ACTION UKRAINE REPORT (AUR)
An International Newsletter, The Latest,
Up-To-Date
In-Depth Ukrainian
News, Analysis and Commentary
Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts,
Business, Religion, Economics,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the
World
HOLODOMOR: 76TH
INTERNATIONAL
COMMEMORATION
DAY. SAT, NOV 28, 2009
30,000 Candles to
be Lite in Kyiv's Glory Park
Induced Famine,
Death for Millions, Genocide. 1932-1933
Ukraine Remembers
- The World Acknowledges!
THE UKRAINIAN
HOLODOMOR OF 1932–33 AS
A CRIME OF GENOCIDE, A
LEGAL ASSESSMENT
ACTION
UKRAINE REPORT (AUR), Number 943
Mr. Morgan
Williams, Publisher and Editor, SigmaBleyzer Emerging
KYIV,
UKRAINE, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 2009
INDEX OF ARTICLES ------
Clicking on the
title of any article takes you directly to the
article.
Return to Index by
clicking on Return to Index at the end of each article
Ukrainian News-on-line, Ukrainian News Agency,
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, November 27, 2009
ZIK news, Zakhidna Informatsiyna Korporatsiya,
Ukraine, Fri, Nov 27, 2009
3
. RAPHAEL LEMKIN'S FAMOUS ARTICLE
"SOVIET GENOCIDE
IN UKRAINE" PUBLISHED IN 28 LANGUAGES IN NEW BOOK
PRESENTED IN KYIV AT HOLODOMOR EXHIBITION
By Morgan Williams, Publisher, Action Ukraine History Report
(AUHR)
Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, November 25, 2009
4
. UKRAINE
TEARS DOWN CONTROVERSIAL STATUE
A concrete slab is all
that remains of the statue of Hryhoriy Petrovsky
Presentation by Nigel Linsan Colley,
Grand Nephew of Welsh Journalist Gareth Jones
Exhibition at UN Dedicated to 76th Anniversary of
the 1932-33 Holodomor
United Nations, New York, NY, Mon, Nov 23, 2009
Action Ukraine Report (AUR), Wash, D.C., Sat, Nov 28, 2009
Rory Finnin: “Ukraine is
a diamond of a country, not studied enough yet”
Interview with Rory Finnin, Lecturer in Ukrainian
Studies, Cambridge University
By Alina Popkova, The Day Weekly Digest in English,
#34
Adviser to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Ukraine, Former Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of Ukraine to Great Britain, Professor of
International Law, National
University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kyiv,
Ukraine, 2009
Ukrainian News-on-line, Ukrainian News Agency,
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, November 27, 2009
KYIV - The Kyiv city state administration
has decided to light 30,000 candles on the bank vault in Glory Park
near the Memorial to the victims of Holodomors on Sichnevoho Povstannia
(Mazepy) Street. Anatolii Holubchenko, the first deputy head
of the Kyiv city state administration, announced this to the press.
"There are 30,000 candles," he said. According to the first deputy head
of the city administration, the Kyivzelenbud municipal company on
Friday started setting saucers for the candles and will start lighting
the candles at 09:00 on November 28. The candles are capable of burning
for nearly 16 hours.
Holubchenko said the lighting of candles on the bank vault in Glory
Park near the Memorial becomes a tradition for honoring the memory of
victims of the Holodomors.
As Ukrainian News earlier reported, the Kyiv city state administration
has decided to honor the memory of the victims of the Holodomors with a
minute of silence at 16:00 on November 28. Ukraine observes the 76th
anniversary of the Holodomor famine on November 28.
In 2008, the Kyivskyi Metropolitan municipal company running the Kyiv
subway honored the memory of the victims of Holodomor with horns of
subway trains at 16:00 on November 22. In 2006, the Verkhovna
Rada declared the Holodomor of 1932-1933 an act of genocide against the
Ukrainian people.
According to various estimates, the Holodomor artificial
famine killed between three million and seven million of innocent
people in Ukraine in 1932 and 1933 alone. According to historians,
there were also Holodomors in Ukraine in 1921-1923 and 1946-1947.
PRESIDENT
YUSHCHENKO TO TAKE PART IN
MEMORY
DAY OF VICTIMS OF HOLODOMOR IN
UKRAINE
ON SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 28
UNIAN, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, Nov 25, 2009
KYIV - The President of
Ukraine Victor Yushchenko will take part in the memorial measures
dedicated to the memory of victims of Holodomor of 1932-1933 on
Saturday, November 28. The press service of the head of the
state disclosed to UNIAN that at 8:45 am the President will lay flowers
to Memorial sign to victims of Holodomor (the Great Famine) at
Mykhaylivska Square.
At 9. 00 am in Sofiyskiy Cathedral the head of the state will be
present at a rite and prayer with participation of leaders of different
religious organizations of Ukraine and high officials of Ukraine. NTCU
will broadcast these measures.
3:15
P.M. EVENT
The memorial measures with participation of
V. Yushchenko will take place at the territory of the State museum
“Memorial to Victims of Holodomors in Ukraine” (Kyiv, Mazepy Street, 15
A) at 15.15 pm. The National Television Company of Ukraine will
broadcast these measures.
The President of Ukraine will address to the Ukrainian people at 15. 50
pm. The national minute of silence will be at 16. 00 pm, after that
all-Ukrainian action “Light a candle” will start.
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2
. SBU NAMES
1932-1933 ARTIFICIAL FAMINE ORGANIZERS
Names of
suspects: Stanislav Kosior, Pavel Postyshev, Vlas
Chubar
ZIK news, Zakhidna Informatsiyna Korporatsiya, Fri,
Nov 27, 2009
KYIV - SBU prosecutors may send
the criminal case on the 1932-1933 Holodomor in Ukraine to court by the
end of 2009, SBU Director Valentyn Nalyvajchenko said Nov. 27, speaking
on the 5th Kanal.
“We will publicize the names of those officials who
orchestrated the crime of genocide against Ukrainians,” the SBU
director said. SBU prosecutors point to top officials in the Ukrainian
Bolshevik party as organizers of the Holodomor, he said. The
prosecution allowed me to release the names of suspects, Nalyvajchenko
assured.
1. Stanislav Kosior, the Bolshevik party of Ukraine
secretary.
2. Pavel Postyshev, who was sent by Stalin and Molotov to
head the Kharkiv oblast, making it one of the worst famine-hit areas of
Ukraine.
3. Vlas Chubar, one of the people’s commissars of Ukraine.
We have to prove the guilt of these people in court. Following this,
these persons must be condemned and stripped of any privileges,
Nalyvajchenko continued. When the Holodomor organizers are
proved guilty, the central government is to oblige local governments to
dismantle the monuments to these individuals, he added.
Answering a question whether a court may give its verdict
with regard to deceased persons [the three suspects are long dead], the
SBU director said the crimes against humanity have no statute of
limitations. He also confirmed the criminal case will be
declassified.
Meanwhile, Ukraine will commemorate the Holodomor victims on
Nov. 28. The Kyiv administration will light up 30,000 candles
on the slopes of the hills facing the memorial to the Holodomor
victims. The candles will burn for 16 hours, city officials
say. In a related move, Ukraine will remember the famine
victims with a minute of silence at 16.00 on November 28.
In 2006, Verkhovna Rada recognized the 1932-1933 famine as the genocide
of Ukrainians. According to various estimates, the death toll from the
Holodomor stands at between 3 and 7 million.
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3
. RAPHAEL
LEMKIN'S FAMOUS ARTICLE "SOVIET GENOCIDE
IN UKRAINE" PUBLISHED IN 28 LANGUAGES IN NEW BOOK
PRESENTED IN KYIV AT HOLODOMOR EXHIBITION
By Morgan Williams, Publisher, Action Ukraine History Report (AUHR)
Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, November 25, 2009
KYIV - A new book "Raphael Lemkin: Soviet Genocide in Ukraine" was
presented today in Kyiv by Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko at the
opening of the "Holodomor 1932-1933 - Genocide of the Ukrainian people"
exhibition at the Ukrainian House.
The book is the first publication in the six official languages of the
United Nations and twenty-two other languages of Raphael Lemkin's
remarkable, eloquent address on the genocidal destruction of the
Ukrainian nation by the Communist regime. Lemkin delivered
the address in 1953 before an audience of three thousand people
gathered at the New York Manhattan Center to commemorate the 20th
anniversary of the Great Ukrainian Famine.
The new book was the dream of Dr. Roman Serbyn, professor of history,
Universite du Quebec a Montreal, who served as the books
editor. The complier was Olesia Stasiuk. Dr. Serbyn
gives credit in the book to a number of individuals and institutions
who offered their full support and services to help make his dream
become a reality. He states that Professor Emeritus Taras
Hunczak of Rutgers University secured Lemkin's text for him from the
New York Public Library and that H.E. Yuriy Sergeev, Ukrainian
Ambassador to the United Nations, was one of the first to offer his
full support.
The Lemkin book was published with the support of Ms. Kateryna
Yushchenko, Head of the Supervisory Board of the International
Charitable Foundation Ukraine 3000, Kyiv, which provided for the tasks
of translating, proofreading, formatting and preparing the volume for
printing. The book was published as part of the "Lessons of History"
project of the Foundation Ukraine 3000.
President Yushchenko in the forward to the book wrote, "The Ukrainian
Holodomor of 1932-1933 was one of the most barbarous, large scale
crimes of the twentieth century.....Lemkin's insightful analysis
explains clearly and precisely why the Soviet regime instigated and
implemented the Holodomor, an act of genocide against the Ukrainian
nation.
"Commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Dr. Raphael Lemkin's death
this year, we should remember the scholarly writings and insights on
human rights of this great legal expert and humanitarian.
Ukraine and the world are deeply indebted to Dr. Lemkin for his
authorities works on the Holodomor and other genocides, works which
lead to broader understanding of historical events and their causes,
and from which we must learn for the sake of the future."
Professor Serbyn in his introductory article wrote, "On the occasion of
the fiftieth anniversary of Lemkin's death, Ukrainians feel particular
gratitude to the father of the Genocide Convention for giving a
penetrating analysis of the Ukrainain tragedy of the early 1930s and
convincingly demonstrating that it was a genocide in accordance with
the principles and criteria of the UN Convention."
POLISH
ARCHIVE BOOK PRESENTED IN ENGLISH
Another book, presented in Polish and
Ukrainian at the Holodomor Exhibition in 2008, was presented this year
for the first time in English. The 650 page book, "Holodomor,
The Great Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933, is Volume 7 of the series
entitled Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's - 1940's, Unknown Documents
from the Archives of the Secret Services."
The book was published by The Institute of National Remembrance -
Commission of the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation,
Warsaw. The book presents archival material of the Polish and
Ukrainain secret services on the situation in Ukraine.
The Editorial Committee says in its introductory article says, "In the
years of the Stalinist regime, the Ukrainian nation was exposed to
cruel repression. Today it can be stated with certainty that
among all the "brotherly republics" of the former USSR, Soviet Ukraine
suffered the heaviest losses in human life."
On March 16, 2006, a resolution recognizing the Ukrainian famine of the
1930s as genocide was adopted by the Senate of the Republic of Poland,
followed, on December 6, 2996 by the Lower House of the Polish
Parliament.
Dr. Janusz Kurtyka, President, Institute of National Remembrance, of
Poland told me at the Exhibition he considers it a great privilege to
work with Ukraine in the publication of documents about the crimes of
Communism. President Yushchenko and Dr. Jurtyka did mention
at the Exhibition the Polish Institute now has 2,000 employees while
the Institute of Memory in Ukraine has only 43 employees.
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4
. UKRAINE TEARS
DOWN CONTROVERSIAL STATUE
A concrete slab is all
that remains of the statue of Hryhoriy Petrovsky
By Rostyslav Khotin, BBC Ukrainian
Service, UK, Thu, Nov 26, 2009
KYIV - A statue of a politician considered
to be one of the main instigators of the man-made famine that killed
millions of Ukrainians in the early 1930s, has been demolished.
The authorities tore down the statue of the Communist leader
of Ukraine when it was part of the former Soviet Union, Hryhoriy
Petrovsky. It was carried out just days before Ukraine commemorates the
victims of the famine, known as the Holodomor, or genocide.
President Viktor Yushchenko issued a decree ordering the
removal of monuments to Soviet leaders, "in memory of the victims of
the Holodomor". The statue stood in Kiev's Europe Square - one of the
capital's most prestigious locations.
Between seven and ten million people died in what officials say was a
deliberate policy pursued by the former Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin,
to destroy the
Ukrainian peasantry who were opposed to the collectivisation
of farming.
CLOSE
ALLY
Hryhoriy Petrovsky was an ethnic Ukrainian
and a committed member of the Bolsheviks - the movement of professional
revolutionaries led by Vladimir Lenin, who seized power in 1917 and
went on to found the Soviet Union. Petrovksy saw himself as an
internationalist, and rejected Ukrainian nationalism.
He fought against the short-lived Ukrainian People's Republic
(1917-1919), which was crushed by the Bolsheviks. Petrovsky became the
interior minister of the Russian Soviet Republic before returning to
Ukraine in 1919, where he served as prime minister until 1938. He was
thought to be a close ally of Stalin, whose purges led to the deaths of
thousands of Ukrainian communists.
Local historians think he and the Ukrainian Soviet Communist leader,
Lazar Kaganovich, were the main executors of Stalin's policies in
Ukraine. Other historians, like Vasyl Marochko, a member of an official
commission which investigated the Holodomor, say that when Petrovsky
realised the extent of the famine he pleaded twice with Stalin to
provide Ukrainians with more food. His requests, they say, went
unheeded.
INCREASINGLY
UNPOPULAR
Last year, the statue to Petrovsky was
defaced by young Ukrainian nationalists who threw paint over it, and
wrote in graffiti: "To Petrovsky, the executioner of the Ukrainian
people". Earlier this year, the still-standing Lenin monument
on Kiev's main street, Khreshchatyk, was also damaged by the same
group.
In that incident, Lenin's nose and one of his hands were broken off
with a hammer. Less prominent statues to Ukrainian Soviet communist
leaders have been removed before.
But Petrovsky, whose body is interred near the Kremlin wall
in Moscow, is perhaps the highest profile figure to have his statue
demolished. His legacy has not completely vanished, because the central
industrial city of Dnipropetrovsk still carries his name, much to the
annoyance of some Ukrainians.
"The city should have been renamed when Ukraine gained its
independence," says Vadym Skurativsky, a leading Ukrainian writer.
ERASING
THE PAST
Ukraine has been slow to remove historical
monuments to Soviet leaders, despite the country's first president,
Leonid Kravchuk, issuing orders aimed at "de-sovietisation" in the
early 1990s.
The process has gone much further in the Ukrainian-speaking
western regions than in the industrialised, largely Russian-speaking
eastern regions.
The Holodomor has emerged as a contentious issue in Ukraine's relations
with Russia.
Moscow insists that other republics, particularly southern Russia and
Kazakhstan, also suffered from famine during the 1930s. It rejects the
assertion from Ukraine's leadership that there was a deliberate policy
of anti-Ukrainian "genocide".
But Ukrainian historians point to the widespread use of Soviet interior
ministry troops to requisition desperately needed food, as well as the
ban imposed on the movement of peasants to the cities. The
commemorations on Saturday will be marked by church services all over
Ukraine, the laying of wreaths, and a gathering of Ukraine's leaders at
a recently completed monument to the victims on a hillside location in
Kiev.
LINK:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8380433.stm
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5
. ‘ARE YOU LISTENING, THE NEW YORK
TIMES?’
Truth, and an informed public, are the
linchpin of a free society
Presentation by Nigel Linsan Colley,
Grand Nephew of Welsh Journalist Gareth Jones
Exhibition at UN Dedicated to 76th Anniversary of
the 1932-33 Holodomor
United Nations, New York, NY, Mon, Nov 23, 2009
Action Ukraine Report (AUR), Wash, D.C., Sat, Nov 28, 2009
NEW YORK, NY - Last
week, 180 newspapers across the world, from the Washington Post to the
London Times reported the remarkable story of Gareth Jones and his
graphic eyewitness accounts of his off-limits trek into Ukraine during
the height of Moscow’s starvation of that country. Today, we
call it the “Holodomor.”
Gareth’s accounts are preserved in his journalist’s diaries
which probably now represent the only surviving contemporary
independent western verification of that genocide. These precious
diaries are currently on display in the Wren Library at Cambridge
University, where Gareth had been a student.
They sit side by side with memorabilia of other illustrious
alumni including Sir Isaac Newton’s personal annotated copy of ‘The
Principia’, in which he proposed his fundamental mathematical Laws of
Motion.
When I came to the UN in 2003 with my mother to attend the
first exhibition commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Holodomor,
few had heard of the great man-made famine in Ukraine and even fewer
knew of Gareth’s role in telling the world about it.
BORN
IN BARRY, SOUTH WALES IN 1905
Gareth Jones was born in Barry, South Wales in 1905, the son
of a School headmaster. After graduating from Cambridge in 1929 with a
first-class honours’ degree in Russian, German and French, he was
employed by David Lloyd George, the former British WW1 Prime Minister
as his foreign affairs advisor.
In 1930 he went to the Soviet Union on behalf of Lloyd
George. Following an unescorted pilgrimage to the Ukrainian city of
Donetz, where his mother had been a governess in the 1890s, he returned
disillusioned at the brutality of the Stalinist regime against the
Ukrainian people and was invited to write three articles about the
subject for the London Times.
In London, in the September of 1932, Gareth learnt through
several informed sources, of reports emanating from Moscow, of a severe
famine in the southern part of the Soviet Union. Professor Jules Menken
(of the London School of Economics), an eminent economist of the time,
told Gareth that he “dreaded this winter, when he thought millions
would die of hunger and finally stated that “There was already famine
in Ukraine.” Due to the censorship of the press in
Moscow the world was unaware of the ongoing plight of the
Ukrainians.
In light of this information, Gareth wrote two prophetic
articles published in the Cardiff Western Mail in October
1932, entitled: “Will There be Soup?” where he painted a very bleak
picture of the coming Soviet winter. However, he knew that in order to
expose the famine in Ukraine he needed to see it first hand. Otherwise
the Soviet sources would continue to deny its existence.
GARETH
LEFT BY TRAIN FOR UKRAINE MARCH 1933
He arrived in Moscow on the fifth of March 1933, and
privately interviewed diplomats and journalists. After five days Gareth
quietly left by train for Ukraine with a rucksack full of loaves of
white bread, butter, cheese, meat and chocolate, which he had bought at
the foreign currency stores.
On his journey Gareth wrote of an episode; ‘Boy on train
asking for bread. I dropped a small piece of bread on floor and put it
in a spittoon. Peasant came and picked it up & ate it.’ Later
he noted ‘Man speaking German, same story “Tell them in England,
Starving, bellies extended. Hunger’
Without official papers he had to leave the train at the
Russian/Ukrainian border and sneak across. He stopped off in villages
along the way talking to the inhabitants and sleeping on the
bug-infested floors of their homes.
In his diaries he wrote… ‘Everywhere I talked to peasants
who walked past – they all had the same
story; “There is no bread – we haven’t
had bread for over 2 months – a lot are dying.”
The first village had no more potatoes left and the store of
БҮРЯК (beetroot) was running out. They all said ‘the cattle are dying.
(Nothing to feed.) НЕЧЕВО КОРМитьn.
Then I caught up with a bearded peasant who was walking along. His feet
were covered with sacking. We started talking. He spoke in Ukrainian
Russian. I gave him [a] lump of bread and of cheese.
[He said:] “You could not buy that
anywhere for 20 roubles. There just is no food”. We
walked along and talked [he told me]; “Before the war this was all
gold. We had horses and cows and pigs and chickens. Now we are ruined.
[We are] ПОГИБЛИ (the living
dead). “Before the war we could
have boots and meat and butter. We were the richest country in the
world for grain. We fed the world. Now they have taken all away from
us. “Now people steal much more. Four days ago, they stole my horse. “A
horse is better than a tractor. A tractor goes and stops, but a horse
goes all the time. A tractor cannot give manure, but a horse can.
"PEOPLE
ARE DYING OF HUNGER"
He took me along to his cottage. His daughter and three little children
[were there]. Two of the smaller children were swollen. “If you had
come before the Revolution we would have given you chicken and eggs and
milk and fine bread. Now we have no bread in the house. They are
killing us.” “People are dying of hunger.”
There was in the hut, a spindle and the daughter showed me how to make
thread. The peasant showed me his shirt, which was home-made and some
fine sacking which had been home-made. [He explained] “But the
Bolsheviks are crushing that. They won’t take it. They want the factory
to make everything.”
The peasant then ate some very thin soup with a scrap of
potato. No bread in house. The white bread [of Gareth’s] they thought
was wonderful.
In Kharkiv, he noted in his diary; ‘Queues for bread. Erika
[from the German Consulate] and I walked along about a hundred ragged
pale people.
Militiaman came out of shop whose windows had been battered
in and were covered with wood and said: “There is no bread” and “there
will be no bread today.” Shouts from angry peasants also there. “But
citizens, there is no bread.” “How long here?” I asked a man. “Two
days.” They would not go away but remained. [because] sometimes the
cart came with bread. Waiting with forlorn hope.
PRESS
CONFERENCE BERLIN MARCH 29, 1933
On 29th March 1933 Gareth exposed the Holodomor at a press
conference in Berlin. However, within 24 hours he was
personally denigrated by the then world’s highest paid correspondent
and Pulitzer prize winner Walter Duranty in an article in the New York
Times called ‘Russians hungry but not starving’. We know that
this was intentional & willfully misleading of the American
public.
The US Embassy in Berlin reported to the US State Department
that in discussions with Duranty, he admitted that the NYT had entered
into an agreement with Moscow to publish only the official Moscow party
line.
Duranty made his outrageous and prompt rebuttal to Gareth’s press
release stating: “Since I talked with Mr. Jones I have made exhaustive
inquiries about this alleged famine situation. . . . There is serious
food shortage throughout the country with occasional cases of
well-managed state or collective farms. The big cities and the army are
adequately supplied with food. There is no actual starvation or death
from starvation, but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to
malnutrition . . .”
He went on to explain the Soviet determination for the 5-year plan to
succeed; “But - to put it brutally - you can’t make an omelette without
breaking eggs.”
Gareth had embarrassed both the Americans and the Soviets who were
engaged in delicate negotiations towards establishing diplomatic
recognition between the two countries.
His reward was to be banished from the international
journalistic scene from more than a year. On the opposite
end, Duranty wrote that Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign
Affairs, was going home to Moscow with a “pretty fat turkey for
Thanksgiving.”
On November 16, 1933, some eight months after Gareth’s revelations,
Litvinov, whom Gareth had privately interviewed in March 1933, managed
to secure American diplomatic recognition of the USSR. He also banned
Gareth from returning to the Soviet Union.
From a letter written to a friend in 1934, Gareth
wrote: “Alas! You will be very amused to hear that
the inoffensive little 'Joneski' has achieved the dignity of being a
marked man on the black list of the O.G.P.U. and is barred from
entering the Soviet Union. I hear that there is a long list of crimes
which I have committed under my name in the secret police file in
Moscow and, funnily enough, espionage is said to be among them. As a
matter of fact Litvinoff sent a special cable from Moscow, to
the Soviet Embassy in London, to tell them to make the strongest of
complaints to Mr. Lloyd George about me.”
Gareth was tragically murdered little more than two years later in
1935, supposedly at the hands of Chinese bandit kidnappers in Inner
Mongolia, though there is much circumstantial evidence to link his
murder with the Soviet Secret Police. The trading company he was
traveling with was Wostwag, a trading front for the NKVD. Thus one of
the very few western witnesses of the Holodomor was effectively
silenced.
Gareth’s story would have ended there if it weren’t for
serendipity or maybe fate. Except perhaps for oblique references to
Jones in a couple of George Orwell’s writings, then for almost 70 years
his memory and role in exposing the Holodomor were forgotten, not just
by the world but also by the Ukrainian Diaspora.
Thanks to the interest generated in 2003, much of the world has been
made aware of the true circumstances of the Holodomor but it saddens me
to report that although the world press ran the story last week,
including a whole page in the London Times, conspicuous by its absence
was the NYT.
All the NYT Pulitzer prize winners are being besmirched by the infamous
acts of one rogue journalist. Isn’t it time Mr Sulzberger that as
publisher of the NYT you should do the decent thing and return his
Pulitzer? You owe it to your own paper’s reputation, and your
readership, to live by your famous motto and publish ‘all the news
that’s fit to print’.
WHAT
DOES ALL THIS MEAN, TODAY?
Ladies and gentlemen. What does
all this mean, today? Well, let me first take you back even
further to the past. One hundred and seventy years ago, a Frenchman,
Marquis de Custine published a book detailing his travels in
Russia. Among the observations was this:
“Russian despotism not only pays little respect to ideas and
sentiments, it will also deny facts; it will struggle against evidence,
and triumph in the struggle!”
Truth, and an informed public, are the linchpin of a free
society. The campaign in Russia to resurrect Stalin, to
whitewash his inhuman crimes, is well under way.
There are disturbing signs that his rehabilitation will not only be
poorly opposed but may even be facilitated by certain media around the
world.
Gareth Jones is a shining example of honest journalism, a
benchmark to be aspired to by today’s media. It is thanks to efforts of
many around us that the Holodomor is slowly, but surely, being accepted
as the apogee of Stalin’s terror. I believe that Gareth was
viciously murdered by the Soviet secret police.
It was what the Frenchman Custine warned about, the Russian
struggle against evidence. Just as decades later journalists
and others who sought to uncover Moscow’s crimes before a trusting
world, would also be murdered. No one is asking you to risk
your lives. But do risk a little of your time and energy to
uphold principle, honour and the truth. To make sure that
despotism does not triumph. Thank you very much.
NOTE: Published by the Action Ukraine Report
(AUR), Washington, D.C., with the permission of Nigel Linsan Colley
.
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6
. THE
MAN WHO EXPOSED STALIN AND THE NAZIS
As a new exhibition to Welsh investigative
reporter Gareth Jones opens we go in search of his legacy
The Big Issue in Scotland, Glasgow, Scotland, Tuesday, Nov
24, 2009
GLASGOW - The truth was everything to
Gareth Jones. The Barry-born Welsh investigative journalist led a short
but highly eventful life that ended in his murder in the wilds of
Mongolia in 1935 aged 29. It was the price he paid for his reportage in
Communist Russia and Nazi Germany in the 1930s, as he selflessly helped
expose one of the gravest crimes against humanity the world has ever
seen.
Unravelling the ultimate legacy of Gareth Jones has only just begun. In
his lifetime his work was cruelly discredited by other journalists,
jealous at his connections and incredulous that the gravity of what he
reported could possibly be true.
Jones’ picaresque career includes the time he shared a plane with Adolf
Hitler and Joseph Goebbels in February 1933, hours after Hitler was
made Chancellor of Germany. Jones later interviewed the Nazi propaganda
minister after a hysterical, 25,000-strong rally in Frankfurt.
He also became a personal aide to former Prime Minister David Lloyd
George, aged only 25, and was once photographed alongside shamed US
president Herbert Hoover outside the White House. Jones could also
count the wife of Lenin and American newspaper magnate William Randolph
Hearst among his interviewees.
But his single greatest achievement was almost single-handedly exposing
to the world the brutal reality of Josef Stalin’s regime, when he
covertly travelled to the Ukraine in the early 1930s to report on The
Great Famine (also known as the Holodomor) which killed an estimated
five million of the Communist dictator’s countrymen.
For the first time ever, Jones’ many diaries are on public display to
help cast new light on the personality and career of a man who, in the
words of his friend Lloyd George, “died because he knew too much.”
Nigel Linsan Colley, great nephew of Gareth Jones and the person who’s
done more than anyone to resurrect Jones’ memory, is keen to shine a
light on his great uncle’s achievements. “I think these
diaries were destined to resurrect Gareth’s memory,” Colley says of the
pencilled notes found in a dusty old suitcase in the house of Jones’
elder sister in Barry in 1990. “I think even [when he wrote them] he
understood how important they would one day become.
“We have the benefit of hindsight and history, but Gareth was living
it. There is great serendipity in his story and it’s one that proves
that the pen was mightier than the Soviet sword.”
Jones’ diaries are on display until next month in the Wren Library at
Cambridge University’s Trinity College, where he was once a student.
Colley says there are no firm plans to hold an exhibition of Jones’
work in his native Wales, but the day is surely inching closer.
The National Library of Wales in Aberystwyth, which already houses many
of Jones’ documents, says it has no immediate plans to hold an
exhibition of his life and work. But the interest in the journalist’s
work will reach a new level when Ukrainian director Sergey Bukovsky’s
documentary about the Holodomor, The Living, gets its Welsh premiere at
Cardiff’s Chapter Arts Centre in January.
Born Gareth Richard Vaughn Jones on August 13 1905 in Barry, Jones
quickly demonstrated a highly inquisitive and academic flare.
Graduating from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth in 1926 with a
first class honours degree in French he went on to Trinity College
Cambridge in 1929 and gained the same result in French, German and
Russian.
But he was flung into the world of work at a time of devastating
financial upheaval. Unable to find regular work as a journalist during
the Great Depression, Jones, through close family friend and fellow
Welshman Thomas Jones, was introduced to the former Prime Minister
David Lloyd George. His talents quickly earned him an internship.
Jones’ close association with Lloyd George’s Liberal Party in the early
1930s was the making of him. “From then on, wherever he turned up in
the world he would be granted interviews with extremely powerful
people,” Colley explains.
Despite his fascination with Westminster, Jones’ true passion was
travel. It was during three visits to Russia between 1930 and 1933 that
he uncovered a genocide being inflicted on the Ukrainian people by
Stalin’s Five Year Plan.
His diaries, and the subsequent newspaper reports in the Manchester
Guardian and New York Evening Post, made him the first Western
journalist to uncover the horror of Holodomor – Stalin’s devastating
“manmade famine” in the Ukraine during 1932-33, which claimed the lives
of millions.
Jones’ diary entries exposed the daily horror of people forced to
starve in a country that in 1932 produced its largest ever wheat
harvest: “Everywhere was the cry, ‘there is no bread. We are dying,’”
his reports read.
“This cry came from every part of Russia, from the Volga, Siberia,
White Russia, the North Caucasus [and] central Asia. I stayed overnight
in a village where there used to be 200 oxen and where there now are
six. The peasants were eating the cattle fodder and had only a month’s
supply left. They told me that many had already died of hunger. Two
soldiers came to arrest a thief. They warned me against travel by night
as there were too many ‘starving’ desperate men.”
Holodomor is now recognised by the Ukrainian government as a crime
against humanity. But after exposing Stalin’s purposeful starvation
policy against the Ukrainians, Jones became a marked man who would
eventually pay the ultimate price for the success and potency of his
work.
“Gareth saw himself as a British citizen, ultimately,” Colley explains.
“Perhaps he felt that was enough to protect him from danger. He knew he
was likely to have been caught by the Soviet secret police, but he was
a teetotal, devout Welsh non-conformist and for him, the truth mattered.
“I think he felt it was absolutely wicked what was happening and that
he had been given this duty to tell the story no matter what personal
risk he put himself under.”
Jones’ exposé of the Soviet government’s persecution of its own people
eventually led to him being banned from Russia altogether in 1933. It
proved a decisive moment; in less than two years, he was dead.
Jones’ Ukrainian stories were mercilessly discredited in the US media,
which, perhaps jealous of his contacts, tried to smear the young
Welshman with claims he’d fabricated them. He died knowing his
integrity had been undermined.
“He loved writing letters to the newspapers,” Colley says. “He enjoyed
having an argument, it was almost a game to him. But I think he was
disappointed to be shunned after his stories were printed and much of
his work was then overlooked.”
Jones’ ability to be at the centre of a story has acquired legendary
status. Within days of interviewing Joseph Goebbels in Frankfurt on
February 24, 1933 in a five star hotel, he was sleeping on bug-infested
floors of peasants in the Ukraine as he attempted to expose the horror
of Holodomor.
He interviewed the Nazi propaganda minister just three days before the
burning of the Reichstag in Berlin; an act that changed Germany
forever. In a chilling warning of what was to come, Goebbels told Jones
the Nazis would never surrender their stranglehold on power.
“It’s almost prophetic how Gareth was always in the right place at the
right time,” Colley says. “But of course, his death was very much a
case of the exact opposite being true.”
The circumstances of Jones’ death are still shrouded in mystery.
Question marks linger over who was with him in Mongolia and why. The
identity of Jones’ murderers may never actually be discovered.
Colley says there is “absolutely no doubt whatsoever” that he was
murdered at the request of Soviet agents. On August 12, 1935 he was
kidnapped while travelling with a German journalist “friend” named
Herbert Mueller in Mongolia.
Both Mueller and Jones were taken by a group of Chinese bandits, but
Mueller was released unharmed two days afterwards. It has since emerged
that Mueller was a Communist spy employed by Soviet agents supplying
arms for Chairman Mao’s Long March in 1934-36.
According to Colley, even the vehicle Mueller and Jones travelled in
was owned by the Soviet secret police. While there’s no conclusive
proof Mueller sold his friend to the Russians, Mueller certainly had
the connections and wherewithal to organise Jones’ death. That he died
because of what he knew seems beyond doubt.
“He was an enemy of the state,” Colley says. “He would not have been
murdered without the say so from someone in Moscow because of his close
association with Lloyd George. I just wonder what would have happened
had he survived. Would he have become editor of The Times or
Churchill’s interpreter at Yalta?”
Gareth Jones’ death aged 29 denied the world a fine journalist who, had
he lived, would likely have gone on to report further atrocities
happening in war torn Europe in the 1940s. The fact that he never
realised his full potential still leaves a bitter taste.
Exactly a year ago this week, the Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko
posthumously awarded Gareth Jones and another British journalist, the
late broadcaster Malcolm Muggeridge, the Ukranian Order of Freedom for
their “exceptional services” to the Ukrainian people in exposing
Holodomor.
The day that Wales brings home Jones’ diaries and recognises him as a
national hero, and arguably the finest journalist it’s ever produced,
must surely come soon.
LINK:
http://www.bigissuescotland.com/features/view/186
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7
. GARETH JONES
DIARIES: PERTURBING TRUTH IN CAMBRIDGE
Rory Finnin: “Ukraine is
a diamond of a country, not studied enough yet”
Interview with Rory Finnin, Lecturer in Ukrainian
Studies, Cambridge University
By Alina Popkova, The Day Weekly Digest in English,
#34
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, 24 November 2009
Recently the entire world heard about the notes of the “man who knew
too much” about the Holodomor in Ukraine. Trinity College, Cambridge
has opened an exhibit in its library of the diaries written by Gareth
Jones (1905–1935), a British journalist who, unbeknown to the Soviet
authorities and secret police, wrote reports and notes about the
man-made famine in Soviet Ukraine in 1932–1933.
Recognized today as a British national hero, Jones reveals through his
diaries the truth about Stalin’s atrocities against Ukrainian people
and conveys it to the Western public and the entire world. Ukrainians
learned about the courageous journalist for the first time from an
article by James Mace, an American researcher of the Holodomor in
Ukraine — “The Tale of Two Journalists.
Walter Duranty, Gareth Jones and the Pulitzer Prize” was
published in Den/The Day on July 16, 2003. Later it was republished in
the newspaper as well as in the books of The Day’s Library series — Day
and Eternity of James Mace and Extract 150.
The Day decided to find out about the atmosphere of the
exhibition, the public interest it generates, the future of Jones’
notes, and the international recognition of the Holodomor in Ukraine by
interviewing Rory FINNIN, Lecturer in Ukrainian Studies at Cambridge
University, who was personally involved in organizing the exhibition of
Jones’ diaries.
[The Day] How is the Gareth Jones’ diaries exhibition going? Has it
attracted public interest? Are the diaries going to be translated into
Ukrainian? Is the exhibition going to be displayed in Ukraine?
[Rory Finnin] “The exhibition of journalist Gareth Jones’
1933 diaries is being held in the library of Trinity College,
Cambridge. It will be open until 2010. The exhibition was opened on
November 13 and devoted to the premiere (all the tickets are already
sold out) of Serhii Bukovsky’s documentary The Living, which is part of
our second Annual Cambridge Festival of Ukrainian Cinema. In view of
that, the public interest to the diaries is high.
"This exhibition has been reported by the world media: by
The Guardian, The Telegraph, The Washington Times, The BBC World, and
others, and there are quite a number of visitors at the library. Nigel
Linsen Colley, Gareth Jones’ grand nephew, and I are just discussing
the possibility of organizing the exhibition of the diaries in Ukraine
and elsewhere in the world, as well as translating and publishing them.”
[The Day] Do you think there is a need on the international
level to know the truth about the Holodomor now that some countries are
opposed to the idea of recognizing it, and prevent it from being
recognized, for example, by the UN?
[Rory Finnin] “I think that every year the world public
becomes more aware of this tragedy. I hope that the exhibit and the
screening of Bukovsky’s film The Living will help us tell the British
public more about the Holodomor, and, to some extent, to commemorate
the famine victims in Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus, and the Volga
region.”
[The Day] In your opinion, why does it happen that the journalists who
deliver the truth to the world often become forgotten heroes?
[Rory Finnin] “Gareth Jones was the only journalist who
staked his name and reputation for the sake of telling the truth about
the famine. He is a model of a journalist’s professionalism; he
inspires our students at Cambridge University. As you know, he was a
Cambridge graduate. We are very proud of him.”
How important are your studies for the image of Ukraine? Can you call
your studies an islet of Ukrainian culture in Great Britain?
“Ukrainian Studies at Cambridge University are only one year
old. During this short period of time we have laid a foundation for a
very bright and unique program of studying the literature, language,
and culture of Ukraine. Our program is one of a kind in Europe. In
addition to our academic subjects I organize public lectures on
Ukrainian culture and society, arrange art exhibits, various seminars,
and the Annual Festival of Ukrainian Cinema.”
[The Day] Is interest in Ukraine increasing among the
university students?
[Rory Finnin] “Interest in Ukraine is increasing, and here,
in Cambridge, we are ready to facilitate its further growth. My
students consider Ukraine to be fascinating and value its rich and
diverse cultural tradition. It is very simple: they look at the map of
Europe and see that the largest country of the continent remains mostly
unexplored, underestimated, or understudied.
"When they start the Introduction to the Language,
Literature, and Culture of Ukraine, they feel they are discovering
something new and exciting: Kotliarevsky’s burlesque poetry, the
Cossack novels by Kulish, pieces by Maksymovych, Bohomazov’s paintings,
Tychyna’s early poetry, and contemporary works by Andrukhovych,
Zabuzhko, Zhadan, Karpa, Kurkov, and Deresh. Our students read all this
in the original and then produce wonderful essays. One of my students
has recently written a poem devoted to Vasyl Stus.”
[The Day] Why is Ukraine interesting to you? What has led you to take
up this job?
[Rory Finnin] “I am a teacher of literature, and Ukraine is
a wonderful place, a diamond of a country, and not studied enough yet.
This is very simple. I have always thought that Ukraine is an important
country, which has to share itself with the world.
“I have Irish background. I first got acquainted with
Ukraine in 1990, when I was a Peace Corps volunteer and taught at
School No. 151 in Chapaievka [in Cherkasy oblast]. I was referred there
by my dear friend Tetiana Kaplun. She and her husband, Ivan Kaplun,
together with my Ukrainian students inspired me to study the Ukrainian
language and culture in greater depth.”
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8
. THE UKRAINIAN
HOLODOMOR OF 1932–33 AS
A
CRIME
OF GENOCIDE, A LEGAL ASSESSMENT
Abstract: Complied by Prof. Volodymyr Vassylenko,
Adviser to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Former Ambassador
Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Great Britain, Professor of
International Law,
National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy
Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Kyiv, Ukraine, 2009
This essay deals with the basic issues related to a legal
assessment of the genocidal nature of the Ukrainian Holodomor of
1932–33 in the light of the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The main emphasis is to prove the
intention of the totalitarian Communist regime to partially destroy the
Ukrainian nation by using an artificial famine as an instrument for
exterminating its major constituent part, the Ukrainian peasantry.
The machinery for carrying out the Holodomor is explained
and issues related to the responsibility of its ideologists,
organizers, perpetrators and accomplices are raised. The author
stresses the need for an official legal assessment of the Holodomor by
competent judicial authorities of Ukraine in order to elucidate all of
its circumstances and detrimental consequences.
CONTENTS
Introduction………………………………………………………………………..4
Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity……………………………………..........5
Distinctive Features of Genocide…………………………………………….........6
Proof of Intent to Organize the Holodomor………………………………………...8
Targeted Group: The Ukrainian Nation…………………………………………..18
Ukraine’s Demographic Losses…………………………………………………..33
The Holodomor Machine………………………………………………………....36
Guilt and Healing………………………………………………………………....41
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………...47
Abbreviations………………………………………………………………….....49
INTRODUCTION
With every passing
year the truth about the Ukrainian Holodomor of 1932–33 is spreading
among the Ukrainian and world communities. Today there can be no doubt
that Stalin’s totalitarian communist regime committed a brutal crime
against the Ukrainian nation as a result of which millions of the
Ukrainian peasants were starved to death in an artificially induced
famine.
The study of the Holodomor
phenomenon is gradually bringing to light an ever increasing range of
issues related to its underlying reasons, the motives, surrounding
circumstances, machinery of implementation, and consequences.
Accordingly, the informational gaps and controversies regarding this
terrible tragedy are decreasing in number. At the same time, however,
the debate as to whether the Holodomor can be qualified as genocide
continues and even seems to be intensifying.
Notwithstanding the Verkhovna Rada’s
adoption of the Law “On the Holodomor of 1932–33 in Ukraine,” there are
still some researchers, political scientists and politicians – both in
Ukraine and abroad – who, while acknowledging the criminal nature of
the Holodomor, do not consider it to have been a crime of genocide. In
essence they argue that Ukrainian peasants were not the only ones who
died en masse on the boundless expanses of the Land of the Soviets, so
it makes little sense to single out the genocidal nature of the
Holodomor.
This type of reasoning ignores
the national dimension of the Ukrainian Holodomor that has been now
been firmly proven by the well documented studies of such authoritative
researchers like Robert Conquest, James Mace and Andrea
Graziosi.
GENOCIDE
AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
Even if one were to consider the Ukrainian peasantry’s victimization by
man-made famine outside of the national context, such mass murder
nonetheless comprises a grave international crime or crime against
humanity.
With this in mind, it should
be noted that for a legal assessment and condemnation of the killing of
peasants by famine, one need not invent new terms like “democide,”
“sociocide or “classocide.” Rather, one need only apply international
law, which, in addition to genocide, includes the category “crimes
against humanity,” among which “extermination” is specifically
mentioned. Under international law, extermination means the deliberate
mass or systematic killing of a large number of the civilian
population, and includes the deprivation of access to food and medicine.
Genocide and extermination are
considered to be the gravest of international crimes according to the
generally recognized rules of international customary law as confirmed
by international treaties and, in particular, by the 1948 UN Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and by the
1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Article 6 of the Rome Statute
sets forth the corpus delicti of genocide as defined in the 1948 UN
Convention, while article VII lists other international crimes under
the general heading “Crimes against Humanity,” which include such
crimes as extermination (par. 1 (b)).
Hence, genocide is not the
only international crime or crime against humanity, but just one of
them. However, this particular crime differs from the others in
character, legal implications, and consequences and is therefore
considered to be the “crime of crimes” in the theory of international
law.
The specific socio-legal
character of the crime of genocide lies in the intent to destroy
national, ethnical, racial or religious groups as such, that is, those
groups that comprise the most important basic civilizational elements
in the structure of humankind. The destruction of such elements, being
contrary to the universal principle of diversity, threatens
not only individuals and communities but the very existence of
humankind.
What genocide and the other
crimes against humanity have in common is the large-scale or systematic
violation of natural human rights and fundamental freedoms for which
states, public officials and private individuals may be held
responsible pursuant to the rules of national and international law.
Surely any unbiased person
with a modicum of conscience and human compassion would not question
the assessment of the intentional elimination of millions of Ukrainian
peasants in 1932–33 as a crime against humanity under the heading
“extermination.” The mass murder of Ukrainians was therefore a grave
international crime regardless of whether it constituted genocide or
extermination.
However, an elementary sense
of justice and human solidarity demands honoring the memory of
Holodomor victims and a proper legal assessment of our national tragedy
within the context of the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
DISTINCTIVE
FEATURES OF GENOCIDE
Some researchers of the Holodomor often criticize the legal definition
of genocide for its imperfection, and the 1948 Convention for
its drawbacks (V. Marochko, Y. Zakharov). Moreover, some of them
conclude that only the Holocaust meets the Convention’s legal criteria
and that such criteria still “do not provide a 100 percent guarantee
that all cases of mass destruction of people will be identified as
genocide” (S. Kulchytsky). Such assessments of the 1948 Convention are
erroneous from at least two perspectives.
[1] First, the legal criteria
of the Convention were not designed to qualify all cases of the mass
destruction of people as genocide. Pursuant to article II of the
Convention, the term genocide means certain criminal acts committed
against any national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such, and
not simply cases of mass destruction of people. As mentioned earlier,
the mass destruction of people is the separate international crime of
extermination.
[2] Secondly, while the
criteria of the 1948 Convention were formulated under the impact of the
tragic events of World War Two, they remain the rules of general
international law. Thus, this document and only this document may be
used to determine whether certain criminal acts meet the legal
definition of genocide.
The Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide reflects the
historical context in which it was elaborated. Whether or not one likes
the final version of the Convention signed on 9 December
1948, it remains an authentic and legally valid instrument of
international law. No state or the international community as a whole
has challenged the authority of the 1948 Convention, as was
convincingly confirmed fifty years later when article II, which defines
the corpus delicti of genocide, was repeated word for word in article 6
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
In light of the above, any
attempt to interpret the provisions of the 1948 Convention in order to
“improve” it or adapt it to the specifics of “Soviet genocide” would be
counterproductive. The researchers who take such an approach present
theses, which, from a legal point of view and contrary to
their good intentions, provide grounds for denying the genocidal nature
of the Holodomor.
On the other hand, attempts by
researchers, politicians and political scientists of certain countries
to deny the genocidal nature of the Holodomor by consciously distorting
the provisions of the 1948 Convention are inadmissible.
In accordance with the
principles of the law of international treaties, the 1948 Convention
should be accepted just as it is and applied to qualify criminal acts
as genocide in strict conformity to the corpus dilecti set forth
exclusively by the Convention, and not to arbitrarily selected criteria
for the sake of convenience.
The essence of the crime of
genocide is defined in the introductory part of article II of the 1948
Convention as “…acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” It is
well recognized in the theory of international law and confirmed by
practice that for a criminal act to constitute genocide, one must prove
that the perpetrator had a special intent (dolus specialis) to destroy
a group specified in the Convention, and that the criminal behavior was
committed against the defined group as such.
Actions that lack both of the
aforementioned essential elements do not constitute an act of genocide
even if they resulted in a group’s extermination. Genocide differs from
other crimes against humanity, first, in the nature of the intent
rather than the number of victims. Secondly, it is committed, not
against people in general, but against a clearly defined
group. Thirdly, genocide is not directed just against
individual members of the group but primarily against the group as such.
In other words, a distinctive
feature of genocide is that members of the groups defined in the 1948
Convention – national, ethnical, racial or religious – are
exterminated, in whole or in part, because of their very affiliation to
a respective group.
A decisive factor in
qualifying certain behavior as the crime of genocide is the proof of a
special intent to destroy a particular national, ethnical, racial or
religious group and demonstrating that this intent specifically related
to that group, rather than asking why, when and where was the crime
committed or concentrating on the so-called quantitative threshold,
that is, the number of victims.
It should be stressed,
however, that the answers to these questions are nonetheless very
important for proving a special intent and other essential elements of
the crime and, in particular, the targeting of the specific
groups referred to in the 1948 Convention. In this regard, one must
acknowledge the contribution of Ukrainian historians, such as S.
Kulchytsky, V. Marochko, Yu. Mytsyk, R. Pyrih, V. Serhiychuk, Yu.
Shapoval, Ye. Shatalina, V. Vasilyev and the many others whose numerous
findings laid a reliable factual foundation for qualifying the
Ukrainian Holodomor of 1932–33 as a crime of genocide. The selfless
work of J. Mace and V. Manyak also deserve mention.
PROOF
OF INTENT TO ORGANIZE THE HOLODOMOR
To prove the genocidal nature of the Holodomor, it is first of all
necessary to demonstrate that Stalin’s totalitarian communist regime
intended to organize the man-made famine in Ukraine. Those who deny
that the Holodomor was an act of genocide ask whether this intent was
documented and whether there existed a premeditated plan as evidence of
this intent. Answering this question, the Russian historian V.
Kondrashin states: “Researchers have failed to find a single document
of the Soviet government or Central Committee of the Party that gave
instructions to starve a specific number of peasants, Ukrainian or
otherwise.”
Given the above, it should be
emphasized that the 1948 Convention does not require a
document to be produced as evidence of the existence of a criminal plan
or the intent to commit a crime: it only requires that such intent be
proven.
Moreover, it is highly
unlikely that a document containing a plan for the destruction by
starvation of the Ukrainian peasantry will ever be found. Given the
proclivity to secrecy instilled in the minds of Bolshevik leaders and
their desire to cover up a horrifically criminal and inhuman act, the
existence of such a document is problematic in principle. Even in Nazi
Germany with its officially approved racist policy, the genocide
committed against the Jews was implemented under the guise of a “final
solution to the Jewish question.”
Today those who deny that the
Ukrainian Holodomor was an act of genocide agree that the famine in
Ukraine and elsewhere in the USSR was precipitated by the arbitrary
confiscation of grain and other produce grown by the peasants, in
compliance with the government’s excessive grain procurement plans as
ordered by higher party organs. The implementation of such plans doomed
the inhabitants of rural areas to an inevitable death by starvation.
Hence, planning the confiscation of excessive quantities of farm
produce from the peasants is the tantamount to planning the
Holodomor. It can therefore be said that the plan for exterminating
Ukrainian peasants was disguised in the form of the state’s excessive
grain procurements.
All of the plans for excessive
grain procurements served criminal purposes but only the grain
procurement plans of 1932 and 1933 became plans for the genocidal
extermination of the Ukrainian peasantry.
In 1926, the last year during
which the free buying and selling of farm produce was still permitted,
the state procured 3.3 million tonnes of grain in Ukraine. With the
introduction of centralized grain procurement planned and managed from
Moscow, Ukraine’s grain quota for 1928 was set at 4.4 million tonnes.
The target for the entire Soviet Union was 10.5 million tonnes. By 1930
the grain procurement quotas had almost doubled and stood at 7.7
million tonnes for Ukraine, and 20 million for the entire Soviet Union.
With the divestiture of the
kulaks and forced collectivization, the traditional system of farming
was utterly destroyed. However, grain procurement quotas were sharply
raised before a new farming system was in place. Ukrainian collective
farms started operating in 1930. In that year, thanks to favorable
weather conditions, Ukraine harvested 23 million tonnes and more than
fulfilled its grain procurement plan. However, due to the inefficiency
of collective farm management, the bumper harvest was accompanied by
massive grain losses. As a result, the peasants were deprived of their
usual grain reserves with which they traditionally made a living.
Ignoring the needs of the
peasants in the mistaken belief that the success of the grain
procurement plan for 1930 was due to the advantages of the collective
farm system, the Kremlin leadership proceeded to inflate the 1931 grain
procurement plan as well. Ukraine was now required to supply 7.7
million tonnes of grain, and the other Union republics – 21.4
million.
With a considerably smaller
harvest of 18.3 million tonnes, the procurement plan for 1931 was
implemented under extreme pressure by confiscating maximum amounts of
grain from both collective farms and individual peasants. Ukraine
delivered only 7 million tonnes of grain instead of 7.7 million. Large
quantities of grain were again confiscated from rural areas, as a
result of which in 1931 there was already starvation in many parts of
Ukraine and even registered fatalities.
The report of the secret
political department of the All-Union State Political Directorate
(OGPU) for the end of 1931 and beginning of 1932 stated: “Food
shortages and cases of starvation of collective farm families have been
observed in a number of settlements of the Ukrainian SSR (in the
Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, and Vinnytsia regions).” However,
there was no mention of famine in official documents at that time;
instead, euphemisms such as “food shortages” and “hunger” were used.
In planning and implementing
the grain procurements in 1930–31, the Bolshevik leadership probably
still had no intention of organizing a famine. Its goal at the time was
not to eliminate peasants in Ukraine and other regions of the USSR, but
to accumulate large centralized supplies of grain and other farm
produce, which was required to earn foreign currency. This income would
then be used for the industrialization of the USSR, the creation of a
powerful military-industrial complex, for modernizing and equipping the
Red Army as the instrument of future “liberation” campaigns, and for
enforcing communism throughout the world.
The starvation and famine,
which first appeared by the end of 1931 and then spread throughout
Ukraine and other regions of the USSR at the beginning of 1932, was the
logical consequence of the criminal negligence of the communist
leadership, which should have foreseen the dangers of implementing the
arbitrarily excessive grain procurement plans.
There can be no doubt that the
Bolshevik leaders fully understood that the continuous practice of such
procurement plans would precipitate a large-scale famine and doom
millions of peasants to death by starvation.
In comparison with 1930–31,
the 1932–33 plans for grain procurements in Ukraine set somewhat lower
quotas at an annual level of 5.8 million tonnes. However, even these
quotas proved to be too onerous for rural areas because potential
productivity had been substantially weakened in the preceding years.
The adoption of such quotas was therefore tantamount to sanctioning the
plans for exterminating the Ukrainian peasants.
Thus, the Ukrainian Holodomor
planned by Stalin’s regime commenced with the implementation of the
1932 plan for grain procurement. In light of this, it is erroneous to
assert that the Holodomor-genocide started in Ukraine in 1933. Such a
conclusion is based upon the presumption that the crime of genocide
requires a certain quantitative threshold related to the number of
victims. This is clearly incorrect as the 1948 Convention does not make
the number of victims a legal element of the crime. It is not difficult
to imagine instances where the number of victims of genocide could be
quite limited, involving not even thousands of people, but only
hundreds, as in the destruction of a small tribe or ethnic minority.
Killing by starvation occurred
in Ukraine and the Kuban both before and in 1933. The difference
between the two periods consisted only in the quantitative scale of the
crime. While in 1932 hundreds of thousands of people were starved to
death, the death toll in 1933 was already in the millions. However, the
famine of 1932–33 in both Ukraine and the Kuban – unlike in other
regions of the USSR, where many also perished of hunger – was an act of
genocide because it was deliberately directed against the Ukrainian
nation as such.
In the critical situation that
developed in Ukraine, a civilized solution to the crisis would have
been to drastically reduce the excessive grain procurement plans, stop
the barbarian plundering of rural areas, declare the famine-struck
areas as zones of humanitarian catastrophe, and immediately provide
large-scale assistance.
Instead, Stalin’s totalitarian
communist regime continued to implement excessive grain procurement
plans and, to ensure their unconditional fulfillment, also undertook
unprecedented repressive measures against the Ukrainian peasants,
accompanied by the confiscation of all food products.
In compliance with the orders
of Kremlin leaders, the resolutions of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (CC of CP(B)U) of 18 November
1932, and of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR
(CPC of Ukr.SSR) of 20 November 1932 required that grain produced on
collective farms and retained as in-kind stock be transferred to grain
procurement stock. Moreover, it was prohibited to make advance payments
in the form of grain, and grain already paid to peasants in lieu of
wages was confiscated. Finally, as punishment for failure to fulfill
grain procurement schedules, and for the incorrect use of grain and its
embezzlement, fines were imposed in an amount equal to 15 monthly
collective farm meat quotas for both collectivized and
individually-owned cattle.
By broadly interpreting these
decisions, those responsible for their implementation went well beyond
the in-kind fines in meat and confiscated other food products as well –
potatoes, kidney beans, onions, cabbage, etc. – under the pretext of
striving to fulfill the grain procurement plans.
The Resolution of the CPC of
the Ukr.SSR and the CC of the CP(b)U of 6 December 1932 approved the
“blacklisting” of villages that allegedly sabotaged grain procurements.
The punitive measures inflicted on such villages included the
following: halting the delivery of goods and removing all those
remaining in cooperative and state shops; a comprehensive ban on
cooperative and state trading, and on collective-farm trading for both
collective farmers and individual peasants; cessation of all credit and
the acceleration of repayment of existing loans and other financial
obligations; and the repression of all “alien, hostile and
counterrevolutionary elements.”
On the basis of this and
similar decisions, hundreds of Ukrainian villages and even entire
districts were blacklisted. Their inhabitants were “ghettoized,”
deprived of the bare necessities of life, and subjected to special
fines and selective political repression. Following implementation of
the 1930–31 grain procurement plans, practically no grain supplies were
left in the Ukrainian countryside, as confirmed by the results of
numerous searches and raids during which infinitesimal amounts of grain
– in terms of the state quotas – were confiscated. Nevertheless, Stalin
sent the Ukrainian leadership a telegram on 1 January 1933 that set
forth a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist
Party (Bolshevik) (CC of AUCP(b)), which by implication gave the signal
to intensify mass searches and the confiscation of all vestiges of food
belonging to Ukrainian collective farms, collective farmers and
individual peasants.
The strict and widespread
application of exceedingly cruel and repressive measures in order to
fulfill the excessive grain procurement plans, such as the arbitrary
confiscation of all food supplies, should be convincing proof of the
intent of the totalitarian regime to precipitate a famine in Ukraine as
the instrument for the premeditated extermination of the Ukrainian
peasantry as part of the Ukrainian nation.
An analysis of the behavior of
the communist leaders reveals a body of circumstantial or indirect
evidence that convincingly proves the existence of the special intent
required for the crime of genocide.
[1] First, at the height of
the Holodomor Ukrainian peasants were prohibited from leaving Ukraine.
Army troops and GPU units were stationed at railway stations and on the
borders of the Ukrainian SSR. The Resolution of the Politburo of the CC
of the AUCP(b) and CPC of the Ukr.SSR of 22 January 1933 gave orders to
prevent “a mass exodus of peasants from the Northern Caucasus to other
areas, and the entry of peasants from Ukraine into the territory of
that region” and “a mass exodus from Ukraine to other areas and entry
into Ukraine from the Northern Caucasus.” This restriction deliberately
deprived starving peasants of access to life-saving food beyond the
borders of famine-struck Ukraine, thereby condemning them to death.
[2] Second, Party and Soviet
leaders at all levels who disagreed with the excessive grain
procurement plans and who wished to help the starving peasants with
collective-farm produce reserves were systematically and ruthlessly
repressed.
[3] Third, the sizable
quantities of grain that had been accumulated in the state reserves of
both the Inviolable and Mobilization Funds were not used to help
Ukraine. As of 1 January 1932 these two funds held a combined total of
2,033 million tonnes of grain, and 3,034 million tonnes as of 1 January
1933. This quantity would have been sufficient to supply, until the
next harvest, the necessary bread rations (one kilogram per day) for
ten million people in 1932, and fifteen million in 1933.
[4] Fourth, while millions of
Ukrainian peasants were starving to death, large quantities of grain
and other Ukrainian food products were being exported to other regions
of the USSR and abroad. The Soviet Union exported as much as 5.8
million tonnes of grain in 1930, 4.8 million tonnes in 1931, 1.6
million 1932, and 1.8 million in 1933.
There can be no doubt that a
restriction on grain exports in 1931 – by the end of which Ukraine was
starting to experience serious food shortages, starvation was
spreading, and the first signs of famine were appearing – and an
outright ban on grain exports in 1932–33 could have prevented the
famine.
Moreover, such
measures would not have critically affected Soviet industrialization
plans because world prices for wheat had dropped and foreign currency
revenues from grain exports had decreased accordingly. In fact, in
1932–33 the value of grain exports amounted to only 369 million rubles,
whereas exports of timber and petroleum products earned approximately
1,570 million rubles.
[5] Fifth, Stalin’s regime
denied the existence of a famine in Ukraine and therefore refused to
accept the aid offered by many foreign non-governmental organizations
and, in particular, by the Ukrainian communities abroad. Such
assistance would have substantially reduced the scale of the tragedy,
if not preventing it altogether. This policy of denial and the refusal
of international humanitarian aid is additional convincing
evidence of the regime’s intention to use famine for exterminating the
Ukrainian peasantry as part of the Ukrainian nation.
Hence, the communist regime
had sufficient resources to prevent both the Holodomor in Ukraine and
starvation in other regions of the USSR. However, instead of using
these resources, a well-devised system of repressive measures was
deliberately implemented to deprive the peasants of all food because
Kremlin leaders intended to use a man-made famine as an instrument of
genocidal extermination.
The regime’s
obvious ability to “control” the famine in 1932–33 confirmed the
artificial nature of the Ukrainian Holodomor and its deliberate use for
killing the Ukrainian peasants. By the middle of 1933 the mortality
rate due to starvation began to drop in Ukraine. In the following year
the famine actually ended, even though the 1934 harvest was a mere 12.3
million tonnes and much smaller than the harvests of 1932 and 1933,
which totaled 36.9 million tonnes.
The first measure taken to
stop the repressive confiscation of produce from the peasants was the
secret directive of Stalin and Molotov, signed on 8 May 1933 and
circulated among all Party and Soviet workers, OGPU departments, the
judiciary and the prosecutor’s office: “The time has come when we no
longer need mass repressions which, as is known, concern not only the
kulaks but also individual peasants and collective farmers.” As the
peasants, isolated in their villages and weakened by hunger, no longer
posed a threat to the regime, the directive called for an end to mass
evictions, the “regulation” of arrests and the “unloading” of places of
detention.
Towards the end of 1933 and
beginning of 1934, the CC of the AUCP(b) and the CPC of the USSR
adopted a number of resolutions aimed at improving the living and
working conditions on collective farms. In particular, these measures
included the repeal of unrealistic grain procurement quotas and
arbitrary expropriations of grain, and the introduction of a new
procedure for making advanced payments for participating in the harvest
(10 June 1933); the statutory right of peasants to own a cow, minor
livestock and poultry (20 June 1933); the preventing of collective
farms that had already fulfilled their planned targets from taking on
additional work orders (2 August 1933); and assistance to collective
farmers for purchasing a cow for those who had none (10 August 1933).
The decisive factor in
stopping the famine was the cancellation of the old system of grain
procurements. The Resolution of the CC of the AUCP(b) and CPC of the
USSR of 19 January 1934 set fixed quotas whereby the mandatory delivery
of grain was not to exceed one third of the gross yield of each
farmstead during an average harvest. As a result of this measure and
the abolition of arbitrary expropriations, grain exports were lowered
by more than fifty percent in comparison with 1932–33. In 1934 only
770,000 tonnes of grain were exported.
The regime’s “efficiency” in
both organizing and ending the Holodomor is evidence of the fact that
the intent to exterminate the Ukrainian peasants was implemented within
the strict time limits that the regime had set for itself.
In attempting to deny the
genocidal nature of the Ukrainian Holodomor, reference is sometimes
made to archival documents attesting to the assistance given to various
regions including Ukraine. For example, R. Davies of the United Kingdom
and S. Wheatcroft of Australia analyze some thirty-five resolutions of
the CC of the AUCP(b) and CPC of the USSR, adopted for such purposes
between 7 February and 20 July 1933. The American, M. Tauger, takes a
similar position. It should be noted that there were in fact many such
decisions, issued not only by the central authorities and not only in
1933. However, a study of these documents reveals that this assistance
was too late, too limited and too selective. Moreover, large quantities
of this aid were not even in the form of food products for starving
humans, but seed stock for collective farm sowing campaigns in
preparation for the coming harvest.
When food aid finally did
arrive in rural areas, it was only distributed in a manner akin to soup
kitchens, and only to those collective farmers who were still able to
work and lived in field camps. There were even resolutions that
restricted hospital treatment and feeding to healthier patients who had
better prospects of recovery. Finally, food aid was not provided to
individual peasants but distributed among local Party and Komsomol
leaders and activists.
As V. Marochko rightly pointed
out, the decisions of the central authorities in 1932–33 with respect
to “improving the situation in Ukraine” and “rendering aid” were not
aimed at overcoming the causes of the famine and saving Ukrainian
peasants, but primarily at ensuring the needs of production during the
sowing and harvesting campaigns.
This assistance was also
provided for propaganda purposes and to conceal the criminal behavior
of the authorities. In view of this factor, one can only agree with the
quite reasonable opinion of S. Kulchytsky that the assistance to the
peasants who had just been forcibly deprived of all their food supplies
should actually be considered an element of the crime.
Indeed, notwithstanding the
food assistance, the mortality rate among the Ukrainian peasants was
still growing. The height of the Holodomor, when victims numbered in
the millions, was in the period February–June 1933, during which the
previously mentioned thirty-five resolutions on assistance to Ukrainian
peasants were adopted. In practical terms, the issue related less to
the provision of food aid and more to its non-provision. The selective
distribution of limited and carefully measured assistance to only a
predetermined segment of the peasantry meant the non-provision of
assistance to the remainder who numbered in the millions. Given the
huge supplies of grain in centralized state reserves and the sizable
food exports, this type of assistance does[pts1] not disprove
the intent to exterminate the Ukrainian peasants but is clear evidence
of the intent to partially exterminate them.
This intent to partially
exterminate was determined not only by the specific “assistance”
rendered to the Ukrainian peasants doomed to death by starvation, but
also by the regime’s pragmatic needs in terms of the human resources
necessary for collective-farm labor, industrial production, and the
armed forces.
TARGETED
GROUP: THE UKRAINIAN NATION
Ukrainian peasants were not the only victims of the artificially
induced famine in 1932–33. However, only the Ukrainian Holodomor, which
engulfed Ukraine and the Kuban, could be considered genocide. The
famine elsewhere in the USSR had the attributes of another
international crime, namely, extermination. The difference between
genocide and extermination lies not in the number of victims, since,
from the legal point of view, quantitative indicators do not constitute
the criteria by which the criminal behavior becomes
genocide.
There was a qualitative difference between the Ukrainian Holodomor and
famines in other regions of the USSR: the peasants living outside
Ukraine and the Kuban were starved to death as a social class, whereas
the Ukrainian peasants were starved to death primarily because of their
affiliation with the Ukrainian nation.
The legitimacy and fairness of
this assessment is obvious in light of Bolshevik theory and practice
with respect to the national question and the regime’s policy towards
Ukraine.
The Leninist-Stalinist
leadership always attached particular importance to Ukraine because
keeping it within Moscow’s sphere of domination was a key prerequisite
for the viability of the communist regime and the new empire known as
the USSR. As Lenin stated, “To lose Ukraine is to lose the head.”
Hence, the Bolsheviks refused to recognize the right of the Ukrainian
nation to establish an independent state. Notwithstanding Lenin’s
slogan about the right of nations to self-determination, the Bolshevik
leaders in Ukraine – Gorovitz and Pyatakov – declared at the June 1917
meeting of the Kyiv Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Workers’
Party, that the Bolsheviks would not support the independence of
Ukraine because Russia could not exist without its grain, coal, sugar,
etc.
In the period 1917–20
following the declaration of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR),
Soviet Russia occupied Ukraine three times under the
contrived pretext of providing armed assistance to the
pro-Bolshevik Ukrainian Soviet Republic that was established to
counterbalance the UPR. Following the second occupation of Ukraine in
1919, Lenin remarked, “Now that we have Ukraine, we have grain.” For
the third occupation, completed in 1920, Bolshevik Russia deployed six
armies of 1.2 million soldiers to keep Ukraine within its grip.
Considering the extent of the
Ukrainian liberation movement and the impossibility of achieving a
lasting conquest of Ukraine with arms alone, Lenin, in December 1922,
signed with the subservient Soviet government of Ukraine the Union
Treaty that recognized the independence of the Ukrainian Socialist
Soviet Republic, as it was then called. Other tactical concessions were
made as well, largely in the national-cultural sphere. In particular, a
policy of Ukrainianization was introduced, thereby contributing to
de-Russification and a strengthening of the Ukrainian identity.
While the Kremlin leadership
was forced to make certain concessions, it had in no way lessened its
control over Ukraine and was actually preparing to take revenge. The
first step in that direction was the creation in December 1922 of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In practical terms, this marked
the beginning of the re-creation of the former empire, albeit in a
somewhat narrower geopolitical space and with a new communist role.
The reintegration of Ukraine
was clearly a success for the Kremlin leadership, as it strengthened
its power grip on the republic without curtailing the latter’s freedom
to pursue its own national-cultural course. Moreover, Ukrainianization
was acknowledged by the Party as its official policy on
national-cultural development, as based on the resolutions of the 7th
Conference of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (CP(b)U) of
4–10 April 1923, and the 12th Congress of the AUCP(b) of 17–25 April
1923. Despite certain controversies and inconsistencies in
implementation, the policy of Ukrainianization was a powerful
instrument in making Ukraine “Ukrainian.”
Ukrainianization not only
involved the extensive use of the Ukrainian language but had an impact
on other key spheres of public life as well. In particular, with the
Ukrainianization carried out under the leadership of the CP(b)U and
with the active participation of O. Shumskiy and M. Skrypnyk, a
European-style cultural renaissance took place. Cultural traditions
quite different from the Russian began to take form and were
psychologically more oriented towards Europe under the motto “Away from
Moscow” (M. Khvylioviy). A national system of education was established
(H. Hrynko) and an economic concept was developed according to which
Ukraine was to become an autonomous economic entity (M. Volobuyev).
In 1928 the Ukrainian Central
Committee once again raised the issue of transferring areas with a
Ukrainian majority in the Kursk and Voronezh regions of Russia to the
Ukr.SSR. They also raised the issue of Ukrainianization in the Kuban,
which at that time was essentially Ukrainian by tradition, language and
culture, but whose inhabitants had already begun to lose their
Ukrainian identity.
By the end of the 1920s, eight
of the seventeen divisions stationed in Ukraine were manned by
Ukrainians. Moreover, the Ukrainian language was beginning to be taught
in military educational institutions.
Finally, the authority and
influence of the national church – the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox
Church – was growing.
Objectively, Ukrainianization
was a continuation of the national resurgence inspired by the Ukrainian
liberation movement and founding of the UPR. Ukraine’s national
renaissance therefore raised concern within the Kremlin’s communist
leadership, which was faced – as had previously been the Russian Empire
– with the need, albeit on a much greater scale, to uproot Ukrainian
separatism.
Judging from reports of the
Ukrainian GPU, or the local secret service controlled by Moscow, the
threat of Ukrainian separatism was a matter of grave concern. The
Ukrainian GPU monitored the population’s mood, studied the attitudes of
its various strata towards the communist regime, assessed “separatist
manifestations” and devised counter measures to thwart them. Particular
attention was directed to the activities of “separatists” aiming to
involve the Ukrainian peasantry in implementing their
secessionist plans. The secret circular “On Ukrainian Separatism,”
issued by the Ukrainian GPU on 4 September 1926, noted that the
“nationalists take a special interest in rural areas” and their work
“in instilling the peasants with a hatred of Moscow produces noticeable
results, especially among the youth.” In the light of this, the secret
circular concluded that it was necessary “to link the work on the
Ukrainian intelligentsia with the work in rural communities.”
The most active phase of this
“work” began with the trial in 1929–30 involving the Union for the
Liberation of Ukraine (ULU), which was directed against the leading
segment of the Ukrainian elite and ended with the extermination of
millions of Ukrainian peasants during the Holodomor in 1932–33. The
defendants in the case, as V. Prystaiko and Yu. Shapoval noted, were
charged with intent to dismantle the USSR and to separate Ukraine from
the other union republics. Hence, by setting up the ULU case, the
Communist authorities believed they were putting an end to the attempts
of certain forces to rally under the banner of Ukrainian “nationalism”
or “separatism.”
Forty-five persons were
indicted at the trial but another seven hundred were soon arrested in
connection with the case. More than 30,000 Ukrainians, mainly members
of the intellectual elite, were repressed during and after the Union
for Liberation trial. Moreover, the net was broadened further, as a
result of which the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was banned.
Thus, a large-scale purge of
the most important segment of the Ukrainian elite took place, which,
had there been a popular resistance to Stalin’s rural policy, could
have led the peasants in a struggle to overthrow the regime and
establish an independent Ukrainian state.
Resistance to the Bolshevik
regime was witnessed throughout the Soviet Union but it was most
intensive in Ukraine. A total of 13,754 peasant rebellions, uprisings,
and riots involving some 2.5 million people were documented in 1930 by
the OGPU. Of these, 4,098 insurrections involving more than a million
people took place in Ukraine, and 1,061 insurrections with about
250,000 people, in the Northern Caucasus. In his 1930 report on the
political situation among the Ukrainian peasantry and elimination of
the kulaks as a class, OGPU Deputy Chief V. Balytsky wrote that in
certain villages the inhabitants sang “Neither the glory nor the
freedom of Ukraine has died” and shouted slogans like “Down with Soviet
power!” and “Long live an independent Ukraine!”
Notwithstanding the repression
of the leading stratum of Ukrainian society and the punitive actions
against the peasantry with GPU troops, the resistance continued but in
a spontaneous and unorganized manner. Under the right conditions,
however, it could have developed into a nationwide upheaval. This
course of events was greeted with disquiet by Stalin’s regime, which
was planning further anti-Ukrainian actions under the pretext of
fighting the Ukrainian “counterrevolutionary underground.” This was
corroborated, in particular, by a top-secret operational order of the
Ukrainian GPU of 13 February 1933.
The order stated that a GPU
operational strike force had “uncovered a counterrevolutionary
insurgent underground in Ukraine that included as many as 200
districts, about 30 railway stations and depots, and several
settlements near border zones.” On the basis of this information, the
order concluded that there was a single, carefully developed plan for
an “organized armed uprising in Ukraine before the spring of 1933 with
the aim of overthrowing Soviet power and establishing a capitalist
state, the so-called Ukrainian Independent Republic.” It should be
noted that the anticipated date of the uprising coincided rather
curiously with the point in time when the Holodomor and repressions in
Ukraine reached their peak.
In light of what is known
today this assessment of the situation and the conclusions drawn were,
to put it mildly, greatly over-exaggerated. However, the fear on the
part of the Stalinist leaders in losing both power and Ukraine was by
no means an exaggeration.
It is also important to note
that, conceptually, the order of 13 February 1933 echoed Stalin’s now
famous letter to Kaganovich of 11 August 1932, in which he had
stressed: “The most important thing now is Ukraine,” where affairs are
going badly – “along Party lines,” “Soviet lines,” and “GPU lines.”
Accordingly, Stalin concluded, “If we do not straighten out the
situation in Ukraine now, we could lose Ukraine.”
The Holodomor was but one
component in a multi-stage, pre-emptive punitive operation directed
against the Ukrainian nation whose renaissance posed a threat to the
unity and very existence of the Soviet empire. In the course of this
operation the artificially induced famine dealt a crushing blow to the
Ukrainian peasantry, thereby physically exterminating a major part of
the nation and undermining its potential for liberation.
According to the 1926
All-Union Census, the rural population of Ukraine was 23.3
million, constituting 81% of its 31.2 million inhabitants; and of the
rural population itself, 20.6 million, or 87.6% were Ukrainians. At the
beginning of 1932 Ukraine’s population totaled 32.5 million, of which
25.5 million lived in rural areas. As before, Ukrainians comprised an
overwhelming majority of the rural population and in certain regions
their numbers exceeded 90%.
It is often claimed that the
Ukrainian Holodomor was not a crime of genocide because it lacked an
exclusively national dimension, that is, the victims of the famine
included not only Ukrainians but also the national minorities that
lived in Ukraine at that time.
This view is similar to the
rather paradoxical position of S. Kulchytsky, which he stated as
follows: “The terror by famine that Stalin implemented in Ukraine and
the Kuban was a genocide of Ukrainian citizens but not of Ukrainians.”
Kulchytsky argues that (a) Stalin had good reason to fear the citizens
of the Ukr.SSR; and (b) no one – neither the descendants of Ukrainian
citizens who starved to death nor the international community – can
prove that the extermination of Ukrainians was similar to the
extermination of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 or of the
Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe. This approach is basically wrong because
it is inconsistent with the criteria of the 1948 Convention on Genocide.
[1] First of all, three
quarters of the population of the Kuban, which was part of the Russian
Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, were Ukrainians but citizens of the
Russian Federation and not citizens of Ukraine.
[2] Second, according to the
1948 Convention, genocide means certain acts that are committed with
the intent to destroy a particular national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, but not citizens as such. In other words, people are
exterminated precisely because of their affiliation with a certain
national, ethnical, racial or religious group and that group per se is
the target of the crime.
[3] Third, Stalin did not fear
the citizens of Ukraine. Rather, he feared the Ukrainian national
renaissance and therefore delivered a pre-emptive strike against the
Ukrainian nation as such. It is for this reason that Ukrainians became
the victims of his criminal actions, and not simply because they were
citizens of Ukraine.
[4] Fourth, it is
incorrect either to contrast the Ukrainian Holodomor or to equate it
with the genocide of the Armenians or Jews because each incident has
its own external material characteristics. What is important from a
legal point of view is not the identical or similar nature of these
features but the conformity of each of these crimes with the criteria
set forth in the 1948 Convention on Genocide. It is futile to attempt
to prove the similarity between the extermination of the Ukrainians,
Armenians and Jews in the course of their respective national tragedies
because there is no such similarity and, objectively, there cannot be.
Rather, one must prove that the specific characteristics of the
Ukrainian Holodomor meet the criteria of the 1948 Convention.
The lack of an identical
correspondence between the Ukrainian Holodomor and Jewish Holocaust
cannot be a reason for denying the genocidal nature of the Ukrainian
national tragedy. The Nazis transported Jews from all over Europe to
concentration camps where they were gassed to death. The Ukrainians
were starved to death by artificial famine on their own ethnic
territory. The material features of each crime are obviously
not the same but their legal dimensions, in light of the 1948
Convention, are identical.
One of the specific
characteristics of the Holodomor was that, throughout Ukraine’s
history, national minority communities had settled amongst
Ukrainians in certain regions of the country. Therefore, members of
Ukraine’s national minorities did perish during the Holodomor along
with Ukrainians. They too became the victims of the Kremlin
leadership’s crimes. However, the genocide was directed not against
them but against the Ukrainian nation. It is well established in
international law and practice that the nation, and not ethnic
minorities is the subject of state-creating self-determination. The
Holodomor was planned and implemented as a stage in the special
operation against the Ukrainian nation as such because it was only the
Ukrainian nation that could have exercised the right to
self-determination by seceding from the USSR and establishing an
independent state.
Forming the basis of the
Ukrainian nation, the Ukrainian peasantry – and not members of the
national minorities – was the vital resource and driving force of
Ukrainian popular uprisings and the national liberation movements. For
this reason it is understandable that the target of the Holodomor was
the Ukrainian national group.
The fact that members of
national minorities of Ukraine were victims of the Holodomor cannot be
used to justify a denial of its anti-Ukrainian nature. During the
Jewish Holocaust, the Nazis also exterminated Gypsies, Poles,
Byelorussians, Ukrainians and members of other nations whom they also
held to be racially inferior and potential enemies of the Reich. The
massacres at Babi Yar and other places of mass extermination of Jews
bore witness to this. Nobody, however, denies that the Holocaust was
the genocide of the Jewish people.
Members of the various
national minorities of Ukraine were innocent victims of the Holodomor,
not because they were Russians, Jews, Poles, Germans or Bulgarians, but
because they lived within the Ukrainian nation against which the crime
was directed. They found themselves as if on the line of fire, like
when the plan is to kill a particular person but bystanders are killed
as well. Nobody, however, would attempt to deny that a crime was
committed on the basis that unintended victims also perished.
Singling out the Ukrainian
dimension of the Holodomor does not mean denying or ignoring the
extermination by man-made famine of the national minorities of Ukraine,
as demonstrated by the work of Ukrainian Holodomor researchers, and in
particular, by O. Ivanov, I. Ivankov, and V. Marochko. A meticulous
study of the fate of Ukraine’s national minorities should become an
integral part of future official investigations into all of the
circumstances of the Holodomor on the territory of Ukraine.
From the point of view of
international law, the mass murder by starvation of the national
minorities of Ukraine was the crime of extermination. It is also an
aggravating circumstance to be considered in determining the degree of
guilt and level of responsibility of the perpetrators of the
Holodomor.
In light of the above, it is
legally incorrect to broadly construe the concept of “national group”
in such a way that the target of genocide is considered to be “part of
the Ukrainian people – all of the victims of the Holodomor …
irrespective of their ethnic, religious and other characteristics” (Ye.
Zakharov).
This approach is
consistent with the provisions of the Law “On the Holodomor of 1932–33
in Ukraine” that was adopted in 2006. However, it is contrary to the
provisions of both article II of the 1948 Convention and article 442 of
the Criminal Code of Ukraine, which define the corpus delicti of the
crime of genocide. It should be noted that in the draft of the Law “On
the Holodomor,” the Holodomor was held to constitute the genocide of
the Ukrainian nation.
In the
course of debating the draft, O. Moroz, then Speaker of the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine, proposed to substitute the word “nation” with
“people.” The Verkhovna Rada agreed to this legally groundless and
provocative amendment, which creates a legal conflict and by
implication opens the way for denying the genocidal nature of the
Holodomor. This conflict should be eliminated by amending the Law “On
the Holodomor of 1932–33 in Ukraine” and having it conform to the
provisions of article 442 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine and article
II of the 1948 Convention.
Attempts to deny the genocidal
nature of the Ukrainian Holodomor are also sometimes based on the fact
that the artificially induced famine killed not only Ukrainians in
Ukraine, but also Russians, Kazakhs, Tatars, Bashkirs and many others
in various regions of the USSR. This approach is at the center of the
conceptual assessment of the famine of 1932–33 by Russian historians,
public officials, and by certain foreign researchers, such as S. Merl
of Germany.
The Russian position can be
briefly stated as follows: since the famine of 1932–33 on the territory
of the Russian Federation was not considered to be genocide, the famine
in Ukraine cannot be considered genocide either. This position lacks
elementary logic and is an attempt to impose the Russian view of
Ukrainian history on Ukrainians and the world. For that matter the
proponents of this approach provide neither convincing arguments nor
documents that equate the starvation in Russia with the Holodomor in
Ukraine. And for one very good reason: they do not exist.
By inducing an artificial
famine, Stalin’s regime aimed at partially exterminating (a) peasants,
as members of a social group considered hostile to that regime, in
order to subdue them and suppress their resistance; and (b) the
Ukrainian national group as such, since its development posed a
potential threat to the integrity and very existence of the communist
empire, and since the peasants constituted an essential part of the
Ukrainian nation and offered the greatest resistance to the regime.
Singling out the Ukrainian
Holodomor as a crime of genocide – which is based upon extensive facts
– in no way denies the criminal nature of acts of the communist regime
that led to the mass destruction of peasants of other nationalities on
the territory of the RSFSR. It may be that the criminal acts committed
at that time against the Kazakhs, Tatars, and Bashkirs were also acts
of genocide, but this can only be proved or disproved by special
studies and official investigations in Kazakhstan, Tatarstan, and
Bashkortostan.
The foregoing raises a
particular question: Could Stalin’s totalitarian regime have committed
the crime of genocide against Russian peasants? To this question there
is but one answer – No. Just as the Ukrainian peasants were ethnic
Ukrainians, the Russian peasants were ethnic Russians. Both the former
and the latter belonged to national groups, but the position and role
of each were quite different in the Russian and Soviet
empires.
The Russian nation was the
“system-creating” element upon which both empires were built. Russian
nationalism was never associated with separatism but with Messianism
and a belief in imperial unity and greatness. It was the official
instrument of the “white empire” and – disguised as internationalism –
the political instrument of the “red empire.”
The Russian nation and its
constituent part, the Russian peasantry, could not, by definition, have
become a target of genocide because the Communist regime was in
principle not interested in exterminating the Russian nation as such.
The resistance of the Russian peasantry to the Bolshevik regime did not
manifest itself with the threat of political separatism and was not
associated by the regime with the possibility of Russia’s secession
from the USSR.
The Ukrainian nation, however,
was always regarded by the rulers of both empires as a
“system-destroying” element. The driving force behind Ukrainian
nationalism was the idea of secession from the empire and the
establishing of the Ukrainian Independent United State.
The Ukrainian peasant’s sense
of national identity and hostility towards Bolshevism laid the
foundation for Ukrainian separatism and posed a threat to the unity and
the very existence of the USSR. It was for this reason that the
Holodomor was directed against the Ukrainian nation as such and aimed
at its weakening by the genocidal extermination of the Ukrainian
peasantry as the major component of the nation and source of its
spiritual and material strength.
The specifically
anti-Ukrainian nature of the Holodomor was evidenced inter alia by the
following facts.
The severest repressive
measures that precipitated the artificial famine were applied by the
regime in Ukraine and the Kuban. At that time the latter formed part of
the RSFSR but was Ukrainian by culture, language, and tradition.
According to the 1926 census, as many as 1.412 million Ukrainians lived
in the Kuban, which made up 75% of the region’s population. In total
there were 3.107 million Ukrainians in the Northern Caucasus.
Kaganovich, Stalin’s most
loyal lieutenant who was given the responsibility of ensuring the grain
procurements in Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus, introduced the
practice of blacklisting as an additional punitive measure directed at
Ukrainian and Kuban peasants who were forcibly deprived of all grain
and other produce.
In the speeches,
correspondence, and all-union resolutions of the Kremlin leaders, the
Kuban had often been singled out together with Ukraine as a region
deserving special attention. This is evident, for example, in the
speeches that Kaganovich made during his visits to the Northern
Caucasus, his correspondence with Stalin, and the resolutions of the
Politburo of the CC of the AUCP(b) of 1 November 1932 and Northern
Caucasus Territorial Party Committee of 4 November 1932.
I. Zelenin, a Russian
researcher of the 1932–33 famine, notes that the actions of the CC of
the AUCP(b) Commission for Grain Procurements in the Volga region,
headed by Postyshev, “varied somewhat from those of Kaganovich and
Molotov in the Northern Caucasus and Ukraine.” Zelenin believes, and
not without grounds, that the peasants of the Lower Volga suffered to a
lesser degree from famine than did the rural population of Ukraine and
the Northern Caucasus.
As V. Kondrashin noted, in
1932 the situation in the Northern Caucasus was destabilized by the
“Ukrainian factor.” The announced grain procurement plans caused panic
among the peasants of the Kuban and Don regions who knew about the
famine in Ukraine and feared that they were threatened with the same.
It is quite obvious that the panic spread throughout the region because
it was populated predominantly by Ukrainians who knew about
developments in Ukraine, although V. Kondrashin does not mention this
fact.
Together with the statutory
acts by means of which the man-made famine was induced on the entire
territory of the USSR, there were a number of specifically ”Ukrainian”
or rather anti-Ukrainian bylaws, resolutions, instructions, directives,
etc. For example, according to the bylaws adopted at the all-union
level in January 1933, only the peasants of Ukraine and the Kuban were
prevented from leaving for the neighboring regions of Russia and
Byelorussia in search of food. Blockades were imposed at the borders
and enforced by GPU and militia units. To prevent starving Ukrainian
peasants from fleeing, army troops also blocked their access to the
border zones adjacent to Romania and Poland.
Stalin’s regime directly
associated grain procurements in Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus with
Ukrainianization, as evidenced by the Resolution of the CC of the
AUCP(b) and the CPC of the USSR “On Grain Procurements in Ukraine, the
Northern Caucasus and Western Region” of 14 December 1932.
The resolution, in its rather
lengthy paragraphs 4, 6, and 7, specifically mentioned only Ukraine and
the Northern Caucasus. The Ukrainian leaders were severely criticized
for improperly applying the national policy, while the Northern
Caucasus leaders were criticized for their un-Bolshevik
Ukrainianization that made it easier for the bourgeois nationalists
and, in particular, the followers of S. Petliura and members of the
Kuban Rada (similar to the Central Rada of Ukraine) “to create their
legal façade, and their counterrevolutionary centers and organizations.”
The resolution contained
instructions for the CC of the CP(b)U and the CPC of Ukraine to “expel
Petliura’s followers and other bourgeois nationalists from Party and
Soviet organizations,” and directed the Northern Caucasus Territorial
Executive Committee to do the following:
- to resettle in the
shortest time possible all inhabitants from the Poltavska (Northern
Caucasus) stanitsa, the most counterrevolutionary of Cossack villages,
to northern regions of the USSR, with the exception of collective
farmers and individual peasants who are truly loyal to Soviet
authority, and to populate this stanitsa with collective farmers who
served in the Red Army;
- to
immediately transfer all activity in Soviet and cooperative offices
of Ukrainianized districts in the Northern Caucasus, and the
publication of all newspapers and magazines from Ukrainian into the
Russian language, which is better understood by Kuban inhabitants; and
to prepare the school system for instruction in the Russian language.
This resolution convincingly
proves that the man-made famine in Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus
was used not only as an instrument for genocidal extermination , but
primarily as a pretext for destroying the Ukrainian national identity
and the carriers of this identity because of their affiliation to the
Ukrainian national group.
The all-union laws and
regulations were implemented throughout the USSR using practically the
same methods, but the scope, targeting and, accordingly, their effects
differed from region to region. The most meticulous and ruthless
application took place in Ukraine and the Kuban. The most active stages
of grain expropriation from Ukrainian peasants also coincided with
hysterical anti-Ukrainian campaigns in the all-union press.
In comparison with other
regions, the mortality rate in Ukraine and the Kuban was much higher
and exceeded the rate of natural mortality by several tenfold.
Significantly high mortality rates were observed in the rural areas
populated mainly by Ukrainians (S. Kulchytsky), which was indicative of
the particularly cruel and widespread confiscation of produce directed
specifically at Ukrainians.
When the Holodomor ended in
the second half of 1933, the All-Union Committee on Resettlement was
established pursuant to the Resolutions of the Politburo of the CC of
the AUCP(b) and the CPC of the USSR. As a result of these decisions,
forty-two districts were selected in the Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk,
Donetsk, and Kharkiv regions to which people from Russia and
Byelorussia were relocated in an organized way to replace the
Ukrainians killed by famine. During the first stage of this operation
at the end of 1933 and beginning of 1934, about 20,000 families were
relocated to Ukraine. Depopulated Ukrainian villages were settled
mainly by Russians and Byelorussians, and also by Jews and Germans,
even though there were several million Ukrainians living within the
Soviet Union outside Ukraine.
The news articles of foreign
correspondents and classified reports of foreign embassies and
consulates were mainly focused on the famine in Ukraine and the
Northern Caucasus. Both sources of information gave estimates of the
human lives lost and stressed that the famine in Ukraine was planned
with the aim of suppressing and exterminating the Ukrainian nation.
Thus, the analytical report,
“Famine and the Ukrainian Question,” prepared in May 1933 by S.
Gradenigo, the Italian Royal Consul in Kharkiv, stated: “[The policy of
the Moscow leadership] aims at eliminating the Ukrainian problem within
several months by sacrificing some ten to fifteen million people. This
figure does not seem to be exaggerated and in my opinion has already
been attained and will be surpassed… From this I deduce that the
present catastrophe will lead to the colonization of Ukraine by a
mainly Russian population, which will change Ukraine’s ethnographic
nature. It may happen that in the very near future we will speak about
neither Ukraine nor the Ukrainian people. Hence, there will be no
Ukrainian problem because Ukraine will actually have become part of
Russia.”
In a political report by the
German Consulate in Kyiv on 15 January 1934, it was noted: “The
situation with respect to the Ukrainian question can only be assessed
this year in the context of the great famine. Because of this
catastrophe, the responsibility for which the Ukrainian people place
solely on the policy carried out by the Moscow leadership, the
long-standing division between Ukrainian advocates of independence and
the proponents of a Moscow-based centralism has only deepened.
Characteristic of the people’s thinking is the widespread belief that
the Soviet government is intentionally intensifying the famine to bring
Ukrainians to their knees.”
It is also worth quoting the
document “Is Ukraine Ukrainian?” which is held in the archives of the
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The anonymous author stated in May
1936, after traveling for several weeks throughout the country: “A
Ukrainian Ukraine has been destroyed. According to various estimates,
six million people or one fifth of a population that once exceeded 30
million died of starvation. The people are now so weak that they will
not be able to withstand this last blow of Moscow centralism… In the
future, a detailed historical study may very well establish that during
the horrifying 1932–33 period, the will of the Ukrainian people was
broken – at least for decades, if not forever.”
Fortunately, these pessimistic
forecasts have not materialized. However, their underlying basis and
content should convincingly demonstrate that the criminal, genocidal
acts of the Kremlin leadership were targeted at the Ukrainian nation as
such.
Despite historical hardships,
Ukraine regained its independent statehood. However, the Ukrainian
nation suffered enormous losses, the consequences of which are still
felt today. Together with the political repression and deportations
that took place prior to, during and after 1932–33, the Holodomor has
had a catastrophic cumulative effect. The genetic potential of the
Ukrainian nation was dealt a crushing blow. The traditional structure
of Ukrainian society was ruined and accompanied by the country’s
devastation.
The nation was
psychologically traumatized by terrible pictures of people dying en
masse, by the painful death of family and friends, and by the shocking
moral degradation in struggling for survival in total famine. The
Ukrainian liberation movement and the nation’s ability to resist were
significantly weakened, and national traditions were undermined.
National revival, normal cultural development, and the strengthening of
the nation’s unity, dignity and spiritual life were retarded. In the
meantime there reigned an atmosphere of fear, brutality, falsehood,
double standards and amorality.
Independent Ukraine’s progress
is still hampered by the Holodomor’s ruinous effects, the overcoming of
which is necessary for social recovery, national consolidation and the
building of a successful country.
UKRAINE'S
DEMOGRAPHIC LOSSES
There is no precise number of the Holodomor’s victims as it is
practically impossible to determine this figure. In concealing the
scale of the crime and its deadly consequences, the Kremlin leadership
prohibited medical institutions and the various state agencies
responsible for civil registrations, vital statistics and movement of
population to record actual causes of death. When in 1933 the
famine was at its peak, the deceased were buried in common graves
without any records being kept. As noted by S. Kulchytsky, the work of
state institutions in rural areas at the time was disrupted and in some
areas completely paralyzed. In 1934 the bureaus of civilian
registrations and related archives of vital statistics were
subordinated to the NKVD and all free access to demographic data was
terminated.
Despite the Communist
authorities’ denial of the very fact of the famine, the extent of the
demographic catastrophe in Ukraine could not but attract the attention
of foreign journalists, diplomats and various specialists working in
the USSR at that time.
The first empirical estimates
of the number of Holodomor victims already began to appear in the
western press when the famine was at its height. Unlike news reports,
the diplomatic reports were classified and only became known much
later. Analyses of news and diplomatic reports at the time
show great discrepancies in the number of victims, with the figures
varying between one and fifteen million. With these estimates it is
only possible to conclude that millions of people – both in and beyond
Ukraine – fell victim to of the Holodomor and that Ukraine suffered the
greatest number of losses.
In addition to the empirical
estimates of the number of Holodomor victims, there were also several
professional estimates made in the 1940–50s by researchers who applied
a number of different methods in using the all-union censuses of 1926
and 1939. (The all-union census of 1937 was declared by the Soviet
leadership to be defective and its publication was prohibited.)
According to the estimates made before Soviet demographic statistics
were declassified, the maximum number of victims was lowered from 15
million to 7.5 million, while the minimum number was raised from 1
million to 2.5 million.
After access to Soviet
archives was re-opened at the end of the 1980s, the total number of
Holodomor victims in Ukraine was further narrowed to vary between 2.6
and 5.2 million
The total number of Holodomor
victims remains a controversial issue to this very day. As before,
researchers obtain conflicting results, even within the scope of the
same study.
This is demonstrated, for
example, by the research report submitted in 2008 by the Institute of
Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of
Ukraine and entitled “Demographic Catastrophe in Ukraine as a Result of
the Holodomor in 1932 – 33: Factors, Magnitude & Consequences.”
The report gives somewhat conflicting estimates of the number of
victims in Ukraine. At page 76 it states that cumulative demographic
losses totaled 5.5–5.6 million, and the number of lives lost due to the
excessive mortality rate was 3.4–3.5 million at maximum. At page 78,
however, total losses are estimated at 5.4 million, of which 5.1
million occurred in rural areas. At page 82 Ukraine’s total losses in
1932 are given as 795,000, and in 1933 – 3.5 million, i.e. 4.295
million overall, while at page 84, in providing a summary, the report
states that Ukraine’s demographic losses resulting from the Holodomor
are estimated at 4.5 million, of which 3.4 million losses were due to
increased mortality, and 1.1 million due to a decline in the birth
rate. It is also stated here that cumulative demographic losses totaled
approximately 6 million.
Discrepancies in the number of
human losses caused by the Holodomor are explained not so much by the
different statistical methods as by the unreliable underlying data.
Even when calculations are made according to all demographic standards,
the results can hardly be regarded as reliable if they are based on the
1937 and 1939 censuses. It is common knowledge that the validity of
those censuses – and particularly that of the 1937 census – is
doubtful. As noted by S. Kulchytsky, between only one-third and
one-half of all deaths were recorded in Ukraine, but death by hunger
was not specifically stated. Moreover, from March to August 1933 the
actual rate of mortality, including natural mortality, was two to three
times greater than the figure indicated in statistical records.
The census documents also did
not duly account for migration. For example, the absurdity of the
statistics of both censuses is evident in the results from 1926 to
1937, according to which the population of Ukraine fell by merely
538,639, but by more than 3 million from 1926 to 1939.
Given such circumstances,
present-day professional estimates cannot be treated as unconditional
alternatives to past professional estimates or to certain first-hand
empirical estimates by observers at that time, especially long-time
residents of Ukraine who visited rural regions and who had confidential
access to people with relevant information.
Taking into account the
peculiarities of the situation, it is necessary to develop new
approaches to correcting false demographic statistics and to using
earlier professional and empirical estimates. A harmonization of such
approaches would only improve the reliability of the results obtained.
The difficulties encountered
in estimating the total number of Holodomor victims are sometimes used
to cast doubt on Ukraine’s national tragedy and to deny its genocidal
nature. As stated above, a key factor in qualifying criminal behavior
as the crime of genocide is not the number of people killed but the
intent to destroy a particular group as such by exterminating its
members in whole or in part. The number of victims is not a legal
requirement for genocide but only one of the evidentiary elements of
the crime. Establishing this element is but an additional means for
proving intent to partially or completely destroy a particular group,
and for determining the gravity of the crime and the appropriate
punishment. If the crime is directed against a particular group as
such, the murder of any number of its members constitutes genocide.
Even if the number of
Ukrainians who perished during the Holodomor was stated to be, not in
the millions but much less, this would not have changed the genocidal
nature of the crime. Even estimates that give the lowest numbers
confirm that millions of people died. It should be stressed again that,
from the legal points of view, concentrating on the exact number of
millions – three, five, seven or ten – is pointless and irrelevant. At
the same time, any political manipulation with figures that either
increases or decreases the number of Holodomor victims is morally
impermissible, as it displays a blatant disrespect towards their memory.
THE
HOLODOMOR MACHINE
The Ukrainian Holodomor was organized by using all of the elements of
the Party and Soviet system that formed the mechanism of the
totalitarian “party state” (Gray – Dorsey) or “commune state” (S.
Kulchytsky). A specific feature of this state was the total
subordination of virtually every state body and public organization,
both central and local, to the Communist Party. Shortly after the
October coup of 1917, it had practically, and by the beginning of the
1920s, had actually become the only party in the country. With the
formation of the USSR, it was named the All-Union Communist Party (of
Bolsheviks) (AUCP(b)).
The AUCP(b) was headed by the
Politburo, which possessed real power in the USSR and was comprised of
a fixed number of party leaders. After Stalin strengthened his position
in the intra-party struggle and emerged as sole leader with dictatorial
powers, his loyal followers – Kaganovich, Molotov, Mikoyan, Kalinin and
a few others – became, as of the 1920s, the most influential members in
the Politburo. The decisions adopted by the Politburo were enacted into
laws and resolutions of the constitutional organs of power, and on the
most important issues, in joint decisions of the Central Committee of
the AUCP(b) and CPC of the USSR.
According to the 1924
Constitution, the USSR was a federal state, the constituent republics
of which had wide powers. However, by the beginning of the 1930s, this
Soviet federation was transformed into an ultra-centralized
totalitarian party state led by Stalin and his closest associates. The
legitimization of the dictatorship of the communist leaders, who
ideologically shrouded themselves with demagogical slogans, was
implemented through statutory acts of the Union and union republics’
bodies of state power. These acts often bore the stamp “top secret” and
were not made public. Party decisions on particularly important issues
and the corresponding resolutions of various state bodies were approved
by Stalin and his inner circle without any formal discussion even in
the Politburo. They were often not even recorded in official documents
but nonetheless served as guidelines for the party dictatorship’s
entire chain of command, from Moscow to the furthest peripheries.
The CP(b)U was a constituent
part of the AUCP(b). It was deprived of independence and used by the
all-union political leadership to keep Ukraine firmly within its
control. To this end, party decisions, and laws and resolutions adopted
at the center were then duplicated in Ukraine with corresponding acts
of the CC of the CP(b)U, the Politburo of the CC of the CP(b)U, the
Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukr.SSR, and the All-Ukrainian
Central Executive Committee. An important role in planning the
suppression of Ukraine was assigned to the Ukrainian GPU (prior to
1922, the All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission).
This tandem of the CP(b)U and
GPU in the 1930s was not Ukrainian, either by the ethnic composition of
its leadership or by the orientation of its activities. Strictly
controlled by the Kremlin, it was an obedient instrument for
implementing the anti-Ukrainian policy of the center.
The Kremlin leadership played
the principal role – as ideologist and organizer – in precipitating the
Holodomor in Ukraine. The Party and Soviet leaderships of Ukraine
became the active participants and accomplices in the crime.
The judiciary, prosecutor’s
office, special services, Red Army, and interior ministry, GPU and
frontier troops were all involved in committing the crime.
In the lower tiers were the
local leaders of the CP(b)U and bodies of Soviet power that recruited
activists from the committees of poor peasants, and rural Party and
Komsomol organizations to expropriate food produce from the peasants.
The chief ideologist and
organizer of the Holodomor was Stalin, who played the leading role in
planning the crime, devising the mechanism for its implementation, and
controlling the process. As the General Secretary of the CC of the
AUCP(b) who ruled the Politburo with dictatorial will, Stalin
masterminded all principal party decisions related to the Holodomor in
Ukraine.
Specialized elements of the
centralized machinery for organizing the Holodomor in Ukraine and the
Northern Caucasus were the Extraordinary Grain Procurement Commissions,
established pursuant to decisions of the Politburo of the CC of the
AUCP(b). The commissions were headed by Stalin’s closest associates.
The Procurement Commission for
Ukraine was headed by V. Molotov, a member of the Politburo of the CC
of the AUCP(b) and Chairman of the CPC of the USSR. The Commission for
the Northern Caucasus was headed by L. Kaganovich, a member of the
Politburo, and Secretary of the CC of the AUCP(b) and Chief of its
Agricultural Department. Although the membership of Molotov’s
commission in Ukraine was not defined, Kaganovich actually participated
in its work. He was from Ukraine, knew the country well and had been
General Secretary of the CC of the CP(b)U in 1925–28.
A special role in Ukraine was
also performed by Postyshev. Both he and Kaganovich were instructed by
the Resolution of the CC of the AUCP(b) and the CPC of the USSR “On
Grain Procurements in Ukraine” of 19 December 1932 to take all
necessary measures together with the republic’s leadership to ensure
the fulfillment of the grain procurement plans. To this end, Kaganovich
and Postyshev visited Ukraine 20–29 December 1932.
In January 1933 Postyshev was
appointed Second Secretary of the CC of the CP(b)U and First Secretary
of the Kharkiv Regional Committee of the CP(b)U. At the same time, he
remained Secretary of the CC of the AUCP(b) until February 1934. As a
close associate of Stalin, he actually controlled Kosior, First
Secretary of the CP(b)U, who had lost Stalin’s confidence. Ostensibly
ensuring the fulfillment of grain procurement plans, Postyshev actually
helped organize the Holodomor and played a decisive role in suppressing
the national deviation within the CP(b)U.
An important role in
precipitating the Holodomor was assigned to the law enforcement and
punitive agencies acting on the Kremlin’s orders. By the Politburo’s
decision of the CC of the AUCP(b) of 24 November 1932, OGPU Deputy
Chief V. Balytskiy was appointed to the position of Extraordinary
Representative of the OGPU in Ukraine. He arrived in Kharkiv at the
beginning of December 1932 and soon thereafter assumed his position as
chief of the GPU of the Ukr.SSR, which had been previously held by
Stalin’s distant relative, S. Redens.
The republic’s activists who
participated in implementing the Holodomor included S. Kosior, First
Secretary of the CC of the CP(b)U; V. Chubar, Chairman of the CPC of
the UkrSSR; H. Petrovskiy, head of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive
Committee; and the first secretaries of the regional committees of the
CP(b)U – in particular, M. Khatayevych, Ye. Veher, R. Terekhov, V.
Strohanov, M. Mayorov, S. Sarkisov, and N. Alekseyev. These officials
ensured that the Holodomor was carried out by leaders at the lower
levels.
Furthermore, the
top officials of the republic’s leadership were incorporated into the
higher Party bodies of the USSR. Thus, S. Kosior had been a member of
the Politburo of the CC of the AUCP(b) since 1930; V. Chubar – an
associate member of the Politburo of the CC of the AUCP(b) in 1926–35;
H. Petrovskiy – a member of the CC of the AUCP(b) in 1921–39, and an
associate member of the Politburo of the CC of the AUCP(b).
The structure of the upper
level of the machinery for implementing the Holodomor made it possible
to effectively control the activity of the republic’s leaders and
ensure their unconditional execution of the will of the Kremlin
leadership.
The Holodomor was orchestrated
by a group of persons who belonged to the highest echelons of the
“party state.” It was a joint criminal enterprise with a clearly
structured hierarchical chain of command and coordination, and
consciously used the party state to involve a wide variety of others in
its criminal activities.
A distinctive feature of this
criminal group was its obviously multi-ethnic character. The leading
roles in ideology, planning, organizing and implementation of the crime
were performed by a non-Ukrainian team composed of Stalin, Kaganovich,
Molotov, Postyshev, Mikoyan, Kosior, Balytskiy, Khatayevych, Veher,
Terekhov, Redens and others.
The GPU, which was headed by
V. Balytskiy, consisted mainly of non-Ukrainians and among its top
leadership there were no Ukrainians at all.
It should be acknowledged that
there were ethnic Ukrainian participants – in particular,
leaders at the republic level, although they did not play key roles in
adopting and implementing decisions. These included V. Chubar, H.
Petrovskiy, V. Zatonskiy and others, as well as numerous local
accomplices.
For the most part, the lowest
tiers included members from the poorest strata of rural society who
shared the ideas of Bolshevism and consciously supported the local
authorities in implementing plans for the building of a “bright
communist future.” However, there were also many who belonged to the
rural lumpenproletariat, which the communist regime deliberately used
as an instrument of the crime. Driven by feelings of envy towards the
wealthy and a desire for vengeance, such people used the opportunity to
prove to themselves and to the regime their own importance
and survived at the expense of their fellow villagers.
It is necessary to write about
this, not only for the sake of telling the historical truth and
relating the specifics and distinctive features of the crime, but
because certain researchers, politicians and political scientists are
either reluctant or simply refuse to qualify the Ukrainian Holodomor as
the crime of genocide, due to the multi-ethnic composition of its
perpetrators and, in particular, the participation of ethnic Ukrainians.
Such an approach is legally
groundless. Neither national nor international criminal law makes the
ethnicity of the perpetrator a condition precedent to the commission of
a crime. The crime of genocide is not and should not be an exception to
this fundamental rule.
The 1948 Convention provides
no basis for linking the crime of genocide to the ethnicity of persons
who participated in the crime. Article IV of the Convention only
stipulates: “Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private
individuals.”
The ethnic composition of the
participants in the crime of genocide is therefore legally irrelevant
and does not affect the qualifying of concrete unlawful actions as the
crime of genocide.
Such methods of denying the
genocidal nature of the Ukrainian Holodomor are immoral as they
deliberately distort the clear and unambiguous provisions of the 1948
Convention. In effect, this is tantamount to a justification of the
crime.
GUILT
AND HEALING
Qualifying the Holodomor of 1932–33 as the crime of genocide also
raises the issue of responsibility. From a legal point of view, this
responsibility rests with the USSR as the party state, and with all
persons who participated in organizing and implementing this crime,
regardless of their position, status, or ethnic origin.
The party state ceased to
exist with the collapse of the USSR. All of the former union republics
had become its successor states. However, the Russian Federation,
contrary to international law, has declared itself to be the “state
continuator of the USSR.” In any case, Ukraine has repeatedly stated
that it does not link recognition of the Holodomor as genocide with the
international responsibility of the Russian Federation. Ukraine will
therefore make no claims in that regard. Of course, this does not
preclude individuals – the descendants of Holodomor victims – from
claiming against the Russian Federation as it considers itself the
state continuator of the USSR. However, in practical terms the
successful realization of such claims would be problematic.
The terrible circumstances of
the crime make it impossible to state the exact number of victims and,
in many cases, to determine their identities. It would also be very
difficult to find witnesses for concrete cases, as the crime was
committed several decades ago. Finally, one should also take into
account the jurisdictional difficulties associated with the fact that
perpetrators of the crime at the republic level were officials of the
Ukr.SSR, who in many cases acted on their own initiative and in
compliance with the republic’s legislative and regulatory acts.
However, it must be remembered that the Ukr.SSR, as a constituent
republic of the USSR, was subordinated to the “party state”
dictatorship.
It is relatively simpler to
establish the responsibility of the main organizers and perpetrators of
the crime at both the union and republic levels. However, their
punishment would be impossible because some of them – in particular,
Stalin, Kaganovich, and Molotov – died natural deaths. By far the
larger part – among them, Kosior, Chubar, Postyshev, Balytskiy, Redens,
and Khatayevych, and heads of all regional committees of the CP(b)U –
were eliminated during Stalin’s purges. It is rather ironic that this
larger group was punished, but not for their participation in the
Holodomor.
It should be noted that the
various ethnic affiliations of the ideologists, organizers,
participants, perpetrators and accomplices of the Holodomor cannot, of
course, be used to accuse their respective peoples – Georgians,
Russians, Jews, Poles, Latvians and others – of having a role in the
crime.
In political terms,
responsibility for the Holodomor-genocide in Ukraine and the
extermination of peasants by famine elsewhere in the USSR should rest
with Stalin’s communist regime. This explains why representatives and
followers of the Communist Party of Ukraine, which is the ideological
successor to the AUCP(b) and then CPSU, attempts to deny the genocidal
nature of the Ukrainian Holodomor, and often denies that there was
even famine in the former USSR.
Russian Federation officials
have actively opposed international recognition of the Ukrainian
Holodomor as the crime of genocide. This is not surprising, given that
the principal organizer of the crime, Stalin, is regarded today by
Russia’s ruling elite as a “strong politician” and “successful
manager.” What is surprising and incomprehensible, however, is that
recognition of the Holodomor as genocide is viewed by various officials
of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an insult to the memory
of the victims in other regions of the former USSR.
Qualifying the Ukrainian
Holodomor as a crime of genocide should not be taken as a denial of the
criminal nature of the actions of Stalin’s regime against the peasants
of Russia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Bashkortostan and others. Ukraine
does not oppose honoring the memory of those victims, nor is it against
condemning the other crimes of Stalinism. In fact, the real insult to
the memory of those victims is not the position taken by Ukraine, but
the glorification of the person most responsible for the crimes of the
communist regime.
The Russian political
establishment’s hysterical reaction to historical truth can be easily
explained. The revelation about the causes of the Holodomor and its
consequences undermine the position of anti-Ukrainian elements in both
Ukraine and abroad, and calls for action aimed at strengthening
national statehood, developing democratic institutions, and moving
further towards Ukraine’s integration into European and Euro-Atlantic
structures.
The majority of the Russian
political establishment still regards Ukraine as a part of Russia,
sharing with it a common history and fate. Hence, the Russian
leadership wishes to impose on Ukraine and the world its own version of
Ukrainian history. Denying Ukraine the right to its own history is a
covert form of denying its right to independence.
It is now obvious that the
underlying causes of the Holodomor were rooted in Ukraine’s loss of
independence and its domination by a regime subordinated to the Kremlin
leadership and hostile to its nationhood. This fact alone should
expressly warn Ukraine about the deadly threat to its statehood by
neo-imperialistic plans for the restoration of a “Unified Greater
Russia” that includes Ukraine.
The strategies for
building the new Russian empire openly proclaim the slogan “Russia
needs a Russian Ukraine rather than a pro-Russian Ukraine."
Hypothetically, there are at least three possible options for
implementing such strategies: (1) by the genocide of the Ukrainian
national group as such; (2) by linguocide, i.e., by eradicating the
language of the Ukrainian nation as its basic and defining feature,
which is tantamount to the final and complete destruction of the nation
itself; (3) or by the cumulative application of these instruments of
national destruction.
In this connection, one must
remember that, except for very short periods, the entire history of the
tsarist and Soviet empires was one of a continuous war for the
eradication of the Ukrainian language. During the Holodomor,
Ukrainianization was terminated and the attack on the Ukrainian
renaissance and language was launched.
This attack did not even stop
after Ukraine restored its independence, but has only acquired newer,
larger, and more treacherous forms. This is evidenced by the intense
linguo-cultural expansion currently being carried out by the Russian
Federation in relation to Ukraine, which is essentially a covert form
of linguocide. Should the Russian neo-empire be restored with the
inclusion of Ukraine, it is unlikely, however, that mass killing of
Ukrainians will take place. Because in the growing
demographic crisis in Russia, the need for human resources is acutely
felt and this will only continue for many years to come. However, there
can be no doubt that the linguocide aimed at wiping out the Ukrainian
nation will become a reality. The persecution and elimination of the
Ukrainian elite will be an integral part of this scenario.
The tragedy of the Holodomor
should compel one to resolutely oppose the Kremlin’s neo-imperialistic
plans. This may also explain why the revelation and dissemination of
the historical truth about the Ukrainian Holodomor has met with such
rejection and opposition on the part of official Russia.
James Mace concluded that the
Holodomor left Ukrainian society in a state of post-genocidal trauma.
To a considerable degree, this remains true today. Therefore the
immediate task is to politically condemn the crimes of Stalin’s
totalitarian communist regime. This should be accompanied by an
official legal assessment of the Holodomor, a systematic study of its
devastating consequences, and the undertaking of comprehensive measures
for the revival of the Ukrainian nation, the rehabilitation of
Ukrainian society and the democratic development of an independent
Ukrainian state.
Such measures, however, should
not be situational in nature, nor applied only on commemorative dates.
Rather, they should be implemented on a continuous, systematic basis at
the national and regional levels. The first steps in this direction are
being made by the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance but they
are obviously not sufficient.
In order to resolve the large
scale and complex issues associated with overcoming the consequences of
the tragedy, the General Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine should, first
of all, initiate criminal proceedings for the genocidal murder of
millions of people under Ukraine’s Law “On the Holodomor of 1932–33”;
Criminal Code, article 442; and Code of Criminal Procedure, articles
94, 97, and 112 (part 3). If established facts related to the Holodomor
meet the corpus delicti of genocide as defined in article 442 of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine, the General Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine
should then prepare an official indictment and submit it to the Supreme
Court of Ukraine for further action.
At the same time, the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine should establish an interim investigatory
commission in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine, article 89
(Part 4), to conduct a parliamentary inquiry into all of the
circumstances surrounding the Holodomor of 1932–33 as the gravest of
international crimes and a tragic event of great significance to
Ukrainian society. Such steps would not require the resolutions of
international organizations. Current Ukrainian legislation and the
political will to do so should suffice.
In this connection, it should
be noted that article VI of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide provides that the prosecution of
this crime should be carried out by a competent court of the state on
the territory of which it was committed, or by an international
criminal tribunal whose jurisdiction is recognized by the parties to
the Convention.
According to the
generally recognized rules of international law, corroborated by the
1998 Statute of Rome of the International Criminal Court, cases of
international crimes may only be submitted to the international
judicial bodies when a state on the territory of which such crimes were
committed is unable or unwilling to conduct an investigation, establish
the identity of the alleged perpetrators, indict and put them on trial.
A comprehensive investigation
into all of the circumstances of the Holodomor and its official
qualification in Ukraine will create a convincing and solid legal and
factual basis for wide international recognition and condemnation of
the genocidal nature of this terrible crime.
БІБЛІОГРАФІЯ
Документи
33-й: Голод. Народна Книга — Меморіал / Упоряд. Л.Б.Коваленко, В. А.
Маняк. — К., 1991.
Колективізація і голод на Україні 1929–1933. Збірник документів і
матеріалів. — К., 1992.
Чорна книга України. Збірник документів, архівних матеріалів, листів
тощо. — К., 1998.
Сталин и Каганович. Переписка. 1931–1936. — Москва, 2001.
Голодомор 1932–1933 років в Україні: Документи і матеріали. — К., 2007.
Розсекречена пам'ять. Голодомор 1932–1933 років в Україні в документах
ГПУ–НКВД. — К., 2008.
Польща та Україна у тридцятих-сорокових роках XX століття, невідомі
документи з архівів спеціальних служб. — Т.7. Голодомор в Україні
1932–1933. — Варшава–Київ, 2008.
Голодомор 1932-1933 років: злочин влади – трагедія народу. Документи і
матеріали. – Київ «Генеза», 2008
Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine- Doсuments and Materials. – Kyiv,
“Kyiv Mohyla Academy Publishing House”, 2008
Документи з архівів відомств закордонних справ іноземних держав
The Foreign Office and the Famine. British Documents on Ukraine and the
Great Famine of 1932-l933 / Ed. by Marko Carynnyk, Lubomyr I. Luciuk
and Bohdan S. Kordan. — Ontario–Westal,
New York, 1988.
Листи з Харкова. Голод в Україні та на Північному Кавказі в
повідомленнях італійських дипломатів 1932–1933 років / Упорядник Андре
Граціозні. — Харків, 2007.
Голодомор в Україні 1932–1933 років: за документами політичного архіву
МЗС ФРН / Упорядник А. Кудряченко. — К.; 2008.
Матеріали розслідувань
Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine 1932–1933, Report to Congress [of
the United States]. Commission on the Ukrainian Famine. Adopted by the
Commission. April 19, 1988. — Submitted to Congress. April 22, 1988. —
Washington, 1988 (переклад матеріалів Комісії див.: Великий голод в
Україні. Звіт конгресово-президентської Комісії США з дослідження
Великого голоду в Україні. Виконавчий директор Комісії Джеймс Мейс. Том
IV.- К., 2008).
International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932–1933 Famine in
Ukraine. The Final Report, 1990. (переклад Звіту Комісії див.:
Международная комиссия по расследованию голода на Украине 1932–1933
годов. Итоговый отчет, 1990 г. — К., 1992).
Дослідження
R. Conquest. The Harvest of Sorrow. — New York — Oxford, 1986.
(переклад дослідження див.: Конквест Роберт. Жнива скорботи. Радянська
колективізація і Голодомор. — К., 1993).
Голод 1932–1933 років на Україні: очима істориків, мовою документів. —
К.. 1990.
А. Грациози. Великая крестьянская война в СРСР. Большевики и крестьяне:
1917–1933. — Москва, 2001.
Командири Великого голоду. Поїздки В. Молотова і Л. Кагановича в
Україну та на Північний Кавказ 1932–1933 p.p. / За ред. В. Васильєва та
Ю. Шаповала. — К., 2001.
Голод 1932–1933 років в Україні: причини і наслідки. — К., 2003.
Famine in Ukraine 1932–1933: Genocide by other means / Ed.: Taras
Hunczak and Roman Serbyn. — New York, 2007.
С. Кульчицкий. Почему он нас уничтожал? — К., 2007.
С. Кульчицький. Голодомор 1932–1933 p.p. як геноцид: труднощі
усвідомлення. — К., 2008.
Є. Захаров. Чи можна кваліфікувати Голодомор 1932–1933 років в Україні
та на Кубані як геноцид? — Харків, 2008.
Джеймс Мейс. Ваші мертві вибрали мене. — К., 2008.
В. Марочко. Геноцид українців. Творці Голодомору 1932–1933 рр. — К.,
2008.
Abbreviations
AUCP(b) – All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)
CC – Central Committee
CP(b)U – Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine
CPC – Council of People’s Commissars
GPU – State Political Directorate
OGPU – All-Union State Political Directorate
RSFSR – Russian Socialist Federal Socialist Republic
Ukr.SSR – Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
ULU – Union for the Liberation of Ukraine
UPR – Ukrainian People’s Republic
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