNITED NATIONS - The United Nations General Assembly has refused for
the second time this year to include discussions on Ukraine's 1932-1933
famine, which Kiev wants recognized as an act of genocide, in the
agenda of the current UN session.
In late 2006 Ukraine's parliament recognized the Stalin-era famine
known as Holodomor as an act of genocide by the Soviet authorities, but
Russia has
consistently rejected Ukraine's interpretation of events.
Russia's UN ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, said after the decision: "this
campaign has ended, and ended with nothing." He said Russia had voted
against Ukraine's attempts to introduce the issue to the agenda of the
63rd UN General Assembly session, as it did at the session in July.
After the refusal, Ukraine circulated a declaration among the UN
members, which according to Churkin was signed by 32 out of 192 member
states.
Russia says the famine cannot be considered an act targeting
Ukrainians, as millions of people from different ethnic groups lost
their lives in various
territories across the Soviet Union - in the North Caucasus, the Volga
region, central Russia, Kazakhstan, west Siberia, and the south Urals.
"The Ukrainian government has declared this to be an act of genocide
against the Ukrainian people, and is politicizing this issue. We take
this as an attempt to bring distrust and hostility into our relations,
and to spark a dispute between the peoples of Ukraine and Russia," the
Russian diplomat said.
Historians' estimates as to the number of victims in Ukraine during the
famine, caused by forced collectivization, vary greatly, ranging from 2
million to 14 million.
Speaking at a ceremony to unveil a memorial in a village in western
Ukraine, one of the areas hardest hit by the famine, President Viktor
Yushchenko said
last month that "Ukraine does not blame any nation or state for the
great famine," but that the "totalitarian Communist regime" was
responsible.
2.
UN AGAIN REFUSES TO INCLUDE UKRAINE FAMINE IN SESSION AGENDA
RIA Novosti, Moscow, Russia, Friday, December 19, 2008
UNITED NATIONS - The United Nations General Assembly has refused for
the second time this year to include discussions on Ukraine's 1932-1933
famine, which Kiev wants recognized as an act of genocide, in the
agenda of the current UN session.
In late 2006 Ukraine's parliament recognized the Stalin-era famine
known as Holodomor as an act of genocide by the Soviet authorities, but
Russia has
consistently rejected Ukraine's interpretation of events.
Russia's UN ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, said after the decision: "this
campaign has ended, and ended with nothing." He said Russia had voted
against Ukraine's attempts to introduce the issue to the agenda of the
63rd UN General Assembly session, as it did at the session in July.
After the refusal, Ukraine circulated a declaration among the UN
members, which according to Churkin was signed by 32 out of 192 member
states.
Russia says the famine cannot be considered an act targeting
Ukrainians, as millions of people from different ethnic groups lost
their lives in various
territories across the Soviet Union - in the North Caucasus, the Volga
region, central Russia, Kazakhstan, west Siberia, and the south Urals.
"The Ukrainian government has declared this to be an act of genocide
against the Ukrainian people, and is politicizing this issue. We take
this as an attempt to bring distrust and hostility into our relations,
and to spark a dispute between the peoples of Ukraine and Russia," the
Russian diplomat said.
Historians' estimates as to the number of victims in Ukraine during the
famine, caused by forced collectivization, vary greatly, ranging from 2
million to 14 million.
Speaking at a ceremony to unveil a memorial in a village in western
Ukraine, one of the areas hardest hit by the famine, President Viktor
Yushchenko said
last month that "Ukraine does not blame any nation or state for the
great famine," but that the "totalitarian Communist regime" was
responsible.
3. OFFICIAL
SAYS RUSSIAN FSB ARCHIVES HAVE NO PROOF
THAT
1930s FAMINE WAS GENOCIDE AGAINST UKRAINIANS
Interfax Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine, Thursday, 18 December, 2008
MOSCOW - The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) archives
do not contain any documents that could suggest that Ukrainian people
might have been subject to genocide during the famine in the southern
part of the Soviet Union in the 1930s, Gen. Vasily Khristoforov, head
of the FSB registration and archives department, said in an interview
with Interfax on Thursday.
"Researchers, and not only Russian ones, have proven incontrovertibly
that famine did take place in the USSR in 1932-1933. Yes, it did, but
not only in Ukraine. Archive documents show undeniably that there was
no purposeful genocide against Ukrainian people. We have not found a
single instruction that would have even hinted about purposeful
genocide against Ukrainian people," Khristoforov said.
A large amount of FSB archive documents related to this problem have
been handed over to Russian and foreign researchers, Khristoforov said.
All these documents have been published, he said.
"The Holodomor [the definition given in Ukraine to the 1932-1933 famine
in the former USSR] is a Ukrainian invention. Ukraine is trying to
prove that the 1930s famine was an act of genocide the Stalin
leadership committed against Ukrainians," he said.
Khristoforov argued that, while the situation in the Soviet
agricultural sector in the late 1920s and early 1930s was difficult,
people suffered not only in Ukraine but also in Kazakhstan, the Volga
area, the Krasnodar territory, and the North Caucasus.
"I am against attempts to gamble on the numbers of the victims. Ukraine
has been inflating the number of these casualties from year to year.
This is at least incorrect," Khristoforov said.
4.
RUSSIAN SPY AGENCY OFFICER DENIES UKRAINE'S GENOCIDE CLAIM
Reuters, Moscow, Russia, Thursday, December 18, 2008
MOSCOW - A general in Russia's intelligence agency has
dismissed as an "invention" Ukraine's call for recognition of a 1930s
famine as genocide after Kyiv urged the Kremlin to join in
commemorations for millions of dead.
The row over the "Holodomor", or famine of 1932-33, in which historians
believe 7.5 million died, is one of many pitting the Kremlin against
Kyiv's pro-Western leaders swept to power by mass Orange Revolution
rallies in 2004.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev stayed away from ceremonies to mark
the 75th anniversary of the calamity last month and accused Ukrainian
President Viktor Yushchenko of distorting history for political gain.
The two ex-Soviet states are also at odds over payment for Russian gas
supplies and Kyiv's drive to secure NATO membership.
"The Holodomor is a Ukrainian invention," General Vasily Khristoforov,
head of registration and archives department at the Federal Security
Service (FSB), told the Interfax news agency. "Ukraine is trying to
prove that the 1930s famine was an act of genocide the Stalinist
leadership committed against Ukrainians.
"Archive documents show undeniably that there was no deliberate
genocide against the Ukrainian people. We have not found a single
directive that would have even hinted about deliberate genocide against
the Ukrainian people."
Researchers, Khristoforov told the agency, had proven beyond all doubt
that a famine in the late 1920s and 1930s did grip various southern
Soviet regions.
"Yes, it did, but not only in Ukraine," he said.
Many of the darkest secrets from the Soviet era remain in the archives
of the FSB, the main successor to the KGB intelligence service that
played a central role in Moscow's efforts to enforce the communist
system.
About a dozen countries have recognized the Holodomor, one of three
famines to hit Ukraine last century, as genocide.
Addressing a gathering last month at the opening of a monument to the
famine, Yushchenko denied any suggestion Russia was to blame for the
famine. But he called on Moscow to denounce Stalinism and join in
commemorations for the dead.
Millions were left to starve in their homes throughout Ukraine as
Soviet authorities trying to bring independent farmers to their knees
imposed impossible harvest quotas and requisitioned grain and
livestock. Soviet authorities denied for decades that the
famine had even occurred.
5.
NEWLY ELECTED UKRAINIAN SPEAKER LYTVYN INTERVIEWED ON RUSSIAN TV
Holodomor:
"I am categorically against bringing this topic into the dimension of
ethnocide."
Rossiya TV, Moscow, Russia in Russian 1700 gmt 14
Dec 08
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Sunday, December 14,
2008
The newly elected Ukrainian parliament speaker, Volodymyr Lytvyn, was
interviewed on state-owned Russian television channel Rossiya's "Vesti
Nedeli" news and current affairs programme on 14 December. Lytvyn
answered questions on the current political situation in Ukraine and
Russian-Ukrainian relations. How do you feel being elected speaker for
the second time?
"Let me tell you frankly, it is quite difficult, because there is an
attempt today to break up the parliament and take Ukraine to elections
in the conditions of the deepening crisis," Lytvyn said.When will the
collation agreement be signed?
"The document [on setting up a coalition of Yulia Tymoshenko
Bloc, Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defence and the Lytvyn Bloc] has been
ready for a long time. The problem is that, as I learnt today, the
president of Ukraine does not support the creation of the coalition,"
Lytvyn said.
"I had a long meeting and conversation with the president.
Very regrettably, the standoff between the president and the prime
minister is quite tense, and society, the country and people remain
hostages to this standoff", he added.
PARLIAMENTARY
PROBE INTO UKRAINIAN ARMS SUPPLIES TO GEORGIA
"The [parliament's] conciliatory council has decided to
recommend the Ukraine's Supreme Council to consider the report of the
investigative commission next week, on Friday, in order to set the
record straight on the matter. This decision, in essence, was supported
by representatives of all factions. I think this will bring clarity. I
am deeply convinced that everything should be done today to establish a
normal dialogue between Ukraine and Russia", Lytvyn said.Ban on Russian
TV channels
"Obviously, my attitude to this is negative. There can be no ambiguity
about it. I believe that people should have the possibility to receive
comprehensive information in which they are interested and draw
relevant conclusions. Therefore, especially in the conditions of a
crisis, when there is no bread, and people feel that their rights are
being infringed in the information space too, this creates a sort of
cumulative negative charge. I am categorically against this.
This issue has already been raised. I think that we will
thoroughly study this issue at the level of Ukraine's Supreme Council
and we will offer our recommendations", Lytvyn said.
HOLODOMOR
"I am categorically against splits that will not leave Ukraine
unaffected, I mean splits with Russia in religious matters as well. As
regards the topic of Holodomor [the famine of 1932-33] as such, I am
categorically against bringing this topic into the dimension of
ethnocide. What is being done in Ukraine with respect to this topic is
intended for export. I think it would be important for politicians to
listen to scientists. The manner in which this topic is being bumped up
in Ukraine, it is turning into a farce", Lytvyn said.
Will you run for president? "I do not see grounds to raise
the issue of an early presidential election in the political context
today", Lytvyn said. "A headache should be treated when one has it. We
shall see how it works out", he added.
6.
WHY THEY [THE RUSSIANS] DO NOT WANT TO SEE US,
OR
HISTORY ON THE SERVICE OF AN IMPERIAL POLICY
The
Russians and the Holodomor, their hard ideological line and
distorted historical realities.
By Volodymyr Serhiichuk, Professor and Doctor of
History
The Day Weekly Digest in English, Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, December 16,
2008
Once Empress Catherine II felt she was sitting firmly on the Russian
throne, she immediately instructed Prince Viazemsky to take a number of
certain steps to force Ukrainians “to get Russified in a delicate way”
as soon as possible. Just a hundred years later Russia’s interior
minister Valuyev considered it necessary to persuade the entire world
that “there were not, are not and cannot be” any Ukrainians.
I recalled this when I read the book "The 1932-1933 Famine: a Tragedy
of the Russian Countryside" by the Penza-based professor of history
Viktor Kondrashin, which was recently published in Moscow.
This author, who decided to study the 1932-1933 famine in
the Volga, Don and Kuban regions, failed to see there the Ukrainians
who were the main grain-growing trail-blazers at least in the two last
areas: “The Russians, Mordvins, Tatars, Ingushes, and other peoples
lived then and are living now in the above-mentioned regions of Russia.
At the same time, this study puts emphasis on the Russian
population of the Volga, Don and Kuban areas because, historically, it
was they who were involved in grain production and, therefore, became
the primary object of Stalin’s forced collectivization” (p. 51 in
Russian).
Why Kondrashin wants to convince the readers that there were no
Ukrainians in these regions from the very beginning of cultivation and
farming and does not consider them “historically involved in grain
production” becomes clear from the panegyric that the author dedicates
to himself in his own book: “V. V. Kondrashin actively opposes in the
media and scholarly publications, including foreign ones, the idea of
Ukrainian historians and politicians about ‘genocide of the Ukrainian
people by the 1932-1933 Holodomor.’ He concludes in his publication son
this matter that the 1932-1933 famine is a common tragedy of all the
USSR peoples and this tragedy should unite, not disunite, the peoples”
(p. 29, Russ.).
Given this self-assessment of the author, it is small wonder why he did
not consider it necessary to mention Ukrainians among the main
agricultural ethnoses in the Volga, Don and Kuban regions. But they
really lived there. According to the 1926 census, Ukrainians prevailed,
for example, in all the 40 Kuban villages (stanitsas) founded by the
first Zaporozhian Cossack resettlers in the late 18th century:
Baturynska (5,034 Ukrainians out of the total 7,086 residents),
Berezanska (9,297 and 10,443, respectively), Briukhovetska (9,698 and
12,466), Vasiurynska (9,142 and 10,443), Vyshestebliivska (2,400 and
3,251), Dinska (10, 316 and 12,525), Diadkivska (6,665 and 7,324),
Ivanivska (12,983 and 14,209), Irkliivska (5,884 and 6,473), Kanivska
(13,878 and 17,248), Kalnibolotska (8,606 and 10,998), Katerynynska
(11,824 and 13,391), Kisliakivska (11, 416 and 13, 112), Konelivska
(7,824 and 8,7121), Korenivska (9,313 and 15,548), Krylivska (8,146 and
9,427), Kushchivska (9,364 and 11,865), Medvedivska (15,222 and
18,146), Nezamaivska (10,150 and 12,133), Pashkivska (14,166 and
18,000), Pereyaslavska (7,552 and 8,781), Plastunivska (10,528 and
12,375), Platnyrivska (11,628 and 13,925), Poltavska (10,985 and
14,306), Popovychivska (7,762 and 10,715), Rogivska (10,806 and
12,475), Sergiivska (4,127 and 4,714), Starodereviankivska (6,529
and 7,230), Starodzhereliivska (5,158 and 5,413), Starokorsunska
(10,477 and 12,273), Staroleushkivska (5,857 and 6,521), Staromenska
(19,736 and 22,604), Staromyshastivska (8,171 and 9,826),
Staronyzhchestebliivska (11,356 and 12,273), Starotytarivska (8,552
and 9,536), Staroshcherbynivska (14,453 and 17,001), Tymashevska
(8,961 and 12,112), Umanska (17,008 and 20,727), and Shkurynska (8,864
and 9,749).
On the whole, there were 915,450 Ukrainians in Kuban and 3,106,852 in
the Northern Caucasus. So we find it difficult to understand the
famine in these villages as a tragedy of “the Russian countryside”
alone. All the more so that Kondrashin names such Kuban districts as
Yeysky, Kanovsky, Kjorenivskt, Krasnodarsky, Staromensky and
Kursavsky in the Stavropol region as ones that make part of the
“especially affected” areas of the Northern Caucasus.
Of course, this is also presented as a tragedy of the Russian
countryside. However, the 1926 census recorded 74,037 Ukrainians and
23,568 Russians in Yesky district; 45,451 and 8,130, respectively, in
Kanivsky; 76,422 and 36,939 in Korenivsky; 103,8312 and 18,086 in
Kraskodarsky; 65,488 and 9,583 in Staromensky; and 57,665 and 8,767 in
Kursavsky district.
After all, we are also not indifferent to the destiny of the
35,115 Ukrainians in the Kondrashin-quoted Armavisrsky district and the
11,514 in Kurganinsky district, where the Russians numerically
prevailed at the time.
Similar facts of ethnic Ukrainian enclaves during the 1932-1933
Holodomor can also be traced in the Don and Volga regions. In the
latter, there were 49 percent of our ethnos in Kapustin Yar district,
51.9 in Yelansky, 69.3 in Kotovsky, 72.4 in Kranoyarsky, 74.9 in
Pokrovsky, 79.3 in Samiylivsky, 81 in Mykolayivsky, and almost 90 in
Vladirirsky district.
According to the 1926 census, the Lower Volga region alone
was populated by 600,000 people who continued to identify themselves as
Ukrainians. Some of them did not even speak Russian, which is proved by
the following fact: failure to meet the planned targets of grain
harvest in 1929 in Dubynsky district was explained by the fact that
“Ukrainian slogans on grain procurement were apprehended in the
district executive committee, and Russian-language placards were sent
to the Ukrainians.”
As for the Ukrainian population in the Don region, there was also a
large number of areas, where our people made up the absolute majority.
This was especially the case in some Taganrog districts. And the
1932-1933 Holodomor took a heavy toll of all these Ukrainians.
But we should admit that the Kuban Ukrainians were the first to suffer
from this horror. And we cannot help recalling the village of Poltavska
whose population favored the development of their native culture and
where there was the first All-Russian Ukrainian Teacher-Training
School. Its population was the first to be deported to the north, its
houses were given to Red Army Cossack veterans, and it was renamed
Krasnoarmeyska so that nothing betrayed its Ukrainian origin.
The second Ukrainian village in Kuban that suffered the same
tragedy was Umanska. After the deportation, it was renamed
Leningradska.
Incidentally, we could not find similar Kremlin instructions with
respect to Russia’s non-black-soil area which also failed to meet the
grain procurement targets.
Indeed, this did not repeat on a mass scale in Soviet Ukraine because
in many cases there was nobody to deport: entire villages had died out.
There are documents that prove that a great number of Russians and
Belarusians were brought to hundreds of the famine-ravaged Ukrainian
villages.
As for the “black boards,” they were introduced not only in Kuban, Don,
the Central Black Soil Region, the Volga basin and the Ukrainian SSR
but also in Northern Kazakhstan on the republican leadership’s
initiative. But if we look at the list of the villages that suffered
this kind of punishment, we will see at once that they were
predominantly populated with Ukrainian peasants.
For example, such villages in Ust-Kamenogorsk or
Fedorivsky districts were mostly Ukrainian because the Ukrainians
were the principal grain producers in this region. For instance, the
1926 census showed that out of the 28,302 residents of the Fedorivsky
district 25,408 were Ukrainians.
When you read the Penza historian Kondrashin’s book, you can see
clearly that he tries, above all, to serve the current political
interests of Russia, which consist in the refusal to recognize the
1932-1933 Holodomor as genocide of the Ukrainian people: “We do not
support the opinion of Ukrainian politicians and historians about the
national genocide in Ukraine by means of the 1932-1933 famine.
Nor do we agree with their definition of ‘holodomor’ as an
action organized by the Stalinist regime inn order to exterminate
millions of Ukrainian residents... We do not share the Ukrainian side’s
position because no documents have been found, which would say that
Stalin’s regime intended to eliminate the Ukrainian people.”
This raises a question to Kondrashin: and what about the directive
documents on stopping the Ukrainization in the areas densely populated
by Ukrainians (nothing of the kind was done against other nations in
1932-1933)? Do they not prove that Stalin’s regime aimed to
exterminate, at least spiritually, millions of Ukrainians?
And the fact that the 1939 census showed that the Ukrainian
population of what is now Krasnodar Territory had diminished by
1,437,151 people in comparison to 1926? Does it not make the historian
Kondrashin think that there was a carefully-orchestrated strike against
the Ukrainian nation?
And the VKP Central Committee and USSR Council of People’s Commissars
resolution of January 22, 1933, on forbidding only Ukrainian and Kuban
peasants to go to other regions in search of bread? Does this not prove
that Ukrainians were deliberately left to starve to death? Then how
should we interpret the following comment of Kondrashin: “What can be
called direct organization of the famine are draconian directives of
Stalin-Molotov on the prevention of spontaneous migration of peasants,
which kept them locked in the starving villages and doomed them to
death by starvation. It is for this reason that the 1932-1933 famine
can be considered a manmade famine, and this famine is one of the
gravest crimes of Stalin” (p. 376, Russ.).
In our opinion, only after reading a large number of documents that
prove the genocide of Ukrainians could Kondrashin write, perhaps
subconsciously, the following: “The famine helped Stalin liquidate what
he considered a potential opposition to his regime in Ukraine, which
could become political, rather than cultural, and rely on the
peasantry. There are some facts that prove this, including those in the
third volume of the documentary collection Tragedy of the Soviet
Countryside devoted to the holodomor, which describes the activities of
GPU organs in the Ukrainian countryside” (p. 242, Russ.).
Pressing the argument of the absence of concrete documents on
pre-planned extermination of Ukrainians, Kondrashin refers us to the
International Commission of Jurists which allegedly concluded that “it
is not in a position to confirm the existence of a premeditated plan to
organize famine in Ukraine in order to ensure the success of Moscow’s
policies” (p. 18, Russ.).
Unfortunately, Kondrashin did not quote the next lines of this
documents, which say: “However, most of the commission members
believe that even if the Soviet authorities did not actually plan the
famine, they apparently took advantage of this famine to force [the
populace] to accept the policy they resisted.”
Besides, the International Commission of Jurists with the Swedish
professor Jacob Sundberg at the head (and without a single Ukrainian,
incidentally) also made this conclusion: “Although there is no direct
evidence that the 1932-1933 famine was systemically masterminded to
break the Ukrainian nation once and for all, most of the commission
members believe that Soviet officials deliberately used this famine to
pursue their policy of denationalizing Ukraine.”
It should be stressed that Prof. Kondrashin hushes up the fact that the
Soviet government furnished no archival documents to this commission
and refused altogether to cooperate with it, organizing protest letters
against its activities on the part of communist historians. Nor does
the monograph’s author cites the commission’s findings that show, on
the basis of open censuses in 1926 and 1939, certain demographic
changes in the USSR population.
The truth is that while the population increased by 16 percent in the
USSR, by 28 percent in the Russian Federation, by 11.2 percent in
Belarus over the aforesaid period, it dropped by 9.9 percent in the
Ukrainian SSR. This provided ample grounds for well-known jurists in
various countries to recognize the 1932-1933 Holodomor as a deliberate
strike on Ukrainians.
We cannot bypass one more cardinal question that Kondrashin touched
upon in his book. Admitting that “the mindless collectivization and
excessive state procurement targets ruined Kazakh animal and land
husbanders, caused a mass-scale migration to China and the
famine-related death of hundreds of thousands of Kazakhstan residents,”
this author claims: “at the same time, Kazakh academics did not follow
in the footsteps of their Ukrainian colleagues and are treating the
1932-1933 tragedy in line with the approaches of Russian researchers”
(p. 27, Russ.).
At the same time, Kondrashin himself points out that Kazakhs were
allowed to settle and set up collective farms, say, in the Volga region
during the Holodomor. For example, there were 81 economic entities with
391 people in Sorochinsky district, Middle Volga region (p. 188,
Russ.).
In other words, Kazakhs were not forbidden to look for food outside
their republic. This is proved, incidentally, by dozens of archival
materials found in Kazakhstan. It is only with respect to the
famine-stricken Ukrainian population that the regime would issue
draconian, to quote Kondrashin, directives that deprived it of a
possibility to flee from death to the neighboring regions.
Prof. Kondrashin tries to persuade us several times that no concrete
documents have been found. But this is not a sound argument because
Moscow also tried to persuade us 20 years ago that there were no secret
supplements to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact on dividing the spheres of
influence in Europe, signed in the Kremlin on August 23, 1939. Then
these documents were found.
It is quite obvious that Nikita Khrushchev’s announcement at
the CPSU 20th Congress that Stalin intended to deport all Ukrainians to
Siberia will also find documentary proof some day. After all, why do
Kondrashin and other Russian historians not ascribe to this kind of
documents Stalin’s telegram to CK KP(b)U Mendel Khatayevich, dated
November 8, 1932, saying that “the Politburo is now considering the
question of how to bring the Ukrainian peasant down to his knees?”
Russian authors keep saying that the Holodomor tragedy should unite,
not disunite, peoples. But this will only occur when they abandon the
hard ideological line and admit historical realities.
7.
HOLODOMOR IS UKRAINE'S NEVER-ENDING TRAUMA
COMMENTARY & ANALYSIS: By Irena Chalupa
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Prague, Czech
Republic, Dec 09, 2008
In many ways, Kyiv is a city of contrasts. On one
boulevard you will encounter a rather squat, red granite statue of
Lenin, his right hand aloft pointing to the proverbial better tomorrow
that, thankfully, after 70 years finally became yesterday. The
authorities refuse to dismantle the statue, claiming it has "historic"
value. That's the communist touch.
Walk a few blocks down to a short, gray, treeless street called Passage
and you will be assaulted by ostentatious conspicuous consumption:
Gucci, Louis Vuitton, Bottega Veneta, Bally, Ferragamo. That's the
nouveau riche, oligarchic touch.
Up the hill from these two telling spots stands a small -- and until,
last week, the only -- monument to the victims of the 1932-33 famine in
Ukraine. It was erected in 1993.
Together these three points in Ukraine's capital create a kind of
historic Bermuda Triangle into which things disappear and people
forget. Lenin gave birth to the people who created the famine; luxury
goods should make everyone forget the deprivations of the Soviet past
and the pain of famine. But today almost 50 million Ukrainians somehow
remain held hostage by one, two, or all three of these points of
reference.
Ukraine's current president, Viktor Yushchenko, has made remembering
the famine a cornerstone of his presidency. In 2006, the parliament
passed a law recognizing the famine as an act of genocide against the
Ukrainian people. Yushchenko went to great lengths to ensure that this
year's 75th anniversary of the famine be commemorated on a national
level. Foreign leaders participated in the commemorations; conferences
were held; memorials unveiled, candles lit, and the names of the dead
remembered.
In a particularly moving sign of solemnity, the president and the prime
minister even suspended their endless bickering for a day to
participate in the unveiling of the new memorial complex in the capital.
DEATH
OF A NATIONAL IDENTITY
And yet large swathes of Ukraine remain deeply ambivalent about the
famine. Eastern and southeastern Ukraine -- where the famine took its
greatest toll -- even today, when the facts about the famine are widely
publicized and accessible, has the fewest memorials. The first attempts
to commemorate the victims took place very far away from Ukraine in
fact; Canadian-Ukrainians erected the first famine memorial in 1989 in
Edmonton.
The late historian James Mace, who joined the famine project at the
Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and collected material for Robert
Conquest's seminal work "The Harvest of Sorrow," called Ukraine a
post-genocidal society.
Becoming a famine expert in his own right, Mace made Ukraine
his adopted homeland. He believed that what Ukrainians call Holodomor
(murder by hunger), maimed Ukraine to such an extent that it created a
discontinuity in the normal development of the Ukrainian people.
In the former Warsaw Pact countries, the collapse of communism brought
about a restoration of a previous independence. But in Ukraine, the
Ukrainian nation -- as a community possessing a clear sense of its
identity, history, and cultural values -- remained a national minority
in its own country even after independence.
The damage from the Soviet legacy was such that Ukrainians
lacked a broad consensus concerning their future. All that remained
were the surviving structures of Soviet Ukraine. The country was no
longer a Ukrainian Soviet republic, but it was also not a Ukrainian
Ukraine, in the sense in which Poland is Polish or the Czech Republic
is Czech.
The orchestrated famine wiped out millions of nationally conscious
Ukrainians. Whether or not one accepts that the famine was genocide,
there is little doubt that it was targeted against Ukrainian
nationalism, against Ukrainian-ness. Mykola Khvylovy, one of the most
popular and talented writers of the period and a committed communist,
shot himself in helpless protest.
The creative engine of a people was destroyed, slowing down
and distorting nation building for decades. The Soviet regime prevented
families and individuals from processing both personal and national
grief. For more than 50 years, Ukraine could not address this trauma
openly.
Ukrainian society, however, was soon to experience new shocks: the
purges of 1937-38, war, Nazi occupation and the Holocaust, Soviet
reconquest, and the 1946-47 famine. The scars of the Holodomor are
overlaid by those of these other tragedies. Yet, under the consequences
of these repeated blows, traces of the 1932-33 famine are unmistakable.
Without taking it into account, for instance, it is
impossible to account for the much weaker -- compared to what happened
in 1914-22 -- Ukrainian national movement that arose in the great
upheaval of World War II. Western Ukraine, which in 1933 was not part
of the USSR, is not surprisingly the exception.
What does it mean to be Ukrainian today? What is Ukraine? What is the
Ukrainian idea? Former President Leonid Kuchma at one time created
quite an angry backlash by stating that the Ukrainian idea had not
worked in Ukraine.
If a country called Ukraine endlessly convenes conferences
on self-identity, if pundits pontificate ad nauseum on "project
Ukraine," if Ukrainians themselves can't define their identity or their
values, then one can safely admit that the country has something of an
identity crisis.
Is it important to have the world acknowledge the Ukrainian famine as
an act of genocide? For the Ukrainian state, yes. But will such
recognition help the country itself? Will it ease the effects of the
famine trauma? Will it steer Ukrainian society onto a path of
self-awareness?
Will it compel the eastern Ukrainian citizen, who is
descended from the ethnic Russians who were resettled into the towns
and villages emptied by the famine, feel a connection to this country?
Will it give the inhabitants of the more than 13,000 towns
and villages that died in 1932-33 a voice and a name? And, most
importantly, will today's diverse Ukrainians, who aren't particularly
eager to listen to the stories of their painful past, hear those
voices?
It seems to me that James Mace was on to something. The famine is not
an only an event in Ukraine's past -- it is an event in its present and
its future.
NOTE:
Irena Chalupa is the director of RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service. The views
expressed in this commentary are the author's own and do not
necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL
8.
UKRAINE, A POST-GENOCIDAL SOCIETY
Ukraine's famine survivors still bear the emotional scars.
By Iryna Shtogrin, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)
Prague, Czech Republic, Monday, December 08, 2008
Distrust of government and future uncertainty are just two
of the most conspicuous features of the post-genocidal syndrome that
psychologists have identified in modern Ukrainians some 75 years after
the famine of 1932-33.
On a more intimate level, famine survivors still value every
breadcrumb, and their descendants greet guests with tables overloaded
with a variety of dishes. In one form or another, Ukrainians will
universally impress on each other the importance of "having something
to eat."
Doctors describe a number of symptoms of post-genocidal syndrome that
are unconnected to the trauma directly, but which can still seriously
undermine the sufferer's health. Victims feel pain in places that are
not supposed to hurt and experience nightmares and hidden anxieties
that steal their ability to laugh and enjoy life.
Taras Vozniak, the editor of "Ji" magazine, has described the
experience as "such a trauma that for people who survived it is very
difficult to remember what happened." He compares it to the effects of
rape: "[Victims] don't want to testify, or to remember. They want to
erase the tragedy from their memory."
Having survived a famine that was brought about by the policies of the
Soviet government, Ukrainians now question the very notion of
government. They have -- if not fear -- then a feeling of permanent
uncertainty about the future. Under each shift in political direction
or change of political leaders, Ukrainians rush to buy the necessary
essentials. Just in case.
The memory of their ancestors -- who were robbed of food by their own
people on orders from the Kremlin -- forces many Ukrainians always to
keep something for a "black day" and never truly reveal themselves
fully, even to close acquaintances.
That same instinct compels Ukrainians to stockpile food, and to invite
anyone who stops by their home to sit down for a meal. Ukrainians tend
to rely on themselves, living by their wits and soothing themselves
with the eternal saying, "God willing."
Academician Myroslav Popovych survived the famine and believes that
other survivors can never really forget. He says, "conditions then were
such that all people who belong to that generation carry this taint."
But he also asserts that "personality always wins out in the end -- I
wouldn't say that I have become more obedient or completely focused on
earthly problems."
But the most important thing that Ukrainians carry from these terrible
times is a complete revulsion toward totalitarian regimes.
"Ukrainians still lack a political culture because of their history,
but we have a huge drive toward liberty," Popovych says. "I don't know
whether you can call this famine memory, but it is certainly a total
aversion to totalitarian mentality."
Ukrainian society is highly individualistic, partly because its history
has incorporated the terrible experience of death and survival of
famine. Old notions such as "my home is my сastle" and "I'm my own
boss" have hampered the formation of civil society and a genuine
national elite in Ukraine.
At the same time, this attitude turns the average Ukrainian into a
libertarian. They view even the slightest attempt by politicians to
elevate themselves with sarcasm, and they sense the slightest false
note in officials' speeches about their "love of the people" and their
promises to solve the problems of average citizens.
One must remember that, aside from the natural psychological reaction
to survived horrors, Ukrainians for decades were not allowed to speak
about the famine -- it could have cost them not only their liberty but
also their lives.
Former dissident and political prisoner Yevhen Sverstiuk recalls seeing
fear in countrymen's eyes when he asked them about the 1932-33 famine
even after perestroika. People asked whether they would be executed.
Many said they still feared being punished for speaking out. That
despite the fact that they'd been invited by the village council to
speak on the subject, and the entire project soliciting their views had
been authorized by the regional government.
Philosopher Yevhen Sverstiuk believes that the time has come when
Ukrainians can cry over their painful experiences. They can process the
past by talking about the famine, identifying all the villages where
people died, naming all of the victims, and taking steps toward
closure.
After crying out their trauma, people should wipe their tears and get
to work, says Sverstiuk. Otherwise, they risk the danger of becoming
spiritual beggars. The world values the brave. By telling the truth,
and overcoming their fear, Ukrainians overcome their inferiority
complexes.
Writer Ivan Dziuba calls the famine a blow to Ukraine's future. And the
only way to fight back is to free oneself of this heavy burden of
genetic memory by revealing the entire truth.
The late American researcher James Mace began the process by defining
Ukraine as a post-genocidal society. Mace believed Ukraine would be
incapable of further development until the entire truth of the famine
was told.
That idea has been confirmed by the experiences of other nations that
suffered similar traumas, defeats, and the burden of penance. Society
returns to successful development through awareness, and acceptance of
its national memory and history.
The best that the current government in Kyiv can do to commemorate
those killed by famine is to create the conditions so that all
Ukrainians could feel certain and security. Little is required in order
to achieve this -- just respect for human rights, abiding by the rule
of law, and hard work.
NOTE: Iryna Shtogrin is a correspondent with RFE/RL's Ukrainian
Service. The views expressed in this commentary are the author's own
and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL.
9.
ROBERT CONQUEST ON 'GENOCIDE' AND FAMINE
Interview with Robert Conquest by Irena Chalupa, December
2006
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Prague, Czech
Republic, Mon, Dec 08, 2008
RFE/RL Ukrainian Service correspondent Irena Chalupa interviewed
British historian Robert Conquest in December 2006. They talked about
the "question of genocide," famine denial in the USSR, and who was
worse: Stalin or Lenin?
RFE/RL: [In November 2006], after much debate, the Ukrainian parliament
passed a bill recognizing the 1932-33 famine as an act of genocide
against the Ukrainian people. Those MPs who argued against the bill --
the Communists and the Party of Regions -- argued that labeling the
famine "genocide" would fuel anti-Russian sentiment. What do you think
of the way Ukraine has handled this part of its history?
Robert Conquest: I don't know much about the internal politics and what
caused people to vote one way or the other and things like that. But in
my book on the famine, "The Harvest of Sorrow," I go into the question
of genocide and note that by the definition of genocide at the time it
was put to the United Nations, it covered a much broader field than the
Jewish one.
It included partial attempts on nationality. I don't think the word
genocide as such is a very useful one. When I say if you want to use it
you can, but it was invented for rather different purposes. I can see
that the trouble is it implies that somebody, some other nation, or a
large part of it were doing it, that the Nazis are more or less
implicated, they are Germans.
But I don't think this is true -- it wasn't a Russian
exercise, the attack on the Ukrainian people. But it was a definite
attack on them as they were discriminated against as far as death went.
But it didn't mean if you were a Russian you were doing very well in
Stalin's time either.
But I think it's a good thing that the famine should be recognized.
It's an odd thing but I was asked by the Holocaust Foundation -- they
asked me to speak on the famine, on the Ukrainian famine some years ago
and it's still on the record. They asked the Armenians to do the same.
At that time the Ukrainian ambassador in Washington came to the
Holocaust Museum. So the Jews were not forcing it as the same thing at
all. That's the other danger.
Once you start using these terms, you have to be not only
just as bad, but just the same as the Jewish genocide. And it's not the
same. As long as that's recognized. And I think there are guilty
people, but they aren't the Russian nation or anybody else. They're a
particular group of particularly horrible people.
RFE/RL: When your book, "The Harvest of Sorrow," was published in 1987,
RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service translated sections of it into Ukrainian and
broadcast it to Ukraine as a multipart series. I suspect that many
Ukrainians first learned about the famine from these broadcasts based
on your book. Famine denial continues on some level today. Why do you
think this is so?
Conquest: I think there are people everywhere who are committed to
think things which aren't true. This doesn't only apply to this -- it
applies to dozens of things. There are Stalin deniers in general. There
are, of course, Holocaust deniers, about the Jewish Holocaust. There
are people who'd like to forget, or else to think: "At least I wasn't
guilty, and if I wasn't guilty, somebody else was." To ask why people
take peculiar political or other views is a long story which I've gone
into other books.
RFE/RL: What kind of scholarship do you think we still need to do on
this particular period in history? Can the full story of the Ukrainian
famine ever be told?
Conquest: I think the famine now is pretty fully established. Nobody
will deny it anymore. I mean, only a very few people would deny it.
There is a tendency not to know some of the actual orders given from
above, from Moscow, to blockade Ukraine, to keep the famine in the
Ukraine and in the Kuban. There were other areas -- there's Kazakhstan,
of course, up on the Volga. There were other similar acts used again
other areas.
But the fact that Ukraine and the Kuban were blocked off, and quite
clearly that was partly due to make sure that the death roll was
localized, not the nationality, exactly, but to the inhabitants -- and,
in practice, meaning the nationality too. But Stalin would not call
himself [anti-Ukrainian]. Andrei Sakharov said that Stalin was
anti-Ukrainian, and other people have said the same.
But he was anti-Ukrainian because they gave him trouble. But
he was also anti a lot of other people. Because even when he was
anti-Jewish in his great purges in 1953, he said: "No, I'm not being
anti Semitic. We're killing only 10 Jews and four or five non-Jews in
the doctor's plot. So I'm not anti-Semitic."
RFE/RL: You probably know Stalin better than most. Is it difficult
studying someone like him in such great detail?
Conquest: A friend of mine has just done a huge book called ["Young
Stalin,"] up to 1917, a huge book -- Simon Sebag-Montefiore, a British
writer -- and he's found new stuff. There's a whole chapter on Stalin
in London. He was in London for a few weeks in 1908 but he's found all
sorts of odd reports and it's a whole chapter. So one can learn more
and more and more about him, go into him.
In Russia they're now publishing books where the Politburo starts
examining the basis of Stalin in Gorbachev's time, and they're arguing
-- why did he kill everybody? They say, what, because he was frightened
of losing power? They have these arguments, but they can't quite make
out because it's irrational, and it's irrational in a very peculiar
way. He's definitely not a normal, straightforward human being. I don't
want to use psychological language -- it's too easy.
But he's a monster, more than anything else. After all, he
wasn't only killing peasants. He was killing his closest supporters.
And in a very nasty way, after torture and so on. He doesn't sound like
a modern man, a terrestrial man, an Earth man. He sounds like a monster
from some strange planet.
I've written a science fiction novel amongst my various
writings and also some of my poems are science fiction and I think
Stalin would fit in very well as a nonhuman. Part human, perhaps, it
was a curious mixture of a monster and a human being on some very
strange planet.
RFE/RL: Do you find that these tyrants -- Stalin, Hitler, Pol Pot --
have a bit of a banality to their being?
Conquest: Oh yes, you're absolutely right. There's something very
third-rate and unnatural, but not stupid exactly, about them.
RFE/RL: Mediocre?
Conquest: Mediocre, yes. Stalin, of course, massacred his
intelligentsia and, of course, the Ukrainian intelligentsia. They're
not only Ukrainian -- they're intelligentsia, that's the other point. I
remember looking at "The Harvest of Sorrow" -- all the pages about the
purges of academe in all the portions of Ukrainian studies and every
other sort of studies. I found that half the professors had been shot.
RFE/RL: The crimes of communism are certainly very vast. Ukraine, like
every republic in the former Soviet Union, has many scars. Ukraine was
maimed by communism as a culture, as an economy, as a nation. How do
you get healthy again after something like that? How do you recover?
Conquest: Well, obviously, it takes more time than people thought. Now
we've got Cambodia and North Korea, which, if anything, were worse than
Stalin They were stupider than Stalin, I think. There's China, who
knows what China's like. Once you fall for a system like that, you
suddenly find yourself empowered to kill a lot of people for no reason
at all. I mean in Cambodia they were just killing people for killing's
sake: "Time to kill a few more people".
And look at North Korea. I met a Soviet diplomat who'd been in North
Korea, and he said that they've done more fakery than was possible in
Moscow. More falsification. There's a big shop on the main street in
Pyongyang, and he went into it -- lots of people buying lots of things,
wonderful salesmanship. But he suddenly realized nobody was actually
getting anything. Extraordinary.
There's another thing that's common to all Stalinists. These are rich
countries mostly, but even poor countries in Africa can build good
hotels; the tsars built good hotels. But the hotels in the Soviet Union
were awful! Why? They could afford to build hotels to impress
foreigners, but somehow they couldn't work it. So they relied on
finding very stupid foreigners, which they found.
When we talk about getting over Stalinism it's not only in the former
Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Russia. It's in the West as well. After all,
in Ukraine and Russia people were not allowed to tell the truth. Full
stop. In the West, they were allowed to and they got themselves fooled,
believed nonsense. They are more to blame than those inside Stalinism
in some ways.
RFE/RL: What do you think stopped people from excelling under
communism? Is it the mediocrity of its leaders that you mentioned?
After all, they certainly had some degree of knowledge, some degree of
talent, and certainly they had money. And yet they produced shoddy
goods, their economies were second- or third-rate, nothing worked.
Conquest: Well, it was an impossible system both economically and
ecologically, of course. When you, for example, see your seas drying
up, you must know something has gone wrong. They did finally after 20
or 30 years that something's wrong. What? Perhaps our system's wrong.
They did start thinking that in 1985, 1990, that sort of time. They
knew something was wrong, and they had to get rid of the old regime. Of
course, they still had more to do than that.
RFE/RL: I read a piece by Andrew Brown in "The Guardian" about you a
few years ago.
Conquest: He made quite a lot of mistakes.
RFE/RL: Did he? Well, he writes that when your book "The Great Terror"
came out, everyone could agree that Stalin was wicked and evil -- but
Lenin, he had to have been good. Brown says that you claimed they were
both cut from the same cloth. Do you think that 40 years later that
sentiment still exists, that Stalin perverted Lenin's ideology and he
is ultimately a better man than Stalin was?
Conquest: Was Stalin worse than Lenin? Well, it's not very difficult to
be better than Stalin. So if Lenin was a bit better than Stalin,
perhaps he was a bit. But it doesn't make much difference. I still
think Lenin is over-praised, if not over-praised, then given a bit of
leeway here and there which he didn't deserve.
I think Stalin could be put down as killing more people, if
that's your criterion. And Stalin certainly produced a system under
which duller and duller and stupider and stupider people came to the
top.
But that isn't based on Lenin's system. I mean, Lenin died
when he was quite young. Had he lived to the age of Stalin or Mao....
[Soviet politician Vyacheslav] Molotov always said, if anything, Lenin
would have been even tougher than Stalin. Molotov said that in his
conversations with [Felix] Chuev, a famous collection. In fact, he
rebukes Stalin for being too soft occasionally.
RFE/RL: Why do you think communism, despite the fact that it has been
totally discredited, still remains attractive?
Conquest: Well, let's start with Marxism. It's one of those beliefs you
get into and it's hard to get out. It's hard to define. I do find when
they get rid of Marxism or anything like pro-communism, they say to
themselves: "Well, what do we do now? What are we thinking? We can't
think like the bourgeoisie; we can't think like the foreigners. We've
got to think like... who?"
LINK:
http://www.rferl.org/Content/RFERL_Interview_Robert_Conquest_Genocide_Famine/1357449.html
10. CHICAGO
UKRAINIANS CONCLUDE HOLODOMOR 75TH COMMEMORATION
WITH
SOLEMN ECUMENICAL GRAND REQUIEM IN CITY CENTER
By Maria Kulczycky, Chicago, Illinois, Saturday, December 6,
2008
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #920, Washington, D.C., Friday,
Dec 19, 2008
CHICAGO - Chicago’s legendary wind whipped brisk and cold as bundled
groups formed in Washington Park, the historical site for public debate
and eloquent discourse that faces Newberry Library, a storied
genealogical research center. People held on to
flags, banners, signs and emblems as the wind bent and unfurled them.
For weeks, radio stations, leaflets, church bulletins,
posters, email postings and other information channels had been
inviting, encouraging, and exhorting Ukrainians all over the city and
suburbs to come to the city center on Saturday morning, November 15, to
join the procession down Chicago’s central avenues heading for Holy
Name Cathedral, the seat of the vast Roman Catholic Archdiocese of
Chicago.
The community had planned a Solemn Ecumenical
Requiem to mark the end of the its year-long commemoration of the 75th
anniversary of the Ukrainian Genocide-Holodomor.
The Soviet-organized and meticulously executed genocide was launched to
crush Ukrainian political aspirations and maintain the integrity of the
Soviet Union, a strategy that has resonance in current
events.
Decades-long secrecy about the tragedy was enforced on
victims and reinforced with a blockade on travel and a muzzling of the
press, making it the largest unknown genocide of the 20th
century. The anniversary milestone was a link in an
international campaign to bring attention to the horrific event and to
acknowledge it as a genocide.
As yellow buses disgorged their occupants, many traveling from distant
suburbs, the park filled. Monitors nudged and shaped the
crowd into groups by affiliation—parishes, youth groups, civic
organizations, Ukrainian schools, the Ukrainian consular staff, and the
general public of seniors, parents holding the hands of small children,
families with strollers. Uniforms and embroidery, as well as
black ribbons, adorned many participants.
The procession stepped from the part and into the wide street
cordoned by police patrol cars. It moved slowly along the
route to the cathedral. In the lead were young men and women
in Ukrainian folk ensembles carrying a birch cross festooned in black
ribbon. Three thorn wreaths came next, then a 10-foot blue
and yellow banner, followed by a coffin, draped in black with a large,
stark lettering “10,000,000 VICTIMS.”
A large group of clergy from Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox parishes
followed the coffin. Then came Ukrainian and American flags
carried by veterans. The procession of orderly, somber
participants stretched for city blocks as the park emptied.
The mood grew exuberant as the marchers looked
forward and back and realized what had happened! They saw
friends, colleagues, and neighbors, but also at faces they didn’t
recognize. They were all united, making a statement with
their large ranks, their number calling attention of
passersby: We ask the world to recognize our genocide, our
national tragedy.
As the procession crossed State Street and moved to the stairs of the
cathedral, the massive central doors stood closed, cold,
forbidding. Then the bells began to intone a rhythmic, grim
chant, a funereal peal. The procession stopped, stood for
interminable minutes, buses and traffic piling up on either side.
Suddenly the great doors were flung open, and within, four hierarchs
stood in full religious raiment, inviting the marchers
inside. The cross, wreaths, coffin, flags and clergy entered
and proceeded down the main aisle as the marchers, 2,000 by some
counts, silently streamed into the cavernous sanctuary.
Nestor Popowych, chairman of the 75th Anniversary Commemoration
Committee, welcomed the assembled crowd and introduced Cardinal Francis
George, Archbishop of Chicago, for whom Holy Name Cathedral is the home
parish. This was the first public event at the cathedral
since a long renovation had kept the main sanctuary shut to services.
The cardinal came to the lectern and cited St. Paul, remarking on the
ecumenical nature of the service. He inveighed against all
totalitarian regimes, particularly the communist terror that destroyed
millions. Next, the new bishop of the Western Eparchy of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church, Bishop Daniel (Zelinsky) addressed the
crowd.
An impassioned speaker, he quoted Shevchenko’s poem, “The
Plague,” noting how it foreshadowed the horror and suffering of
Holodomor of 1932-33. His shout, “10 million!” rang out
through the cathedral, to the 65-foot rafters. “We have to
teach our succeeding generations. And we can never forget!”
he charged.
Archbishop Alexandr (Bykovetz) of Detroit, a survivor of Holodomor,
spoke in Ukrainian about the loss of future generations, both in
numbers and in potential, “the Sheptytskys, Mazeppas, Vyhovskis,
Petluras, and Bandery,” as well as the artists, musicians, writers, and
other lights of the community that were extinguished before they could
be born.
The hierachs returned to the altar and the requiem service began:
lyrical, melodic incantations in the Kyivan style of the Panakhyda
(requiem) sung by a choir collected from the best voices of the
numerous Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic parishes throughout the
region.
It was conducted by Dr. Vasyl Truchly, noted for his deep
and comprehensive study and propagation of knowledge about Ukrainian
liturgical music, assisted by Michael Holian, a conductor, musician and
teacher. The music resonated through the sanctuary, supported
by the responses of the bishops and the 20 priests surrounding them,
and melding the spirits of the assembled crowd.
Photographers, reporters, and cameramen from the local NBC and ABC
affiliates and Ukrainian media wandered through the cathedral,
capturing the uplifted faces, the rows of Holodomor survivors in the
front pews, the youth organizations in uniforms, and the sleeping baby
in a mother’s lap.
Bishop Richard (Seminack), head of the Western Ukrainian Catholic
Eparchy and pastor of St. Nicholas Cathedral, concluded the service
with a moving recollection of the ritual of baking bread that his
grandmother practiced, “blessing and praying at each step, picking up a
crumb that fell to the floor and kissing it,” he recalled.
Bread is holy to Ukrainians, and this bread, the basis of their diet,
was taken away from them, he noted. Their resulting
starvation created a wound that hasn’t healed through succeeding
generations.
Bishop Richard thanked all the participants who so massively
participated in the solemn ceremony, concluding right at high noon. The
crowd filed out, a little more noisily now. All had been
visibly inspired by an event that will rank among the most memorable
and affirming expressions of a community message in the city’s history.
==============================================
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Director
Government Affairs, Washington Office
SigmaBleyzer Private Equity Investment Group
President/CEO, U.S.-Ukraine Business Council (USUBC)
Publisher & Editor, Action Ukraine Report (AUR)