A. From May 28 to Sep. 28, 2001,at the request of CIC, DOJ, RCMP
Goss Gilroy Inc.
Ottawa, ON K2P 1P1
evaluated Canada's War Crimes Program from 1998 to 2001 with a 3 year budget of $46.8 million ($28.2M CIC, $16.5M DOJ, 2.0M RCMP).
B. The key underlying mantra of this program is "to demonstrate, internationally and in Canada, the Government of Canada's commitment to denying safe haven to suspected war criminals."
- One of the 5 intermediate objectives was to complete 14 old WWII cases and initiate 14 new WWII cases.
- The Modern War Crimes section is distinct from the old WWII section.
C. One of the 4 key methodologies utilized was:
"Structured interviews with over 110 key informants from inside and outside the program's delivery agencies. For a comprehensive list of key informant interviews see Annex 1 below."
- [In my opinion, it is important to gain access to these interviews.]
D. The "key Canadian and international stakeholders", who were interviewed, are grouped into 4 categories:
(a) Program staff and other agencies in the Canadian government: CIC, DOJ, RCMP, CSIS.
(b) "International peer community" within "Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Scotland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as current and former staff of both the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)."
(c) Canadian and international human rights organisations and advocates.
(d) NGO's representing both victims and suspected perpetrators.
E. One of "the essential features of the War Crimes Program" is
"an explicit goal of dealing with both World War II and Modern war crimes cases in a single program."
- "At the same time, while there were no new World War II cases opened under that component of the program during 2000/01, some seven files continue with court proceedings ongoing. As noted in the most recent annual report, [note 2] it is becoming increasingly problematic to investigate and prosecute World War II cases due to the passage of time and its effects on both suspects and witnesses. Nonetheless, interviews in Canada with stakeholder groups and internationally with prosecutors in other jurisdictions strongly suggest that there are no grounds for backing away from Canada's commitments to investigate and prosecute appropriate World War II cases at this point in time."
- "At the same time, while activities under the World War II component of the program may diminish over time, there are no criteria available which would suggest that the prosecution of appropriate cases should cease to be a priority at this time."
F. According to Goss Gilroy, the program priority most emphasized by "key external stakeholders" (as defined in point D. above) is the necessity of initiating criminal proceedings under the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act.
- "They noted that domestic and international media coverage of prosecutions is intense and would have much more effect on domestic and international opinion of Canada's intentions than a continuous stream of refusals of entry or denials of refugee status."
- "... domestic prosecution in Canada of a person suspected of a modern war crime will be one very effective means of combating a culture of impunity."
G. The overall program is co-ordinated by the Interdepartmental Operations Group (IOG)consisting of senior bureaucrats in CIC, DOJ and RCMP. They meet monthly, have reviewed and recommended actions on 944 cases, and set the overall policy.
- [i.e. Bureaucrats, and not Parliamentarians, set war crimes policy.]
- CIC - "The Modern War Crimes Division [note 4] of CIC encompasses a core group of analysts, supported by a Resource Centre, staffed by researchers, and an Intelligence Coordination Unit."
- DOJ wants 6 geographically focussed teams for Africa, Yugoslavia, Middle East, Asia, Latin America and WWII, each with a lawyer, historian/analyst, RCMP officer.
- RCMP has one researcher on contract processing and analyzing information.
- The needs and views of CIC, DOJ and RCMP are often different. RCMP expects fair degree of separation between investigators and prosecutors, while DOJ wants complete integration, avoidance of unnecessary delays, etc.
- Goss Gilroy strongly recommends "integration" rather than just "co-ordination".
(a) Modern War Crimes - Goss Gilroy notes that 519 refugee and immigration cases have been investigated by CIC in 2000/2001, but only 42 have been deported.
-Interventions before the IRB by CIC staff has increased markedly.
- Goss Gilroy recommends prosecutions under the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act be initiated.
- "This fact makes it all the more important that a suitable inter-departmental model for the investigation and prosecution of modern war crimes be developed and accepted by the agencies involved."
- Goss Gilroy lauds the international partnerships and interactions being developed.
- "Except through intermediary organizations, the evaluation team was not able to directly test the effect of the program on Canadian public opinion regarding Canada's commitment to denying safe haven to war criminals."
- [WHY NOT?]
(b) World War II cases - Goss Gilroy notes that
- "Since 1995, program successes have exceeded losses, in contrast to the pre-1995 criminal prosecutions record which was zero successes for four prosecutions."
- [Rather than regurgitate old data we refer the reader to the 2002 Annual War Crimes report.]
J. Program resources:
- As expected, Goss Gilroy makes a strong plea for an increase in funding for the War Crimes Program.